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ABSTRACT
The founding of the colony of Southern Rhodesia created a plural
society quite in keeping with the Furnivall model and very much
characterized by dissensus, conflict and coercion as features of general
interaction between the dominant and the subordinate strata of this
newly founded societ,y. In reality, a three-tier social segmental system
evolved in the new society, with the foreign African elements represent-
ing an interpolating median between the dominant white settler classes
and the subject African indigenous societies. Introduced, at first, as
simple menials, military auxiliaries and necessary adjuncts to mission-
ary enterprise, the foreign Africans, then largely from South Africa,
were gradually reinforced in their numbers by numerous other immigrant
groups brought into the country later, at various stages, as labourers,
but with various degrees of success. The Abyssinians, Somalis and
Arabs from North East Africa and Aden, for example, failed to provide
Southern Rhodesia with a perennial external source of labour supply
either because these recruits would not accept employment under the
chattel labour conditions prescribed by Southern Rhodesia's repressive
colonial setting or because of the reluctance of the territory's
colonist employers to reform these conditions in question. Indian
labour supply would not materialise because the plan obviously ran
counter to the relatively liberal political philosophy of the colonial
government of India at Simla; a philosophy that was expected to take
into consideration issues of relevance to universal British imperial
citizenship and trusteeship. Chinese labour supply raised so much
controversy and fragmented the white colonial front in Southern Rhodesia
so seriously that it had to be abandoned. The Mfengu settlement scheme
was only a temporary success, as far as its labour value was concerned.
Indeed, in the final analysis, it was only the trans-Zambesian immigrant
(xiv)
labour solution which proved a success, for reasons of political,
economic and geographical nature. Once these African immigrants,
from below the Limpopo and from across the Zambesi, established them-
selves in Southern RhodeSia, they began to playa very significant
part in the political, social and economic development of their country
of adoption. In their dealings with the indigenous African societies,
they initiated an intricate pattern of alliances and social relations.
Collectively, they played a leading role in the birth and evolution of
proto-nationalist associations, labour organisations and other social
movements that demanded greater involvement of African initiative and
leadership. Individually, the descendants of these African immigrants
constituted very important elements in the social development of,
especially, the urban and African educated strata of Southern Rhodesia.
These descendants took an important role in such matters as education,
the professions and even the modern forms of African intertainment.
Various historical landmarks in the country today are a symbol of the
enduring character of African immigrant influence.
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ORTHOGRAPHY AND TERMINOLOGY
Because of the constant changes in African orthography, no
specific one has been followed in this thesis, more so as the
geographical expanse the research covers is rather extensive. The
only claim this author can therefore make, in relation to this York,
is that derogatory and condescending terms, generally used in Euro-
centric and colonial literature, have been totally excluded. Thus in
accordance with the rising African resentment against such terms as
"native", "tribe" and so forth, these have been disregarded altogether.
However, because of the colonial conception and period which this
research is supposed to deal with, I have not been able to use the
term "colonial Zimbabwe II for Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, even Zambia,
Malawi, and Botswana for instance, are just referred to,in this work)
as Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland Protectorate
respectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the study of migrations and migrant and immigrant
communities has comeinto prominence in someparts of Africa.l This
development which apparently involves systematic research on African
migration and immigration themes from, of all things, historical,
political and economic perspectives as well, is very interesting in
manyways. Hitherto, very little work on the phenomenaof migration
and immigration in Africa had been carried out by historians and political
scientists in partiCUlar.2 Economists and geographers had, for their
part, examined the same phenomena,but purely in terms of tmptrical
data on African migrant labour and, therefore, without sufficiently
taking into consideration the overall historical and political origins
and, indeed, implications of the phenomenaunder discussion.3 In fact,
on the whole, African migration and immigration remained, for quite a
long time, a preserve for social anthropologists and sociologists, along
with the serious defects which their thrust had on various fields of
African studies. For example, sociologists and social anthropologists,
together with geographers, economists and demographers, bad the peculiar
lvide: S. Amin(ed.): Miaations in West Africa: Studies presented at
the Eleventh International African S.inart April. 1972: Oxford
University Press: London: 1974. It might also be observed here that
when the author arrived at AhmaduBello University, Zaria, in 1976,
migration and general distribution of the various African communit es
in Nigeria, prior to and during the colonial era, constituted the main
theme for the dissertations of the final year B.A. (Honours) students in
History.
2vide: It Wallerstein: "Migration in West Africa: The Political
Perspective": in Ht Kuper (ed.): Urb.niization and Migration in West
Africa: University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles:
1965: pp 148-59; and B. Pachai: TheKalawi Diaspora and Elements of
Clements Kadali: C.A.B.A. Local Series: No. 24: Salisbury: 1970.
3E• Berg: "The Economics of the Migrant Labor System": in H. Kuper (ed.):
Urbanization and Migration in WestAfrica: University of California Press:
Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1965: pp 160-81; J. W.Barber: The Econom.,y
of British Central Africa: Oxford University Press: London: 1961;
F. E. Sanderson: N sa and Mi ant bour in B °tish Ce t a rica,
1890-1939: M.A. thesis unpublished • University of Manchester: 1960;
W. A. Hance: Population. Migration and Urbanization in Africa: Columbia
University Press: NewYork: 1970 and P. Scott: "Migrant Labor in
Southern Rhodesia": Geographical Reviey: VoLXLIV:1954: pp 29-48.
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trait of treating the African migrant labourer of the colonial period,
in particular, essentially on the same basis with the free "proletariat"
of the western world, with very minor concessions on the limitations of
the former in relation to his potentialities and alternatives on the
labour market.
On the other hand, a greater proportion of those few studies
which have hitherto dealt with the political, social and historical
perspectives of migration, immigration and immigrant communities in
Africa have, however, tended to focus largely on the continent's non-
African communities and their influence in those parts of Africa, where
they were and are still established. In this connection, we might take
into consideration the research of Engholm on the influence of the
European and Asian immigrant cOlDJllUIlities in Uganda and its bearing on
the decision-making processes of that protectorate during the colonial
period;4 and the work of Mangat on the history of the Asian peoples of
East Africa,5 as some of the illuminating examples in that part of the
continent. In the sub-continent, studies of historical and political
nature on the Asian immigrant communities appear to have been largely
prompted by primary concern with the rise of~.tma Gandhi to prominence
in South Africa and his subsequent ability to internationalize the
6problems of the Asians in that complex part of Africa.
4G• F. Engholm: Immi ant In! ue ces u da,
199°-1952: Ph.D. thesis unpublished:
5J• S. Mangat: A History of the Asians in East Africa: Clarendon Press:
Oxford: 1969.
~uttenback; R. A: Gandhi in South Africa: British Imperialism and the
Indian Question. 1860-1914: Cornell Univerai ty Press: Ithaca and
London: 1971; and B. Pachai: The International Aspect of the South
African Indian Question. 1860-1971: Struik: Cape Town: 1971.
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On the whole, the bulk of research that has been carried out in
various parts of Africa, with special reference to migration and
immigration,especially during the colonial period, bas tended to betray
either a very strong sociological bias or a social anthropological one.
The older generation of scholars, mostly social anthrologists, whohave
examined the themes of migration, immigration and immigrant communit es
between the 1940's and the early 1960's for example, was evidently too
pre-occupied with the processes of internal social change within the
African communit es they dealt with, whether in the Bechuanaland
Protectorate, in Uganda, Tanganyika, Southern Rhodesia or South Africa.7
Because of this pre-occupation with internal social change within the
African communit es, allegedly induced by both labour migration and
immigration, other appects of these phenomenathat carried more weight
were ignored. Sociologists of both the older and younger generations
.ere also largely influenced by the bug of their social anthropologist
compeers; hence their inordinate concern with, for instance, the issues
of psychological and social bearing or even "multiple causes" as major
factors in the processes of labour migration, either on inter-territorial
7Vide: I. Schapera: Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of
Conditions in the Beghualand Protectorate: Oxfore Universit,y Press:
London: 1947;
I. A. Richards (ed.): EconomicDevelopmentand Tribal Chpn: A Study
of Im,igrant Labour in Buganda: W.Heffer &: Sons, Ltd: Cambridge:
1954;
P. H. Gulliver: "NyakyusaLabour Migratio~ Rhodes-Livingetqpe Journal:
No. 21: 1957: pp 32-9;
J. C. Hitchel1: "WageLabour and African Population movementsin
Central Africa": in K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero (eds.): Essays
OD AfriCan Population: Routledge and KeganPaul: London: 1961:
pp 193-244; and
X. Hunter: Reaction to Conquest: Oxford University Press: London:
(2nd Edition) 1961.
8level or on the rural-urban circulatory basis.
In essence, the approach of social anthropologists and socio-
logists to the phenomena of migration and immigration in Africa has
been somehow geared towards corresponding research carried out in
other parts of the world,9 where conditions differed, and still differ,
quite considerably from the African colonial and post-colonial situations.
In fact, sociologists and social anthropologists, like geographers,
demographers and economists of the earlier period in Africa, generally
fell foul, as a class, in their analysis of the phenomena of migration
.and immigration, because of their tendency to neglect the political and
economic realities of the forced labour economies of both the colonial
and neo-colonial phases of Africa.lO The tendency to ignore the effects
of underdevelopment and differential economic development as underlying
factors in the processes of labour migration and other forms of
population movement in colonial and neo-colonial Africa,ll can hardly
be said to refleot favourably on same of the works mentioned in this
Bvide: J. Gugler: "On The Theory of Rural-Urban Migration: The case
of Sub-Saharan Africa": in J. A. Jackson (ad.): Migration: Cailbridge
Universi ty Press: Cambridge: 1969: pp 134-55 and G. K. Garbett and
B. Kapferer: "Theoretical Orientations in the Study of Labour Migration":
The New Atlantis: No.1: Vol. 2: 1970: pp 179-97. See also, in
addition, J. C. Mitchell: "The Causes of Labour Migration": Inter-
Afric8P Labour Bulletin: Vol. VI: No.l: 1959: pp 12-47; E. P.
Skinner: "Labour Migration and Its Relationship to Socio-OU1 tura1
Change in Mossi Sooiety": in I. Wallerstein (ed.): Social Change:
The ColOnial Situation: John Wiley &: Sons: New York: 1966: pp 91-106;
J. van Velsen: "Labour Migration as a Positive Factor in the Continuity
of Tonga Tribal Society": in I. Wallerstein (ed.): Social Change: The
Colonial Situation: John Wiley &: Sons: Nev York: 1961: pp 158-67 and
P. Mayer: Townsmen and Tribesmen: Oxford University Press: Cape Town:
1971.
9vide: J. Ravestein: "The Laws of Migration" Journal of'the Ror'l stat-
istical Sooiety, Vol. II: 1885: pp281-96 and J. A. Jackson ed.):
Migration: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1969.
10Cf. G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul: Essays on the PO~ti~ EconoDlY of
Africa: Monthly Review Press: 1973 and R. Harrised:; The Political
EconOllJ of Africa: Schenkman Publishing Co: Cambridge: Massachusetts:
1975.
llCf. Sam1r AmiD's works: "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa:
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introduction. The same applies to the failure, by these scholars, to
consider the role of either administrative fiat or the conflict situation,
which characterized the colonial societies,12 and how these influenced
all forms of African migration and immigration.
In Southern Rhodesia, though some work has been done on the
phenomenon of circular labour migration, especially by Mitche11,1; none,
however, has been carried out so far on African immigrant COmmunities.
In fact, the little research that has been done on immigrant communities
of any kind deals essentially with the Asians and the various classes
of the white settler society of the territory.14 Of course, this
general neglect of the African immigrant communities in Southern Rhodesia
is by no means strange, since it is apparently in keeping with the
overall influence of the governmental policy of the territory towards
the subject African societies •. With the exception of one or two studies
of recent Origin,15 very few works of bona fide academic value dealing,
specifically, with the historical, polltical and economic aspects of any
Origins and Contemporary Forms": Journal of Modern Africap Studies:
~ol. 10: No.4: 1972: pp 50;-24 and Neo-Colonialism in West Africa:
Penguin Books: Harmondsworth (London): 1973.
l2yide: L. Kuper and M. G. Smith (e... ): Pluralism in Africa:
Universi ty of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles: 196' and
J. Rex: Race RelationS in Sociological Theory: Weidenfield &
Nicholson: London: 1970.
l"ide: J. C. Hitchell: "Structural Plurality, Urbanization and Labour
Circulation in Southern Rhodesia": in J. A. Jackson (ed.): Migration:
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1965: pp 156-80 and some of
his works already cited.
l4vide: F. Dotson and L. O. Dotson: The Indiap Minority of ZUbia.
Rhodesia and Malawi: New Haven and London: 1968. B. A. KoslliDhas
also written a Ph.D. thesis on the Asian, Greek and Jewish cODlJllUllities
in early Southem Rhodesia for the Universi ty of Rhodesia. (Tbat is all
I know about this research since there is no cOJlDlUllicationbetween West
Africa and colonist Rhodesia.)
15navid Chanaiwa and the late Richard Mtetwa (died August 1978),
example, have recently researched on the Nho'We and Duma (Shona)
communities respectivelJ.
for
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given African communi ty in the country has been executed at all. Indeed,
all the works on the African societies of Southern Rhodesia that the
country's historiography has hitherto boasted of are essentially of
dubious value, being by nature generalized editions on Shona and
Ndebe1e peoples by ill-informed professional and amateur social anthro-
po10gists and sociologists, sub-conscious1y influenced by that prominent
practice of the dominant classes, in racially hierarchical colonial
societies, which tended to dehumanize the subject peoples by trivia1izing
their cultures, obviously as a prelude to the imposition of the culture
of the dominant classes themselves.l6
From this point of view, it could,therefore}be said that most of
those specious works of dubious academic value on the African societies
of Southern Rhodesia by Ge1fand,17 HOl1eman,18 Bul10ck19 and Nielsen,20
to name only a few, are very much in accord with the colonist ideology
of cultural differences from which the dominant classes of the plural
colonial societies generally derived their legitimacy. Perhaps as an
apt commentary on the adverse effects of colonist ideology on the study
l6vide: L. Kuper: Race, Class and Power: Ideology and Revolutionary
Change in Plural Societies: Gerald Duckworth &: Co: London: 1974.
l7Note Michael Gelfand's works on various aspects of the Shona peoples:
Shona Ritual: Juta &: Co: Cape Town: 1959; Shona Religion: Juta &: Co:
Cape Town: 1962; An African's Religion: Juta &: Co: Cape Town: 1966;
The African Witch: E. &: S. Livingstone: Edinburgh and London: 1967;
The Genuine Shona: Mambo Press: Gwelo: 1973 and African Background:
Juta &: Co~ Cape Town: 1965.
lBvide: Holleman's books: J. F. Holleman: African Interlude:
Nasionale Boekhandel: Cape Town: 1958; The Pattern of Hera Kinship:
Oxford University Press: London: 1949; AccOlllJllodatingthe Spin t
amongst some North-Eastern Shona Tribes: Oxford University Press:
London: 1953 and "Some 'Shona' Tribes of Southern Rhodesia": in
E. Colson and M. Gluckman (eds.): Seven Tn bes of Bri tish Central Africa:
Manchester University Press: Manchester: 1952: pp 354-95.
19vide: C. Bullock: The Hashona and the Matabe1e: Juta &: Co: Cape
Town and JobanneabUrg..: 1950.
2<lvide: P. Nielsen: The Hatabe1e at Home: Juta &: Co: Cape Town: 1928.
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of African societies in Southern Rhodesia, it is important to observe
here howeven more credible academics have been affected by the general
thrust of misleading amateur populist writers, wi th deplorable resul ts~l
In the final analysis, it can only be said that a greater proportion of
such literature on African societies of colonial Southern Rhodesia,as
hitherto e:ristsJis only useful to the Ministry of Tourism and Immigration;
whose intentions need no further explanation here. For academic value,
such literature is totally irrelevant.
On the obverse side however, some of the more generalized recent
studies have,indeed,endeavoured to tackle those matters relating to the
African societies of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, with all the historical,
political and economic implications which such research deserves for a
better understanding of the effects of the colonial situation on the
African in that territory. In this category we may mention, for instance,
the works of Ranger22 and"van Onselen.23 For the sake of our present
21Amongstthose scholars, besides Holleman, whose works have been
influenced, either directly or indirectly, by Southern Rhodesian colonist
ideology are, for instance, G. K. Garbett: "The Rhodesian Chief's
Dilemma.: GovernmentOfficer or Tribal Leader?" Race: Vol. VIII: No.2:
October 1966: pp 113-28; H. Kuper, A. J. Hughes"""&iidJ. van Velsen:
The Shena and the Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia: International Affairs
Insti tute: London: 1954; and J. M. Mackenzie's wri tinge on African
labour: "African Labour in the Chartered CompanyPeriod": Rhodesian
History: Vol. I: 1970: pp 43-50; "The Chartered Africans, Colonial
Office, Settlers and B.S.A. Co., Rhodesia 1890-1923": Institute of
CommonwealthStudies (University of LondOn)Collected Semipar Papers:
Vol. 4: 1972: pp 77-86 and "Colonial Labour Policy and Rhodesia'!:
The Rhodesian Journal of Econoaics: Vol. 8: No.l: March 1974: pp 1-15.
2"or Ranger's works, Vide: T. O. Ranger: Revolt in Southern Rhodesia
1896-7: Heinemann: London: 1967: The African Voice in Southern
Rhodesia 1898-1930: Heinemann: London: 1970; "The Role of the Ndebele
and Shona Religious Authorities in the Rebellions of 1896 and 1897": in
E. Stokes and R. Brown(eds.): The ZambesianPast: Manchester University
Press: Manchester: 1966: pp 94-136; "Traditional Authorities and the
Rise ot ModernPolitics in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930": in E. stokes
and R. Brown (eds.): The ZambesianPast: Manchester University Press:
Manchester: 1966: pp 171-93; "The nineteenth century in Southern
Rhodesia" in T. O. Ranger (ed.): Aspects of Central African History:
Heinemann: London: (Reprint) 1973; pp 112-53 and "African Politics
in twentieth-century Southern Rhodesia": in T. O. Ranger (ed.): Aspects
of Central African History: Heinemann: London: (Reprint) 1973: pp 210-45.
23For van Onselen's writings: Vide: C. van Oneelen: Chibaro: African
study, it is particularly van Onselen's Chibaro and Ranger's African
Voice which come very close to embracing the question of the "foreign
African factorll in Southern Rhodesia up to the 1930's. In Chibaro,
van Onselen highlights, though in a light manner, the significanoe of
trans-Zambesian immigrant labour in providing a source of cheap labour
supply to the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia; a fact which is
obviously not ignored by our present research. Ranger's African Voice
is even more valuable, in a number of ways, on the role of the "foreign
African factor" in the various African movements of the 1910's and the
1920's which became very influential in articulating African grievances
at the time.
Whilst the value of Ranger's African Voice is very much appreciated
for the purpose of our present research, it bas, however, to be sadly
admitted, at the same time, that the African Voice is marred by a number
of weaknesses which tend to counter-balance its usefulness. In the
first place, whilst there is a good deal of discussion on the claims of,
for example, the black emigres from South Africa to privileged status in
Southern Rhodesia's colonial society, obviously in accordance with these
people's contribution towards the colonization of the territory, there
is, nonetheless, no analysis of any kind on the origins and degree of
purported contribution of these immigrants to the processes of conquest
Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1990-1933: Pluto Press: London: 1976;
"The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mining Industry, 1900-1935":
African Affairs: Vol. 72: No. 289: October 1973: pp 401-18; "Worker
Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920": Journal
of African History: Vol. XIV: No.2: 1973: pp 237-55; "The 1912
Wankie Colliery Strike": Journal of African History: Vol. XV: NO.2:
1974; and "Black Workers in Central African Industry: A Critical Essay
on the Historiography and Sociology of Southern Rhodesia": Journal of
Southern Afrioan Studies: Vol. I: No.2: April 1975: pp 228-46.
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and "pacification" of the terri tory. Similarly, nothing is provided as
background information on the presence of the trans-Zambesian immigrants
in the various employmentcentres of Southern Rhodesia, where they also
played, and still play, an important role. The reader is evidently
expected to accept the presence of the "foreign African factor" as a
fa! t accompli.
Secondly, whilst the combative character of the black emigres from
South Africa is, for example, well captured in the dealings of these
immigrants vith the Southern Rhodesian authorities, an impression is
also, unwittingly, created that these immigrants were necessarily a
monolithic force/obviousl~united against the successive colonial
governments of Southern Rhodesia. In reality, this vas clearly not the
case, and the false impression portrayed in Ranger's African Voice
arises/naturallY/fram the work's neglect of those internal social and
poll tical forces which, in one way or the other, influenced the general
outlook of the black emigres from the South. linally, inter-group
relations, in terms of social and cultural identificational associations
and general poll tical and structural alignment between the African
immigrant cOJllllUllities and the indigenous peoples, are not by any Ileans
taken into consideration. Thus, because of these shortcomings, it is
perhaps 11ttle surprising that the role of the "foreign African factor"
in the Afrioan proto-nationalist associations and other specious social
movementsin the Southern Rhodesia of the 1910's and 1920's is somewhat
exaggerated and blown out of proportion in Ranger's analysis.
It is against this background discussed above, that The Atrican
Igigrant lactor in Southern Rhodelia. 1899-1230 should, therefore, be
viewed. In essence, its function wi thin the context of both Southern
Rhodesian and general African historiography is twofold. Firstly, it is
expected to counterbalance the social anthropolOgical and sociological
thrust which has hitherto characterized academic research on African
migrant and immigrant communit es, with very serious deleterious
results. Secondly, it is also supposed to add a new dimension to the
study of African communit es in colonist Rhodesia and, in this way,
contribute to the general understanding of the African position in that
country's colonial setting. These ideals are very noble, but also quite
difficul t to achieve. Thus this research can only be regarded as
nothing else but an attempt in every sense of the word.
In the main body of the present research, Chapters 1 and 2 examine
the original alliance between the white settler society and the "black
pioneers" from the South; their subsequent use in the wars of conquest
and "pacification" in early Southern Rhodesia (1890-1897) and the
subsequent development of dichot~ between these two fronts after 1897.
Because of the prOJDinenceof the colOnist labour dell8.lldin the post-
1897 period and howit featured in the subsequent chasmbetween the
white settlers and the "black pioneers" in early Southern Rhodesia, it
is thus natural that Chapter 3 should deal with the question of foreign
labour solutions. The failure of the colonist societ,y to induce both
the "black pioneers" and the African indigenous societies to respond
positively to the dominant group's labour requirements, inexorably
predisposed the former to look for foreign labour supply, for which
purpose the Abyssin1ans, Somalis and Arabs of North-East Afrioa and
Adenwere hotly sought after. Indian and Chinese labour solutions were
also resorted to, but, like the Abyssinian, Somali and Arab sche.es,
also turned out a complete failure.
In Chapter 4, the unsuccessful colonist attempt to introduce
JI1fenguiJmIigrants fro. the Cape, by establishing a satellite cODlDrUD.ity
of these people at Bembesi between 1896 and 1905, obviously as a form
of handy reservoir ot dependable labour supply, is discussed. Chapters
5 and 6, on the other hand, examiDethe more successful introduction
into Southern Rhodesia of trans-Zambesian iDlJRigrantlabour from Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 190' and 19'0, focussing particularly on
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such issues as the administrative policies of the respective territories
of South Central Africa and how these influenced the ebb and flow of
African labour into Southern Rhodesia. Chapters 7 and 8 together analyse
the general influence of those foreign African immigrant groups, which
made Southern Rhodesia their home, on the overall development of that
country. Chapter 7 in particular dwells on the activi Ues of one
immigrant community, with specific reference to its relationship with
the B.S.A. Co. Administration, whilst Chapter 8 looks at the manner in
which the other African immigrant communities interacted with the
indigenous African societies and also how these two African fronts
together reacted to various pressures generated by Southern Rhodesia's
colonial setting. In Chapter 9, this study concludes by a general
survey of the genesis and permanence of the "foreign African factor" and
its overall implications for Southern Rhodesia's colonial society.
Extensive use was made of various archival sources in Britain and
Southern Africa for the purpose of this research. The Public Record
Office in London, Rhodes House in Oxford and the Rhodesia National
Archives in Salisbury provided the backbone of the documentary material
used by the author. But it has to be admitted, however, that the P/R/O
sources are too peripheral and very poor in comparison to those of the
Salisbury archives. In fact, I have to confess tha~ for the five months
(July to November 1975) I carried out my research in the Salisbury
archives, I found much more useful and relevant aaterial than I ever did
during the previous three years of sustained hardwork in Britain. If
to this you add the fact that Southern Africa is literally overflowing
wi th oral evidence relevant to this research, no further comment needs
any mention here. Rhodes House (Bodleian Library) was especially use-
ful on personal correspondence between leading black immig.r~ts in
Southern Rhodesia and Rhodes or the A.P.S. Edinburgh House (~aton Gate,
London), which houses the correspondence of various missionary societies
in Southern Africa, though useful on missionary comments on the state
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of race relations, labour, land, African education and many other issues,
tends, however, to comprise a greater proportion of documentary sources
specifically dealing with missionary enterprise and African independent
church movements than on any other matter. For this reason, the presence
in these archives of a manuscript copy of Sundker's bOOk,24 should,
therefore, not surprise anybody. In the India Office Records (Foreign
and Commonweal th Office Library, Blackfriars, London), the bulk of
material on the Asians in Southern Africa deals with the race problems
faced by the Indians in South Africa.
As far as printed primary sources are concerned, use was made of
the Royal Commonwealth Societ,yLibrary (London) which has got a very
valuable collection of reports of various commissions and departments
of the governments of the territories of Southern Africa. These reports
were, in turn, supplemented by some few printed documents available in
the various branches of the University of London, such as the School of
Oriental and African Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science
and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The British Museum. (both at
Great Russell Street and Co1indale) was also consulted in connection
with rare secondary sources, diaries, reports and newspapers. Still on
secondary sources, one or two books deserve mention on how they influenced
this research. These are Cairns' work on race attitudes in Central
Africa during the nineteenth century,25 and Tinker's study on the
exportation of Indian labour overseas between 1830 and 1920.26 But in
2~. G. M. Sundker: Bantu Prophets in South Africa: Oxford University
Press: London: (Reprint) 1970.
2~. A. C. Cairns: Prelude to Imperialism; Jritish Reactions to
Central African Society 1840-1899: Routledge & Kegan Paul: London: 1965.
26g. Tinker: A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour
Oterseas, 1830-1920: Oxford University Press: London: 1974.
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the final analysis, it has to be said that the opinions expressed in
the research are nobody else~, but the author's own personal perceptions
on the tortuous history of Southern Africa.
CHAPTER 1
The African Auxiliary Forces of Occupation and
Conquest in Early Southern Rhodesia, 1880'15-1900
I The foreign African aides in early missionary enterprise, the
Pioneer Column and the Anglo-Ndebele War: c. 1880's-1894.
Introduction
Robinson has argued that the expansion and acquisition of overseas
possessions in Africa and Asia by European powers was, in large measure,
an outcome of the collaboration of non-European elements in these continents.
The effectiveness of this collaboration, Robinson further argues, was such
that it enabled the metropolitan powers to deploy only a small fraction of
their resources in manpower and capital as befitted their stringent financial
policies. 1 For the colonizing powers therefore, it is assumed, collaboration
provided the cheapest means of promoting imperialism either in terms of
the character of territorial acquisition or the administration which later fol-
lowed, while the collaborators on their part saw the colonizing powers as
providing:
••. an alternative source of wealth and power; which if it could
not be excluded, had to be exploited in order to Plrserve or im-
prove tthelr~ standing ••• in the traditional order.
Van Onselen, using the Robinson model of collaboration, has defined
the role of the African police, mine compound police and messengers as
functionaries of the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia for extracting and
controlling large supplies of cheap labour in return for higher wages and
3other fringe benefits of economic and social variety. In this studyJit will be
argued and demonstrated that,firstly, the collaborators were victims of gen-
1R. E. Robinson: 'The Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism:
A sketch for the theory of collaboration' inR. Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds. )
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism: Longmans: London: 1972: Part V:
PP. 117, 120.
2Robinson: 'The Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism'; p.121.
3Charles van Onselen: 'The Role of Collaborators in Rhodesian Mining Indus-
try 1900-1935' in Journal of African Affairs: Vol. 72, No. 289, October, 1973;
PP. 401-.8: The privileges of the collaborators included, also exemption from
manual labour and passes, sexual favours, free food etc.
1
eral colonial policies, designed to promote the political and economic
objectives of the colonizing powers and their agents. The collaborators
were not in a position to influence either the origins or courses of these
policies and.on their part, had few alternatives to choose from. Secondly,
It will also be demonstrated that collaboration was born of supremacist
ideology in which the differences between collaboration and resistance
were often blurred in their results, aa.tn the final analystsjthe lot of the
collaborator was no better than that of his counterpart.
In Nyasaland, Dacha has shown to what degree Sir Harry Johnston was
able to adopt a deliberate policy of collaboration and divide and rule to ex-
tend British control in the areaJin spite of the meagre financial and mili-
tary bacldng that he had. Johnston's campaigns against the Arabs and the
Yao chiefs between 1891 and 1896 divided the opponents, by careful ealeu-
lation,into two camps: the collaborators like the Yao Chief Jumbe, on the
one hand, and the resisters like Chiefs Makanjira and Chiwaura, also Yao,
on the other. The distinction between collaboration and resistance here was
clear-cut. Whilst collaboration was amply··rewarded with favours and
4friendship, resistance invited the venom of British weapons. The same
Machievallian policy of divide and rule was also applied,for fnstance}by
• the British SouthAfrican Company (BSACo)in Southern Rhodesia"with re-
gard to the Shona Chiefs during the 1896-97 risings.5
On the religious front, collaboration was widely used to permeate
African societies with a foreign missionary ideology. Missionaries, like
their secular allies, could at first only dangle tangible material induce-
ments in the form of education, trade or protection from attacks by neigh-
bouring foes in order to CUltivatesizeable followings within the African
communities.6 Material inducements,on the part of the missionary}came
to solve, especially in the pre-colonial period, the tendency amongst
African states,in particular I to reject the tenets of Western teaching and
4A. J. Dacha: 'Politics of Collaboration - Imperialism in Practice' in
B. Pachai (ed.): The EarlY History of Malawi: Longman: London:1972~PP2m-5
5T. O. Ranger: Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7: A Study in African
R!sistancej Heinemann; London:1967: Passim.
6Dacha: 'Politics of Collaboration - Imperialism in Practice' PP. 285-6.
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culture as unfit for their purposes, 7 and.consequently,a pattern emerged
whereby the so-called 'Christian Revolution' of the early colonial period
was adopted by African leaders only to keep the forces of colonialism at
an arm's length: on the periphery and away from the core of the society as
a whole. 8 In a nutshell, the endeavours of both the religious and secular
wings of imperialism faced great obstacles as African rulers, then custo-
dians of their people's sovereignty, were not prepared to come to terms
with the new forces of change. Those who came to terms with these new
external forces"out of a desire to seek alliances against their more power-
ful neighbours"'later became hostile when the extent of European ambition
9was discovered'. Others collaborated as a result of defeat and recog-
nition of the superiority of European weapons, whilst the former servu.e
but negligible social strata, at least in African SOCieties,were the only
ones who offered any form of meaningful assistance to foreign forces of
9achange at all.
In Southern Rhodesia,such collaboration as we have discussed above,
did not exlst,especially with regard to the Ndebele state before 1893"for
instance. The solidity of Ndebele state in the political and military fields
precluded any collaboration and)consequently,both the missionaries and
7J. F. Ade Ajayi: 'The Continuityof African Institutions Under Colonialism'
in T. O. Ranger (ed.): Eme;rg!9f;Themes of African Histozy: East
Africa Publishing House; Nairobi: 1968: Chapter 17: PP. 196-7.
8T•O. Ranger: 'African Reactions to the Imposition of ColonialRule in
East and Central Africa' in L. H. Gann and P, Duignan (eds.):
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: Vol. I: Cambridge University Press:
London:1969: PP. 311-2. Ranger mentions the examples of Khama of
Bechuanaland, Lewanika of Barotseland and Mutesa of Buganda,
rulers who accepted the so-called 'Christian Revolution' in their
states without radically changing the internal structures of their soc-
ieties.
9J. F. Ade Ajayi: 'Colonialism: An episode in African History' in Gann
and Duignan (eds.): Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960:Vol. I: p. 506.
9~he example of the Mfenguin the Cape and slaves inWest Africa who
assisted the European forces against the African states is a case in
point here. For the Mfengucase, Vide:R. A. Moyer:.'Some.Current
ManifestatiOnsof Early MfenguHistory' in (Universio/ of London)
Institute of Commonwealthstudies Seminar Papers: Vol. ;3.No. 1~:
October 1971-J'lUle1972: pp. 144-5.
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political agents ab initio met with strong resistance to external influence,
whose outcome was a hearbreak particularly to the lone missionary. In-
deed the only form of influence Europeans could exert on Ndebele l1fe1at
this early atagejwas through connubiumwith Ndebele girls. 10 Collabora-
tion in the Ndebelewar of 1893/therefore"had to be sought elsewhere. The
African auxiliaries from the Southand the Shonahere fulfilled the role of
collaborators. For the Shona, collaboration against the Ndebele in 1893was
not actuated by rewards to be gained at the end of the journey. They saw
the war of 1893 as a continuation of the chronic conflict and struggle between
a fairly fresh im.migrant national group and themselves as indigeous ones,
very similar in nature to the rivalry between the recently arrived but
militarily stronger Yao and the weaker indigenous Chewa (Nyanja)people
11in Nyasaland"at the time of Johnston's exploits. The Shonasaw the war
in terms of their previous struggle against the Ndebele state before Euro-
pean occupation but now on a bigger scale. The fact that the Ndebele raids
did not stop,even up to the eve of the 1893war itself)must have strengthened
12this belief among the Shonachiefdoms. The Shonawere thus in the
category of African peopleswho, as Ajayi describes them as we have indi-
cated, were the militarily weaker ones)who exploited the advent of Euro-
peans by allying themselves with the latter against a power that had hitherto
harassed them and yet sooner or later they moved from collaboration to
hostility/when they perceived and comprehended the Impltcations of coloni-
t. 13za ion,
The collaboration of the emigres from SouthAfrica was)however,dif-
ferent and as such does not fall into the scope described either by Robinson
or Dacha, Thoughby historical origin and by ethnic affinity)a large number
of these em.igres were closely related to the Ndebele, their longstanding
association with the Europeans, either at personal or national level, had
created a wide gap between their errant kinsmen and themselves. The
social and almost cultural distances that divided them by the 1890's,could
10Vide: H.:A;"C. Cairns: Prelude to Imperialism: British Reactions to
Central African Society 1840-1890:Routledge & Kegan Paul: London:
PP. 52-7 and N. M. B. Bhebhe: Christian Missionaries in M:a.tabeleland
1859-1923: (Unpublished)Ph. D. thesis, University of London:1972:
pp. 114-5.
11Dacha: op. cit. P. 286.
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not have been easily reconciled. Moreover" the black emigres differed
with the Ndebele In outlook and objectives. Whilst the Ndebele were fight-
ing to retain the status quo and obviously the entrails of sovereignty they
still enjoyed, the African emigres turned into visionaries" who saw in the
creation of a Western-orientated state.dominated by white settlers/some
chance in which they too stood to gain. For them, the substitution of a
time-honoured traditional African political state by a Western bureaucratic
infrastructure provided the openings they were looking for.14 They col-
laborated in the 1893 war not primarily because they were seasoned
gamblers betting for high or low economic stakes, but largely because they
identitled themselves ideologically with the settlers whose boots they had
borrowed. By volunteering first to accompany the Pioneer Column and
their masters, they bad placed themselves at the disposal of the colonizer
and through their readiness to offer their services and to protect the col-
onizer's interests they ended up, as Memmi puts it,
••• adopting his -(colonizer's)- ideoW' even with regard
to their own values and their lives.
But it would be a gross oversimplification to look at the collaboration
of alien'. African auxiliaries in Southern Rhodesia or elsewherejaimply in
terms of either master-servant ideological relationship or even economic,
social and psychological self-interests. The incidence of this type of alien
collaboration must not be viewed in isolation. It was only a twig from the
whole branch of imperial and colonial military policies. The alien Afri-
cans were a minutae, and a passive one for that matter, of an overall
imperial strategY" through the means of which imperial powers and their
agents fought their wars by proxy and.by virtue of this practice, effected
economies in the metropolitan budgets. On the strength of this policYjthe
British Foreign and War Offices,for examplejoften used African contingents
12n. N. Beach: The Rising In South-Western Mashonaland, 1896-7: Ph. D.
thesis (unpublished) London: 1971: PP. 249-50. This explains the
Shona activities in rustling Lobengula's cattle during and after the war.
13Ajayi: loco cit.
14lbid,
15Albert Memmi: The Colonizer and the Colonized: Orion Press: New York:
1965: P. 16.
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to fight in other colonies or in foreign parts. The Zulus were.for example,
proposed for the suppression of the revolt in Uganda in 1898. The Dinkas,
ShUooks and other Nilotic groups of the Sudan were used for the same pur-
pose in Uganda and Egypt, while the Hausa of Northern Nigeria were also
16used with good effect in other parts of West Africa. This policy was
equivalent to the more involved one of introducing Indian troops in East and
West Africa for either military or police purposes or to the suggested but
unsuccessful proposal of employfng)in 1898"Zulu troops in Malaya and
Hong Kong.17 Nearer homejthts system resembled the French practice
of engaging the 'tirailleurs senegals' for the pacification of the rest of the
18French Western Sudan.
Non-European participation in the colonial wars of conquest and
pacification went beyond the issue of simple collaboration. Far from being
what Robinson rather glibly calls 'imperialism's vollmtary partners, ,19
the non-European functionaries were an important factor in the reckoning
of the global military policies and strategy of the imperial powers. The
argument for their use in these wars was, as the Foreign and war Offices
in Britain pointed out, that in this manner the expenses of the Exchequer
would be eased, whilst it was also stressed that African and Asian auxlli-
aries were physically better able to stand the climatic conditions in the
20tropical regions of Africa and Asia. Thus such participation does not, in
16C. O. 879/53: Francis Bertie, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office
(hereafter FO) to Colonial Office (hereafter rendered as CO) January
17, 1898, Confidential Print, Public Record Office (hereafter called
PIR/O), London.
17C. O. 897/53; Francis Bertie at F. O. to C. O. January 17, 1898, and
Fred Graham at C. O. to F. O. January 28, 1898.
lBw. F. Gutteridge: 'Military and Police Forces in Africa' in L. H. Gann
and P. DuJgn.an(eds.): Colonialism in Africa. 1870-1960: Vol. 2:
Cambridge University Press: London: 1970: p. 291.
19Robinson: 0pr cit. P. 121.
20C• O. 879/53, Memorandum by the Intelligence Division of the War Office,
Enclosed in Francis Bertie. at F. O. to C. 0, March 1, 1898.
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most casesJjustify the general conclusion that the adoption of the col-
laborative mechanism was for reasons of gain. The non-European auxili-
ary was a 'servant' in the 'master's wars' whose cause and justification
he was not always aware of even if he so desired He might perhaps have
been interested in the outcome, provided he survived, only to tell his grand-
children. There is hardly any case, in Africa at least, in which the short-
age of African auxiliaries and initiative forced a colonizing power to abandon
its military objectives and the vigour with which some of these campaigns
were executed,21 precludes any suggestion that imperialism was a half-
hearted ideal)which gained its momentum in step with the rising goodwill
of the Asian and African collaborators.
In concluding from the foregoing discussion, it is argued here that in
a large number of cases" collaboration by non-European peoples during
the heyday of European im.perialism, while widespread and common, was
not of their making. It was a mechanism carefully formulated by 'high
gods' on polished office floors and executed by the military generals on
the battlefields. Political states in Asia and Africa caught in the maelstrom,
whether intrinSically different in political and social organisation, ex-
ternal and economic relations, military strength and indeed even in geo-
graphical location, were juxtaposed and their responses noted. Once this
was done,their differences were reckoned and exploited to the advantage
of the colonial powers in order to minimize the tedium of resistance to
foreign rule. These states lost their sovereignty and initiative and be-
came parts of wider political unital the formation of whose policies they had
no power to control. They became parts of a wider polltical family whose
extensive geographical dimensions cut athwart family ties, ethnic identity
and national or race boundaries. The role of the individual and individual
groups with special skills and aptitudes was limitless in these new macro-
cosms. Faced with such developments, African groups from below the
21Compare here the British overthrow of the Zulu ldngdom in South
Africa in the second half of the nineteenth century, in :M. Wilson and
L. M. Thompson (eds.): The Oxford History of SouthAfrica: Vol. 2:
Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1971: PP. 261-71 and the British campaign
against the Ashanti confederacy as well as the French overthrow of
Samory Toure in West Africa during the same period, in J. D. Har-
greaves: 'West African States and the European Conquest' in Gann
and Duignan (eds.): Colonialism inAfrica. 1870-1960: Vol. I: Chap-
ter 6: PP. 199-219.
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Limpopo took advantage of the addition of a sister state between the
Zambesi and the Limpopo, proceeding there firstly, as menials to the
Pioneers; secondly.as military auxiliaries in the wars of conquest and paci-
fication and finaUy)as a distinct political force to be heard. In the long run,
they were reinforced by other African groups from neighbouring countrtes,
who submerged them on the point of sheer numbers and whose objectives
and outlook did not always correspond with their own.
(i) Black/Wh1te Contact Below the Limpopoup to the 1890's: A Back-
ground to the Formative Influences oh the 'Cape Boys' and Other
Fdreign African Groups from the South
The occupation and conquest of Southern Rhodesia by the BSACoat
the close of the nineteenth century gave rise to the creation of a composite
colonial society.22 This development across the Limpopobeing part and
parcel of the world-wide colonial movement was naturally a process of
population transfer ..whose effects were such that peoples of different racial
and ethnic origins as well as national and cultural outlooks were brought
together to co-exist and interact in various ways. Whilst the white coloni-
sts in this new territory of Southern Rhodesia constituted the major
immigrant group by virtue of their dominant political role, they werejhow-
ever}not the only immigrant peoples the indigenes were destined to con-
tend with. Foreign Africans from SouthAfrica who formed part of this
new colonial society of early Southern Rhodesia, though generally treated
as a 'forgotten factor' from an administrative point of view, were..in every
respect, a Significant force not only in the whole process of conquest and
pacification of the country..but also in the stages of political and economic
development which subsequently followed.
Though Southern Rhodesia may have attracted large numbers of
African immigrants at a later period,»especia11yafter 1903, most of these
22For the purpose of this study I have used, in reference to the Southern
Rhodesian society after 1890, interchangeably the terms 'composite
colonial society' as portrayed by Rex in his work, J. Rex: Race Rel-
ations in Sociological Theory: Weidenfield & Nicholson: London:
1970: passim; and 'plural society' in the orthodox Furnivall tradition
further clarified by Kuper and Smith in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith
(eds.): Pluralism inAfrica: University of California Press, Berkley
and Los Angeles, 1971: Part I: Chapters 1-2: PP. 7-26 and 27-57.
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immigrant communtttesjbowever, appear to have been largely overshadowed
by the African community from the South of the Limpopo}particularly dur-
ing the period of Southern Rhodesian history with which this study is con-
cerned. The reasons for this dominance of the black emigres from the
South are}of course.qutte obvious. In the first place, the colonization of
Southern Rhodesia was a by-product of the colonial movement that had been
going on in South Africa for many generations and,»fromthis point of vie\\)
the new colony had its political and economic origins below the Limpopo.
Africans from these areas below the Limpopo were.therefore, from the beg-
inning, distinctly involved with the expansionist movement into Mashonaland
and Matabeleland by the 1890's"more so as they came to play the role of
allies of the Southern Rhodesian white colonists. 23 Secondly, between 1890
and 1903, a period van Onselen regards as 'the era of speculative capitalism'
in Southern Rhodesia, there was little profitable gold mining going on in
the country, the various companies and syndicates formed for the purpose
were hitherto dependent}as they did" on other economic ventures like land
speculation, rent-collecting or trading rather than gold mining.24 More-
ovet; the introduction of foreign African groups, especially labourers, from
surrounding countries appears to have been somewhat delayed by the bectic
efforts of the BSACo. Administration and allied mining consortia to bring
into the country alien peoples from the horn of Africa (Abyssinia, Somalia
and Aden) as well as Asiatics from India and China. These schemes,so
suggested and actively pursued between 1898 and 1904"were actually copied
from the Rand where they had originated but could not be implemented due
to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899. The failure of such schemes,
precipitated obviously by the termination of the Anglo-Boer war in 1902 and
the subsequent one-sided competition over labour supply between the Rand
and the Rhodesian mining industry, naturally meant that the relatively im-
pecunious Rhodesian employers had to look elsewhere for their labour
25supply. InCidentally, it was on those African sources of labour nearer
23For the role of foreign Africans as allies of the white colonists during
the Anglo-Ndebele War (1893) and the risings of 1896-97: Vide Infra:
pp.]9.-64; 83-149.
24c. van Onselen: Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia
1900-1933: Pluto Press: London: 1976: pp. 14-7.
25For a fuller discussion on these external labour schemes; Vide Infra:
Chapter 3.
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home that the Southern Rhodesian employers had to rely; sources which
they had hitherto scorned and ignored. In this manner, African immigrants
from the Southjwho had, up to the beginning of the first decade of the
twentieth century, remained the only alien African factor of importance to
reckon with in early Southern Rhodesia,were thereafter reinforced on a
massive scale. But their fellow African immigrants of)especlally" the
post-1903 era were predominantly of a labouring class orfentationjwith
few notions and pretensions to the superior airs that the largely quasi-
middle class black emigres from the South seemed to harbour.
Perhaps of greater sfgnificance~for these black emigres from the
SouthJwas the fact that by the time Southern Rhodesia was annexed in the
1890's, Africans in the territories below the Limpopo had by then had a
long history of contact with the white colonists. Indeed by the 1890's, the
third century of black/white contact- in South Africa, Africans of that
region of the African Bub-continent were generally moving towards total
integration into an economic, social and political system dommated.to a
large extent/by white colonist values and standards. As a matter of fact,
it was because of such factors of historical, economic and social signifi-
cance that even in the later phases of Southern Rhodesian history, the
African emigres from below the Limpopo, though fewer in numbers than
other immigrant communities, came towield influence totally out of prop-
ortion to their numbers, as this study will show as it unfolds. 26 Therefore
in accordance with the laws of historical precedence, not to mention this
group's inordinate dominance within the context of this study, it is only
proper and fitting to examine those historical processes relating to the
presence of the South African black emigres in early Southern Rhodesia,in
order to assess and understand more thoroughly the factors that shaped
this group's ideals and clientship to the white colonist society and thus in-
exorably compelled them to cross swords with the African indigenous
27
peoples of Southern Rhodesta,
26On the later-day activities of the black emigres from the South: Vide Infra:
Chapters 7-8.
27The typology adopted in relation to the term 'Immigrant' derives from
the Colson theory that once colonization started, boundaries of African
states became more permanently defined and the movement of peoples
from one place to another became more regulated and restricted than
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In any analysis of black/white interaction and sources of group contact
influences at the beginning of the colonial period in Africa, three forces
are important to consider; namely the missionary, the colonist trader and
the administrator. Together these forces came to epitomize not simply the
process of colonization,but they also denoted a major phase of SOCial,
ecooomic and cultural change. They acted as sources of the disintegrating
influences which visibly paralysed and revolutionized African traditional
societies and consequently became themselves focal points of new social,
economic and political organisations. The church and the school intro-
duced a new ethic whilst the colonist trader, with his material goods,ushered
in a new economic order which drastically transformed the African mode
of living and grievously undermined the seemingly self-sufficient African
traditional economywhich had hitherto held the fabrics of these traditional
societies together. Acting within a political framework provided by the
colonial administrators, after allegedly pacifying the individual African
chiefdoms through the deployment of superior military resources, both
the missionary and the colonist layman were instrumental in producing
what became known in SouthAfrica as the 'school people' or,in the broader
sense of the termJthe 'dressed people'; the forebears of the African elite
28and reformers.
For their part, the African societies were influenced in the course of
their initial contact with the white immigrants through a number of fac-
tors. These included the enormity of external pressure generated by the.
before. Moreover"the African rulers are said to have become more
possessive of their land as this asset became scarcer. Vide:
Elizabeth Colson:.'~grationin Africa, Trends and Possibilities' in
I. Wallerstein: Social Chge: The Colonial Situation: JohnWUey&
Sons: NewYork: 1966: pp. 107-13. In a way, this typologyon the
'immigrant', denoting political status as it does, is similar to Barber's
designation of 'de jure migrants' for alien Africans in Southern
Rhodesia as opposed to their local counterparts the 'de facto migrants'
- the victims of.a.pecullareccnomtcsystem, Vide:W. J. Barber:
The Economyof British Central Africa: Oxford University Press:
London: 1961: p, 52.
28The distinction between 'school people' or 'dressed people' and non-
Christians was a result of the requirement by the early missionaries
in SouthAfrica that their converts should wear European dress as
opposed to ochre or later blankets worn by their non-Christian kins-
men. Vide: MonicaHunter: Reaction to Conquest: Oxford University
Press: London: (2ndEdition): 1961: pp. 6-7; 548.
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colonist immigrants; the geographical location of each particular African
state as well as its accessibility and vulnerability to external threats.
There was also the strength of internal resistance which each African
state or chiefdom could muster and the degree of economic self-sufficiency
and viability which underlined this capacity to withstand all or most forms
29of external pressure, the particular African society thus faced. However"
with the military defeat of most of the African societies and the consequent
loss of land, cattle and other economic resources to the white colonists
at the beginning of the colonial era, both the confidence and economy of
yester-year) which these African societies had hitherto enjoyed"were
seriously weakened. Instead the African came to appreciate the material
culture of the white man, the superior weaponry not excepted, which had
been the cause and mystery of colonist victory over the indigenous peoples.
Of course.such appreciation of the European culture by the Africans)at the
beginning of the colonial era and after; was further strengthened by the fact
that those Africans who accepted a large measure of assimilation into the
white colonist society received more generous material rewards.tn return"
than their more cautious compatriots who adopted a policy of selective
30conservatism.
In a nutshell, it was these developmentsjfndicated above.which created
a Situation, at the beginning of the colonial movement in SouthAfrica in
particular and inwhite-dominated Africa in general, whereby black/white
contact profoundly transformed African societies. The missionary"whose
calling was to work exclusively within the African soctettesjwas by far the
most active force in the vanguard of the movement for change; a phenomen-
on which had become quite evident in SouthAfrica by the 1890's when
Southern Rhodesia was annexed From all appearances, the missionaries
29Hunter mentions the geographical position of Pondoland and its inacces-
s; pUity from the coast in general as having contributed to its isola-
tion from forces of change which affected other parts of the Cape be-
fore the 1890's. Vide: Hunter: Reaction to Conguest: pp. 6-7.
300f course,those 'Europeanized' Africans in SouthAfrica, for instance,
like teachers, clerks, interpreters, ministers and their class got the
best paid jobs and in this way received more generous rewards from
European material culture than their more conservative countrymen.
Vide: Hunter: OPe cit. PP. 8-9; 548-9.
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were certainly quite convinced on the bona fides of the novel culture they
were so intent to introduce and spread in Africa and as such the mechanics
they employedwere thus basically geared towards these convictions. The
'church', the 'school' and educatton.In general,were some of the more
effective means central to missionary commitment in bringing about
revolutionary change. Through these means)the missionaries, therefore,
provided not only an alternative set of values to their followers, but also
introduced a new identity or 'in-group' feeling and, particularly for col-
onized peoples, a psychological equilibrium to enable them to absorb the
cultural shock created by the destruction of these peoples' traditional
beliefs and values?1 Consequently, by the beginning of the twentieth century)
missionary influence had established itself as one of the strongest sources
of revolutionary change and ipso facto the undisputed parent of the process
of African elite formation.
In that part of the African continent below the Limpopo, the response
of the indigenous societies to miSSionary influence was most pronounced
amongst those Mrican states which in the nineteenth century surrounded
32the white colonist society of the Cape. Further away from the borders
of the Cape colony, the African societies were not as forthcoming as was
expected in their response to missionary enterprise. The Pondo.Ior in-
stancejrefused to have anything to dowith the missionaries1right from the
beginning of the nineteenth century up to the 1890's)and their rejection of
missionary influence had little to dowith the revolutionary content of its
teaehfng, as is often assumed. As a matter of fact, Pondo reaction to
missionary overtures was essentially dictated by the fact that this African
group had had the chance to witness the development of affairs within the
Xhosa/Thembu confederacy in the Southjespectally with regard to the poli-
tical affinity between missionary enterprise and colonialism and the over-
all bearing of these factors on African political independence and sovereignty.
Thus the Pondo, like the Masai in East Africa, 33 used the politico-religious
31J. S. Coleman: 'Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict' in R. D. Knudten
(ed.): The Sociologyof Religion: Appleton·-Century-Crofts: NewYork:
1967: pp. 483-4.
32A greater part of this chapter is based on a seminar paper given by the
author to the History Department, VanbrughCollege, University of
York: November 1973, entitled: Missionary Influence and its Impact
on Africans below the Limpopobefore 1900: 28pp. Vide also: Appendix
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model to reject missionary enterprise and what it stood for. 34 In this
wa~ the Pondowerejof eoursejatded by the geographical position of their
country; they remained for a long time untouched by the forces of colonial
change and thus became virtually pariahs in an ocean of advancing forces
of European influence till they were forced to succumb to such change
by military invasion during the premiership of Rhodes at the Cape in the
1890's.35
Beyond Pondoland, the northern Nguni states of Zululand and Swazi-
land, then by far the strongest military polities amongst the African
states below the Limpopo, had literally no room whatsoever for missionary
enterprise. All what the Zulu and Swazi rulers didJfor instancelwas to
flirt with the various missionary societies of British and American origin
before the mid-nineteenth century)merely for diplomatic and economic
reasons, though.of course/these missionary societies in question may
have made the most out of this regal action. 36 Indeed like their Ngoni
kinsmen in Central Africa and the Ndebele state in pre-1893 Matabeleland,
the Zulus and the Swazis obviously were in no mood to appreciate the tenets
of the revolutionary movement which the missionaries so advocated till
the military power of these Nguni states had been either broken or contained.
But with the rapid changing political situation below the Limpopoby the
middle of the nineteenth century, a movement greatly facilitated by the
Mfecane as well and initially set in motion by the Zulus themselves, it was
not long before these Nguni states too were compelled to come to terms
with the then overwhelming forces of change.
I (Map):African Areas and Ethnic Groups and their location below the
Limpopoup to the 1930's.
33The Masai rejection of Christianity in East Africa in the nineteenth cen-
tury is well captured in F. B. Welbourn: 'Missionary Stimulus and
African response' in V. Turner (ed. ): Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960:
Vol. 3: Cambridge University Press: London:1971: p, 326.
34For Pondo rejection of misSionary presence in their country, Vide:
J. Macdonald: Light in Africa: Hodder & Stoughton:London:1890: p.110.
35This rejection of European influence by the Pondo people is clearly, though
in a somewhat prejorative manner, portrayed in DudleyKidd: The Es-
sential Kaffir: Adam & Charles Black: London:1904: passim. Kldd,
howeve1)fails in this instance to explain the role of the geographical
factors which also isolated Pondoland from the processes of black/
white interaction and are quite clearly explained by Hunter. Vide:
HunterReaction to Conquest: loco cit.
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But as has been indicated already, it was on the borders of the Cape
Colonythat missionary enterprise, as a source of black/white contact
influences, had the most telling effects by the middle of the nineteenth
century. This was particularly true in relation to the Gcaleka (Xhosa)
state of Hintza,where a sizeable number of Mfengupeople lived under the
conditions that simulated some form of servltude.sfnee the beginning of the
century. Given the tendency of missionary teaching to appeal to the down-
trodden strata of the African social tapestry l1ke,for Instancejthe slaves,
immigrants and the poor fighting material in the Yoruba and Ibo societies
of modern Nigeria: the 'liberated' slave community of Sierra Leone37 and
also the slave settlements of the East African coast, 38 the missionaries
operating below the Limpopo during the past century were not slow to apply
the same tools.lto appeal to the subject Mfenguwithin the Xhosa SOCiety.
The main card played by the missionaries in XhosalandJas in other cases
t
elsewhere in Afrtca,was)of course, the underlying feature of the Christian
faith to appeal to the poor and the 'oppressed' Mfenguas 'the chosen people'
to 'inherit the earth', not to mention the obvious role of the new faith in
providing a new identity to these subject people: an identity which enabled
them to free themselves from the old values and constraints of the dominant
societies" which had hitherto regarded them as low and despicable. 39 Obver-
sely, the quasi-egalitarian philosophies advocated by the new faithJwhich
had such a positive impact on the Mfengu elements in Gealekaland, very
effectively alienated the Xhosa people who concluded, rightly or wrongly,
40that this new faith was a religion for 'their dogs', the Mfengu.. Xhosa
36For the early attempts of the Anglican and Methodist missionaries to
establish a foothold in Zululand and Swaziland, Vide: p. Hfnohe lfff:
The Anglican Church in SouthAfrica: Darton, Longman & Todd: Lan-
don: 1963: PP. 19-24; C.T. Loram: The Educatioo.of the SouthAfrican
Native: Longman & Co. : London:1917: PP. 54-5 and J. Du Plessis:
A History of Christian Missions in SouthAfrica: Longman & Co. :
London: 1911: PP. 344-5.
37E. A. Ayandele: The Missionary Impact on Modern Nigeria 1842-1914:
A Political and Social Analysis: Longmans: London:1966: PP. 331-4
and J. F. Ade Ajayi: Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891: The
:Making of a New Elite: Longmans: London:1965: pp. 1-52.
3Bwelboume: 'Missionary Stimulus and African Response': PP. 333-4.
39Coleman: 'Social Cleavage and Religious Conflict': loco cit.
40J. Ayliff and J.whtes~:History of the Abambo: 'Gazette': Butterworth:
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disillusionment with missionary teaching was certainly further intensified
by the repeated loss" amongst both the Gcaleka and their Gaika kinsmenj of
their lands to the combined forces of white colonists, missionaries and
Mfengu collaborators between 1835 and 1878...when total subjugation of the
41African states in the sub-continent was nearly completed.
Whatever claims and counterclaims may be raised in connection with
42Xhosa/Mfengu relations at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
Mfengu on their part seem to have made the most out of the advent of the
British missionaries in the Xhosa country. They were apparently quite
pleased with what they and the missionaries then regarded as 'liberation'
from Xhosa domination and, therefore, readily accepted some form of alliance
with the British administration of the Cape colony and the missionaries.43
It was obviously because of these reasons and against such a background that
both the social revolution and the process of elite formation amongst the
Mfengu began to pick up more rapidly than in any other African society
below the Limpopo, at the time under discussion. Mfengu response to the
continuum of social change was altogether massive and total) thus justifyingJ
in some waYJthe view that the whole phenomenon took on a form of some
kind of national movement. YetjironicallYJit was in this endeavour to come
to terms with the various forces of change in a colonial situation that the
Transkei: 1912: P. 20 and G. G. Findlay and W.W. Holdsworth: 11!!
History of the Wesleyan Methodist Society: Vol. 4: J. A. Sharp:
London: 1921: p, 258. Moyer has however countered the orthodox mis-
sionary view in relation to Xhosa/Mfengu relations in the 1820's and
1830's as it would appear that the missionaries deliberately exploited
the so-called servile Mfengu status within the Xhosa society for their
own ends. Vide: Mayer: 'Some Current Manifestations of Early Mfengu
Hlstory': P. 145.
41The Gcaleka Xhosa lost land around Fort Peddie and Gaga in 1835 for
example,which was turned into Mfengu settlements. Worse still they
also lost Butterworth, the heart of Gcalekand, in 1857,when Kreli
(the son of Hintza) was expelled from the area by the Cape authorities.
Vide: J. H. Saga: The Ama-Xosa Life and Customs: Lovedale Press:
Lovedale: 1932: P. 116 and Ayl1ff and Whiteside: History of Abambo:
PP. 38-9, 62.
42The servile and pusillanimous image of the Mfengu in the Xhosa society
at the beginning of the nineteenth century as expressed in J. D. Omer-
Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath: Longman: London: 1966: p. 164 and
Ayl1ff and Whiteside: op. cit.: p, 18, is however rejected by Mfengu
hlstorians. Vide: Interviews with Chief Morosi Nyilika and Mr. Paul
Hlazo: Fingo Location: Bembesi: November 17-8: 1975 and :Moyer:op, cit.
pp. 148-9.
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Mfengu rendered themselves wlnerable to the machinations of collaboration)
which they and other African groups of kindred mentalttyj elther consciously
or unconsctouslyembraced, Sooner or later, they began to translate their
association with the Cape authorities and the missionaries into the language
they could easily understand, Settled inwell organized communtttes such
as those at Fort Peddle and Gaga in modern Ciskei founded for their ex-
clusive occupation. in 1835 or later on the periphery of the areas of white
settlement, the Mfengusoon entered the maze of settler economy in full
force. They assumed the role of tradersjwtth their commodities of ex-
change with the white colonists consisting mainly of cattle, tobacco, agri-
cultural implements, household utensils and exotic articles like beads,
thus eventually acquiring for themselves an apt nickname, 'the Jews of
Kaffirland -(I'ranskeih ,44 Moreover, because of the manner inwhich
they developed partisan fnterests in all forms of black/white conflict on
the Cape frontier, during the course of which they repeatedly notched some
material gains in one form or another at the expense of other African soc-
ieties, the Mfengu certainly went all the way to fulfill the Robinson.model
on collaboration discussed earlier on.in this study.45
But whatever character and form these early contacts between the
whites and the blacksj dtscussed above.may have takenjespectally within the
context of missionary influence amongst the African societies below the
Limpopo prior to 1900, thereJhoweverJemerged a new class of African
leadership and following whose formation the missionaries were largely res-
ponsible. Perhaps as an apt commentary on this role of miSSionary
enterprise in African elite formation in this part of the world during the
nineteenth century, it may also be quite pertinent here to bring into the
picture ane or two case studles,as a demonstration of the tangible evidence
on African response to both missionary enterprise and white presence in
the African sub-cantinent at the time in question. In the circumstances,
no case study on the process of African elite formation below the Limpopo
and its positive results can serve a better purpose than the career of John
43This favourable attitude towards the Anglo-Mfengu alliance of the early
nineteenth century still survives even amongst the modern Mfengu.
Vide: Interview with Mr. Paul mazo: November 18, 1975 and Moyer:
ope cit.: pp. 148-9, 150.
44Ayliff and Whiteside: OPecit.: PP. 18-20, 34.
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Tengo Jabaw, the illustrious Mfengu educationist, politician, newspaper-
man and patriarch of a line of distinguished African scholars in modern
SouthAfrica. From very humble beginnings, Jabavu rose, through his
association with the Methodist missionaries at Healdtownand their Scottish
Presbyterian counterparts at the famous Lovedale institution, both in the
Cape colony, to become a leading figure not only in the African social and
political circles of the sub-continent, but also a force which even white
colonists of all persuasions could not easily ignore. For these reasons,
Jabaw's alHances with the Cape liberal politicians at the close of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century)not to mention his
personal relationship with RhodesJwhich led to his invitation as Rhodes's
special guest on the first train to Bulawayo in November 1897,46 constitute
one of the most remarkable stories on vertical mobility in a colonial
setting. As the career of Jabavu here illustrates, missionary enterprise
had by the end of the nineteenth century quite successfuly, and whether by
accident or design, played midwife to an era of general revolutionary change
below the Limpopo: an era which inexorably made the succeeding twentieth
century a wholly different affair from its predecessor.
Jabaw's successful career, as discussed above,naturally leads to a
logical but all the same false conclusion)that it was only through the edu-
cational or religious front that the process of change was effectively pre-
Cipitated and contact influences widely spread in the nooks and corners of
the African societies below the LimpoPOJduringthe period before the 1890's.
Indeed it could be said, with good reason too, that white colonist laymen
also helped greatly, through both secular and non-academic means, to
promote those aspects of black/white interaction which/in the prooessjfao-
illtated the integration of the Africans into the whole continuum of Euro-
pean colonist economy, thought and values. In this respect) various forms
of economic activity could be said to have been the most effective mech-
anism for compelling the black and white communities of SouthAfrica to
45
Vide: Supra: pp.l- 8.
46The story of Jabavu is here a much shortened version of the one prev-
iously written and based 00 the followingworks: D. D. T. Jabavu: ~
Life of John Tango Jabavu, Editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, 1884-1921:
Lovedale Press: Lovedale: 1922; R. T. Kawa: I-Bali Lama Mfengu:
Lovedale Press: Lovedale: 1929: N. Jabavu: Drawn in Colour: African
Contrasts: John Murray: London: 1960 and E. Roux: Time Longer Than
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co-operate in spite of themselves. For the white colonists, firstly) at the
Cape right from the early times for instance, influenced by both frontier
attitudes and race prejudices as they were, the non-white peoples could
only be regarded as one of the two things: enemies or servants.47 Though
these sentiments and views were,of course, bound to influence and aggravate
the course of race relations in Africa below the Limpopo for years to come,
they",however) failed to reverse the trend of black/white economic inter-
action.
Black/white economic interaction in South African colonial societyJat
first took the form of economic co-operation, though on an inequitable basis,
either through such direct means as wage employment or indirectly by
way of trade and exchange of commodities. Sooner or later, this economic
co-operation was replaced by ecmomic competition, the white colonists
and the indigenous African groups vigorously competing over natural re-
sources in form of land and cattle. But economic competition)as a form. of
black/white interaction,obviously~ended with the military defeat of the
African societies at the hands of the white colontsts, 48 Yet,at the same time)
other forms of black/white interaction in the economic sphere.sttl! per-
sisted and, in a way, continued to widen the scope of black/white contact
influences in the sub-cantinent. The demand for labour by the white col-
onists, firstly) at the Cape and,laterJ throughout the length and breadth of
South Africa,naturally provided the necessary catalysm for a greater deg-
ree of racial interaction than either conventions or legislation would have
warranted. The rather inherent slavery syndrome coupled by Calvinist
doctrines that portrayed the black man as a beast of burden amongst the early
white colonists at the Cape and their descendantsjcertatnly engendered a
situation whereby the utilization of non-whites for cheap manual work be-
49came general and widespread in the sub-continent.
Whilst before the second half of the nineteenth century, wage employ-
ment amongst the white colonists in South Africa was essentially agricul-
Rope: The University of Wisconsin Press: Madison: 1972 (2nd Edition).
47Martin Legassick: 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historio-
graphy': Institute of Comm.onwealth studies (University of London) Sem-
inar Papers: January-March 1969: p.2.
48H. M. Robertson: '150 Years of Economic Contact Between Black and
White: A Preliminary SUrvey:' The South African Journal of Economics:
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tural in nature, with domestic service coming close second, which altoget-
her could easily be met by either various kinds of servile labour supply at
first or, at a later stage/by voluntary recruits from such obliging indigenous
societies as the Khoikhoi and the Mfenguwho sought employment with the
Cape colonists by the 1840's, 50 the situation changed materially with the
advent of the mineral revolution" starting in the 1860's. The colossal
labour demand which the mineral revolution occasioned and the decline of
the political and economic power of the major African states of the regioq,
such as the Xhosa and the Zulus between the 1850's and 1870'sJare indeed
some of the cogent factor~ whtcb.essenttallj; influenced the course of black!
white interaction in South Africa before the close of the nineteenth century.
Indeed it may be pertinently observed here that wage employmentjas a form
of black/white Interactioq, had become quite dominant as the demand for
labour throughout the sub-continent sky-rocketed by the 1860's and 1870's.
In Natal where the labour-intensive sugar industry had been started already,
the coastal farmers had in fact found local labour supply so inadequate
that they had to resort to Indian 'coolie' labour to augment their supply. 51
Moreovelj as small-scale diggings in Gr;i.qualandand at the Rand began to
rapidly give way to deep-level operations by big mining combines or cor-
porations in the 1870's and after 1886 respectively, the demand for labour
became so intense that taxation and.othe» forms of fiscal pressure had to
be introduced to facilitate the process of labour m.obUisation throughout
South Africa and thus meet these requirements of the new industry. In this
way, the incidence of black/white interaction and exchange of contact in-
fluences was also precipitated at the various centres of employment.
The advent of the mineral revolution and the growth of urban and
mining centres which this movement occasioned in SouthAfrica inexorably
led to the exodus of the African worker from the rural areas to these emerg-
ing centres of employment and consequently by the 1880's and 1890's, a new
Vol. 2; 1934: p. 403.
49Iagassick: 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography':
pp. 6-7, 9.
50J. T. van der Horst: Native Labour in SouthAfrica: Frank Cass & Co.
tid: London: 1971 (2nd Edition): pp. 26-8 and Robertson: '150 Years
of Economic Contact between Black and White:•••• ': p, 411.
51Van der Horst: Native Labour in South Africa: PP. 120-2. Vide also:
Infra: Chapter 3.
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class of African people was also beginning to appear on the scene. This
was a class of people called the amahilihili/amakhumutsha. denoting those
workers whowent to the towns and never returned to the rural areas at
all. 52 What may have obviously made the urban and mining centres more
attractive to the African worker below the Limpopomay not be unconnected
with the comparatively higher wages of these centres) which distinctively
dwarfed those normally obtaining on the farms; the relatively favourable
conditions of employment in the urban and mining centres"which contrasted
quite sharply from those feudal arrangements existing on the farms and
finally)the growing economic dessication of the African areas as they were
increasingly by-passed by both economic development and social invest-
ment andJin this waYJlosing to the white-dominated areas. For the educated
African too whowas often inacceptable to the colonist employers on the
farms in their preference for the so-called 'raw natives', the urban con-
glomerations provided a lot of scope and an environment very much con-
ducive to the emergence of an African entrepreneurial claasjcomposed
largely of ex-pupils from missicn institutions)spread allover the sub-
continent. These ex-pupils from mission institutions were.apparently,
setting themselves up in the urban centres as carpenters, wagonmakers,
printers, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, masons, furniture makers, teachers,
joumalists, clerks, tailors, policemen and the lot. In this Instaneejthey
were )therefore Jacting as a counterpoise to the more venturesome Africans
in the rural areas whowere coming up too as agriculturalists, transport
53riders and large-scale consumers and producers in general.
In concluding this part of our study, it could.therefore.be said that
between the 1870's and 1890's, the processes of African elite formation as
well as integration into the social and economic system) dominated by the
values and tastes of the white colontsts, had become quite pronounced below
the Limpopo. The African societies of the region were, perhaps with the
exception of the Pondo, very profoundly affected by these events. The rise
in demand amongst these peoples for~firstly, blankets in place of karosses
and.later, European dress in place of blankets and the general increase in
52Hunter: OPe cit.: pp. 526-7.
53Van der Horst: Ope cit.: PP. 95-6, 105-6.
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the consumption of products of European material culture, 54 was in
itself indicative of the changing tastes and mode of living within these Afri-
can societies themselves. In one form or another, this course of events
could be said to have given rise to a situation not only favourable to the
birth of an African middle classJbut one which precipitated the various
trends of social and economic change and/at the same ttme, cemented contact
influences between whites and blacks below the Limpopo. The colonist
employer, the trader and the administrator, like the mtsstcaary, altogether
played a significant part in bringing about revolutionary changes within the
African societies below the Limpopo by the 1890's. On their part, the
Africans of the region/so affected by this movement for change.were no
longer content with the superficial constraints imposed by their narrow
ethnic and geographical boundaries and~when an opportunity arose for them
to employ their skills elsewhere beyond these limits, they naturally took
55up the challenge.
Itwasjthereforejagalnst this background of a long history of black/
white contact. below the Limpopo that the annexation of Southern Rhodesia
in 1890 was undertakenj as an extension of the economic, political and social
system already existing in South Africa. In the circumstances, it is hardly
surprising that Africans from the South offered their services as an auxl-
ltary force to the colonial movement into early Southern Rhodesia and,in
so dOingJbecame an active force for collaboration in the subsequent develop-
ments of the new territory. But these black emigres from the South were I
however" more or less 'tools' rather than masters of their own destiny in
this expansionist movement and,therefore/their activities were dependent)
in every sense of the wordjon the dicta of the white colonist community.
Once these black emigres began to question the character of their client-
54By 1875 products from the Transkei sold in the colooy were estimated
at about £ 750,000 annually" whilst consumption of European manu-
factured goods totalled up to £400,000 a year. Vide Robertson:
OPe cit. p, 424.
55It must be noted here also that by the 1890's, Africans from South
Africa were also proceeding overseas in increasing numbers for edu-
cational, religious and other purposesjespecfafly to America and
Britain and their international awareness was also becoming more
easily discernible. Vide: Mary Benson: South Africa: the Struggle for
a Birthright: Penguin Books: Harmondsworth: 1966: pp. 15-22 and
P, Walshe: The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The Afri-
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ship to the dominant white community, a rift between the two communities
inevitably emerged 56 In the prooeeding sections of this chapter, we shall
accordingly examine the role of these African emigres ..firstlYJas aides to
missionary enterprise in the BSACo. territories of Mashonaland and Mata-
beleland and secondly, we shall also consider one or two case studies of
some of those black emigres who proceeded to the north on their own. In
both cases"the presence of black emigres from the South in early Southern
Rhodesia was irrefutable evidence of the success of the processes of L'
African eUte formation and the permanence of black/white contact influences.
ii :Missionaries. Foreign African Agents and Individual
'Black Pioneers' in the BSACo, Territories During
the Early Period
Considering the laws of historical precedence, the reliance on the
African auxiUaries from the Southby the forces of colonization in Mashona-
land and Matabeleland was not altogether illogical. The missionary soc-
ieties below the Limpopowere especially prone to the practice. But it is
impossible, in a study of this character, to trace all the cases of African
agents, evangelists and missionaries from the South employed by different
missionary societies in Mashonaland and Matabeleland We shall therefore
confine our references to a few cases here to illustrate the widespread
character of the practice.
The Dutch, German and Swiss missionary soctettes, which had their
bases in the northern 'I'ransvaal.had by far the greatest number of workers,
especially in Southern Mashonaland.57 Thoughnot by any means the strong-
est sources of missionary influence below the limpopo in the nineteenth
can National Congress. 1922-1952: C. Hurst: Lcmdan:1970: PP. 12-5.
See also Evidence of Bishop Levi J. Coppin (black American, AMEC)
and Rev. A. H. Attaway (black American), Cape Town: October 14-5; 1903
and Rev. James M. Dwaneand Enoch Mamba: Cape Colony:November
12, 1904: all in SouthAfrican Native Affairs Commission Report. 1903-5:
VoL II: PP. 221-2; 256-7 and pp. 708-16; 1046-7 respectively.
56Vide Infra:Chapters 7& 8 .
57Rev. Graaf estimates that foreign African evangelists employed by the
missionaries in early Southern Rhodesia could not exceed two dozen
and that in any case the D/R/C had the biggest number. B. Graaf:
Modumedi Moleli: An Account of His Educational Work in Mashonaland
1892-96: Dip. Ed Thesis, University of Bristol: 1969: PP. 1-3, (but
it has since become apparent through Beach's study that the D/R/C
alone could easily have commanded over two dozen of these agents).
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century and.for that matter) the most favoured within the non-European
circles, these bodiesjwhleh were in the 1870's operating in the Transvaal"
had a variety of advantages in relation to the extension of their work across
the Limpopo into the Shonacountry. The DutchReformed Church (D/R/C)
and the Berlin Missionary Societylin particular) enjoyed the favourable
political atmosphere of the Transvaal Republic in a manner not by any
means possible to other missionary bodies andJaccordingly)they exploited
the geographical advantagaprovided by the proximity of the Transvaal to
Mashonaland. Secondly, the Ndebele/Shana political relations,Jbefore 1890
especially, were such that it was not possible for white missionaries, coming
through M:atabeleland, to work in the Shona country. But African mission-
aries were unmolested. Such a policy was adopted by Lobengula due to the
Ndebele fear of the extension of what Beach has called 'the gun frontier'
in Mashonaland. The Portuguese were apparently upsetting the balance of
military and political power between the Ndebele and Shonaby the 1880's
through their extensive commercial and political activities, 58 andjas such)
Lobengula feared the repercussions that the presence of white missionaries
might produce for Ndebele/Shona relattons.once the missionaries converted
the Shona to Christian influence; taught them new techniques and sold them
firearms. 59 Finally, the growing stream of labour migration from the
Shona country to Kimberley in the 1870's and later to the Rand in the pre-
colonial era also brought in its trail contacts between the Shonaand the
patently enthused African evangelists from the Southwho, on several occa-
59asions, accompanied these Shona labour migrants on their return home.
Whatever the motives and advantages so construed, the African and
half-caste evangelists of the D/R/C, the Berlin Mission and the Swiss Mis-
sion 'Vandoise' started working in the Shonacountry in earnest in the
1870'slusing their Transvaal operational bases. Indeed they made contacts
with the people of Chief Zimuto as early as 1872Jinwhat later became the
Victoria. district in the colonial eraJandJa year later)with those of Chief
Chfbi of the modern Chibi district. These contacts)which were pursued on
58
Vide infra: pp. 42-3
59D•N. Beach: 'The Initial Impact of Christianity on the Shona: The Protest-
ants and the Southern Shona' in A. J. Dacha (ed.): Christianity South of
the Zambesi: Mambo Press: Gwelo: 1973: pp. 34-40.
59~ote the case of the Venda Christian evangelists who accompanied the
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and off up to 1888Jwere the work of the half-caste Buys brothers) namely
Gabriel, Jefta, Michael, Petrus and Simon Buys, whose father Coenraad
de Buys, a Boer of the Transvaal, had a large harem of African wives of
Khoikhoi, Xhosa and Ndebele origins. The Buys brothers were agents of
the D/R/C and were assisted by a host of African evangelists of similar
creed During the period 1872-1888 for example, when the Buys brothers
worked in Chief Zimuto's and Chief Chibi's areas, the African evangelists
who worked with them were of Sotho, Pedi and Venda origin1largely from
the Transvaal and including among them Asser Sehahabane (Sotho from
Lesotho), Johathan (Pedi) and Aaron, Andreas, Azall, Bethuel, Petrus
Kolkodo, Jacob Moami and Micah Makhato (Makgato), all Sotho from the
Transvaal.
But in spite of the blessings and backing these agents received from
their respective parent bodies in the Transvaal as well as the goodwill of
the Southem Shona Chiefs of the period, their work was unsuccessful by
1883 primarily for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the inclusicn
of the French missionary, Francois Coillard of the Parish Evangelical
Missionary Society (PEMS), probably for tactical reasons, during the
third trip of these half-caste and African workers to Southern Mashonaland
in 1877- 8, was to prove a drawback to their hitherto independent work.
By some unforeseable tum of events, in the winter of 1877 the Mhari people
of the Chibi area had inflicted a severe defeat on the Ndebele impi1durlng
the course of which the commander of the Mhari forces, Tagwireyi, won
for himself the legendary title 'Tagwireyi chitsiga chomupani' (literally
'Tagwireyi is as strong as the stump of a mopani tree'), so common in
Mhari songs of traditional worship. 60 Under the circumstances, when the
party of African and half-caste evangelists appeared in the Chibi district
accompanied by a white man, Chief ManyumbuMasunda II, of the ever
belligerent Masunda royal house of the Chibi dynasty, mistook Collard for
Shooa labour migrants back from the Transvaal to their home area in
Chief Ziki's. .!!Wl: p. 81.
60Interviews with Mr. Isaac Ketiwa Madangombe, August 24, 1975, and
Miss Shumbei Madangombe, September 12, 1975, Chibi District.
Shumbei Madangombewho was at the time of interview one of the
oldest scions of the Madangombe (Mhari) dynasty died of infirmity two
days later (September 15, 1975).
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a trader in firearms, which the Mhari then needed badly in case of
further Ndebele attacks. Chief Masunda naturally became hostile when he
discovered that Coillard would not supply the firearms which he (the chief)
required Coillard himself further complicated the matter when"in accord-
ance with the general misconceptions of the time among the whitesjea-
pecially from the South, he sent an envoy Asser Sehahabane to Lobengula,
purportedly to announce the missionary's presence in the country. Given
the fact that the Ndebele/Mhari relations at the time were then not at their
best; that the Chibi paramount, Chief Chibi Madhlangove had already granted
the Coillard party protection. and that the question. of white men's presence
in the Shona country was a particularly sensitive subject at Lobengula's
capitalJBulawayo, it is not surprising,therefore"that the third mission. of
these evangelfatsj accompanfed by CoillardJtotally failed. Moreove; the
fact that the envoy, Asser sehahabane.was himself Sotho, the traditional
enemies of the Ndebele, further put the prospects of evangelical work beyond
repair.
However) to some extent, these purveyors of missionary enterprise
among the Shona were themselves to blame andmay have contributed to
their own failure to achieve their goals prior to 1883. For example in
July 1883, during one of their regular visits to Chief Zimuto's .country, the
Buys brothers were persuaded to take sides with a party of Boer adven-
turers from the Transvaal led by one field-cornet Grobler of Waterberg
against Chief Zimuto. In the course of the ensuing affray, Gabriel Buysl
the veteran preacher. was killed) with the result that the Buys brothers
61
dropped out of missionary work in this part of the country altogether.
Whilst these eventsj mentfoned abovejmay have retarded missionary
work in the Shona country during the pre-colcnlal period, theY.,however) did
not totally stop the activities of the African evangelists from the South.
All what happened in the post-1883 period is that the half-caste evangelists
dropped out from the movement altogether. Following in the footsteps of
their predecessors, Johannes Madima, Paulus Lovengo and Samuel, the
61Beach: 'The Initial Impact of Christianity on the Shona': PP. 25-31;~-
view with Mr, Isaac K, Madangombe: August 24, 1975: The version of
the Coillard party recorded by the m.issionary himself is regarded by
Chibi historians as calculated mischief. Vide F. Coillard: On the
Threshold of Central Africa: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd: London (Re-
print) 1971: PP. 20-30.
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agents of the German mission (the Berlin Missionary Society) based at
Tshakoma in the Transvaal, once more crossed the Limpopoand estab-
lished footholds for their parent society in the Matibi and Mposi chiefdoms
of the Chibi/Belingwe districts and also.tn a large measure; paved the way
for good relations with other Shonachiefs like Chibi Madhlangove, Zimuto
and Chirimanzu between 1886 and 1890. In this manner, these agents pre-
pared the groundwork for the Berlin mission stations at Gutu (1872) and
Chibi (1894). 62
The agents of the DutchReformed Church (D/R/C) also played an
equally active part in the same area between 1887 and 1892. Their groups,
which consisted of predominantly Sotho-Vendaworkers from the Trans-
vaal, included a number of individuals who later became notable characters
in the twentieth century history of Southem.Rhodesia. These were :Micah
Makhatho (Makgatho), Joshua Masoga, Zacharia Ramushu, SimonNyt,
Mikia Choene, Isaac Khumalo, Petrus Morudu, Daniel Molea, Petrus Khobe
and Lucas Mokwele (Mokwile). Their work among the Southem.Shona
covered the chiefdoms of Nyajena, Neshuro, Mugabe, ShumbaChekai and
the ffiengwe (Shangaan)of Vurumela"next to the BubyeRiver in the Chibi
district. It was this group of evangelists which spread D/R/C influence
among the Southern Shona and generally foreshadowed the birth of the D/R/C
mission station at Morgenster near the Zimbabwe ruins in the Dumacountry
of Chief Mugabein 1892. In the subsequent yearsJthis became the principal
63base of D/R/C influence in the country.
These endeavours of the African missionaries of the Dutch, German
and Swiss missions in the Shana country are particularly interesting not
only in the manner in which they were able to pave the way for the more
effective missionary enterprise of the colonial era, but also because of the
enduring influence some of them left on Southern Rhodesian history. We
may take a few cases here for examination to illustrate our argument. The
62Beach: Ope cit. PP. 25-31: Du Plessis: OPecit. pp. 349-50; Vide also
E. K. Mashingaidze: Christian Missions in Mashonaland, Southern
Rhodesia: 1890-1930: PhD thesis (tmpublished):University of York:
1973: pp. 37-42; 98-102.
63Beach: Ope cit. PP. 32-3; M. I Daneel: Old and Newin Southern Shona
Independent Churches: Vol. 1: Mouton Publishers: The Hague: 1971:
PP. 188-9.
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Rev. MIcahMakhato (Makgatho)for example, who later became the
leader of the black-American led religious movementjthe African
Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC)"atthe close of the nineteenth century,
had a peculiarly eventful career. As he informed the SouthAfrican Native
Affairs Commission in Bulawayo in September 1904, his contacts with the
country had actually been longer than those of his white counterparts,
dating back to 1882when he first made his appearance at Chief Zimuto's
in Mashonalandwith the half-caste preachers/Gabriel and Petrus Buys)
as well as a fellow Sotho, Jacob Moemi. Rev. Makgathosubsequently
worked in the Nyajena chiefdom in the Victoria district with another fellow
Sothoevangelist from the Transvaal, Joshua Masoga, during the years
1887 to 1892Jcarrying out their work as before in the name of the D/R/C
mission under the direction of Rev. Stephanus Hofmeyr of Zoutpansberg
in the Transvaal. In the pre-colonial era when Makgathoand his colleagues
worked as semi -independent agents of their mission, their work among
the Shonahad progressed obviously to the advantage of the mission. But
the situation soon changed with the coming of colonial rule and the assump-
tion of the command of the D/R/C mission in Southern Rhodesia by the
64Rev. A.A. Louw.
The D/R/C mission and its associates were not)howeverJthe only
misSionary societies to take advantage of their connections beyond the
Limpopo and further their work by such means in the Companyterritories.
Other societies, thoughwith less geographical advantage than the former
religious bodies, also exploited those favourable factors arising from
their wide experience and huge followingsinthe SouthJwhichacted as
supporting material to missionary work in Mashonalandand Matabeleland.
The Wesleyan Methodist MIssionary Society in particular, may even have
had advantages approximating those of the D/R/C. As a matter of fact
this bodywas actually able, by leaning on its organisational advantages, to
spearhead the missionary movement in SouthAfrica even within the borders
of the Boer republics themselvesjwhere the atmosphere was not politi-
c ally conducive for work by foreign societies. Indeed it had even carried its
64Evidence of Rev. MIchael (MIcah)Makgatho, AMEC, Bulawayo, Septem-
ber 10, 1904;in SouthAfrican Native Affairs Commission Report 1903-5:
Vol. IV: p. 199.
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cause right up to the Transvaal by the 1880's and it was from this region
that it first drew its early African manpower andjin fact)the Mashonaland
province, in the pre-1896 days, was run as part of the ~ransvaal dist-
rict, in Methodist parlance. Besides, the WMMS cast its net on a much
wider scale and"therefore ..some of its African evangelists in early Southern
Rhodesia also came from as far as the Cape Colony.
Starting with Michael Bowen, a Xhosa and an able linguist who came
with the Rev. Isaac Shimmin, the senior WMMS missionary, to Mashona-
land in 1891 and laid down the foundation of a Methodist station at Chiremba's
(Epworth) near Salisbury, further efforts were made by the Methodists to
increase the number of its African teachers and evangelists from the South.
By 1892, therefore, a fairly large number of these workers were accord-
ingly enrolled from Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal. They in-
cluded among them Modumedi Moleli and his cousin Josiah Ramushu,
Samuel Tutani, James Anta, Daniel Mochudi, Hogane (Gogani), Mohgari
(Muhari), Fakazi, Morago (Murawu) and Orga Belezi, to name only a few.
These workers were,from all appearances, a mixture of Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho
(Pedi) and Tswana nationalities. Molell and Ramushu (Tswana/Rolong)
and Mochudi (Tswana/Kgatla) were products of the Good Hope mission in
the Zoutpansberg. In fact, Moleli and Ramushu came from Mphahlele
village on the foot of the Drakensberg mountains. They had come under the
influence of their Pedi kinsman Samuel Mathabane, the Methodist evangel-
ist who had in tum been a disciple of Rev. James Allison of Nataljwhom
he had encountered on a job-seeking venture thither in 1867. James Anta
was a Zulu1whilst the remainder were Xhosa who had been enrolled through
Methodist agencies in Johannesburg. But all these agents were fluent in
Xhosa.whtch they generally adopted as a medium of instruction in Mashona-
land before 1896. Moleli was stationed at Chief Nenguwo's in the Marand-
ellas district where he laid down the foundation of Nenguwo school (Waddi-
love) in 1893; James Anta at Hartley in Chief Zvimba's in the Lomagundi
district where,among other things" he taught the late Chief Patrick Guaha
Chidakwa Zvimba. 65 The remainder were distributed in the Charter dis-
trict; Orga Belezi working among the Njanja people of Chief Gambtaajwhflst
65 .
Chief Zvimba died in February 1976 whilst this thests was being
written.
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his compatriots were placed at Chief Kwenda's, where they pioneered
what later became the KwendaMethodist station. 66
Anglicans, like the D/R/C and the Methodists, also brought into the
country their own African workers from the South. But these Anglican
agents were too few in number, the best known being Bernard Mzeki,
Frank Zixubuandthe Rev. Hezekiah Mtobi. Bernard MzekiJwhobecame
more famous after his death in 1896 and for which reason he is regarded
in some Anglican circles as a 'martyr', was a former Mozambique labour
migrant to the Cape Colony. Here he managed to find his way into Zonne-
bloem College, the school founded in 1860with the blessings of Sir George
Grey, the Governor of the Cape whohad in mind a programme by means
of which he intended to establish peaceful conditions on the Cape frontier
through the production of a class of neo-traditional African elites, that is
educated sons of African chiefs less amenable to confrontation. 67 Mzeki
was therefore one of the many commoners who jostled shoulders with
this African nobility at Zonnebloem.
But just as he was unique at Zonnebloem College so also was he dif-
ferent in the group of African pioneer evangelists in SouthernRhodesia
before 1896. Because of his Gaza/Ndau origin (Ndaubeing one of the
seven Shona ethnic groups), Mzekiwas naturally more acceptable to the
Nhowe (Shona)of Chief Mangweuieamongwhomhe worked in the Mrewa
district. Indeed because of Mzeki's 'tsiwo/Dhliwayo' (rat) totem identity,
he found friends andwhat could be called classificatory relations among
the Nhowe. Such relations included the mother of Mahwetu(John)Kapuya,
whom Mzeki treated as a 'sister' because she was of the same totem as
his; an important factor in the context of the African extended family
system. That this relationship between the two had stuck is demonstrated
66This account is based on these works: Graaf: ModumediMoleli: PP. 1-8,
27-8, 119-22 •H.E. Summers: 'The KwendaStory' NADA:Vol. IX.
No.4, 1967; pp. 3-5; Findlay and Holdsworth: oPe cit. PP. 337-40;
W.R. Peaden: 'NenguwoTraining Institution and the First Shona
Teachers', in Dacha (ed) Opecit. pp. 72-3; C. J. M. Zvobgo: 'The
Influence of the Wesleyand-Methodist Missions in Southern Rhodesia,
1891-1923': Ibid. pp.63-70.(Zvobgohas also written a PhD thesis on
this subject fu;"'the University of Edinburgh) ; Vide also: E. K. Mashing-
aidze: Christian Missions in Mashonaland, 1890-1930; pp. 85-92.
67W•L. and L. Rees: The Life and Times of Sir George Grey; H. Brett:
Auckland: N. Z. ;..1892: pp. 186-96: 256-87.
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by the fact that Mzeki persuaded John Kapuya's mother, in those days of
general indifference to missionary enterprise, to allow the boy to live
under his (Mzeki's) custody,in his capacity as the Anglican teacher in the
MangwendeChiefdom)andwith the result that Kapuyawas later sent for
further education at Isandhlwana Teacher Training College in Zululand
after Mzeki's death. Moreover, unlike the rank and file foreign African
evangelists who despised the Shonapeople, Mzekigot married to a Shona
woman MutwaNyatsunga, a grand-daughter of Chief Mangwende;an act
which further strengthened his connections with his flock. 68
The other two Anglican workers, the Rev. Hezekiah Mtobi and Frank
Zixubuwerenotso closely connected with the Shona societies. Father Mtobi,
the first African priest in the Anglican diocese of Mashonaland, came from
Grahamstown in the Cape Province; proceeding to join the mission in
MashOllalandby sea via Beira. Havingcome through the eastern section
of Mashonaland, he naturally started work among the Manyikapeople of
Chief Mutasa and in 1895 laid downthe foundation of the Anglican institution
of St. Augustine's, PenhalongaJin the area. It was also Rev. Mtobi (Mtobi)
who performed the marriage ceremony on the occasion of Mzeki's mar-
riage to MutwaNyatsunga, before Mzekiwas killed and also before the
cleric himself returned home to Grahamstown insane in 1901.69 Frank
Zixubu,the Zulu evangelist and the last man in the Anglican trio, came
from Pietermaritzburg in Natal and survived the risings of 1896. It was
Zixubuwhoin fact laid downthe foundationof the Anglican mission
stations of Epiphamy and St. Faith's at Rusape in the Maungwechiefdom
of Makoni. Althoughhe occasionally went to Natal for visits, he remained
permanently in Mashonaland, subsequently becoming a wealthy landowner
and rancher and generally wielding much influence within the African
circles. Like the other proud Africans from the Southof his generation,
he remained a bachelor and when he died long afterwards, his brother
70
came all the way from Natal to take over the estate.
68Jean Farrant: The MashonalandMartyr: Bernard Mizeki and the Pioneer
Church: Oxford University Press: Cape Town: 1968: PP. 52, 138-42 and
228.
69Farrant: The MashonalandMartyr: pp. 82-3; 141-2; 175.
701bid:PP. 80, 85; 116, 230: Interview with John Khambula (Zulu origin),
Cbegu.tu Location, Hartley, November 22, 1975.
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Whatever justifications these various missionary societies operating
in the Companyterritories may have applied to introducing an African
sub-elite from the Southwhere these respective bodies had worked for
decades,if not centurtes.before and had large followings as a result, this
practice was bound, all the same, to bring about profound repercussions
within the local African traditional environment. The African missionary
agents acted generally as midwives in the processes of social, economic
and political change. But some of them, perhaps carried awayby the
implications their new role involved, paid too much blind faith to their
white-settler allies that they too became somewhat oblivious of the features
of maladministration so dominant in the 1890-.6 era of BSACo. rule.
This loyalty to the white colonists was the cause of their undoing and con-
sequently they found themselves compelled to pay the debt, which they
unconsciously owedthe local people, with their lives in the 1896-7 risings.
Bernard Mzeki, who of all the individual members of this group of evan-
gelists should have been spared on account of his marriage to a local
woman and might have been redeemed by his closenesss to the various
Shona social systems, paid his debt for collaborating with the officials of
the Native Department and other white settlers in their drive to make the
Shona respond to what these subject peoples obviously regarded as un-
bearable hut-tax and labour demands. 71 ModumediMoleli, working for
the Methodists at Nenguwo's.was killed for transgressing the traditions of
the local people. He, for example, cultivated a garden under the 'multi
usina Zita' ('the nameless tree') beneath the Nyachiswa kopje; a tree which
represented the perpetuity of Shonatraditions and heritage, having been
the place where five centuries back, MweneMutapaMunembiri, the grand-
son of Nyatslmba Mutota, the Shonaruler of fifteenth century fame,
had held court and assemblies of the people. In this regard,thls tree,
which only withered up in 1930, was of tremendous religious and historical
value to the Shona.
Moreover, Moleli's offences did not merely concern the above matter,
but also dealt with his abuse of Shonavalues and traditions which largely
alienated those of Chief Nenguwo's people who had hitherto stood up in his
71Farrant: loco cit.
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defence. In addition, Molelt's offer to aid 'his friend' James White, a
farmer whom the Shonapeople had killed at the very beginning of the
rebellion, was quite inexplicable to the local people. For one thing, James
White was well mown in the area for his outspoken negrophobia and,be-
sides",this farmer had previously clashed with Chief Nenguwoover the
latter's daughter}Panashe, whom the former required as a concubine in
spite of the fact that the girl was betrothed. 72 Thus Moleli was in every
way fumbling and stumbling over one obstacle or another in his dealings
with the people of Chief Nenguwo.
The problems of the African evangelists in a foreign land were
legion. Whilst their white masters generally tended to throw overboard
most, if not all, African customs and traditions as inferior, decadent and
culturally irrelevant on the grounds of their racial pride, technological
and social distance as well as the backing of superior military strength,73
the African foreign agents, whose justification for their contemptuous
attitudes and disdain of local African customs solely rested on their asso-
ciation with the white settlers, were obviously exposing themselves to
physical retaliatory attacks during the risings. The case of James Anta,
the Zulu evangelist at the Methodist station of Hartleyton, demonstrates
this point admirably. The insurgents in the Lomangudi area where Anta
worked had, as one of their objectives, the idea of avenging the deaths of
three of their chiefsJIDcludingthe then Chief Zvimba, who had been pre-
viously shot by Sub-Inspector Hooper in September 1894"after their removal
from a Sundayservice then being conducted by the Rev. George Eva.
James Anta whowas killed in revenge was thus unfortunately exposed to
the mishap by his alliance with the white settlers and missionaries. 74 The
72Graaf: OPe cit. PP. 53-9; 208-12; The 'muti usina zita' is also mentioned
in the biography of a former student at Waddilove Institute in the
1920's: Vide: S. Samkange: The Mourned One: (Heinemann Education
Books Ud., London: 1975): p. 30.
73Cf. Cairns: op, cit. pp, 38-9.
74Peaden: 'NenguwoTraining Institute and the First ShonaTeachers':
pp. 74-5 and C. F. Andrews: John White of Mashonaland: Hodder &
stoughton: London: 1935: pP. 51-2. Chief Zvimba whowas killed by
Sub-Inspector Hooper is the father of the late Chief Zvimba (died
February 1976)who detained the author on November 22, 1975 during
a visit to the Zvimba area to interview the Rev. 8ojini.
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collaboration of these African teachers with the white forees of occupa-
tion therefore rendered them despicable and detestable in the eyes of the
local people they intended to convert.
For those African teachers in the Charter dlstrtct, namely Mohgari
(Muhari), Fakazi, Tutani and Morago (Murawu), stationed at the Method-
ist outpost in Chief Kwenda's, the dimensions of their difficult position
in connection with their relationship with the whites were clear enough,
as they were scornfully treated by the African insurgents as 'mbeva'
(rats) and were sought after by the soldiers of the neighbouring chiefdoms
of Masarirambi andWedza. Their redemption in the event came not from
heaven as they had been teaching their converts, but from their patron,
Chief Kwenda, who refused to allow the irate insurgent soldiers to carry
out their schemes and thus frustrated their intentions further by ordering
the foreign teachers to stay among and identify themselves with his people. 75
In a nutshell, the crime of the foreign African teachers and missionaries
may have been well summarized by Rev. Micah Makgatho, when he stated
in 1904 that
••• when I came from my country -(Transvaalh I said 'Now I
am going under the British Govemment'. I am still of the
same opinion, and am loyal. In all the wars in Mashonaland
and here -{Matabeleland)-and with the DutchGovernment
-{Anglo-BoerWar)- I was always with the ~ernment -{BSACo.h
and I do not lmowwhy I should now change.
This loyalty of these African evangelists and teachers to the Company
Administration, while the rest of the country was .in ferment against Com-
pany rule"left these African emigres in an unenviable position indeed in
1896. But those who, by dint of good luck, survived the crisis lived
not only to carry out the revolutionary movement they had from the start
volunteered to be part of, but also to provide some of the country's leading
figures of African opfnton, The Tutanis of the Marirangwe African
77Purehase Area in the Hartley district, and the Ramushus of Bulawayo,
75Summer: 'The KwendaStory': loco cit.
76Evidence of Rev. Makgatbo: loco cit.
77The Tutanis who are the descendants of Samuel Tutani, spared at
Kwenda in 1896 include among others, Rebecca Tutani, a pioneer
woman teacher, the unpopular police officer (amongAfricans)
Sergeant James Tutani (died in 1974) and many more in the Hartley
district: Vide: Peaden: Ope cit. pp. 77, 81.
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so prominent in the Methodist Church circles in modem colonist Rhodesia, 78
are among the direct descendants of these African evangelists brought along
by the pioneer missionaries into the country.
Whilst the missionaries were instrumental in bringing into the Com-
pany territories the prototype of the African elite of modern colonist
Rhodesia, this should not however be taken as the cause for a general con-
clusion that only the missionary agencies were responsible for the intro-
duction into the country of this educated African social stratum" which
mediated between the white settlers and the _ -... ' indigenous Africans at
the time. The secular colonial agencies were also active in this respect,
as we shall see later" and the Africans in the South were themselves becom-
fug increasingly aware of the advantages the extension of European in-
fluence across the Limpopo offered for those with the necessary skills.
Thus some of them were coming up on their own initiative as economically
motivated migrants and perhaps as a counter-stream to the Shona and
Ndebele labourers already going to Kimberley and the Rand mines even in
the pre-colonial days. As the case of these individual African emigres
::.~ is"by and large) a visible manifestation of the success and fruition of mis-
sionary enterprise, we shall discuss their careers in the Company territor-
ies at this [unettonjbefore we delve into the more involved military
auxiliary movement. A few examples to illustrate this point may be well
demonstrated.m this instance/by the careers of Jolm Makunga and Karl
Khumalo in Matabeleland, who, together with John Jacobs, were at one
tim.e or another secretaries of Lobengula before the war of 1893.
John CUmmings Makunga, our first case study, was a Swazi of the
Dhlamini clan who had been educated at Lovedale during the time of Dr.
James Stewart's emphasis on education with a practical bent for non-
78The two Ramushu brothers1the Rev. Oswald D. Ramushu and the Rev.
William H. Ramushu both of Mpopoma, Bulawayo, and both ministers
of the Methodist Church and maternal cousins of the famous African
Nationalist leader, the Rev. Ndabaningl Sithole, are the sons of
Josiah Ramushu (died 1918 of Spanish Influenza) who came from the
Transvaal with the missionaries in 1892. Vide N. Sithole: African
Nationalism: Oxford University Press, London: (2nd Edition) 1968:
P. 20; and Graaf: Ope cit. p. 27. (Miss Eileen Buckley of Bulawayo
who is researching on the Methodist Church with special reference
to African evangelists and workers for the period 1890's-1940's for a
PhD thesis with London University may deal best with this. )
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Europeans in the 1870's. After taking a course in carpentry, John
Makungawent to work for some time with a firm of Kimberley lawyers",
before he proceeded to Matabeleland together with Karl Khumalo,in the
wake of the Rudd Concession party of 1888. In Matabeleland, Makunga
was engaged by Lobengula as one of the Ndebele monarch's personal
secretardes, whose job it was to count the money paid to the king in monthly
stipends by the newly formed British SouthAfrica Company (BSACo.)Jas
the terms of the Rudd Concession stipulated. This money, so it was
asserted, was paid in: gold sovereigns and kept in canvas bags
(izinjumba) in a wagon at the king's kraal, Esigodhlweni, where it was
liable to be misplaced,especlally by children, who could not,as a matter
of fact, resist the temptation of playing with these shiny and rather exotic
79metal pieces. It was in this capacity)therefore)that Makungafeatured
in the story of the so-called 'educated Kimberley natives' at Bulawayo,
so scathingly referred to by the BSACo. and the Imperial officials in
Southern Africa in December 1890Jfor their part in allegedly abetting the
efforts of the German ooncesston-huntere in Matabeleland in a deal which
80later gave rise to the Lippert concession. Besides, as Lobengula's
secretary, John Makungaalso took a prominent part in the diplomatic drive
to avoid the Anglo-NdebeleWar of 1893 and.therefore.Is best known as one
of Lobengula's envoys to Sir Henry Loch, the HighCommissioner for South
Africa in Cape Town. Accompanied on several occasions by old Umshete,
one of Lobengula's most senior counsellors whohad previously visited
England in 1888with Maudto interview Queen Victoria, this 'Cape native',
as Glass condescendingly describes Makunga, tried to salvage the det-
eriorating relations between Lobengula and the BSACo. in the period pre-
81
ceding the 1893war but in vain, as wUIbe discussed later in the study.
79C. O. 879/57: Memorandum on proceedings at an indaba held at Govt.
House, Bulawayo, on the 12th December, 1898; Personal Communi-
cation from Mr. DodsonMakunga. of Selebi-Pikwe, Botswana,
December 7, 1974; and also Interview with Mrs. Ruby Adonis (nee
Makunga);MkobaTownship, Gwelo, November 20, 1975 (Mr. Maklmga
is the son of John Makungaand Mrs. Adonis the granddaughter).
80C.O. 417/72: J. S. Moffat, Assistant Commissioner to Sir Sidney
Shippard, December 29, 1890.
81S. Glass: The Matabele War: Longmans: Londonand Harlow: 1958:
PP. 158-61.
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During the war of 1893 and for the subsequent period preceding the
Ndebele rising in 1896, Makunga appears to have gone underground re-
appearing in the course of the risings on the side of the BSACo. Icrces,
when he and John Groothoom later took an active part in bringing about the
Matopo peace 'indaba' in August 1896. 82 It is possible that Malamga had
undergone this process of transformation during the inter-war years
(1893-1896), when he learned to accept that the Ndebele power was no
more. Thus Makunga persuaded himself at the same time to adopt, what
may have appeared to him, a practical approach to the changed situation
by collaborating with the Company against the Ndebele. This practical
approach, so adopted by MakungaJ is well demonstrated by the story of his
career in the post-1896 period.
John Makunga appears to have had a fairly peaceful career in Mata-
beleland,but his Zulu companion Karl Khumalo, with whom he arrived in
Matabeleland from Kimberley just before 1890, had a very turbulent one.
This difference may have been a result of the quaHty of the relationship
of these two characters and their loyalty to the Ndebele nation right from
the start, not to mention also the manner in which they adjusted to meet
the wishes of the new Company Administration in later years. Karl
Khumalo/on his arrival from Kimberley,presented himself to the Ndebele
as one of them and indeed insinuated to be the son of Zehin)one of the
Ndebele indunas who had, for one reason or another, previously left Mata-
beleland for the South. In this wa~ he was thus presented to Lobengula by
Ishwapa, the induna of what later became the Bubi district. Unfortunately I
his story proved inacceptible to a deputation appointed by Lobengula to
examine the matter and whose verdict.lconsequentl~ was that Karl Khumalo
was an undesirable 'impositor'. He was, however, not deported from
Matabeleland by pleading that
••• being an educated man, he could assist the king, who
was then overburdened by ~rrespondence with white men,
and required a secretary.
Thus Karl Khumalo's literary skills not mly rescued him from the wrath
of the Ndebele monareh.but also won him a special place in the sun before
the overthrow of Lobengula in 1893.
_,--------------------------------------------------------82
Vide infra. 130-9
B3C• O. 879/57: Statements of Ishwapa and Sikombo (Ndebele indunas) in
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Karl Khumalo first came to the attention of the BSACo. in the period
between December 1890 and February 1891,during the visit to Matabele-
land of the German concession-hunters Hassforther, Lippert and Detelback,
as we have already seen in the case of John Makunga. He and John ('Karl')
Makunga were referred to by J. S. Moffat, the Assistant Commissioner
for Matabeleland and Bechuanaland, as the 'two natives recently arrived
from Kimberley .•. who can also read, , and had accompanied the German
Hassforther from 'Emvatsha' (Umvutsha), where the Ndebele king had just
signed the document forming the basis of the Lippert Concession, to James
Dawson's store where the king's 'Elephant seal' for stamping the official
accreditation was kept. On this occaston, Khumalo and Makunga did not,
however, fall into the firing line of the Company and Imperial officials, who,
of courae.atrongly resented German competition over Matabeleland. In-
stead these officials preferred to keep their powder dry for their German
rivals. Hassforther in particular, came off worst being referred to as
' ••• a reckless and shameless liar' whose activities and misrepresentations
were likely to bring about 'evil effects' on Anglo-German relations. Karl
Khumalo and Makunga were readily excused for their lack of understanding
of the convolusions of the politics of the scramble for Africa and the im-
plications of Hassforther's activities. 84 During the Anglo-Ndebele War
(l893»)there was equally little contact between Khumalo and the Company
officials; the only occasion for such contact being the time when Khumalo
and Dawson were sent with wagons by Dr. Jameson to fetch the wives of
85the vanquished Ndebele monarch. Such an amicable relationship between
Karl Khumalo and the Company did not.however.Iast long and when the
Ndebele rising; broke out in April 1896, the point of departure had been
Memorandum on proceedings at an indaba held at Govt. House, Bula-
wayo, December 12, 1898.
84C• O. 417/72: Moffat to Shippard: December 29, 1890; and Weartherley,
Secretary, BSACo. to Sir R. G. Herbert at Colonial Office (hereafter
c. 0.): February 12, 1891. For Anglo-German Scramble for Matabele-
land etc. . ... . _ ': -;. '. Vide: R. Robinson,
J. Gallagher and Alice Denny: Afric'a_and the Victorians: Macmillan:
London: 1961: PP. 221-9.
85C. O. 879/57: Statement of Sikombo••••
..
38
ultimately reached.
The underlying thesis of the foregoing study may be summarized
simply as that when the colony of Southern Rhodesia was founded, the
shortage of both qualified manpower and an obliging African population
was made up by the reliance of the agencies of colonization on an external
African auxiliary force; a force which fitted the requirements of the 'master'
society because of several reasons of historical nature. The missionary
societies, which regarded the expansion of their work into the newly
acquired Company territories as a spill-over from their main bases across
the Limpopo, were among the first to take advantage of their historical
connections with territories below the Limpopo and so did the secular
agencies, as we shall see below. But while the whole process of politi-
cal and economic aggrandizement was taking place, the African peoples
from the Southwere also",in many ways"qUiteconscious of these new
developments and those whowere prepared to stake their claims in the new
colony, as the cases of John l\1akungaand Karl Khumalo have demonstrated,
proceeded to do so. We shall theretore.accordtngjy.examtne some of the
more populous African groups from the South and their part in the wars of
conquest and*pacification"inM:atabelelandand Mashonaland and the im-
plications arising from this participation.
iii The 'Cape Boys'. The Pioneer Column and The Anglo-Ndebele
War 1890-93
Professor Ranger argues that the colonies of East and Central Africa
(the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda), though
annexed by two different colonial powers, were born in the same cradle.
Germany and Britain which acquired these territories were ab initio not
anxious to allow large-scale commitment of their manpower and capital
resources, but in their places allowed private companies to do their jobs
for them. 86 These companies were apparently prepared enough to create
sufficiently stable conditions for organized exploitation of the resources
of these territories and pay requisite dividends to their shareholders. But
unfortunately the same companies' enthusiasm could not match the adminis-
86Ranger: 'African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and
Central Africa' in Gann and Duignan (eds, ): OP. cit. pp. 293-5.
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trative demands in manpower and capital outlay required for laying down
any meaningful infrastructures. On the surface, the British South Africa
Company87 appeared better off than any of its sister syndicates in the
North: the British Imperial East Mrica Company in Kenya and Uganda,
the German East Mrican Company in Tanganyika and the African Lakes
Corporation in Nyasaland, However, this Company's problems too were
not made lighter with the extension of its control across the Zambesi and
the annexation of the then provinces of North/Eastern and North/Western
Rhodesia as well as the subsidies which it provided to Harry Johnston and
88 -
his doddering Administration in Nyasaland. Consequently, the BSACo.
was,therefore)heavily handicapped financially) in spite of its reliance on
Rhodes's enormous private fortune. For such reasons, by 1896Jthe BSACo.
had hardly established any satisfactory administrative machinery to meet
with its requirements South of the Zambesi. Inadequate provtston.espect-
ally of the military and civil services for the good government of the
countl'Yjwas destined to cost the BSACo. dearly and.ulttmately, it never
89effectively recovered from these disasters ti111923. In the circum-
stances, the need to effect economies was uppermost in the calculation of
the early Southern Rhodesian AdministrationJ with the result that the
military and the police forces were evidently the first targets. 90 In this
situation" the role and value of the African auxiliaries as collaborators
was inestimable.
Before we explore the role of the Mrican emigres in the wars of
"pacification"and conquest in early Southern Rhodesia, it would be only
87Hereafter called the BSACo.
88B. Pachai: Malawi: The History of the Nation: Longman: London: 1973:
p. 82. BSACo. bought shares in the African Lakes Corp. in 1889 and
by 1895 its annual subsidy to the ALC was about £17,500.
89J. K. Rennie: Christianity. Colonialism and the Origins of Nationalism
among the Ndau of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935: (unpublished) PhD
thesis, Northwestern University, 1973, p. 165: Rennie argues that the
BSACo. 's poverty was due to the fact that it farmed out sub-conces-
sions for the major undertakings to subsidiary companies whose
profits went to Rhodes and the directors of these companies rather
than to the BSACo. shareholders.
9°Ian Colvin: The tife of' Jameson: VoL I: Edward Arnold & Co. : London:
1922: pp. 219-20. As early as 1892 Jameson reduced the police from
700 to 40 members thus reducing also the BSACo. 's expenses from
£250,000 to £30,000 annually.
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appropriate to trace their original association with the white settler com-
munlty. When the dreams of Cecil JohnRhodes to extend the boundaries of
British political control into the inner recesses of the African continent came
true with the Rudd Concession and the grant of a Royal Charter in 1888/9 to
occupy Mashonaland, a Pioneer Columnwas formed to carry out these object-
ives in 1890. The Columnwas intended to represent a new and self-sufficient
society befitting a land-locked territory. With this idea in mind, the Pioneer
Columnwas from the start very carefully chosen and in its composition reflect-
ed various shades of social and occupational classes of SouthAfrica. Thus the
Columnnot surprisingly included clergymen, doctors, lawyers, farmers, min-
91ers, sailors, builders, tailors, butchers and many other classes. Ofparti-
cular prominence within the Pioneer Columnranks was a rudimentary class of
aristocrats; the recruits chosen at the insistence ofRhodes from such leading
families of the Cape Colonyand SouthAfrica in general as wouldbe capable of
exerting pressure onto the British Government to come to the BSACo.'s aid,
92should any unforeseen disaster befall the Mashonaland venture. The
Column also represented a broad spectrum of political groups, both on the
SouthAfrican provincial and inter-provincial levels. Boer families from
various parts of SouthAfrica also had representatives in the Pioneer Column
to attract Boer sympathies and assuage their feelings against British designs.
Last but not least, the Columnincluded a large number of pollce, the nucleus
of the British SouthAfrica Police, and an army of Africa auxiliaries, drawn
from the most leading African national entities of SouthAfrica, such as the
Zulu, Sotho, Mfengu, Khoikhoiand many others. These were engrafted into
the Column at :M:afeldngwhere they had converged and were engagedprimarily
for menial and semi-speciaI1zed jobs like wagon-driving, cattle-tending and
the like.93
91Frank Johnson: Great Days: The Autobiographyof an Empire Pioneer:
G. Bell & Sons: London:1940:PP. 109-12.
92Johnson: Great Days: loo, cit.: Frank Johnsm states that this clique
from important families called 'Rhodes's Angels' or 'the twelveApos-
tles' consisted ofR. T. Corydon (later Administrator of N/W/Rhodesia
and Governor of Uganda); Jack Grimmer, one ofRhodes's Secretaries,
Sergeant Schermbrucker, brother-In-law of Sir Charles Coghlan,
Rhodesia's first Premier, amongmany others.
93Hans Sauer, one of Rhodes's closest friends in his biography mentions
the importance of goodwagoo. -drivers and leaders for trekking. In
this light he refers to the short-comings of British 'greehorns' like
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However the police and the African auxiliaries to the Columnwere
not chosen with as great care as that shown in the case of the members of
the Column,whowere supposed to lay downthe foundation for permanent
white settlement. In fact)the police had only been included at the insistence
of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, whowas not altogether con-
94vinced on the adequacy of the military muscle in the movement. Indeed)
one of the members of this police force described, a few years later, the
character of the force in less charitable language~indicating that
••• such a mixed lot I have never seen in my life, all sorts
of conditions, from the aristocrat down to the street Arab-
peers and waifs of humanity mingling together like ingredients
in a hotch-potch. Clerks and businessmen of all kinds jostle
one another, and one troop is called brokers, tholJ§hsome of
the men say they are more broke than broker •••
Thus the occupation of Mashonaland in 1890witnessed the birth of a totally
new society, a society described by Gann, on account of its plural charact-
er, as resembling '••• a slice of Neapolitan ice-cream'. 96
The successful occupation of Mashonalandby the Pioneer Column,in
the face of Lobengula's protests, created new political problems. While
the Shona communities, in the early stages of occupation, saw the pioneers
as a new factor in their system of external relations and regarded them
either as possible political allies or commercial partners in the per-
ennial Shonagame of trade on the existing pattern of their relationship
97with the Portuguese, the Ndebele.on the other hand.saw settler presence
,I
Lord Randolf Churchill on trekking. Dr. Sauer was Afrikaner from
the OFS.-_.: Vide: Hans Sauer: Ex Africa: Geoffrey Bles: Lmdon:
1937: PP. 192-5.
94Johnson: ope cit. P. 112.
95(MajOr)A.G. Leonard: HowWe MadeRhodesia: Kegan Paul & ce..
London: 1926: P. 126.
96L.H. Gann: A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934:
Humanities Press: NewYork: 1969 (2nd Editim): P. 172.
97'Curio' Brown states that the Shona regarded the Pioneers as 'harmless
lunatics ••• temporarily wandering about, shooting game and searching
for gold mines••• ' but Hable to go back to 'Diamond' (Kimberley).
The Shana even.gave Brown himself a very apt nickname Nyamazana
(wild game). Vide: W.H. Brown: On the SouthAfrican Frontier:
Sampson Low & Co. : London: 1899: PP. 195-202.
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as a handicap to their erstwhile free military and political reign. However,
it must also be pointed out that,as a matter of fact, very few raids appear
to have taken place in Mashonalandduring the period of settler/Ndebele
co-existence 1890......3. 98 The white settlers, although somewhat irritated
by the Ndebele pressure, were not in a position to attack the Ndebele state
during the early period of occupation,when they were still too drunk with
gold fever to think of other matters. But as the gold myths exploded and
it began to dawn onto them that they had, after all their efforts, failed to
discover the 'SecondRand' they were looking for, their former optimism
turned into frustration and frustration into bitterness. They had been pro-
mised an El Dorado on enlistment into the Columnbut the promises had
not materialized. Both these settlers and the BSACoo) therefore/naturally
concluded that as they had not discovered the El Dorado in Mashonaland
perhaps Matabeleland provided the answer.99 Thus it became incumbent
on these white pioneers to bring their hopes to reality and it required only
one or two tactical errors on the part of Lobengula, the Ndebele monarch,
to provide a tangible casus belli for the former to effect the conquest of
his kingdom. The seizure of the Ndebele cattle by the BSACo.officials in
mid-1893 and the subsequent attack on the Shonacommmtity around Fort
VictoriaJcausing anxiety within the settler community there, surely
provided the casus belli so required.
As the purpose of this chapter is to examine the part played by the
so-called 'Cape Boys' or 'Colonial Natives' and their associates as
military auxiliaries of the Companyforces, we shall not go into any detail
on either the causes of the 1893war, the course of the war itself and its
results, but we shall merely pick out those aspects of the war which neces-
98These raids were.of course.that against Chief Nemakonde (Lomangudi)
in 1891; in Ranger: Revolt in S. Rhodesia: 1896-7, p, 28; that against
Chief Chibi. in 1892, .-in Beach: The Rising in South-Western Mashm-
aland 1896-97: p. 229, and the one against Chief Mutema in 1892, Vide:
Rennie: Christianity, Colonialism and the Oripes of Nationalism among
the Ndauof Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935:pp. 152-4.
99Ian Colvin: The Ufe of Jameson: Vol. IT: EdwardArnold & Co. : London:
1922: PP. 18-9. The thesis that Matabelelandwas the El Dorado the
white settlers were looking for was referred to once more by Rhodes
and Jameson after the 1893war at a banquet given at the Imperial
Institute in Londonin January 1895. Vide also: S. Samkange:Origin
of Rhodesia: Heinemann: London:1968: p, 240.
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sitated the involvement of Cape Africans or Africans from the Southin general.
Such an approach is conditionedby a number of factors. In the first place, the
Ndebele war (1893) is an involved affair requiring fully-fledged research in its
100own right. Secondly, there is the question of the patchy character of mater-
ial on Africans as individuals in early SouthernRhodesia in particular and in
Africa in general during the early colonial period, or at least before the begin-
101
ning of the twentieth century, and finally, the influence of racial and supre-
macist psychology and the irreparable damage this inflicted onAfrican historio-
graphy of the pre-colonial and early colonial period. Of these three factors,
we may discuss here the implications of the third one onAfrican history and its
interpretation, especially, as the views so held had far-reaching consequences
in SouthernAfrica in particular.
The story of the early race contacts between the whites and blacks in Cen-
tral Africa and the orlg~ of the race problem that influenced the later-day
attitudes have been fully examined by Caims in his valuable study Prelude to
Imperialism. Amongst the many souvenirs these contacts and attitudes imprin-
ted onto ihe African image, so far as the contemporary European reader was
concerned, is the generally negative picture which Cairns describes as,
••• Hobbesian in its harshness and primeaval in the dominance of
nature over man. In -(these)- European accounts individualAfri-
cans emerged rarely from the mass as distinct personalities. As
objects of salvation, obstacles to rapid travel, or ~~thful fol-
lowers, they are relegated to a secondary position.
100For such a study note the rather out-moded: Glass: The MatabeleWar.
Whilst this thesis was in progress, Julian Cobbfngof the University of
Rhodesia was currently researching 00 Ndebelehistory up to 1896, with
all the possibility of throwing new light on both the Anglo-Ndebelewar
(1893) and the Ndebele rising (1896).
101C.O. 767/5: Weare, Secretary for the S. Rhodesia HighCommissiooer, to
DominioosOffice (hereafter called D.0.), December 18, 1925: S. Rhod-
esia Correspondence, P/R/O, London. This material forwarded by the
DominionsOffice to the S. Rhodesia HighCommissioner has 14 pages of
names of scarcely any reference to them in 1893 except in passing. Glass
in his book, The MatabeleWar does not mention any 'Cape Boys' at all,
except John Makunga, but then only as Secretary and envoyof LobenguIa
to the HighCommissioner in Cape Town.
102Cairns: oPe cit.: PP. x11-xlli. For further discussion of these attitudes,
Vide: O. Mannon!: Prospero and CalIban: The Psychology of Colonization:
(translated by Pamela Powesland): Praeger: NewYork (2ndEdition) 1964:
and also Memmi: The Colonizer and the Colonized:passim.
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Such an African image was,of course,forcibly stuck into the mind of the
reader by the various erroneous assumptions that were not by any means
devoid of patriotic tinsel and generally asserted that qualities of virtue,
worthiness, manliness and intellect, to mention only a few, were preserves
of the European peoples only, whilst their opposites naturally applied to
the Africans. 103 Hand in glove with these early European misconceptions
was the treatment of Africans as sub-human andltherefore Jas objects of
humorous superiority in satirical memoirs and adventure stories of Euro-
pean writers. Thus IDaccounts of adventurers, Africans rarely emerged
as individuals capable of attaining the qualities worthy of admiration. When
they did .so, they were portrayed as exceptions rather than a general rule,
and were ,therefore) consequently treated IDisolation from their African
environment to avoid impinging onto the image hitherto conceived in the
mind of the white man. More often than not howeveljAfricans whowere
charitably treated in European literature had more to give than the writers
dared admit. 104 To cap these preceding views, was the rasa tabula theory
dominating the writings of these early European travellers, missionaries,
hunters and adventurers. By virtue of this theory, it was predominantly
believed and accepted that Africa was a 'no-man's land' and that the Afri-
105cans had no right there at all.
The general effect of this type of logic in both precolonial and colonial
psychology was obviously to ignore African presence in the continent not
103Ca1rns~ OP. cit. PP. 36-9; Cairns discusses the distortion of the con-
cepts 'gentleman', 'courage' and others by early Britons inAfrica
through the manipulation of the psychology of superiority to such an
extent that these concepts became exclusively descriptive of British
character and hence were obviously Inapplicable to African peoples.
104Thid.: PP. 114-0.9;This isolation technique was usually applied to
shrewd African leaders like Kbama, Lobengula, Mirambo, Mutesa
- whose wit and shrewdness the European travellers were compelled
to admit. These were praised becanse.by virtue of their positions)
they usually held the destinies of the travellers in their hands.
105L. H. Gann : . : 'Reflections on Imperialism and the Scrambl~
for Africa' in Gann and Duignan (eds.): Colonialism in Africa 1870-
~: Vol. I. chap. 3; p. 114; An extreme view in this connection was
that of Lord Bryce's that '••. the savage .•• had no more right to claim
that the land was made for him than have the wild beast of the forest
who roar after their prey and seek their meat from God'. Quoted In
Cairns: oPe cit. p. 77.
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only in the literary sense.but physically as well. SuchAfrican presence
as was admitted was)therefore",merely in a subservient role, described
succinctly by Cairns in the following terms:
Implicit in many of the statements -{ofearly European
writers on Africar- was the assumption that to be the first
white man was equivalent to being the first man. The Afri-
can was part of the background inwhich Europeans carried
out their activities. His co-operation might be essential
to the accomplishment of European objectives, but the
overwhelming emphasis was a European centred approach.
The recurring praise for the faithful porter Indicates praise
for the sUPPfdlJentalrather than the independent role assigned
to Africans,
These flaws in early Eurocentric literature on Africa and the African
obviously make research on African individuals and groups, at least In
107the early period, a daunting task. The general tendency of the Euro-
centric writings was to submerge African individuality and claims to rec-
ognition. In effect, the value of this type of literature was only for its
propaganda purposes and like all propaganda technocrats the early white
writers were obviously married to the spirit of their age and became
widows In the generations that followed, Against this general background,
it iSItherefore}not surprising that the role of the 'Cape Boys' in the hist-
orical development of Seuthern Rhodesia is seriously overlooked in official
literature, more so that the 'Cape Boys' were not only,at the time"a racial
108anomaly, but were also regarded as administrative misfits.
106caims: op. cit. p. 30. African historians andwriters as well as like-
minded Africanists have,howeveIjbecome increasingly critical of the
early trend of historical mterpretation by predominantly European
writers. See for instance, A. B. Davidson: 'African resistance and
rebellion against the imposition of colonial rule' in Ranger (ed.):
The Emerging Themes of African ffistory: PP. 183-4; T. O. Ranger:
'The Rewriting of African History during the Scramble: The Mata-
bele dominance over Mashonaland': in African Social Research
(University of Zambesi): No.4, December 1964: pp. 271-81; Law-
rence Vambe: An nI-fated People: Heinemann, London: 1970: PP. 29-
30, 123-4.
107The effects of this discrepancy in early historicall1terature actually
account for the very laboured and time-absorbing character of work
on the biographies of early African historical figures: Vide: G. Shep-
person and T. Price: Indeeendent African: John Chilembweand the
Origins. Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915:
Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh: 1958; Farrant: The Mashona-
land Martyr; and Graaf: ModumediMoleli.
108The 'Cape Boys' were not always under the general scope of the NICs
46
. ... .,.. .:. ::: "~ ..';..~..~..:.
,: .: ';:. .. ,';.;; ','
t .
f .,
: .
••e-
~
..:.';i~~'~
" ,< ::,' , ,
We have already seen.at the beginning of this analysis" that the
Pioneer Column was a form of multiracial movement with the white mem-
bers, according to the ideology of the time, forming the primary element
within the movement, whilst the African auxiliaries were a subsidiary
stratum for menial and quasi-skilled services. These roles were not dis-
mantled once permanent settlement in early Southern Rhodesia was attained.
The hierarchical structure was instead entrenched, but with the only dif-
ference that in the new settlement area where the African indigenous people s
formed the majority, the African auxiliaries from across the Limpopo now
played a mediating role between the white settlers and the indigenous
African majority. In a new state which demandedjfor its political economy,
the co-operation of the African majoritY, particularly on labour and other
economic matters, it became the duty of the African emigres to translate
the wishes of the white settlers to the indigenous African peoples. The
African emigres had their special role and their particular identity and
were thereforeJfor all intents and purposes.called Mapainera (Pioneers)
either by their white counterparts; the indigenous African people or later
109groups of African immigrants. In this way"the identity of the African
emigres was directly linked to that of their masters, clearly regarded by
the local people as quite different from the pre-1890 white adventurers
110and hunters termed by the Shona,for instance"Maguvu (sloughs). Not-
withstanding the hierarchical social stratification, the occupation and sub-
sequent conquest of Southern Rhodesia was, in al respects, a result of
co-opted efforts of a multiracial movement whose members contributed
variously towards its success. Let us now examine some of the subsidiary
when the Native Dept •. was later established. Vide: C. O. 417/53:
Mlltm to Milner, December 8, 1897: On legislation agaJnst 'Colonial
Boys'.
109B. J. Wilson: 'Kwezane Frank: African Pioneer' NADA:No. 39, 1962,
p. 45 (Vide also picture: plate 1): Interview with John Khambula (Zulu
origin); Chegutu Location, Hartley, November 23, 1975; and Written
Evidence of Rev. John Wesley Solin! to the Author; Sinoia, December
11, 1975.
1l0The term Maguw (sloughs) may have arisen from the manner in which
early Europeans to Southern Rhodesia were constantly on the move thus
resembling the way in which snakes discarded their skins, from the
Shona point of view. IntervieW with Mr. Madhlangove Madangombe:
Chibi District: July 26, 1975.
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functions performed by the African auxiliaries before the 1893war.
After Frank Johnson had engaged the African auxiliaries at the beg-
inning of pioneer journey at Mafeking; as we have seen, some of them fell
out before they even reached Macloutsie in Bechuanaland and their work
as labourers was taken over by the Ngwatosupplied by Khama for the
service. It would appear that the willingness of Khama to cooperate in
the venture may have been born out of the longstanding acquaintance bet-
ween him and Frank Johnson the organizer of the Pioneer Column.111
Whatever the reasons, Khama was very anxious to oblige and provided a
battalion of Ngwatoauxiliaries under his brother Raditladi, later of
Southern Rhodesian fame. These imm.ediately took over the work of those
SouthAfric an auxiliaries who had deserted and were quite useful in pro-
vidlng services for road-cutting and scouting work with Selous. Unlike
the African auxiliaries from the South, the Ngwatoalso had the singular
advantage that they were not a financial liability to the Pioneer COluIDIlJas
they had their ownhorses whilst those of the Columnwere either too few
or dying of horse-sickness in large numbers. Besides)the Ngwatoauxili-
aries provided their own food and were not expected to rely on the Column's
112supplies.
Of even greater importance was the political significance that Khama's
co-operation implied It was to some measure a poUtical gimmick by
Rhodes to woe the support of Exeter Hall and render the occupation of Mash-
onaland as a move motivated not only by political and economic objectives
alone)but one tampered with humanitarian or altruistic ideals too. Indeed
the members of the Pioneer Column themselves were well aware of this,
butJas far as they were concernedjthetr racial feelings were too strang to
accommodate political and humanitarian gestures. On the contrary, they
were greatly offended by what they termed Ngwato 'praying habits' and as
such were reluctant to work side by side with these Ngwatohelpers) whom
they ridiculed as well,indicatlng that, as 'CUrio' Brown puts It:
111Jobnson Opecit. pp. 27, 73-4, 123, 130; Johnson had actually been
granted a concession by Khama for the formation of the Bechuanaland
Exploratim Company lid. in 1888,which was later absorbed by the .
BSACo. Hewas also involved in the transfer of Khama's capital from
Shoshmg to Palapye.
112Samkange: ,. Origin.: of Rhodesia: PP. 201, 230.
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They -(the Ngwato~ read the bible, sing and pray a great deal;
but the men of our expedition who had been at their town, 113
Palapye, all agree that their religion was not deep-seated
Khama himself also played his part in assuring Lobengula that the Pioneer
Column was only proceeding to Mashonaland and did not intend to attack
114the Ndebele State.
The Ngwato were temporary auxiliaries and once Mashonaland was
reached the burden once more devolved onto the few African auxiliaries
from the South still in service. This motley lot of menials and aides, some
of whom had merely followed their masters from the comfort of settled
cities like Johannesburg as servants, became very handy in these early
days. They were used in building the forts at Victoria, Charter and
Salisbury and the houses of European residents as well as offices for
administrative purposes. The roods connecting these posts were also con-
structed with the labour of these African auxiliaries to the Pioneer Col-
umn. 115 The services of these auxiliaries were also indispensable during
the period following the dispersal of the Column) when it became necessary
for individual members to seek their fortunes as their callings demanded.
They apparently accompanied the settlers during the course of these es-
capades throughout the length and breadth of the territory when the settlers
116acted as funa-tengas (traders) or funa-sevenzas (labour recruiters).
They were used in cutting makeshift roads through the various districts of
Mashanaland for conveying goods for exchange with agricultural produce;
for, at the early stage of white settlement, the Pioneer settlers were/in every
sense of the word.beavtly dependent on the Shona food supplies and in this
field, contact between the white settlers and local African communities was
of such import ance that even Rhodes himself often encouraged the pioneers
113Brown: On the South African Frontier: PP. 90-92.
114 Samkange: loco cit.
115 J. R. Duncan, 'The Story of Mugodi Diamond' NADA: No. 36, 1959,
pp. 49-51.
116'Wiri' Edwards 'Reminiscences ••• ' II; NADA: No. 38, 1961, PP. 10-11
and J. R. Duncan: 'The Story of Simba Jim' NADA: No. 35, 1958;
pp. 99-102; Simba Jim recounts the activities of one 'Mbaimbai'
(Mr. Peck) a postal agent and trader at Chatsworth who used to go
into the ChUimanzi District with a gang of road-cuttmg Xhosa to ex-
change blankets for maize.
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to do so,when they complained of the shortage of food supplies. 117 Blankets,
beads, salt and limbo were therefore exchanged for upfu (mealie-meal),
118rice, African beer, tobacco, monkeynuts and honey.
Such trade between the two communities obviously involved contact
and communication which the African auxiliary members of the Pioneer
Column obligingly facilitated. It must also be borne in mind that the Shona
were not in any way acquainted with the whole idea of the Pioneer Column
and the occupation of the country and naturally they refused to pay any
heed to the demands of these foreigners for obeisance and labour before
they were conquered. This reluctance wasjto a large extent" reinforced by
Shona suspicions on the white immigrants' intentions as it began to appear
that their erstwhile visitors were outstaying the visit. Labour requtrements
in the absence of the use of force by the settlers were consequently nega-
tived. 119 Faced with this situation, the African auxiliary from the South
thus became quite an asset to the Pioneers. The foreign African auxiliary,
unlike Khama's Ngwato helpers, became a permanent member of the settler
society and, together with the white settler, staked his life for the success
of the new Colony. Along with his masterJthe foreign African auxiliary
remained to share the fortunes and hazards of frontier life and wasl in every
sense of the wordJquite ungrudging in supporting his master in the military
disasters that later followedjwhen his aid was required of him.
We have already pointed out some of the causes besetting research on
,
117D•C. De Vaal: With Rhodes in Mashonaland: London: 1896: P. 229.
118'Wiri' Edwards: 'Reminiscences' IT: Ioc, cit. and A. Darter: The Pion-
eers of Mashonaland. Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. ;
London: 1914: PP. 102-3, 108. Darter states that the dependence of
the early white pioneers on Shona food supplies was so prevalent that
Sir John Willoughby, one of the military leaders was nicknamed
'Monkey Nuts' for issuing this Shonastaple food to his troopers as
rations.
119Duncan:'The Story of Simba Jim': Ioo, cit. The famous Head Messenger
Mahachi's case at Fort Victoria, is a good example of Shona suspicion
towards the pioneer settlers. Mahachi, alias Imbayargwo, who had
been engaged for a job herding horses (hence his nickname MAHACHI)
in Fort Victoria could not get anybody to assist him in his home area,
as Chief Zimuto had forbidden his people to work for the white men.
Consequently Simba Jim of Masendeke's kraal in the Chilimanzi dist-
rict was asked to go and help his brother-in-law, Mahachi, in the new
urban settlement.
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African groups and individuals in early African colonial history120 and
have also dtscussedjtn a nutshell, the problems posed by the co-existence
121of the settlers and the Ndebele state. We may here further look at the
deterioration of Ndebele/Settler relations during the period before 1893.
The Rudd Concession had been granted by Lobengula to Rhodes's
representatives in October 1888 under a cloud of deception, suspicion and
mutual hostility. The hurried flight of the main actor in the whole drama,
Francis R. Thompson, from Matebeleland (nearly perishing in the bush
and desert of exhaustion and privation) and the subsequent extermination
of the Ndebele induna Lotshe Hlabangana and his followers, their chic ken
not excepted, for having espoused the cause of the Rhodes party, are factors
which underlined/from the start)the poignant relationship between Lobengula
and the BSACo.122 The repudiation of the Rudd Concession and the despatch
of envoys to Queen Victoria by Lobengula, as well as the Rhodes-Johnson
plot to assassinate Lobegula; events which followed in the wake of the Rudd
Concession, further strained the Ndebele/BSACo. relations. Yet it was in
the face of this mutual hostility that the Pioneer Column undertook the
occupation of Mashonaland in 1890 andJfor three yearsj co-extsted with
Lobengula. It is not surprislng,therefore)that during the 1890-3 period of
uneasy truce, the settlers felt the weight of the Ndebele threat like a mill-
stone around their necks. The Ndebelejon their partjwere defiant of white
settler presence and carried out military raids in Mashonaland as of old,
going even as far as the Melsetter district in the heart of the Ndau terri-
tory whither they had never ventured before. The Ndebele thus totally
ignored the presence of the white settlers and took advantage of the with-
drawal of Gungunyana, the Gaza ruler, from the Melsetter highlands to
123
BUeni on the lower reaches of the Limpopo.
120Vide: Supra; pp.44-6
121
Vide: Supra; pp.42-3
122Samkange: ope cit. chaps. 7-13; pp. 56-164 and Nancy Rouillard (ed, ):
Matabele Thompson: An Autobiography: Faber & Faber: London: 1936:
pp. 97-189.
12~ennie: Ope cit. pp. 152-4; The Ndebele raided Chief Mutema in
August 1892 after Gungunyana had removed to Bileni in 1889. Before
1889 the Ndebele and the Gaza, these two Nguni states, had recog-
nized the Sabi River as the boundary of their respective operations.
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This era of co-existence between the BSACo. and Lobengulajdurtng
1890-3Jmay also be aptly called the 'period of confusion'. The Shona
chiefs who were caught in the melee of this political impasse were con-
siderably confused too. For examplejwhtlst the BSACo. Administration
imposed taxation in what later became the Victoria Circle in July 1892,
the Ndebele simultaneously raided Chief Chibi to settle old scores. 124
The same applied to Chief Nemakonde (Lomagundi) in the Lomagundi
district who refused to pay fealty to the Ndebele monarch any longer as
his tributary status had previously required. Chief Nemakonde naturally
could not pay fealty to Lobengula and at the same time also pay tax to the
125
BSACo. The BSACo. Administration at first took no interest in these
Ndebele/Shona relations before 1893 as they did not affect the Company's
immediate interests. But by 1893jthe situation was changing fast. The
failure of the settlers to discover the 'Second Rand' they were looking for
and the BSACo. 's shift of emphasis in its economic pohctesjatnce the
replacement of Archibald Colquhoun by Dr. L. S. Jameson as Administrator
in July 1891)largely accounted for this changing political situation.
Soon after the departure of Colquhoun, a laxity in the maintenance of
law and order for the sound govemment of the territory of Mashonaland
appeared and with this was born the practice of cattle seizure and confis-
cation to which Dr. Jameson paid little attention, hence unwittingly en-
couraging it.126 This inclusion of cattle as a target of the Company's
policy of economic adventurism was destined to clash with Lobengula's
127
interests,as cattle were the basis of the economy of the Ndebele state.
Thus when the BSACo. officials seized cattle from the South-Western Shona
chiefdoms in 1893, 128 this naturally brought in train a chain of reactions.
124
Beach: loco cit.
12~anger: Revolt in S, Rhodesia: 100, cit.; Beach argues that Chief Nema-
konde was raided by Lobengula for conspiring with the Rozvi Chief
Sango and signing treaties of alliance with the portuguese against the
Ndebele before 1890. Vide: Beach: OPe cit, P. 193.
126Ranger: Revolt, pp. 60-7.
127Vide: H. Kuper, A. J. B. Hughes and J. van Velsen: The Shona and the
Ndebele of Southem Rhodesia: International African Institute: London:
1954: PP. 54-9.
128Beach: Ope cit. PP. 126-7; Beach lists the tributary chiefs in South-
Western Mashonaland,who herded Lobengula's cattle.as Chiefs Nhema
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whose effects were to eventually lead to . conflict, as the twobulls
were nowbeing drawn closer to the arena to measure their respective
strengths. This seizure of cattle by the BSACo.mustjof course.be seen
in its proper context. The Companywas infuriated when its telegraph wire
had been cut by the people of Makamure near Rungai Hill in the Chibi chief-
dom and also by the people of the Godhlwayodivision in Matabeleland itself.
In returnJthe BSACo. seized large herds of cattle for compensation, but,
in doing so,allowed its cattle-mania to overrule the propriety that the
situation required. Moreover,the seizure was made from the wrong people
in Chief Chitawudze's in the Bubi/UmzingwaneDistrict where Lobengula's
herds were lodged andwhich Chitawudze ('Setouse') herded in return for
129immunity from Ndebele military raids.
Maximumattempts were,from this point onwards.consequently made
between the two political forces, though in different directions, either to
avoid the war or to bring it nearer and sooner. The Ndebele had tasted
the strength of the white men's weaponry before and had consequently fled
from their old home in the Transvaal in the first half of the nineteenth
century as a token recognition of its superiority. As another attempt to
avoid any conflict with the white men, the Ndebele monarch had .ordered
his punitive impis sent to the Victoria division of Mashonalandin mid-1893,
to avoid conflict with the white men at all costs and deal onlywith Shona
130miscreants. On the diplomatic front too.Lobengula despatched envoys
to the Imperial officials in the South, but both the HighCommissionerJSir
Henry Loch.and his assistantlJ. S. Moffat, responsible for Bechuanaland
and Matabeleland, wouldnot be moved. These envoys were sent to the
South three times and on these three occasions their attempts came to
131naught. Preparations for war were being mounted and by mid-October
Banga, Munyikwa(Mhari): Shiku, ChibMudzeand Matenda. Chiefs
~irumanzu (Chilimanzi) and Hamapaid tribute in labour for repair-
ing Lobengula's huts and Masunda (Shahaniarea) provided soldiers.
1291bid: pp. 232-4; 32 heads of cattle were seized from Makamure for the
170 yards of wire cut in his area and 100heads from Khohomera, one
of Chitawudze's headman, for 400yards ofwire found in the Godhlwayo
district. 'Chitawudze' is the 'SETOUSE'in Lobengula's letter to Sir
Henry Loch: Vide: SamkangeOpecit. PP. 247-48.
130Samkange: Opecit. pp. 244-6.
131.!!W!: pp. 247-57; Glass: The MatabeleWar: PP. 152-3; and Personal
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1893 it came.
The BSACo. Administration under Dr. Jameson was not unaware of
the effort and resources involved in attacking the Ndebele State and so when
the conflict came it had gone to its length to raise a sizeable army and
mobilize it for action. It scratched the very bottom of its barrel and was
compelled to rely on the 'Cape Boys' and Shona levies as an ancillary force
to strengthen its front. The company's main fighting forces consisted of
the following divisions: the Mashonaland Force (1. e. the Salisbury and
Victoria Columns) of 665 atrongjunder Major Patrick William Forbes,Jand
the Southern Force, the so-called Bechuanaland Border Police, an im-
perial force under Major Goold-Adams numbering 445 troops. The
Southern Force also had a supporting strength of 154 'Colonial Boys' (I, e.
132Africans from South Africa) and a force of 2, 000 Ngwatos. In the Mashona-
land Force, Africans from South Africa and 'Coolies' (ASiatiCS) were also
raised and commanded by Captain J. W. Nesbitt, the son of Major Nesbitt
133
of Cape Colcmy fame, assisted by Lieutenant L.W. Papenfus. These
African auxiliaries were obviously quite welcome.as Major Forbes was
short of manpower for his military muscle and had expressed doubts from
the start on his ability to raise the required quota for the war, estimated
at 2, 500 white troopers. Jndeed fn his report to the BSACo., Major Forbes
thus admitted the readiness with which he accepted Captain Nesbitt's plan
on a non-European supporting force, adding that the Africans from the
134
South and the 'Coolies' were ' •.• of the greatest assistance to us'. It
must be bome in mind too that the members of the Mashonaland Force had
to be encouraged to fight by dangling rich booty, as described in the terms
CommlDlication from Mr Dodson Makunga: December 7, 1974.
132C. O. 417/136, Report on the Matabele War by Sir John Willoughby,
Bart. n, d. Enclosed in Herbert Canning. BSACo. to C. 0, March 7,
1894; Africa South Correspondence, PIR/O, London.
13~. A. Wills and L. T. Collingridge: The Downfall of Lobengula: The
African Reviews Offices: London: 1894: pp. 68-9, 228. A short bio-
graphical sketch on Captain Nesbitt and his association with 'alien'
Africans in the 1893 war is included here.
134C• O. 417/136: Major Forbes'S Report on the Campaign in Matabeleland;
p, 4; Enclosed in Herbert Canning, BSACo,. Secretary to C, 0,
August, 17, 1894.
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of the Victoria agreement" and by the promises that these white volunteers
would not be alone in the campaign as they would converge onto Bulawayo
with the Southern Force of Major Goold-Adams, proceeding via Tati.135
The readiness with which the motley of African auxiliaries was
accepted and the variety of duties they were to perform in the waIj in a
large measure/justified Forbes's action. Alongside the alien Africans
were also Shona levies under the notorious John Somerset Brabant of Fort
Victoria and Lieutenant Quested. These Shona levies) together with a con-
tingent of domestic servants and grooms of the white settlers, as well as
wagon-drivers and leaders, completed Forbes's roll-call of African auxi-
liaries raised in the hope of making up for the prospective short-fall in
military manpower requirements. Their duties in this war included,in the
main) serving as pickets at night around the laager: an assignment for
which Forbes found them particularly useful and informed London Wall
that
I found that the natives were thoroughly rel1able for
duty at night, and only ane native during the campaign
was found asleep at his post... Their hearing and eyesight
are both so superior to a white man's especially at night,
-(and)- I consider them useful in this capacity so long as
they feel tht96hey are in touch with and supported by
white men.
Such falth,on the part of Forbes,in these auxiliaries was patently justified
by the alertness of this subsidiary force and its capacity to bear the
rougher aspects of the campaign. At the battle of the Shangani on October
25, 1893 for example/when the Forbes column was confronted by one of
Lobengula's famous crack regiments, the Insukamen1 regiment, the white
forces, smug in the comfort of the laager, were nearly overwhelmed,but
for the African auxiliaries who slept outside the laager and bore the first
137wave of attack. Their chores,of course,involved mainly work of the base
type or that demanding physical exertion even in the time of war. Thus these
auxiUaries were responsible for rounding up captured herds of cattle and
13512!!!: pp. 3-4.
136C. O. 417/136: Forbes's Report on the Campaign in Matabeleland:
PP. 10-11, and Wills and Collingri~e: The Downfall of Lobengula:
pp. 81-2.
137Wills and Collingridge: oPe cit. p. 40.
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driving them back to Mashonaland; tending of horses, mules, maxim guns
and wagons - a special field here for the 'Cape Boy' drivers and leaders;
guarding Ndebele prisoners and ferretting out information from them for
use by Forbes's officers. On the actual battlefield, especially as far as
Captain Nesbitt's contingent was concerned, the African auxiliaries were
usually sent forward to drive out the Ndebele 'impis' from rough and rocky
locations,inaccessible to the predominantly mounted white troopers, or to
carry out any related activities of provocative nature so as to draw the
138Ndebele into engagements. The auxiliaries were also divided into two
parties for the purpose of '••• cutting bush and maldng drifts ••• ' essential
for wagon transport.
Ftnally.as eommunicatton between the civil authorities in Salisbury
and the forces on the field was essential and Dr. Jameson had particularly
insisted that he should be kept informed about the progress of the war,
Forbes had to make use of his auxiliaries in this field and accordingly
states that after the Shangani engagement with the Insukameni regiment,
139he despatched 'coloured' runners to Salisbury with reports for Jameson.
But whatever importance may be attached to the role of the Cape
Africans and other aliens in the 1893war as a group, the story would not
be complete without reference to individual figures within this sub-stratum.
The best example is the case of John Grootboom, 140 who fought in both the
1893 war and the Ndebele rising an 1896 and survived both in the end. A
case study of Grootboom's career reveals) in the main, that he was one of the
few African figures who almost won the respect of white biographers of his
time, m spite of the attitudes that hindered communication and understanding
above the racial bracket. When reading about Grootboom, one is time and
again forcibly reminded of the heroes of either the Arabian nights, Afri-
can mythology or classical literature. His escapades, tricks, bravery
and many other eptes.In the course of the Anglo-Ndebele war, put him some-
l3SC. O. 417/136: Forbes's Report ••• p, 28, 33, 53; Forbes states that it
is the 'Cape Boys' who secured the information from the Ndebele
prisoners that he had been deliberately misled by the captive son of
Magwegwe and thus sent the Wilson patrol to certain death.
139.!!?!!!: PP. 13, 23.
140Vide: Plates II and m: (pictures).
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times even higher up the ladder than some of these mythological compeers.
Yet in spite of this, Grootboom is one of the historical iIgUres also very
roughly handed by writers, whether his contemporaries or those of succ-
eeding generations. Among the many ethnic identities that Grootboom has
unfortunately gained are Zulu, Tembu, Swazi, Xhosa,and 'Fingo'; whilst
those who had little stomach for 'complicated' African names contented
themselves with the generally descriptive and geopolitical term"popular in
its time, and called him simply 'a Cape Native'. 141 This jung'leof nomen-
clature is symbolic of the spirit and psychology of the period, with its
characteristic lack of sympathy with and corresponding disdainful attitudes
towards African languages and cultural, social and political systems. In
shortJthe effect this had was to once more bring downGrootboom from his
peak of achievements, it so they were, to an ordinary level because of his
race.
John Grootboom was actually a Mfengu from the Cape Colonywho had
come up to Matabeleland either before or after 1890, but definitely before
1893. He came up and took employment as a driver to the LondonMission-
1~ . 1~ary Society minister, the Rev. C.D. Helm of the Rudd Concession fame.
Grootboom, like John Makunga, John Jacobs and Karl Kumalo the sec-
retaries of Lobengula, was obviously among those enlightened Africans
from the Southwho saw in the gradual encroachment 00 the Ndebele State
by European forces of change an opportunity to utilize their skills in a new
144geographical sphere, as we have already seen. John Grootboom..in
141W111s and ColUngr1dgecall Grootboom 'a Cape Native'; Vide: The Down-
fall of Lobengula: p. 288; in Felix Gross: Rhodes of Africa: Cassell:
Lmdon: 1956: p. 344, Grootboom is 'Swazi'; in J. G. Lockhard and
C. M.. Woodhouse:Rhodes: Macmillan: London: 1963: p. 352, he is
"I'hembu': in F. R. Burnham: Scouting on Two Continents: WUliam
Heinemann: London: 1926: P. 163, Grootboom is 'Fingoe'. In Sauer:
Ex Africa: p. 311, the author remains quite faithful to his Boer racial
ideology and consequently both Grootboom and Makungaare clubbed
together as 'Red Kaffirs (AmaXhosa)'. Finally Major Forbes called
Grootboom a 'Zulu': Vide: C.O. 417/136: Forbes's Report on the
Campaign in Matabeleland. ••
142Hereafter called L.M.'S.
143C. O. 417/136: Forbes's Report on the campaign.•• pp. 39-40: and
Interview with Mr. Paul Iflazo; November 18, 1975. Mr. Hlazo,
the son of the famous John Hlazo, was scathing over these misnomers
given to his compatriot John Grootboom.
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fact1came originally from Alice near Lovedale, the famous educational
institution in the Cape, and was related to the dissident Mfengu Presby-
terian Minister, the Rev. Pambani Jeremiah Mzimba, well known for
crossing swords with the Rev. James Stewart of Lovedale at the end of
the nineteenth century. 145 Grootboom's real name should have been John
Mt1mkulu, but it so happened that his father had worked for a Boer em-
player in the Cape"whochanged the family name from. 'Mtimkulu'
(literally meaning 'big tree') to its Afrikaans equivalent 'Grootboom', for
his own convenience. 146 Thus a name given by an uncanny employer,
unable to comprehend African languages and without the patience to learn
them either, went down into historical usage, an irony of linguistic acci-
dent. In some ways"John Grootboom's career resembles that of his Xhosa
countryman William Koyi, whowas orphaned during the Xhosa cattle-
1d.1ling of 1857; went into employment as a wagon driver and leader in the
Colony: educated himself at Lovedale and finallYjended up as a volunteer
with the Scottish pioneer missionaries in Nyasaland. The only difference
between these two appears to be that while Koyi expended his energies in
bible-verse-mongering and hymn-Singing, Grootboom found himself com-
pelled to play hide and seek with the Ndebele warriors on the battlefields
of Matabeleland. 147
There is little Information however, about John Grootboom's career
during his service with Rev. Helm and on his evolution from a religious
148fellow traveller to a soldier. Nonetheless,lit might be assumed that
144Vide: Supra: PP.35009
145Vid.e: L.N. Mzimba: Thali Lohomi nomsebenzi Womfi Umftmd1siPam-
bani Jeremiah Mzimba: Lovedale Press: Lovedale: 1923: passim.:
(Translation by Rev. Sojini).
146Jntervlew with Mr. Paul IDazo: November 18, 1975; I was unable to find
out, due to pressure of work and shortage of time, whether Grootboom
was related to Peter Grootboom of the Cape Colony (Vide: Kawa: I-Bali
Lama Mfengu: passim). But Mr. IDazo asserted that during his years
at Lovedale 1914-1919 Grootboom's uncle worked in the school's,
printing shop and used to enquire a great deal about his nephew's
health and progress in Southern Rhodesia.
147Vid.e: Pachal: Malawi: The History of the Nation: PP. 19-20; 168-70.
148Grootboom, aptly called 'JAN! MTHIMKULU'by the Ndebele at Hope
Fountain mission station where he also interpreted for and taught the
Helms the Ndebele language, appears to have initially won the con-
fidence of the Ndebele"especially his fellow drivers like Mutshweni
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Grootboom came to share the views and attitudes of his patron towards
the Ndebele state. Rev. Helm's endoresement of the Rudd Concession in
1888"when he knew the deception involved and the subsequent endowments
and favours the LMS received from the BSACo. after 1893,149 can hardly
be viewed as symptoms of Ndebele-philia. Indeed it is asserted that the
LMS missionaries in Matebeleland, frustrated and disappointed over many
years of sacrifice without any meaningful results, viewed the destruction
of the Ndebele state in apocalyptic terms and concluded that it was the
'wrath of God. •• -(agalnstr ••• oo{arstiffnecked tribe ••• oo{forrtheir constant
and persistent refusal' to come to terms with missionary enterprlse.150
The BSACo., 00. the other hand, was regarded by these missionaries as
151'a God-sent deliverer', and was consequently hailed with joy. This
atmosphere in which Grootboom worked in Matebeleland, strewn with
frustration, bittemess and pre-1893 Ndebele-phobia as well as corres-
ponding eulogy for the Chartered Company, might have left Grootboom
with little choice to make. Moreover, as a Mfengu, Grootboomwould have
anyway naturally aligned himself with the side which espoused Christianity
as its article of faith, For it has to be recognized that for the Mfenguof
152that era, Christianity went beyond the matters of an ordinary creed.
As for Grootboom's involvement in the 1893war, he features after
the fall of Bulawayo early in November 1893when he serves in various
capacities. We have already shown Forbes's initial fears about raising a
full quota of fighting men for the war and the promises he had made to the
members of the Mashonaland Force that,at least, they had some assistance
:Mabena, a driver to the Camegies, another missionary family. Vide:
Iris Clinton: Hope Fountain StOry: A Tale of One Hundred Years:
:MamboPress: Gwelo: 1969: PP. 10, 22-3.
14~ev. HelmJwhohad been in Matabeleland since 1875Jstated in 1904 that
his missionary body, the LMS, owned four farms of about 3, 000
morgen (6,000 acres) each in extent; a reward from the BSACo. Vide:
Evidence of the Rev. C.D. Helm, Bulawayo, September 9, 1904: in
SouthAfrican Native Affairs Commissim Report 1903-5: Vol. IV:
PP. 171-97.
15~ev. D. Camegie to R.W. Thompson, June 27, 1890, LMS quoted in
Calrns: OPe cit. P. 242.
15~ev. Elliott to R.W. Thompson, February 19, 1890, LMS in Ibid
152
Vide: Supra: PP. 15-7
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153coming from the Bechuanaland Border Police. After the fall of Bula-
wayo it became necessary to co-ordinate the two Columns in pursuit of
the fugitive Ndebele monarch. This task was no small affair. The Ndebele
impis during the fUght had no more towns to guard and consequently con-
centrated their strength on guarding the person of their king. But before
Forbes and Jameson, the latter having come down from Salisbury to accept
Lobengula's submission, took any action, attempts were made to locate
the position of Goold-Adams' forces. This task was entrusted to the
American seouta, Burnham and Ingram,led by Grootboom '••• a Zulu boy
154who knew the road to the South'. as Forbes then described him.
Kho1khoiand :Masarwa (San) trekkers were also set onto the trail of the
fugitive ldng's wagons, under the impression that their lmowledge of the
desert and the veldt as well as their ability to trace game spoor would pay
off in this task. 155 These efforts, however..failed and active pursuit was
thus required.
Having failed to save the Ndebele state from the white man's weaponry,
LobeDgu.lawas apparently now anxious to preserve his royal trappings that
were still left. His flight from Bulawayowas therefore part of his efforts
In that direction. After leaving Bu.lawayolthe Ndebele ldng and the royal
party were located somewhere in the bushy area near the LMS mission
outpost of Shiloh at a place called 'Thaba-zi-konga'. John GrootboomJa
very 'plucky boy'. so it was reported, Samuel and Wilhelm, all Africans
from the Cape/volunteered' to convey Dr. Jameson's letter to the king"
156requesting the latter to retum to Bulawayo. This letter, written In
Dutch, English and Zulu and conveyed by the Grootboom party on November
7, 1893}hadstipulated a time limit of two days within which Lobengula had
to reappear in Bulawayo, but by November 9, 1893"neither the king nor
the Grootboom.party appeared as expected. In fact, this began to reinforce
Forbes's anxiety over the mission which he had,from the outset;described
as dangerous and likely to render the envoys vulnerable to attack and massa-
153Vide: Supra: PP. 54 -,
154c.O. 417/136: Forbes's Report. •• p. 37.
155Burnham: Scouting on Two Continents: p, 163.
156Glass: Ope cit. PP. 216-22: It is argued by Glass that Jam.eson and
Rhodes were here trying to wtwit the 'Imperial Factor' in the peace
negotiations.
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cre before they reached the king.
Forbes's anticipation was not altogether wrong as the mission to the
Ndebele ruler turned out to be a trial of guts. The Grootboom party fell
into the hands of the Imbezu regiment, who took the letter and forwarded it
to the king retaining the bearers as prisoners. But serious danger to the
party was.however, averted by Grootboom's acquaintance with Umjaan, the
commander of the Imbezu regiment whomGrootboom had knownduring his
career as a driver and interpreter to Rev. Helm. In the efrcumstances,
this party of foreign Africans managed to get away with Umjaan's reap-
proach only for siding with the Company forces rather than the Ndebele.as
some of their fellow countrymen had done. 157 Umjaan may have here
taken the chance to make a comparison between Grootboom's position as
against that of the other Africans from the South then still on the side of
the Ndebelejlfke John Jacobs, John Makungaand the rest"though some of
these later deserted when it became apparent that the Ndebele would not
158win the war. However, when the Grootboom party returned from. their
excruciating missio~ they bore a letter to Dr. JamesonJwritten by Jacobs,
then still the king's secretary, indicating the king's wish to return, but.at
the same time,confessing that this could not be done as Bulawayohis seat
and symbol of authority had been destroyed. Itwas a surprisingly con-
cilliatory document which ended up irOnically with the king asking for
paper, pens and ink for writing purposes. The letter, it is alleged, may
have reflected the concilliatory mood of the older regiments, which the
Grootboom party reported were no longer interested in further fighting.
But these 'doves', the Imbezu and Ingubo regiments, were,howeverJoPposed
by the younger ones, the Insukameni, Ihlati and Siseba regiments, the
159'hawks' which called for fighting to the bitter end.
The effect of the Grootboom mission to persuade the king to return
and its subsequent failure wereto strengthen the resolve of Jameson and
Forbes that the king should be pursued, captured and forced to surrender.
For John Grootboom and his colleagues, this meant further involvement on
157C.O. 417/136: Forbes'S Report. •• PP. 39-40.
158Ibid: P. 46: Jacobs for instance later deserted at Bembesi in November
1893 and offered his services to Dr. Jameson to lead the Company forces
to Lobengula. II
159Ibid.
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an even wider scale. The news of the alleged slackening morale of the
Ndebele impia and the growing dichotomywithin these impia, coupled with
the desire to out-play the 'imperial factor' in ending the war, made the
whole case a vitally urgent one for Jameson. This urgency was apparent
in the impatience with which the Grootboom party's retum was treated.
160A second party of messengers had/in fact,been sent treading on their heels,
thus turning the affair into something similar to a relay game. As fur-
ther military efforts were . mounted to achieve maximum submission
of the Ndebele people,either on their ownor at the king's initiative, Groot-
boom himself was repeatedly sent forward together with the American
Scouts Burnham, his brother-in-law Ingram, and :Mayne",whomwe have
previously come across. These American 'cowboys' were,obviously,
greatly valued by the Company for their experience in the Apache and other
Amerindian Wars and their somewhat unorthodox or rough-and-ready
161methods of approach to bush warfare and general frontier problems.
But these same Scouts were, unfortunatelj; neither familiar with the Afri-
can languages nor the African terrain. For this reason,they relied largely
162on their 'Zulu boy' companion.
Indeed Grootboom.must have greatly impressed Burnham as the
latter's descriptions of scenes in Africa)which generally manifest a rabid
type of racism, do not include him. Burnham himself confessed that
Grootboom was '••• ~the)- bravest ••• black of all my African experiences',
and in lyrical terms, went on to compare the latter with the Natal writer's,
Rider Haggard's, fabled hero, 'Umsplopogaas] stating that:
He ~Grootboom)- was well known in the country, could
speak good EngUs~dWdwas one of the pluckiest Negroes
I have ever seen'.
This combination of the American and Grootboom scouting parties was
160!2!!!: This was the party of the 'Zambesi' envoys sent on November 8,
1893 and which succeeded in commingling with the Ndebele impis pre-
tending to be part of them looking for missing relatives.
161Sauer: Opecit. PP. 240-1: Dr. Sauer states that so unorthodox was the
approach of these American 'Cowboys' to African affairs that their
exploits included the destruction of ancient ruins in the Belingwe dist-
rict in particular in search for gold Dr. Jameson allowed them to do
so till Rhodes himself intervened. These 'Cowboys' later incurred the
disapproval of the High Commissi<ller when they also tried to rustle
cattle from.N/W Rhodesia in spite of Lewanika's protests.
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actually in itself symbolic of the increasing tempo of the war. The very
wide scope of scouting work.In the final stages of the 1893war, involved
securing information not only from the Ndebele captives, but also from
within the ranks of th enemy itself by hook or crook, which was quite a
hazardous affair; the scouts were responsible for incessant vigils over
the Shangant River and its trtbutartee, checking and tracing the spoor of
the fugitive monarch's wagons and, in the case of the Grootboom scouting
party especially, they had the added charge of capturing herds of cattle
repossessed by their Ndebele owners, rem.oving them, somenmes, even from
under the very noses of these owners. Such herds were.of course) very
important for the commissariat division of Forbes'S army.164
In the manner described above, Grootboom and his allies from the
South,who had sided with settler forces"met their challenges and were not
found wanting. Alongside his eompatrtots such as John Selous1 an old
hand of F. C. Selous during the latter's wanderings and hunting trips in
Central Africa for which the former eamed his employer's surname,
Ghert and John JacobsJwho changed sides In mid-course, Grootboom played
his part within the context of his situation, as a supplementary factor in
the 1893 war and in the overthrow of the Ndebele state. At the end of the
day, these African emigres formed what the Colonial Office termed, with
165some degree of detachment, 'a respectable total' of the casualties. But,
unUke their white counterparts In the war, they were not fighting for
economic rewards as the Victoria Agreem,ent symbolized, and it is not
certain whether some of them knew what the war was actually about,except)
of course,withfn the general context of current Southern African black/white
confrontation and struggle for supremacy. To say the least, these auxili-
aries were certainly fighting to promote the conqueror's ideology which
162C.O. 417/136: Forbes's Report •• , p, 50 and Burnham: OPa cit. PP.
163-7.
163Bumham: op. cit. p, 163.
164C•O. 417/136: Forbes's Report •• , : pp. 66-8. On account of the extra
nerve required towards the end of the war, it is reported that some
'Cape Boys' avoided this kind of engagement by feigning sickness.
165C•O. 417/136: Minute by Edward Fairfield to Fred Graham: March 7,
1894.
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166they had unconsciously borrowed; an ideology under which the whites
had no room for sharing political power with the Ndebele along with the
social and economic privileges associated with it. It WaB a war not only to
justify the ethos of white supremacy, but also to avenge British patriotic
pride.167
In the circumstances, it is hard to justify Robinson's collaboration
m.odel IDwhich the non-European emerges/in the processes of European
aggrandizement in Africa and Asia/aB a seasoned calculator/ gambling for
higher or lower stakes in what inevitably appeared a lucrative venture.168
This model applies in very few cases within the colonial fram.ework like
that of Southern Africa/except,of course.In terms of political and social
fission and we are obviously compelled to look elsewhere for a more turgid
explanation to this type of collaboration. The 1893 group of aliens had
neither cards to gamble with nor stakes to gamble for. They expected very
few crumbs,if any,from the confHct and were only a cog in the general
military and indeed colonial policy of conquest and"pacification:J But the
end of the Ndebele war of 1893 was by no means the end of Southern Rhodes-
fa's wars of conquest and resistance, and we shall once more meet our
alien African heroes" though in very much swelled numbers, together with
the indomitable John Grootboom in the rising of 1896-7.
166Memi: OPr cit. pp. 15-7.
167 Even before 1890, British travellers to M'atebeleland and Mashonaland
had vigorously resented Lobengula's power and control even for the
good government of the country. For this reason Frank Johnson had
stated in 1887 that ' ••• To feel meself under the power of a nigger is
worse than being in prison and quite enough to bring on fever.' John-
son's Diary, August 21, 1887: Quoted:ln Cairns OP. cit. p. 259.
168_
-Robinson: OP. cit. passim ..
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CHAPTER 2
The African Auxiliary Forces of Occupation and
Conquest in Early Southern Rhodesia, 1880's-1900
II The foreign African elements in the Shona
and Ndebele risings and after: 1894-1897
f Some Causes of the Risings
It is tempting to describe the period of BSACo. rule in early Southern
Rhodesia following the 1893 war as one characterized by general lethargy
with Company officials and their clients all in varying degrees of inebri-
ation. In a situation of this nature, relationships between the Administra-
tion and the Africans and between whites and blacks obviously suffered and
inexorably deteriorated. We shall therefore look into some of the features
of Company rule in this period, with special reference to the degree in which
they were responsible for the outbreak of the risings and the role of the
'alien' African factor as a collaborative mechanism in the story of the sup-
pression of these risings amongst the local African population.
Rhodes's aims and ideals of expanding British political and economic
control into the inner recesses of the African continent were magnanimous,
but these were also too ambitious to be realistic especially as they did not
for example take into consideration the presence of the African peoples of
the areas so acquired. This aspect of Rhodes's schemes was well demon-
strated by the absence of any defined 'native policy' in the territories admini-
stered by his Company; a shortcoming which some of his advisors had tried
to point out to him at the early stage of Company rule in Mashonaland and
Matabeleland, but in vain. One such advisor Sir Marshall Clarke, later
Resident Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia, who had on several occasions
warned Rhodes on the problems arising out of this administrative deficiency
stated in 1898:
••• long ago I tried to induce Rhodes to try something of the
sort (re: native policy) but he then had some idea that he could
ignorEi the natives of the country & make a purely white settle-
ment.
1Mas. Afr. S.211/3: Sir M. Clarke to Sir G. Lagden: Private: December 6,
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In the early days of Companyrule in Mashonalandand Matabeleland,
Rhodes was apparently too pre-occupied with issues of wider imperial
concern such as the Beira railway; the treaties with Gungunyanaof Gaza-
land; the annexation of Barotseland and adjacent territories across the
Zambesi and indeed the struggle with the Transvaal Boers, to consider the
African factor in the newly acquired territories as worthy of any reckoning.
But then it was not only these more ambitious plans which pushed 'native
policy' overboard in the Companyterritories at the time. Rhodes and
Jameson shared a kindred feeling of adventurism and a loathing for formality,
control and bureaucracy. In view of this, it is quite strange that Archibald
ColquhoWl,thefirst Administrator and a former civil servant in IndianRaj,
was ever appointed, given all his Civil Service background and orientation.
Colquhoun's appointment, wrong as it was, may well have been compensated
by the universal contempt in which he was held, symbolized here by the dis-
paraging descriptions of him portrayed by Rhodes's acolytes, who outrightly
regarded him as 'one of Rhodes's mistakes' and quite unfavourably compared him
2with Dr. Jameson. It was basically these reasons, so well reflected within
the top..level official stratum of the BSACoOJwhichwere responsible partly
for the neo-anarchical state of affairs in the Companyterritories between
1893 and 1896. The British government for its part did not help matters
either on account of its half-hearted policy as then directed especially by
Chamberlain at the Colonial Office and one euphemistically termed as that of
turning an 'Imperial blind eye' to the Company's activities,ldespite the
vtgUance demanded of DowningStreety by the Charter.3 Accordingly it may
therefore be surmised bere that the compliicity of the Imperial government)
in allowing the Company a free reign to exploit its political connections and
at the same time perpetrate a buccaneer system of administration in the new
possessions,lmfght have been tbe crowning factor to the chaotic situation/aptly
baptised by Galbraith with regard to the Jameson era in SouthernRhodestan
4
history as one resembling 'an engine without a driver.' The general con-
1898. The Lagden Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford. I am grateful to my
compatriot Francis Mashasha of Pembroke College, Oxford, for draw-
ing my attention to this material.
2 •Johnson: op. cit. pp. 102-3; 116-7: and also Ranger: Revolt PP. 51-4.
3C. Palley: The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-
~: Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1966: pp. 38-43.
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sequences of this absence of a defined 'native policy'; the development of
a noticeable taste for adventurism and the lack of Imperial control were,
to say the least, rueful as the risings and their aftermath will indicate in this
study.
The immediate effect of the absence of a proper mechanism to regulate
contacts between whites and blacks was that settlers began to take matters
into their ownhands in their dealings with the African inhabitants. Even
during the short-lived era of Colquhoun(1890-1), whohad tried in vain to
induce the Company officials in Kimberly and Cape Town to create a viable
framework for sound administration, these new arrivals had shown them-
selves to be less amenable to official control. In March 1891, one Hudson
of the Bechuanaland Exploration Companyfor example, raided the kraal of
headman Goredema in the Mazoe area north of Salisbury, burning the
dwellings and extorting five heads of cattle in fine for what he allegedly re-
garded as theft of his goods by Goredema's people. Hudson further justified
his actions <n the grounds that as Colquhounhad previously refused per-
mission to some of his fellow settlers to flog the Africans or take other
actions in the way of redress for misconduct, he (Hudson)had gone ahead
with his punitive raid anticipating that the Administrator might prevent him
5from carrying out such action.
After the departure of Conquhounin July 1891, dismissed on account
of his bureaucratio mentality, this development in the way of free reign for
the settlers was given official blessing by the new Administrator,Dr. Jameson.
Indeed such acts as that of Hudsonmentioned above became more common-
place and were not infrequently undertaken with Jameson's approval and
allegedly in the name of law and order. The Negomoaffair in March 1892,
in which Captain Lendy raided this Shonaheadman of Chief Mangwendewith
a patrol force, maxim guns and heavy artillery, killing in the process '21
men' inoluding among them headman Negomohimself and also capturing 47
heads of cattle as a punishment for Negomo's crime over striking one white
trader named Bennet and his servant and for allegedly stealing this white
man's goods, was only one of the many activities which characterized the
4J. S. Galbraith: 'The Engine without a governor: the early years of the BSA
Co. ': Rhodesian History: Vol. I: 1970: pp. 9-16.
5
Ranger: oPe cit. p. 57.
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quasi-anarchical nature of the Jameson Administration before 1896 and
consequently led to conflict between the Company and the African inhabi-
tants. In factjCaptain Lendy, together with a colleague of hlsjCaptain
Graham, had on another occasion also raided headman Goredema in Feb-
ruary 1892 in part fulfilment of some punitive and compensatory measures
in favour of prospectors and settlers of the Mazoe area who had allegedly
I
complained of thefts of their property. Thus Goredema, who had been
raided previously by Hudson, was once more raided by Captain Lendy now
with official approval and during the course of which action the latter sub-
sequently managed to kill seven of Goredema's men; wounded three and.as
usual, burnt down the village. 6
These raids against headman Goredema and others were obviously
symptoms of over-reaction on the part of a white colonist administration
described by students of colonial psychology as characteristic of 'a Nero
complex', 7 and which apparently had various justifications in those early
days of black/white contacts. In Iactjtt is said of such disproportionate
punitive measures that they were often carried out as a vindication of the
white man's strength and werejat the same timejdestgned to safeguard the
sanctity of the lives and property of the white people. In short, these puni-
tive actions were therefore.naturally; part of a characteristic defensive
policy of the early Europeans in Africa; one adopted in their efforts to com-
pensate for their inferior numbers and to protect the myths of the white
man's superiority and invincibUityJwhich were together essential for security
reasons, gfvenjas in this early Southern Rhodesian case, the larger numbers
of the African peoples they so faced. Cairns appropriately says of such
actions:
It was widely believed that the numerical inferiority of these
early pioneers had to be counter-balanced by a prestige and
respect on which•• , depended not oni the influence of the white
man, but 'often his very existence'.
In these circumstances, security considerations and racial psychology
naturally became entwined together in the process of administration at titre s
defying even the ideal of 'pacification', which most of these colonizing agencies
6.!2.!!!: PP. 63-6,
7Memmi: op. cit. pp. 52-3.
8Cairns: Opecit. P. 48.
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and powers in Africa claimed to have had in mind. Accordingly any inroads
tnto these aspects of colonial administrative psychology,especially by sub-
ject peoples,were thus taken as both insulting and dangerous and thus des-
serving of severe punishment. Cairns once more aptly describes this
phenomenon of colonial and racial psychology as explanatory to a state of
affairs whereby:
The murder of a white man, the ultimate indication of a
breakdown o~prestige, was thus an event of great symbolic
importance.
The Companyofficials and the white settlers in Matabeleland and Mashona-
land were certainly not unaware of the advantages derived from this ideo-
logical background to white colonization in Africa and elsewhere and there-
fore the activities of Hudson and Captain Lendywere viewed as token
reparations to the sanctity of white man's prestige and security to his life
and property against any form of ill-treatment by the Shonapeople of Mazoe
and elsewhere. But when the economic motives of the Companyalso came
Into play, this process of disorderly activities was carried even beyond the
norms of formal colonization requirements.
In any case,whatever methods were adopted by the colonist pioneers in
early Southem Rhodesia, the problems of the Jameson Administration were
in every sense considerable. Indeedwhile the BSACo.was prepared to
administer the territories in the manner,which, it was hoped, would permit
a measure of law and order to effect peaceful exploitation of resources, it
could however hardly afford to deploy the necessary capital and manpower
resources for the purpose; a problem also characteristic in other parts of
East and Central Africa where colonial administration had been left at the
mercy of private interests. Tn Matabeleland and Mashonaland, Jameson was
forced to streamline his economies with the result that the police force was
abandoned as early as 1891, as we have seen, and the settlers became the
backbone of both the defence structure and civil administration of the new
territories.10
9le!!!: pp. 49-50.
10Colvin: loc. cit, The white-settler volunteers were engaged for both
defence and civil services in retum for promises on free privison of
horses and protection. In this way the BSACo.hoped to spend as little
as £4 per head per annum for defence and police purposes.
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But the employment of especially farmers in the civil and defence
sections of the Administration of these territories introduced a new element
- the burgher law and the injection of personal interests in matters of gen-
era! concern. The system was naturally copied from a similar one which
had been quite popular in the SouthAfrican colonies in the earlier phases
11of their history. In the Companyterritories ,the farmers appointed to
assume these new responsibilities however began to promote their own and
their relations' interests under the rubric of law and order"before they could
pay any attention to the requirements for good government in their respective
areas. They confiscated African stock and acted as recruiters of labour
which they secured in the process by force for their own and the use of those
close to them. These farmers-turned-officials also developed a propensity
to interfere unnecessarily in African affairs outside the purview of their
authority and concern primarily for private gain. Cases of this nature and
of abuse of official authority in general were many and varied. The examples
of one Bruce, the first magistrate of UmtaU (1892)JandDunbar Moodie)the
leader of the Boer trekkers from the Orange Free State and himself the
first magistrate of Melsetter, were only some of the fewglaring examples
of this governmental process at work in the eastern areas of Ma.shonaland.
Moodie, for example, a Boer of Scottish origin, provides a particularly
interesting case study. He had been generously rewarded by the BSACo. for
his part in the negotiations leading to the Gungunyanatreaty with Doyle in
1892 and for bringing into the country what Rhodes considered the proper
type of settler, the 'poor whites' from the Orange Free State. These immi-
grants, it was thought, were most likely to stake their lives in the land in a
manner patently different from that of the miners and prospectors and were
therefore more liable to stay permanently in the new stateJespeclally given
111 this case the declining economic situation in the Orange Free State,where
the land tenure system could no longer sustain the age-old Boer tradition
whereby fathers allocated farms to every son in the famlly as his inheritance.
11The use of burghers for defence, civil administration and raiding African
societies for personal gain had been introduced in the 18th century at
the Cape: Vide: M. F. Katzen: 'White Settlers and the Origins of a new
society, 1652-1779': in M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson (eds.): The
Oxford History of SouthAfrica: Vol 1: Oxford University Press: Lon-
don: 1969: PP. 213-32.
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This system had apparently become impossible to cope with by the close of
the n:lneteenth century because of the territory's increasing population.12
Besides the enormous land rewards Moodiereceived from the BSACo., he
also acted as courier for private financial interests in the Free State"buying
them land in Mashonaland in return for commission. 13 These rewards did
not however satisfy this Boer leader, whowent m to exploit his official
position in the Company's employ in the Melsetter district and made a for-
tune by charging his fellowwhite settlers for odds and ends and also acted
as judge and jury in African cases.m return for payment in form of money
and stock. Besides, he also made extensive use of forced labour on his huge
farms for private purposes, compelling in consequence a large number of
Africans of the area to leave the Melsetter district and settle in the adjacent
14Portuguese territory of Mozambique.
Yet Moodiewas by no means an exception to the rule. Similar practices
were quite prevalent in the Charter and Victoria districts as well/where
farmers and field-comets took advantage of their authority to establish them-
selves as civil court judges in African affairs and extorted stock in the pro-
cess. Quite often these officials also deliberately sided with the offending
parties in Shonacivil cases in order to create a situation of perpetual strife
and in this manner promoted further lucrative ventures. The interesting
factor in the activities of these farmer-officials is that few of them understood
Shona languages and customs.
In the Charter and the Victoria districts in particular, this combined
Interference in Shonadomestic affairs by private farmers and Company
officials,especially after the creation of the Native Department fn 1894,
affected Shma communities to the very core. The policy of Native Commi-
ssioner (N/C)Alfred Drew in the Victoria district, for example, of delibera-
tely supporting the Shona junior house heads agafnst their chiefs; N/C Comp-
ton - Thompson's activities in the Charter district in forcing Headman
Marume to obey a senior chief, Maromo of the Guzho, who had no claim,
l~ennie: oPe cit. PP. 170-2.
13 disMoodiewas given 21,000 acres in the Marandellas trict as reward by
the Company in 1892 and one J. J.W. Swanepoelof the Free state gave
him a total of £1,650 to buy 12 farms in the Melsettler district: Vide
Rennie: OB cit. p, 206. '
l~anger: OPe cit. p, 59.
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whatever/0f fealty over him; and N/C Weale's ('Chari's') interference in
the Chilimanzi/Hama dispute in favour of the former)whose daughter he had
married)as well as his activities in supporting the political claims of the
Ngowa royal house against the Mhari house of Matsweru in the Chibi district,
were evidently some of the most unsavoury features of the BSACo.Admini-
15stration in the Shonacountry prior to 1896. These activities, whichwere
in their time only the tip of an iceberg, were.In all respects.actually the very
antonym of the dictum of Pax Britannica.
This process of general interference in African affairs was.however.not
confined to the local people's domestic affairs. The ill-formed and ill-
equipped Jameson Administration of the pre-1896 era also had other forms
of manifesting its presence. The widespread practice of forced labour"
which allowed the settlers to venture far and wide in the country quarrying
their requisite amounts of recruits) and the introduction of hut tax, which)
incidentally, entwined together these two aspects of the CompanyAdministra-
tion, were other means of administrative control and explOitationregarded
by the settler community and their allies as more scintillating. Farmers and
other private settlers whowere appointed hut-tax eolleotors.m form of
labour on the roads, money and stock,certalnly left no stone untumed in
the execution of their duties. Shootingof those who resisted the labour and
hut-tax demands by these funa-sevenzas was not infrequent, and it was
especially this practice which forced people to clear away into the bush before
or at the arrival of such colonist officials in the villages. A typical example
In this respect may here be illustrated by the case of Richard O'Reilly, a
farmer and trader in the Rusape district, the territory of Chief Makoni.
When.O'Reilly was appointed hut-tax collector in June 1894, he overtly took
advantage of the situation to promote the sale of his goods to Chief Makoni
and the Maungwepeople at exorbitant prices) threatening in the process to call
the police and bum down this ruler's homestead in the event of nm.-cooperation.
In the Lomangudi district too where a Mining Commissioner was put in
charge of the civil administration of the area, this official went about the
district securing labour for the prospectors and farmers and on one occasion
in March 1894, accompanied by Herbert Eyre a prospector and farmer of the
Umvukwes in the same district, en.dedup shooting some of the reluctant
15·Beach: The Rising•• , : pp. 288-9; Ranger: op. cit. PP. 59-63.
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labour recruits. The same methods were apparently pursued by his succ-
essor A. J. Jameson, also a Mining Commissioner, whose escapades in
search of labour very often ended up in violent conflicts. It waa.ln fact.one
such conflict which led to the shooting of three Shona chiefs, including in this
instance Chief Zvimba"by Sub-Inspector Hooper in September 1894, as we
16have already seen.
But whatever repercussions the above incidents might have produced on
black/white relations in the Shona country, they could not.however, in any way
exceed in dimensions the Brabant raid on the Budja Chief Gurupira in the
Mtoko district in February 1895. John S. BrabantJaUas Makuvire. who was
the head of the Native Department in MashonalandJformed in 1894, was par-
ticularly liked by his fellow settlers for the generally rough treatment he
meted onto his African proteges. On this particular occaston.Brabant re-
quested Gurupira to fUI a whole valley with stock for sequestration allegedly
in payment of hut-tax. In addltion,some 500 Budja men were at the same time
conscripted for labour on the mines. This Brabant raid was undoubtedly the
highest watermark of the Company's economic policy of free-booting. Sim-
ilar raids, but on a smaller scale, were repeated throughout the length and
breadth of the territory from the Mrewa district in the north to the Victoria
Circle in the South and from the Lomangudi in the West to the Melsetter in
the East.17
Through such activities as these indicated above, the BSACo. cmsequently
tightened its economic stranglehold on the country at a rate which alarmed
even some of those white settlers who were by no means negrophllists, but
saw in the Company's activities a growing threat to their own economic in-
terests as well. One such man was Robert Vavasseur, a farmer in the
Charter district of Mashonaland and an Oxford graduate himself, who was
compelled to contact an old friend Clement Webb of Magda1ine College at
Oxford in September 189S/with the intention that the latter might forward his
complaints against the Company to the Colonial Office. Moreover IVavasseur
was also a grandson of the well lalown missionary. Robert Moffat, and a
nephew of David Livingstone by marriage. He had at first visited the country
In the accompany of his uncle.J, S. Moffat, when the latter had called on
16Ranger: op. cit. pp. 67-73: For the Hooper incident: Vide: Supra: PP. 33-4.
17Ibid: PP. 72-80; 86-8.-
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Lobengula,prior to tm :1893W3r (JIlofficialbusiness. Later on.he took up
farming in Mashonaland and fought for the Company in the Anglo-Ndebele
War.18 Subsequently Vavasseur had become disillusioned with the Company's
economic policies and therefore his grievances were chiefly of economic
kind. He expressed these in a rhetorical manner in September 1895Jwhen
he enquired:
Are the Mashuna in Mashunaland (sic) British subjects,
and have they the rights of British subjects, or are they
the property of the British SouthAfrica Company?
Have they the right to sell their produce, maize, kafir corn,
etc., to anyone whom they choose to sell it without restriction?
Has the British SouthAfrica Companyany right to grant any
individual or individuals the sole right of buying such native
produce from the natives at their kraals? ••.
Is it not the fact that all the cattle, sheep and goats which the
Mashuna at some kraals in the Charter district possessed before
the Matabele war have been taken by the British SouthAfrica
Company's Police?
Has the British SouthAfrica Companyany right to !'!iW-sha
British subject for buying cattle from the Mashuna?
After posing these prodding rhetorical questions, Vavasseur supplied
the facts relating to the Company's activities,which, he thought, did not
tally with the basic characteristics of a British colony. He stated:
It is a fact that the British SouthAfrica police have taken
all the stock belonging to the Natives in this district ~Charter)-
which they ownedbefore the war, and that not in payment of hut
tax but in a simple raid by menwho could not even speak the
language. The Company have never been at War with these
Mashl.Dla,so they cannot call it loot, as they do in the case of
the Ndebele cattle. It is only too probable the Natives whohave
been subjected to this injustice wUlletallate and steal the
stock of the ~hite)- farmers here.
These aspects of the Company's economic pollciesJrelatfng to stock
seizure,were not the only causes of Vavasseur's worries. The Companyas
the political and economic power in the country had also granted trade mono-
polles to certain individuals.with regard to the supply of grain from the
Africans in Mashonaland
1
and by such means tried to corner the market for
18C•O. 879/47: Clement E. J. Webb, MagdaleneCollege, Oxford, to C.O. :
April 2, 1896.
19c.O. 879/47: Robert Vavasseur, Charter District, Mashonaland, to
Clement Webb, Oxford: September 22, 1895.
20Ibid,
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African agricultural produce. In the Charter district where Vavasseur
Uved, this monopoly had been granted to one Salisbury contractor named
Homan and it was to him alone that African peasant producers had to sell
their gram. Any sales of both grain and stock to anybody else were appa-
rently punishable by the Companywhich itself claimed the control and
monopoly of such sales. To the white settler/traders/this development
meant, especially in tim.es of drought like 1895, higher transport costs and
prices. Vavasseur and his colleagues in the Charter district who had been
for instance excluded from all access to the grain supply market in the
Mtekedza and adjacent Shona chiefdoms onwhich they had previously relied
for their supplies, were consequently forced either to buy some from Homan
himself"who retailed this grain from the Africans ' .•• at a price of 400 per
cent rise ••. ', or proceed to the Victoria CircleJsome hundred and seven-
teen (117)miles away for the purpose. With the drought and locust con-
ditions of 1895, the Charter district settlers were obviously compelled to
tolerate either of the two alternatives, as failure to do so meant shortage of
grain for feeding their labourers, horses and cattle. This was particularly
because.,unlike the neighbouring African communities, the white farmers were
unable to employ adequate labour on their extensive farms to counteract the
periodic locust invasions as the Africans did in their fields by turning out
in whole villages to meet these demands. Moreover, after travelling all the
way to the Victoria Circle to secure grain, as Vavasseur bitterly discovered,
this com.modity cost the Charter district farmers as much as £2.5/- Odper
bag,whereas locally they had usually obtained the same at 8/- per bag only.
Thus the problem of mixing politics and economies,which had all along been
primarily telling an the African population, was now also beginning to have
some side-effects on some aspects of white settlers' lives too. VavasseurJ
who had become more aware of the involved nature of the problem than most
of his colleaguesJcertainly also appreciated its immensity and thus concluded:
The Companywill, of course, deny 1t~the accusation)- blankly,
as it denies2,verything - being a corporation, it has no con-
science ••• '
Whilst a section of the white settlers were thus becoming aware of the
incongruities of the Company's economic policies and,simllarlYJwere feeling
21Ibid
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the pinches of the exclusive character of the policies in question, the
Africans who had everything to lose and little to expect from the new
economic and political set-up were in no way relieved. The Company's
stock-seizing activities were, for instance,easily the most hard-hitting
feature of BSACo. rule in the Shonacountry,particularly before 1896. Beach;
for example.argues that for the seventeen months between the birth of the
Mashonaland Native Department in September 1894 and the outbreak of the
Shona arisings in mid-1896, this Department had seized stock amounting
to about 2,369 cattle and 3,822 sheep and goats,which was, if translated
into percentages, approximately 24%of the total cattle and 19%of the total
sheep and goats in only four or so districts on which the calculation is based;
namely the Hartley, Charter, Victoria, Tuli and Iron Mine Hill (part of
, 22Selukwe) districts. It is even asserted that the collection of stock and
grain for hut-tax purposes had to be suspended in November 1895by Dr.
Jameson himself,arguingJas he did/that' ••. there wouldbe no cattle to collect
in a year or two•.• 'Iwhilst at the same time the 1895 drought had virtually
made prospects on future grain supply quite oblique. Beach also further
quotes Alfred Drew, a prominent official of the Native Department in Mashona-
land, corroborating the fact that Companyofficials were wont, in the early
days, to walking into an African cattle kraal, pick out the fattest young
heifer and ldll it ,without prior consultation with the owner,for the sake of its
kidneys, liver or some fanciful portion only.23
In view of these stock-seizing activities, it is therefore not surprising
that 'the white man's rule' became easily the most hated phenomenonin
early Southern Rhodesian African history. In the Chibi district of Southern
Mashonaland for instance,where Robert Duncanand his colleagues carried out
these nefarious activities, songs of protest deploring the loss of Shonacattle
wealth were composed and handed downfrom generation to generation as part
and parcel of the people's traditional history. One such song goes:
Ngombe Dzavana baba (x2)
Dzapera naMaldwa (x2)
Ngombe, Ngomhe,
Dzapera naMakiwa.
22Beach: The Rising; p. 285.
23!2!!!: pp. 285-6.
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(The cattle of our fathers (x2)
They're finished by the white men (x2)
The cattle, the cattle, 24
They're finished by the white men. )
To these Shona societies of the Jameson pertod , who had no means of dif-
ferentiating between the Company and the settlers, they obviously viewed
both in terms of 'white men' and that was enough for them.
Finally, there was the question of local women which further complicated
relations between the newcomers and the indigenous peoples. Both the white
settlers and their foreign African clients,who had both come without female
compantons.were quite prone to fall victims to their passtons. Whilst some
of the whites married these Shona women or kept them as concubines, as they
25popularly termed the practice, others were content to abuse local women on
a hit-and-run basis, with the result that within the Shona societies there
developed a tendency among the women to nee at the very sight of these
pioneers or their foreign African auxiliaries. 26 This and all the other feat-
ures of BSACo. rule during the period between 1890 and 1896, created a
situation whereby conflict was impossible to avoid and,sooner or later, it carne.
The causes of the rising in Matabeleland, as in Mashonaland, were
equally the same in character I arising as they did from the Company's mal-
administration,following in the footsteps of the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893.
But two important factors operative in Matabeleland during the 1893-5 period,
..
2~ecorded at Madangombe, Chibi District, and sung for the author by Messrs •
Abisai Madangombe et al. ; September 14, 1975.
25In Mashonaland a good number of early Native Commissioners,for Instance,
married local women. Even F. C. Selous,the famous hunter himself,dld
t he same and his son was actually still living in Salisbury in his father's
house, the famous 'Hunter's Lodge' at Kopje by the 1960's. Vide: Vambe:
An ill-Fated People: pp. 205-9, 240. other white colonists preferred
illicit connections with local women behind the scenes, while at the same
time playing an innocent role among their fellow whites. For a fiction-
alized version of this kind of activities, Vide: Olive Schreiner: Trooper
Peter Halket Of Mashmaland: T. Fisher Unwin: Lmdon: 1897: PP. 39-
41. (This aspect of black/white social reatians in the early period of
Southem Rhodesian history and after has been adequately dealt with in a
work concurrently carried out with mine by a fellow Zimbabwean,but
complete a few months earlier than this. Vide: LD. J. Mandaza: White
Settler Ideology. African Nationalism and the 'Coloured' Q.,uestion in
Southem Africa: Southem Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Northem Rhodesla/
Zambia and Nyasaland/Malawi 1900-1976: D. Phil. thesis (unpublished):
University of York: 1978: Vols. I & II.)
26Beach: op. cit. pp. 216, 268 and Ranger: op. cit. PP. 67-8.
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however,underUned the basic features of Companyrule among the Ndebele in
a manner that did not obtain in Mashonaland at the time, The Ndebele after
1893 were a coo.quered people whilst the Shonawere merely 'occupied'. In
this respect,the former were made to feel the pinches of military defeat and
its accompanying humiliation more painfully than the latter. Such treatment
was further engendered by the earlier resentment of the white pioneers against
Lobengula's political control of the country which militated against white
ambitions. This resentment was well demonstrated by Frank Johnson, the
organiser of the Pioneer Column to Mashonaland, who had plotted with Rhodes
27to assassinate Lobengula as early as 1889. After the 1893War,the Ndebele
were naturally victims of the carry-overs of this pre-colonial bitterness and
resentment. The second feature which distinguished the situation in Mata-
beleland after 1893was the more vigorous economic approach adopted by
the victorious Company and the settlers towards the new territory. This
vigorous economic approach which white settlement entailed in Matabeleland
was characterized by two factors: firstly, the geographical position of
Matabeleland and its proximity to the SouthAfrican colonial markets and
systems of communication which also rendered it wlnerable to total economic
warfare after 1893. Secondly, Matabeleland's economic resources had,as a
matter of fact,actually been pledged before the 1893war in form of the Vic-
toTfa Agreement as a device by the Company to goad the reluctant settlers
28hlto the war against Lobengula, Thus after the 1893war, the land and
cattle issues became easily the most dominant preoccupations of the BSACo.
Administration in Matabeleland as the Companyforged ahead with the economic
transformation of the former Ndebele state that was no more.
The land question in Matabeleland was dealt with with such rapidity
after the war that by October 1894, when a Land Commission was appointed
to look into the matter and distribute the land equally between the two races,
there was l1ttle suitable land left for the Ndebele. The Companyhad naturally
given away the land as rewards and emoluments to the participants in the war
as it had promised. Moreover, various individuals like the rudimentary
aristocratic class and other less prominent people lounging in the Company
27Samkanga OPe cit. pp. 150-65; and Cairns: Ope cit. PP. 48, 236.
28Samkange: loco cit.
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tenitories in quest of fortune and fame/gained considerably from the
Company's post-war benevolence,when the cutting of the melon was carried
out. An extensive system of land alienation therefore emerged at an early
stage,which later became a stumbling block in the administration of the
province. The Ndebele were either banished to the remotest and most in-
hospitable areas of the territory, where two reserves, the Shanganiand the
Gwaai, were created for them or remained as squatters on their former
lands now ownedby white landlords.29
In the meanttme.the appropriation of Ndebele cattle was the more pre-
dominant concern of the BSACo. in the period after 1893. The fact that these
cattle had been prized before the 1893war, singled them out as a visible
sign of victory on the part of the Companyforces. Thus cattle seizure and
appropriation started the very day the war broke out and was therefore only
canied out to perfection and minute detail after the Ndebele had been defeated.
It was in fact on Ndebele heads of cattle that Major Forbes's forces had
relied for their commissariat division. 30 A handy pretext,well exploited by
the Company in the Ndebele cattle question,was in this case the quasi-
anthropological argument that all the cattle had,after all,belonged to the king
and the Companybeing the king's successor by right of conquest was there-
fore,consequentlY.,entitled to the whole lot. All that the Ndebele rank and
file could ever hope to gain, it was argued, was the remainder to which they
31were entitled only through the benevolence of the Company. Here play was
of course being made on the quasi-feudal nature of the Ndebele political and
military system. This was a factor which rendered vulnerable not only the
Ndebele political and economic system,but also those of the related Nguni/
Nganl states as well. The Nguniemphasis on cattle like the Massi as a form
of mobile wealth whilst quite suitable during the periods of continuous and
successful military raids and migration, was not however easily commend-
able in cases of defeat. Like their COUSins, the Ngunistates of Gazaland in
Mozambique and the Ngoni of Mp_zeni in what later became the provtnee of
Nortb/Eastern/Rhodesia across the Zambesi, the Ndebelewere obviously
29Ranger: op. cit. PP. 6; 106-14; Vide Infra: Chapter 7 for further discussion
on land.
30Vide Supra: PP. 54-6.
3~anger: oPe cit. PP. 105-14.
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being hoisted by their own petard. Just as the Gaza of Gungunyana lost all
32
their heads after their defeat by the Portuguese in 1895 and the seizure of
Mpezeni's cattle by the BSACo. after the defeat of the Ngoni of Mpezen; in
1898, 33 the Ndebele fell victims to the potential wealmess of their state
organization in 1894Jas was also to happen to their cousins at later times.
As far as Lobengula's herds were concerned, the matter became quite an
involved affair, attracting as it did even. free-booters from the neighbouring
Boer republics across the Limpopo. The BSACo. which wielded both
economic and political control over the former Ndebele state was however
the principal winner. In the end, it was reputed to have left only 40,930 heads,
for use by the defeated Ndebele people-out of the previous total of 280, 000
34heads existing in pre-1893 Matabeleland.
The BSACo. 's activities with regard to the Ndebele cattle question, like
the land issue, naturally had widespread repercussions on Ndebele economic
life. Even some of the white settlers who had previously supported the
Company's military campaign against the Ndebele in 1893 were also begin-
ning to resent its aggressive economic policies. Robert Vavasseur of the
Charter district in Mashonaland, whom we have already come across on the
same question in that province, 35 once more complained about the Company's
seizure of Ndebele cattle,with the same old vigour,queryfng,as he didJin the
process:
Is the Secretary of State for the Colonies aware that the
whole of the Matabele cattle, whether the property of the King
or of private Individuals, has been. claimed by the British South
Africa Company as loot: whereas in the Zulu wars only the
cattle of the King were claimed? That these cattle are still
being taken. and being sold, till in many Matabele kraals there
is no longer any milk on which to feed the young children:
that British subjects have been punished with iTisonment
for buying private cattle from the Matabele ••••
32p. R. Warhurst: 'The Scramble and African Politics in Gazaland' in
E. Stokes and R. Brown (eds). : The Zambesian Past: Manchester
University Press: Manchester: 1966: PP. 60-1.
3~ennie: 'The Ngoni States and European Intrusion' in Stokes and Brown
(eds, ) OP. cit. pp. 328-30.
34Sir E, R. Martin's Report on the Native Administration of the BSACo, ,
Cmd, 8547; July 1897: (British Parliamentary Papers): PP. 9-10.
35Vide: Supra pp.
36c. O. 879/47: Vavasseur to Webb, September 22, 1895,
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Native Commissioner 'Wiri' Edwards and a colleagueJwhohad ignorantly
bought cattle from the Ndebele in 1894,had apparently to flee in haste to
Mashona1and,when they discovered to their surprise that all the cattle in the
province were supposed to belong to the Company and not subject to sale to
37private individuals.
In Mashonaland the prohibitive instrument the CompanyAdministration
deployed regarding the sale of cattle by the Shonapeople was only its enabling
leglslation,the Sale and Disposal of stock Regulations (1.895). But in Mata-
beleland the matter was different. Both this legislative device and the Com-
pany's claim of ownership over Ndebele cattle by right of conquest operated
in such a way that the white settlers and the Ndebele people themselves were
bogged down on the cattle issue. Indeed when the Native Department was
created in Matabeleland in 1894,it functioned primarily as a cattle-collecting
agency and among some of the duties of the Native Commissioners (N/Cs),
each of them was instructed, as Sir Richard Martin reported,
••. to supply the Government with 50 head of cattle eac\flonth,
which they did through the agency of the Native Police.
These Native Commissioners and the Native Police in their tum evidently
carried out their duties to perfection and the cattle question thus consequently
created a situation of perpetual dread and uncertainty within the Ndebele
society. The appearance of these officials and their African aides in
Ndebele vlllagesJin the course of their cattle-draftlng visits in the pre-1895
perio~ were, to say the least, not occasions for comfort and joy to the
Ndebele. As the Rev. David Caroegie of the Lmdon Missionary Society in
Matabeleland informed Sir Richard Martin after the rising, the Ndebele were
no lODgercertaJn which herds belonged to them any more,as the Administration
made repeated inroads onto those that were left. In short:
They ~debele)- never mew when the next drain wouldbe made
on the herd in their possession, nor howsoon they~Jght be
deprived of those battle they considered their own.
The Ndebele were also affected in various degrees by other features of
the Jameson Administration between 1893 and 1896. As in Mashonaland, the
absence of a defined 'native policy' to act as a directive for the operations of
37'Wiri' Edwards: 'Reminiscences': IT:loco cit.
38Sir Martin's Report on the ltative Administration of the BSACo., P. 9.
39S1r Martin's Report ••• : loco cit.
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Matabeleland Native Department was also a severe handicap. In Matabele-
land, consequent to the 1893 conflict, the Native Department assumed a
peculiarly military character and this military character of the Department
was strengthened by the false assumptions of the white colonists that such
a machinery was rather parallel to the pre-colonial Ndebele state, then
considered essentially dictatorial and oligarchic on account of its military
orientation. The reckless characters too chosen to man the Matabeleland
Native Department did not alleviate matters either, as far as their Ndebele
proteges were concerned Some of these officials, from all appearances,
actually did not even seriously regard the Department as an organ of civil
adm1n1stration,but instead started using it and their official positions to
organise Ndebele raids into the Shonacountry for cattle. Colonel H.M. Hey-
man, the magistrate of Bulawayo,who organized such raids into the Victoria,
40Hartley and Selukwedistrictsl is a good example in this respect. For the
Ndebele society too with its previous social and political stratification which
had apparently survived the death of Lobengula and the 1893crisis, the
demands it also faced at the hands of this ill-formed MatabelelandNative
Dpeartment were culturally incompatible and disruptive. The Abezansi (the
aristocracy) and the Hole (the commoners) were nowbeing indiscriminately sub-
jected to the same treatment in the process of this Department's efforts to
meet colonist labour requtrements, The Ndebelewere a conquered people
now and they had Uttle choice. But they could only tolerate the situation
insofar as their patience would permit and when this stock of patience ran
out,they rose against the Company's maladministration.
The character of Companyrule or more appropriately the Jameson Admin-
istration in Mashonaland and Matabeleland before 1896, influenced the whole
course of interaction between the white settlers and the African indigenous
peoples in the various branches of Ufe as we have discussed above and the
effects of these contacts were not the best that could be desired. When the
1895-6 drought, locust and rinderpest disasters came onto the scene,acting
as fuel to dry tinder, a cosmic factor was introduced into the saga of black/
white relations and to meet the situation, the local peoples consequently
appealed to their traditional mythology for means with which to combat the
40:aanger: op. cit. pp. 115-6, 118-9.
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impending disasters and in this manner gave a freehand to traditional
leaders to assume the leadership. Both the Company's maladministration
and the cosmic factor had created a shock situation by 1896 and it appeared
only proper that the local people should appeal to their traditional religiOUS
, 41
bellef system to provide the requisite psychological balance.
As the purpose of this study is primarily to examine the role and involve-
ment of foreign Africans in the Shonaand Ndebele risings in 1896-7, on the
same pattern as we have previously seen in the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893,
we shall not here go into the detan of the Shonaand Ndebele risings. Having
established the guid pro guo of the risings in the first part of this section, we
shall proceed to pick out the highlights of foreign African cmtribution in the
course of these conflicts and determine the implications of such contribution
thereto in order to understand subsequent historical developments.
11 The African Police, Messgers and Foreign Military
Auxiliaries: How they were raised and assisted the white settlers
When the Native Departments were formed in both Mashonalandand
Matabeleland, an essential feature of their composition was the role of
African the police and messengers. Both branches of this Jnstrument of
civil administration had no hard and fast regulations regarding the recruit-
ment of African police and messengers, but appeared to rely m both local
and foreign material for these services. In Mashonaland,where the Native
Department was headed by Brabant, an illiterate youngman from the Cape
colony with a strong partiality for African beer and womenbut whowas/all
the same Ivery much admired for his rough qualities by the BSACo. officials
41It might be noted here for observation that this author strmgly rejects
the revisionist interpretation of historians associated, however tenuously,
with the colonist Rhodesian 'establishment', as recently demonstrated
by Julian Cobbing,onthe role of Shona traditional religion in 1896-7.
Vide: J. Cobb1ng:'The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodes-
ian Risings of 1896-1897': in Journal of African History: Vol. XVIn:
No.1: 1977: PP. 61-84. Whilst Cobbtngis entitled to his own conclusions,
I strongly contest and challenge the assumptions and inferences on which
such conclusions are based. Vide: E. P. Makambe: 'Colonialism and
Racism and their Bearing on the Shonasocieties in colonial Zimbabwe,
c. 1880-1930: The Dimensions of a Natimal Tragedy': Postgraduate
Seminar Paper: History Department, AhmaduBello University: Zaria:
36pp. (forthcoming).
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42and white settlers, a general idea on the manner inwhich this department
operated has been given by 'Wiri' Edwards, the former Native Commission-
er for the district of Mrewa to the north-east of Salisbury. In his remInisc-
ences, 'Wirl' Edwards describes his boss,Brabant.las a '••• rough diamond,
but. •• -(a)- first class N/C ••• " whohad no room for rules and regulations
governing the Department's etiquette except:
Get to knowyour district, and your people. Keep an eye
on them, collect tax if possible, but for G~s sake don't
worry headquarters if you can avoid it••••
The Native Commissioners in Mashonalandwere,in this manner)therefore
given greater latitude to operate on their own and, In the way they saw fit,
to shape matters to suit their particular districts. They raised their quotas
of African messengers and police and armed and provided them with uniform
of 'cat or monkey skins and feather head-dresses ••• ' or any other accoutre-
44ments as befitted the status of these functionaries. These aides, as the
case of 'Wiri' Edwards's sixteen messengers and police illustrates, were
very effective and instrumental in the process of hut-tax eollectten, then paid
In klnd and in form of sheep, goats, cattle or pigs, since there was little
currency in circulation to raise the 10/- per hut required by the Company.
The African police and messengers were also especially useful on punitive
raids to secure hut tax and labour or in mounting attacks against hostile
chiefs and their followers, occasions which,in most cases,involved violent
45conflicts and burning downof homesteads.
But local African messengers and police so employedby the Native
Department did not last very lang,especially once the risings broke out. How-
ever Iwhile they were still in the service of the Native Commissioners, they
incurred deep euraes symbolized by the names these functionaries earned for
themselves)through what their kinsmen regarded as ignominious associatim
~anger: op. cit. PP. 74-6, and Andrews)JohnWhite of Mashonaland: P. 51.
Brabant, whose Shonanickname, 'MAKUVIRE',sfgnifiessomeone who likes
beer (a ShonaBacchus), was however dismissed at the end of 1895,for
obtaining the daughter of a certain ShonaChief for carnal purposes by
threatening violence to her father.
43'Wiri' Edwards: 'Reminiscences' II: 9.P.r ctt. p. 12.
44Ibid: and Vide: Plate IV: (picture): HeadMessenger, 1898.-45Ibid: PP. 13, 16-20; and Ranger: op, cit. p. 74
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with Company rule. In the Shona country for Instancejvartous distinctive
names were coined for these African collaborators. In the Salisbury dist-
rict/they were called imbga dza vasungute (white men's dogs) or magubwe
(roek rabbits). 46 In the Charter district,these associates of the white people
were nicknamed mbeva (rats), a term applied also against foreign African
47Methodist teachers,as we have seen. The Shena people resorted to these
abusive names as a way of venting their spleens on these African quislings,
who were then taking advantage of their position to abuse their own people.
With their uniforms and sjamboks, these black functionaries openly resorted
to excessive abuse of authority and behaved generally as if they were no
longer of the same kin as other African people, Their social status had been
raised and.not unnaturally, they tended to identify themselves with their
masters under the new order. They represented what approximated to a
newly assimilated class in a colonial situation, with its characteristic ten-
dency to overplay its new role in order to please the 'colonizer' and,by so
dOing,gain closer identity with the latter. Indeed such a class of people,as
symbolized by the African pollce and messengers in the pre-1896 era in the
Company territories,mlght have well fitted Memmi's category of the recently
assimilated 'colonizers' of whom he says:
They push a colonial mentaUty to excess, display proud disdain
for the colonized and continually shaw off their b~8rowed rank,
which often belies a wlgar brutality and avidity.
These African auxiliaries may of course have viewed their own position
in a different light. With their uniforms and sjamboks, the overt symbols
of their collaboration with the white men, 49 these people thus represented
what Vambe calls the epitome of the 'the sjambok reign of terror that was
unleashed against their own people', as far as their operations in the Shona
50CO\DltTywas concerned. In view of this, the resentment these African col-
46Vambe: An ill-fated People: p. 125: Joseph Savanhu: 'The Waharawa Hist-
ory': NADA:No.3: 1925: pp. 59-62.
47Vide Supra: pp. 32-5.
48Memmi: op. cit. p, 16.
49Van Onselen argues that these uniforms and sjamboks were some of the
rewards of the African police for collaborating in Rhodesian mines:
Vide: van Onselen: 'The Role of Collaborators •••• ' loe. cit.
50Vambe: OP. cit. p. 107. For the sjambok reign of terror, Vide also
Samkange: Opecit. pp. 240-2.
85
laborators of the pre-1896 period fomented amongst the local people was
obviously proportional to the treatment they meted onto their victims.
Among the Shona people of the Chishawasha country in the Salisbury district,
Vambe aptly captures the uneasy feeUngsJthat existed between the local
people and the African police and messengers.from the oral tradition of the
period in question. These feelings, which were by no means friendly, are
portrayed by the Vashawasha as:
They -{African poltce)- were continually ammg us. To them we
were not people like themselves. • .. They came into the African
villages for all sorts of reasons and were a law unto themselves,
just as was the European. They used the sjamboks freely. They
were arrogant and insulted everybody without cause. Each man in
untform Insisted on being addressed as mwana we ngosi, son of
the Native Commissioner or Government, a self-aggrandizing
title which was accepted as meaning that whatever they did olj;faid
had the full backing of the white power that they represented.
Such activitiesl involving the excessive use of the sjambok by the Company
authorities and its poltee.were commonplace in the Shona COlDltry. In the
ChiUmanzi district, where the African police and messengers were just as
eager as their couaterparts in the Salisbury region for acts and titles of
self-aggrandizement, they were also called Varuwasha (the sons of the chief)
and woe betide anyone who denied them. the honorific glamour and other
social benefits they considered they were so entl.tled to by virtue of their
52association with the Native Department.
Bearing in mind these activities of the African police and messengers,
it is not surprising therefore that when the risings broke out,the African
functiOllaries and their masters were not spared. As for the local African
auxlliaries)some however managed to avoid this unfortunate end to their
hitherto successful careers by deserting and joining their kinsfolk in the nick
of time. But even then some of their kinsmen were not prepared to accept
this belated repentance with ease. The messengers of 'Wirl' Edwards once
51 ...., ..
Vambe: OPt cit.: PP. 107-8.
52 . , ..... .. . .. . .... -
Jntervie\vs with Mrs. Tsindika Tadeno and Mrs. Mbevi T~tewende. Madan-
gombe. Chibi district, July 26, 1975.(Mrs. Tadeno, originally of the
Chilimanzi district but married in Ch1bi district, was more acquainted
with this early period). The Rev. Graaf in his interviews in the Maran-
dellas district was informed that the African police threatened to go to
bed with anybody's mother-in-law,if they were not treated with proper
honour, and such type of punishment is unimaginable in Shona custom.
Vide Graaf: ope cit. PP. 169-71.
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more give us an interesting example on this point. Before the 1896 rising}
these messengers and police in the Mrewa district had included in their
number the Kahiya brothers, Savanhuand Jacob, the sons of Chirozwa
Kahiya of the Seke chiefdom in the Salisbury district. These and other Shona
messengers had been quite useful to 'Wirl' Edwards during his escapades
to subdue the M:arambasection of the huge Mrewa district in the heart of the
Fungwi people. Jacob Kahiya in particular had played quite a prominent
part in these operatlons,especlally during an affray against one Gamina (the
lame one), a limping European labour agent of the Trans-Continental Tele-
graph Company,who had been wont to raid the Fungwi people and extorting
labour by force from them. Jacob had actually been captured by Gamina's
horde of labour touts and kept prisoner in the forests of the MountDarwin
area, where the telegraph line had then reached, but later on escaped his
53captors. Savanhu, his brother, was 'Wiri' Edwards'\Head Messenger.
But when the Shona rising broke out,all this faithful service was forgotten as
the Kahiya brothers made their secret exit, taking along with them their
families and firearms without Edwards's permisSion.
The nature of the departure of the Kahiya brothers from Mrewa is,in
many ways/dem.onstratlve of the secretive character and the careful con-
cealment which accompanied the Shonarising. In. this instance, .at the out-
break of the rising, Chirozwa Kahiya the father of these two local m.essengers,
realizing the cmtempt and resentment the Shonapeople reserved for col-
laborators from within their own communities, left the SaHsbury district
secretly and went to fetch his sons personally from 'Wirl' Edwards's service
in the Mrewa district. Kahiya's approach to the matter of his sons' plight
was 1Uldoubtedlycommingled with stealth and cunning; a line of action
adopted by this man perhaps in fear that his miscreant SOIlS mjght spill the
beans and cause general panic withfn the Mrewa camp. He thus gave it to be
understood by his two SOIlS that he had come to fetch them home OIl account
of their sister's serious illness and nothing more. But interesting as
53Savanhu is the grandfather of Jasper Savanhu, the famous Southern Rhodes-
ian African politician and one of the first African MP's during the days
of the Central African Federation,starting in the late 1950's. Vide:
R. Gray: The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Rela-
tions in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: Oxford University Press: London:
1960: PP. 318-9.
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Head Messenger, Mt. Darwin, 1898 (Plate IV)
Extract" from N.A. D.A. series.
Kahiya's secretiveness might have been, it is even more intriguing to note
that on their way home from the Mrewa district, the Kahiya brothers were
only served from perdition by the differences of opinion within the ranks of
Kunzwi-Nyandoro's army, a force which fortunately included some relations
of the Kahiyas and had been sent out to deal with the collaborators and their
. t . th 54asSOC18. es m e area.
The recruitment of local African police and messengers for the Native
Department differed,however,in the several districts of Mashonaland. In
some mstancea.It was a result of genuine response by individuals to the
white men's labour demands.often achieved through direct appeals by the
Native Commissioners themselves to chiefs, headmen and house heads to
induce some of their relations to take up service in the Department. 'Wiri'
Edwards, for example, used this method in appealing to one Katiyo, a Budya
headman under Chief Gurupira of the Mtoko district. He had lmown headman
Katiyo during his early days as a trader in the area,before his appointment to
55 .
the Native Department in April 1895. Some of his colleagues like N/C
Weale of the Chilimanzi district, who had married Chief Chinyama Chiru-
manzu's daughter, exploited this relationship and enlisted the chief's sons
and brothers as police and messengers in his service in the Chilimanzi
56district. But the case was,however,totally different with those foreign
Africans in the service of the Native Department.
Initially, there was a decided preference, by the whites of whatever per-
suasion,for Africans from South of the Limpopo for employment in any
ancUlary services, whether in private, religious or administrative sectors.
This preference for the people with whom the pioneer colonists had come
along from the South was not at first unreasonable. But the inclination was
at times pursued to fanatical extremes; some of the white circles even
indicating their intentions, if so it were possible, to fill all their services
with foreign Africans from the South. Such intentions were however frust-
rated by the small numbers of the foreign Africans then at hand in BSACo.
territories in the pre-1896 period. On their part, the foreign Africans so
54Savanhu: 'The Waharawa History' loco cit.
55 'Wiri' Edwards: op. cit. PP. 16-20.
56Sister Mary Aquina: 'The Tribes in ChUimanzi Reserve and Their Rela-
tion to the Rozvi' NADA:VoI. IX: No.2: 1965: pp. 44-5. Vide: Plate IV:
Head Messenger. Mt. Darwin. 1898.
88
engaged were greatly handicapped by their masters' as well as their own
attitudes towards the local people; a situation which in the event created a
lot of problems for them and the Administration. The case of the Zulus in
the Salisbury district may indeed be of particular interest as an illustration
at this juncture. In September 1894,an affray took place between a party of
Zulu wagon drivers and leaders and Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro's peopleled by
the chief's son.Panashe, These Zulus had apparently let the cattle they were
then in charge of stray onto the crops of Nyandoro's peopleJinflicting heavy
damage In consequence. But when the aggrieved party demanded compensa-
tion by means of civil action through their chief, the offending Zulus viewed
the demand with scorn and disdain, well described by 'Wirl' Edwards in the
following terms:
The Zulu drivers considered themselves much superior to
the Mashona, and they treated Panashe's demands with contempt.
They l,.hed at the idea of paying them -(the Shona)-compen-
sation.
The Zulu aides could not reconcile their own self-image and misconcept-
ions over the local people to the realities the situation demanded and thus
refused to pay the compensation so required. This refusal not unexpectedly
led to a violent conflict during the course of which one of the Zulus was
killed and Panashe himself was wounded. But as Companyrule before 1896
had no regard whatsoever for the welfare and interest of the local peoples,
plus the fact that Zulus and other Africans from the Southwere frequently
more favourably treated by the white settlers than their local counterparts
in matters of this nature, the Administration charged Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro
twenty heads of cattle for the affray. The judgement in question was delivered
in absentia as this Shona Chief refused to recognize the legitimacy of Com-
pany rule and.mdeed.when Vuta, N/C Archie D. Campbell, one of the
youngest men in the Pioneer Columnwhohad been appointed Native Com-
missioner on the strength of his nuence in Zulu language, went out to enforce
the decision of the CompanyAdministration, Kunzwi-Nyandoroassumed a
patently belligerent attitude either towards .Y!!!! himself or the messengers
subsequently sent on the same errand. In fact,it was even decided that for
so treating the servants of the white men, Kunzwi-Nyandoroshould be dealt
with in the same manner as Captain Umdy had previously dealt with Negomo,
57'Wirl' Edwards: Ope cit. PP. 8-9.
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the headman of Chief Mangwende.in1892. But this plan could however not
work,as Jameson was already preparing for his raid against the Transvaal
and there was therefore no white police to spare. 58 Thus,in this way.the
foreign Africans differed in status from their local fellow collaborators. The
former enjoyed the patronage of the Administration and their masters Jwho
were somehow convinced that these foreign Africans were of better quality
and therefore offered better service to their white employers than the local
people. The CompanyAdministration at first also put a very high premium
on the value of most foreign Africans in the white men's service and these
functionaries were obviously not unaware of this.
Taking advantage of the official blind eye and the favoured treatment
the authorities then bestowed onto them inthose pre-1896 days, the foreign
Africans created a state of terror amongst the local people/during their rounds
of labour and hut-tax collecttoe, by exercising powers,which their authority
did not warrant them. Their treatment and abuse of local women in the
outlying districts tumed these auxiliaries into veritable denizens of the local
societies, as they went on creating pandamonium in those villages where they
59put up an appearance. Their relations with the local people, especially
women, were a basic feature of the many social problems arising from the
practice of recruiting foreign Africans into the country, either as labourers
in the mining and farming industries or the police force. The Zulus were no
exceptions to this phenomenon. Indeed the case of one Meyiwa, the wife of
a Zulu migrant to Mashonaland, brought before the Native Commissioner of
the Mapumulo district in Natal inAugust 1903,is very demonstrative on the
social problems of these early Zulus in the Company territories. Meyiwa's
husband, Dungumuzi alias Thomasi ka Mnyamana, arrived in Mashonaland
in 1893 from Johannesburg,where he had been working,and for some time was
virtually not heard of. In Zululand,his wife and relatives had actually given
him up for dead,when in 1897he wrote from Matabeleland,whither he had
moved,indicattng that he was no longer able to retum to Natal as he was busy
'selling his cattle'. In the eventJthe wife and relatives wanted the Natal
60
Native Department to bring him back by force. Dungumuzi,in fact.had
58Ibid,
59Beach: op. cit. pp. 216, 268; andRanger: op, cit. PP. 78-9.
60N•B. 1/1/20: Statement of Meylwa, wife of Dungumuzi, before J. J. Jack-
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initially volunteered for short-term service in the Companyterrftortes, but
was no longer interested in returning home. In the meantime,he and his
compatriots became a social problem to the local people and,in the pre-l896
period, such problems were considerable in both Mashonalandand Mata-
beleland. It is for these and other reasons therefore that the foreign Africans,
lying outside the purview of the local people's social life and cultural norms
as they did, were thus killed together with their white masters.
Whilst the recruitment policy for African police and messengers to the
Native Department in M:ashonalandlacked coherence and the force so re-
cruited before 1896was coosequently a heterogeneous admixture of odds and
ends from both the local and foreign African material, the case was alto-
gether different in Matabeleland. Here a uniform pollcy was pursued with
regard to the so-called Native Messengers and Police and their enlistment.
Their services in the Matabeleland Native Department.formed in 1894 to
deal mainly with the cattle question, were essenttal.as it was their duty to
brand, trace and collect the Company's huge herds in the province. After
the 1893warJ the BSACo. officials actually toyed with the idea of importing
Zulus from Natal for the purpose and in June 1894, Captain C.W. Breton of
the Inniskilling Dragoons was even despatched thither to carry out this task.
For this reason, the BSACo. Secretary, Dr. Rutherford Harris, wrote
LondonWall at the same time outlining at length the basic features of Captain
Breton's mission to Natal and the Zulu scheme as follows:
He -iBretonr shall go to Captain Mansell with a personal
letter from Mr. C. J. Rhodes and endeavour to raise a force
of 200 trained Zulus. Hewill communicate to us -iBSACo.r
the pay which they are at present receiving for their services,
and also what the suggested increase of pay should be to
induce them to volunteer for service with the Companyin
Matabeleland. If it is necessary in order to obtain volun-
teers from the present trained Force to promise them that
their wives and children shall be allowed to live with them,
Captain Breton has the power to do so, but the Companywill
not be able to send up their wives and chUdren this year but
will undertake to do so early next year -i1895r.
Their uniform and armaments shall remain as it is at present
in use, but Captain Breton shall arrange for sufficient clothing
for 12 months according to the Regulations in force in the
Zulu force.
son, Magistrate, Mapumulo:August 5, 1903, Enclosed in S,O. Samuel-
SOIl, Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, Pietermarltzburg, to C/N/C.
~ August 11, 1903:R/N/A: SalisbUry.
91
Captain Breton shall also promise to each man an area of
garden ground on which they will be allowed to erect their
own huts for their wives and families, - in the case of those
who have wives and families - and the use of which groun(\)1
will be granted to them for gardening and other purposes.
It was consequently within the framework of these Instructions that
Captain Breton was naturally to carry out the Zulu scheme and, with the
help of Captain Mansell of the Zulu Force in Natal, to layout a plan,
for Rhodes's consideration, by means of which those Zulu recruits who re-
mained in the Company's service for a specified period would derive some
advantages in return for their services. These advantages, as pointed out by
Dr. Harrls,included also shares 'from the cattle taken ~from the local
peoplej- by way of fines'. The Zulu recruits were to be sent up by wagon
transport from Natal via the Transvaal to Tuli near the LimpopoRiverJ in-
side the Company territories Iwhere they were to be divided into two sections;
one for Bulawayo in Matabeleland and the other for Fort Victoria and Salis-
bury in Mashonaland. The services of one Mr. Cook, a brother-in-law to
the Crown Prosecutor in the Company terrftortea, were also solicited to
help Captain Breton's recruiting venture in Zululand, with Cook lUldertaking
such service in the capacity of a clerk and possibly securing permanent
placement in the Company territories as an interpreter, should he be succ-
essfully persuaded to accompany these Zulu recruits from the South. The
BSACo. officials fixed the number of Zulu recruits required for service in
the country at 200 all told, but left all the detail relating to things like unt-
form and other police gadgetry to be arranged between Captain Breton and
the military authorities in Matabeleland and Mashonaland In this way, the
Company officials in the Cape Town Office thus made scrupulous arrange-
ments for importing Zulu police recruits from Natal and Zululand for service
in their territories in the north. They had even come to an agreement with
the Cape Town Agent of the Union Castle to transport these recruits by sea
from Durban to Beira,at the rate of 30/- per head,fncludtng deck accomoda-
tion and rice rations, in case the overland route via the Transvaal turned
62out a failure.
61CT. 1/4/13: Dr. Rutherford Harris, Secretary, BSACo., Cape Town to
London Board: June 1, 1894: BSACo. Correspondence, Cape Town
Office: R/N/ A: Salisbury.
62Ibid: E. Steele, Agent, Union Castle Shipping Co. Ltd., Cape Town to
Dr. Harris; June 12, 1894.
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However, Captain Breton did not find matters as simple as his superiors
had at first given him to understand, when he arrived in Natal on the assign-
ment. In the first stages of his mission,Captain Breton's hopes were ex-
ceptionally high,especially after meeting his Natal counterpart, Captain
Mansell, and the Governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, In Pietermaritz-
burg. The former had apparently promised to give Breton some of his own
Zulu police officers to form the nucleus of the proposed contingent and had
also assured Breton that the quota of recruits he so required could be raised
with ease and at a very low cost. Breton and his BSACo. superiors In their
estimation had apparently calculated the rate of pay for these recruits at
about £2 per merraem each, while Mansell actually paid them in Natal only
£1 per mensem.
From this point of view, Breton's initial optimism appeared quite justi-
fied But the BSACo. envoy had not had any interviews as yet with the other
leaders who carried weight in the country; namely the Natal Prime Minister,
Sir John Robinson, and Sir Marshall Clarke, the Resident Commissioner of
Zulu1andbut later of Southern Rhodesia. When a day later, on June 13,
1894, Breton had held a second interview with Sir Hely-Hutchinsm and was
informed by the Governor not to prooeed with his scheme on account of what
the Governor considered very strang objections to it in Natal and thus to
wait for further consulations, Breton was understandably embittered and
accordingly conveyed his feelings to Dr. Harris in Cape Town in the same
vein:
It is a most damnable -(and)- silly objection & it is this that
the, Boys -(Zulus)- after having served their time in the
Chartered Co's (sic) service would come back to Zululand
as trained Police and might form a nucleus of disturbances.
As I told the Governor why for so many years have they kept
the Zulu Police in Zululand as they are only engaged for 1
year & then go off to their kraals, but he did not see it. I
dare say can see the real reason as well as I can, they don't
want to help Rhodes on account of his attitude towards Natal and
they take this way of showing their feelings.
After urging secrecy on the part of Dr. Harris, Captain Breton then con-
tinued:
I think myself it is a most rotten objectlm but I expect it will
pace out alright & I will just give the Governor a little more
63 ..
Ibid: Capt. C.W. Breton, Pietermaritzburg to Harris, Cape Town:-June 12, 1894.
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time & then g06t see him again as I want to go to Zululand
& begin work.
Breton's optimism had been dealt a heavy blow,but he would not accept
the prospects of failure which now clouded his mission to raise Zulu police
recruits for service in the Company's territories. He continued somehow
to retain a measure of his former optimism,anticipating that matters might
turn out favourably after all and,for that reason,recouped his confidence by
harping <Xl assurances previously made to him by Mansell on how easy and
cheap it was to raise the requisite force of these Zulu recruits and.eon-
sequentlY,saving,in the process, a larger part of the £1,000 the BSACo. had
deposited for him in the standard Bank in Pletermaritzburg for the purpose.
Perhaps unjustifiably) he also still hoped that he could succeed to mould a
Zulu contingent,especially for Matabeleland)in which service Mansell's Zulu
officers would form the core. SUchdetermination as Breton showed,even
in the face of some early symptoms of failure might of course have been part
of his plan to justify an offer of a magistracy, the Companyhad promised
him at the end of his Natal mission. His bitterness over the obstacles arising
in Natal was indeed only matched by the corresponding resentment of Rhodes
and other Company officials who readily concluded that the objections of the
Natal poltttctans were deliberatively disruptive and malicious. Dr. Harris,
for instance,informed Captain Breton in commiseration:
If ••• , Natal politicians think they are going ty,FOY him
-{Rhodes)-, they are very much mistaken ••••
But the Natal politicians were not the wilful villains the BSACo. imagined
them to be. They,in fact,put forward very forceful arguments to justify
their objections to the Company scheme,which did not for instance take their
security into consideration. As Sir John Robinson, the Prime Minister, in-
formed the Governor, these objections relating to the state's security were
the basic causes of the negative reactten of the Natal politicians to Breton's
request. He argued that in the first place, all the colonists in Natal were
agreed that they would not approve of any scheme which tended to revive
Zulu military instincts1as this could 'be fraught with evil or peril in the
future as regards the Native population'. The 'evil and peril' alleged by Sir
.. 64Ibid: Breton to Harris, June 18, 1894•-65J!:W!: Harris to Bretoo.: Telegram: July 8, 1894.
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Robinson lay in the fact that the removal of the Zulu recruits in question to
Matabeleland would cause as much confusion within the Zulu population in
Natal and Zululand as it would certainly be a dangerous experiment/because)
on their return from Southern Rhodesia as trained men, it was feared/these
Zulu police recruits would inevitably become a focal point of attraction and
trouble,consequentlyl putting the security of the white colonists at risk. In the
second place, Natal was still looking forward to and awaiting the approval of
the Secretary of state for the Colonies to incorporate Zululand. The chances
of a favourable decision by the Colonial Office could be harmed should a force
of Zulus with military training return from Southern Rhodesia to foment
disturbances. But it was primarily on the first objection that Sir Robinson
put his emphasis; an objection that appeared quite popular with the rank and
file colonists in Natal,that the BSACo. scheme:
••• would tend to keep aHve the military instincts and habits
which made the Zulu Nation so formidable a menace in the past
to the peace of SouthAfrica. They -(colonlsts)- fail to see what
guarantee could be afforded that the men thus deputed for what
would practically be MiHtary Service might not, sooner or
later, return to ZulutefJd, and become there a source of
-(strife)- and trouble.
The basic arguments on which the objections of the Natal politicians and
colonists were foundedwere considered,by the Imperial Officials in South
Africa and Britain}sound ones. The Governor of Natal even went on to indi-
cate that similar objections had been previously raised in 1890,when
Colonel Curtis attempted to recruit Zulus for Imperial service; a plan then
67popular with the War Office in Londonbut equally blocked by Natal colonists.
For the BSACo. in 1894, the failure of its Zulu scheme must have been
more injurious to its economic strategy than it could have ever been to the
War Office which suffered similar reverses in 1890. For OI1ething, the
Company had already started counting its chickens before they were hatched.
It had alreactr calculated in advance to minute detail on the manner inwhich
the Zulu poHce recruits would actually have to be distributed throughout
various centres in Matabeleland and Mashooaland. Bulawayo in Matabeleland
66.!2!!!: Sir John Robinson, Prime Minister to Governor, Pietermaritzburg;
Confidential, June 19, 1894.
67
~ Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, Governor, Natal, to C.0.; Confidential,
June 25, 1894 and also to Sir Marshall Clarke, Zululand, Confidential:
June 21, 1894.
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had been supposed to get the bJggest number;with a total of about 100 Zulus
there,where they were expected to serve with 25 white troopers; Salisbury
was to get 60 Zulus serving alongside 15white troopers and For Victoria
40 of them serving under N/C Brabant. The payments of these Zulu rec-
ruits as well as those of white officersJexp8cted to work with them,had also
been meticulously planned and estimated in total costs at about £10,200 per
annum.68 But this financially attractive proposal decided uponby the Com-
pany with such careful calculations was nonetheless a fiasco. The Company
had based its plans on the classical colonial tradition of relying on those
African national groups with welllmown military traits for colonial military
and police purposes. The War Office had also previously failed in this res-
pect at least as far as Zulu recruits were concerned as has been indicated,
and it was obviously an idle thought for the BSACo. offi.c1als,with less lev-
erage on both SouthMrican and British seats of power, to have ever imagined
that they could succeed in the matter.
The immediate effect of the failure of Breton's Zulu scheme was
apparent. The Companywas consequently forced to rely on the local mater-
ial for its police requirements even in :Matabeleland,with one or two
foreigners also assisting in related fields. LondonWall,for Instanee.treated
the question of raising local Ndebele pollce for the period after 1893 as an
urgent matter and therefore insisted that the Administration should raise:
••. a thoroughly efficient force on which it GWSACo.)- could
rely in the case of native troubles arising.
Further pressure on the subject of raising a local African police force
was exerted onto the CompanyAdministration and directorate by the im-
pending prospects on extending Companycoo.trol across the Zambesi; a
move later delayed, fortunately for the Company, by the risings. The in-
determinate conclusion of the Anglo-NdebeleWar of 1893had made the
Company Administration in Matabeleland feel somewhat insecure militarily
and this factor could be said to have greatly fnfiuenced the organization of
the Ndebele police raised 1.Dlderthe auspices of the Native Department of the
province. This Ndebele police force, consisting of 150nm-commissianed
68!!m!: Draft Estimates on Zulu Police: Enclosed in Breton to Harris n. d.
69BSACo. Directors' Report and AccOlDltsfot the Year Endlns :March,
1895: P.ll
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Ndebele officers and men,drawn mainly from Lobengula's two crack regi-
ments' the Imbezu and Insukamini, was mouldedby the Chief Native Com-
missioner (C/N/C),Herbert James Taylor,himself on semi-military lines,
perhaps to conform with the volunteer force system then simultaneously
instituted among the white settlers of Matabeleland.
In any case C/N/C Taylor was apparently quite determined to make his
Ndebele force an exemplary organisation and after putting it through a one-
month course of training, posted the recruits to different stations throughout
the province. Indeed it would appear that by the end of 1895, Taylor had
succeeded in his objectives,as favourable reports were already coming in on
the capabilities of his Ndebele force, especially on the shooting skills of
70what the officials considered a 'smart body of men'. The duties of this
force for whose success, so it then appeared, Taylor was thus highly credited,
included among other things:
••• asSisting Native Commissioners in the various districts in
collecting hut tax, arresting deserters, branding cattle,
tracing hidden cattle, procuring evidence in native cases,
and police and ~tect1ve work generally in connection with
the natives ••.•
As far as its work in these police matters was concerned, Companyofficials
were generally agreed that the Ndebele force had been a success. And such
success during the 1893-6 period of Company ruleJof courseJgenerally meant
anything which militated against the interests of local African societies. In
Matabeleland for instance,this success may have been obviously reckoned in
terms of the numbers of cattle and the amount of labour this Ndebele force
procured from within the Ndebele society.
To some extent the Ndebele police force was reinforced in the course
of its duties by foreign Africans from the South}some of whom the Ndebele
insurgents later complained about so much to Rhodes at the Matopopeace
settlement in 1896. Together these African functionaries were largely respon-
sible for the brutal treatment of the Ndebele people; tweaking the beards of
the indunas, insulting the young men, ravishing Ndebele daughters and.worst, n
of all)making sexual advances to women.of the Ndebele royal house. In
70BSACo, Directors' Report and AccOlDltsfor the Year 1895: p.I4
Vide: Plate: V: (PIcture): Matabele Native Police.
71Ibid,
72Ranger: OPe cit. PP. 118-24.
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short, it was a combined force of this newly assimilated class in a colonial
situation and an element which lay outside the pale of the social organisation
of the local people that the Ndebele were dealing with and it is from this
point of view that Ndebele bitterness towards their collaborating kinsmen
must therefore be examined As for the foreign Mricans, NgangonyiMhlope
aptly summarized the feelings and reactions of the Ndebele people towards
them and why, when it became necessary to kill the white men in the Inyati
district for instance, the foreign Africans were killed as well. Mhlopeand
his fellow insurgents, for example,killed a Zulu servant together with the white
73settlers '•.• because he was as good as a European'.
By their reactions, the local people in Matabeleland underlined quite
clearly that the rising was not a racial war, but a movement to counteract
what they saw as lDlfair and unjust treatment by the CompanyAdministration
of the period To save themselves from certain perdition, the local Ndebele
police, who had been perpetrating these iniquities against their own people
purely for ideological reasons, deserted!!!-. masse and went on to rejoin
their own people and,in this waYJconsequentlystrengthen the latter's defences
by injecting those shooting skills for which they had been,ironically, so much
praised by the Company officials before. By this action, the Ndebele police
therefore deprived the Company forces of a Significant number of local col-
laborators in the Ndebele rising.
But before we leave the question of the Ndebele police in the period bet-
ween the war and the rtstngs, it must be pointed out here that the mythJso
popular in Southern Rhodesian colonist historiographYJthat Shonapolice were
raised for services in Matabeleland and vice versa is not in any way proven.
by facts. 74 Indeed this myth,which has been popularized by some historians,
obviously for their own sinister designs, has no factual basis at all except
insofar as it is a gross oversimplification of the involved character of the
1896-97 risings. Even after the risings,the question of Shona police serving
in Matabeleland or Ndebele ones being conversely engaged in Mashonaland
did not apply. In fact,the African police ever employedwere found only in
Mashonaland where they formed the major part of the 'Black Watch', as the
Mashonaland Native Police was called, and it was not at least as late as
73Ibid: p. 130.-
74warhurst: 'The Scramble and African Politics in Gasaland': PP. 60-1.
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1904 that Matabeleland had any African police at all in the service.
The proceeding study on the Shonaand Ndebele risings has so far pre-
sented many important arguments. In the first place, we have established
the causes of the risings Iwhich, as the preceding argument has shown, were
a result of the inherent shortcomingS of the CompanyAdministration in
Matabeleland and Mashonaland between 1890 and 1896. Secondly, we have
discussed the role of the African police and messengers with special ref-
erence to how they were recruited and in what ways they collaborated with
the white settlers thereby eventually courting their owndoom. We have also
examined the composition of these African police forces in both provinces
with regard to the proportion of local and foreign African elements and their
respective influence on the risings as a collaborating factor. In the succeed-
ing part of this chapter, we shall ,accordingly, round up our analysis by
examining the nature of both local and alien African collatoration in suppressing
the risings ,starting with the Shonacountry where collaboration by the local
people was the most prominent feature }dueto the fragmented character of
Shena societies themselves, and how this lack of lDlitymatched with the col-
laboration practices of the foreign Africans and together played into the hands
of the white forces of colonialism.
76We have discussed somewhere else in this chapter, the animosity
which collaboration excited within the Shonasocieties at local level, as the
scornful niclmames given to collaborators signified. But even with all their
contempt of collaboration at local level, the various Shona societies could
not prevent collaboration by kindred communities of different pe.rsuasloo..
Indeed in the punitive attacks mounted by the Shona insurgent forces an
isolated white settlements, the Shonaevinced some of their venom against
collaboration with the whites by killing both the foreign and local African
collaborators together with their masters. The attacks, at the beginning of
the rising,agatnst N/C Mooneyof Hartley district; the Nortons in the Salisbury
district and James White, the representative of Willoughby's Consolidated
Company in Marandellas district all demonstrate this point. Even Shona
antipathy towards some of their women, formerly concubines to the white
75Vide: C. O. 417/393: Lt. Col. R. Chester-Master, Commandant, British
SouthAfrica Police (BSAP)to C.O. : November 14, 1904; and also C.O.
417/373: Lawley to Chamberlain: August 10, 1903.
76Vide Supra: pp. 84-8.
99
settlers and 'Cape Boys! is also indicative of their resentment towards col-
laborators and thus these women were retained in captivity under Nehanda's
guardianship. 77 Yet in spite of this hostility, the Shona could not harness
their animosity to prohibit further actions of collaboration in which it appears
sister societies competed to outplay one another and instituted once more
a pattern of alliances very much similar in nature to that which they had
previously formed to counteract Ndebele and other invasions of the pre-1890
era. In this way the Shona therefore exposed themselves to the machinations
of the BSACo. in 1896. The causes of these shortcomings on the part of the
Shona societies, it could be said, were endermic to their social and political
organization and} in the event) the Shona provided more collaborators from
amongst themselves than they could prevent.
Beach may have revealed ..in his study of the risings in South-Western
Mashonaland, some of the more fundamental aspects of Shma societies whioh
determined to a large extent the nature of Shona resistance and collaboration
in 1896-7. 78 The characteristio fission and general disunity whioh then
dominated the Shona country severely handicapped the prospects of a united
front in 1896. The absenoe of a centralized political system and authority
since the fall of the Rozvi Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century
also had significant impact in the Shona country, as in the absence of these
basic factors united political and military action was impossible to achieve.
But even if, as a matter of speculation, unity of action may have been attained
temporarily in other fieldsJlike traditional religion)in the course of Shana
struggle against white forces of change, this would still have been less mean-
ingful J especially as far as Shoo.a political organisation was concerned. The
Shona collateral system of succession to chieftainship for example, unlike
the Nguni primogeniture one, made any prospects of pol1ticallDlity at various
stages of Shona history quite difficult though not altogether impossible. By
its very character, the Shona collateral system of succession provided con-
stant opposition and threat to the new pol1t1calleadership by entrenching the
77H. M. Hole's Report on the Mashonaland Rebellion: Part II: October 29,
1896: Enclosed in BSACo, Reports on the Administration of Rhodesia:
1896-7: pp.7t~2
78Dr. Beach has however expressed to the author that since writing his
thesis in 1971 he has now changed his views on Shona collaboration in
1896-7: Personal Communication from Dr. Beach, HiStory Departmen..1
University of Rhodesia: March 15, 1976.
100
fact that an alternative leadership was always available and ready to assume
command, should circumstances warrant any change. In this way,Shona
political leadership, whether real or potential, was therefore easily vulner-
able to external overtures from the enemy camp itself. The matter was
even more complicated by the institution of polygamy amongst the Shona
chiefs}which inevitably multiplied the numbers of royal houses and claimants
79to chieftaincy.
Whilst in the pre-colonial era such problems were easily solved by
cleavage and simple secession from the major chiefdoms due to the absence
of physical and political restraints, with dissident royal houses breaking
away to form their own independent but related dynasties in different parts
of the country and away from the main ethnic groups, this could not however
work in the colonial era when boundaries became more fixed and were there-
fore not liable to fluctuation at the will of the local chiefs. ContendingShona
royal houses had to be contained in one chiefdom in spite of their differences
in the colonial era. Moreover, it has to be observed that Shonachiefs relied
for support on their people's goodwill and not on coercion as what usually
happened with the Nguni political systems which tended to rely on military
power. The implications of this relationship between the political leaders
and their followers in Shona societies were that the chiefs had to depend
solely on their own roles as spiritual guardians of the people; roles bestowed
onto them not only by virtue of descent but also by their capability to pro-
vide land and other forms of economic and social security for their people.
Any chief who could not provide such assets in a Shona society was naturally
liable to lose his followers as they eventually broke away and joined neigh-
bouring chiefdoms more capable to guarantee these features of ShonaUfe.
Indeed,the posttton of the Shonachiefs in the absence of coercion was
not an easy one. Such a state of affairs was obviously further weakened by
the economic impotence of these Shoo.achiefs who had to depend largely on
themselves and the efforts of their own families for economic survival, since
no Shona law provided for any levy or tribute as an instrument of political
organization. These features of quasi-democratic nature in Shonasocieties
79In the Madangombedynasty of the northern part of the Chibi district, to
which the author belongs, there are at the present time (1976)10 royal
houses eligible for succession to only one throne.
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extended even to military affairs. Withoutboth coercion and compulsory
regimentation, this meant that Shonachiefs could only rely on a voluntary
citizens r army rather than the regular professional forces which characterized
the Nguni military and political systems. This aspect of Shonapolitical
organisation even further left the chiefs at the mercy of their followers than
any other factor, making it even more imperative for these leaders to have
the interests of their people under constant review, lest they might not afford
to defend themselves against their foes once most of their people had left
80and joined neighbouring chiefdoms.
The final aspect of Shona social and political organization which proved
a source of wealmess was the marital system. Most clans and totems in
Shona communities did not allow endogamy and consequently marriage within
the same communtty,where people were most likely of the same totem,was
impossible. In this way,the Shona societies became more outward-looking
and ready to tolerate the torwa (foreign) element within their ranks}in order
to provide wives and husbands for their children andlespeciallYJfor the ehtld-
ren of the chiefs on whom the societies depended for their cultural and social
welfare. A natural development from this outward-looking tendency was that
Shona societies became constantly ready to forge new alliances and links with
either foreign groups or other distantly related sister societies}with the
result that this socially essential practice in the end began to influence Shona
poUticallife as well; first with the arrival of the Ndebele and later that of
the BSACo. Thus it was obviously this constant search for allies and alli-
ances that rendered Shona societies wlnerable to the collaborative mechanism
and the policy of divide and rule In the Southern Rhodesian colooial era
before 1896. 81
In short, Shona societies characterized by the relative lack of autocratic
political control, ecOllomicallyand politically impotent chiefs, absence of
80In this respect Shona societies ta1Uedin many respects with the Sothol
Tswana ones. Vide L. M. Thompsoo: Survival in twoWorlds: Moshoe-
shoe of Lesotho 1786-1870: Oxford University Press, Clarendon: 1975:
PP. 8-16; For the Nguni systems, Vide: Omer-Cooper: The Zulu After-
math: Chapters 2-4 and 9.-81This argument m Shona societies is based on Beach: The Rising: PP. 42-
53; A.K. Weinr.!1ch (sister Mary Aqutna): Chiefs and Councils in Rhodes-
ia: Heinemann: London: 1971: pp. 106-10 and C. Bullock: Mashona Laws
aid Customs: Government Printers: Salisbury: 1913: passim.
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regular armies, constant fission and schisms within the same societies to
satisfy marital and land-hunger requirements or as a sign of protest by dis-
contented royal houses questioning the legitimacy of the particular political
leader in control, were naturally, on account of these features, subjected
to chronic disunity and liable to fall victims to the processes of collaboration
in the face of external attacks and invasion. Shona tendencies also to resort
to external factors or impartial third parties as arbiters to solve their
internal problems, especially where coo.tendfngparties were concerned, did
not make matters easier either. The problems of the Rozvi Mambos at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, for example, were thus in every way a
reflection of the Shonapolitical, economic and military organization at work.82
Even the relationship between various chiefdoms within the Shonacommon-
wealth were often liable to collapse in the face of a astrongly organized enemy
as Shana/Ndebele relatioo.s demonstrate before 1893. A veritable system of
alliances, resistance and collaboration had been forged in the Shcmasoc-
Ieties in response to Ndebele military raids. A threefold pattern of alliances
had also emerged within these societies on these lines; firstly, a group of
Shona chiefdoms which submitted to Ndebele dominance and identified them-
selves as tributory states of the Ndebele political ldngdomJbut at the same
time retaining the entrails of internal political autonomy they still had The
group which adopted this solution included the Rozvi chiefdoms in the modem
Gwelo-Que Que districtsJ like Rosant (Losani) and Rukuruba (Lukuluba»)
whose leaders became couriers for the collection of Ndebele tribute fTom
other Shona states. The second group accepted Ndebele tributary statusJ but
unlike the first one did nct.bowever.also accept Ndebele cultural and political
Ideology. This group essentially provided services to the Ndebele monarch
in form of herding Lobengula's cattle, supplying labour to build Lobengula's
dwellings or provision of young recruits then engrafted into the Ndebele
impis all in return for immunity from regular Ndebele raids. Suchchiefdoms
in the Shona country,which accepted this form of association with the Ndebele
state,were situated mainly in the eastern direction of the latter. Those
Shana chiefdoms which accepted herding LobengulD cattle included the north-
82Beach: OPe cit.: PP. 115-25; K.R. Robinson: 'The Archaeology of the Rozvi'
and D.P, Abrahams: 'The Roles of the Mhondoro-cults In Shona
Political History' both in Stokes and Brawn (eds, ): op, cit,: PP. 3-27
and 28-46 respectively.
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ern Mhari dynasties of Nhema, Banga and Munyikwa inthe present Selukwe
district} and Mapanzure in the modem Shabani area. Chiefs Chitawudze of
the Bubi/Umzimgwane area to the South-West and Wozhele, the Rozvi ruler
m the Que-Que region, also accepted to undertake the same service to the
Ndebele state. Chiefs Chirumanzu and Hama in the Chilimanzi district on
the other hand provided labour, whilst chiefs Madangombe, Masunda and
Shiku in the Chibi/Shabani area, for example, provided military recruits. In
the Nyoka country to the north-west of the Ndebele state, the Shangwe Chiefs
Chireya, Pashu and others paid their tribute to the Ndebele rulers in tobacco,
the famous Nyoka tobacco of Southem Rhodesian colonial era; hence the
83saying among the Ndebele that Chireya was 'the king's snuff-box'. The
third group of Shona states however remained outside the purview of Ndebele
aUiances and even military operations and it Is this group which was lnstru-
mental in bringing onto the scene the Portuguese as a factor in Shona military
alliances against the Ndebele.
This state of affairs; regarding Ndebele/Shona relations} while providing
a new factor in the Shona system of alliances also presented Its problems,
Some Shana chiefs began to exploit the situatlon)using the Ndebele as a new
whip-cord to settle their old scores. The Ngowa of the Belfngwe district,
for example,took advantage of their relationship with the Ndebele through the
marriage of Makwa, Lobengula's sister, to solicit Ndebele military aid In
attacldng their Mbari kinsman,Chief Chibl/across the Lundi river In the
present Chibi district as well as against the Dumbuseya of Wedza Mountain
in the Shahani area. Even individual Shona aspirants to polltlcalleadership
were also not unaware of the advantages proffered by the Ndebele factor to
further their claims to their respective Shona chleftalncles as Chiefs Bangure
Chirumanzu and Chibl Mazorodze did, when they employed Ndebele military
84
power to back their claims against other more acceptable claimants.
83Beach: OPt cit. PP. 124-81: C. L. Carbutt: 'Reminiscences of a Native
Commissioner' NADANo.2: 1924: pp. 76-82; Paskari Tizirayl:
'The Story of the Chillmanzi People' NADANo. 26, 1949, PP. 36-8;
Rufu. M. M. Ncube: 'The True Story re:- Chaminuka and Lobengula'
NADA No. 89, 1962: pp. 59-66: and Interviews with Mr. Madhlangove
Madangombe: July 26, 1975.
84Paskari Tizirayi: 'The Story of the Chillmanzi People': loc, cit,:
Johnson H, Tagwlrey1: 'The Origins of the Mhari clan': NADANo. 27:
1950: pp. 68-6,
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But a far more dominant aspect of these Ndebele/Shona relations how-
ever, was the cognisance by various Shona chiefdoms of the serious challenge
the Ndebele military threat posed towards the security and welfare of their
societies. In the cfreumstaneesjthe Shona chiefdoms decided to take advan-
tage of their lmgstanding commercial associatian with the Portuguese and
began to transform these commercial links into political alliances to counter-
act Ndebele threat. Thus by I890J through the agency of the Goanese/
Portuguese adventurer, Gouveia, Shona/Portuguese treaties became the dom-
inant phenomenon of Shona external politics throughout the length and
breadth of the Shona country, involving chiefs as far apart as Nemakonde and
Sango of the Lamagundi district in the West; Mangwende, Mtoko, and Makoni
in the North-east and Gutu and Chirumanzu in the South. This realization of
the gravity of the Ndebele threat by the Shona chiefs thus brought onto the
scene a new factor; 'the gun frontier' in Mashonaland, so christened by Beach
and one which prompted Lobengula to treat the Rudd Concession party more
85favourably than would have otherwise happened a decade earlier.
In conclusiOll,it is argued that the endermic features of Shona political,
social, economic and military organisation were by no means conducive to
unity against any foreign enemy, as they showed during the Nguni invasicms of
the early nineteenth century. In the face of established Ndebele threat before
1893, the Shona chiefdoms could not unite either)to face the common enemy,
but devised a complex system of alliances to come to terms with the situation.
In the period between 1890 and 1896 J the same pattern of alliances was adopted
by these Shona chiefdoms to meet the BSACo. threat,especially with the out-
break of the risings in l896,and the Company was quick to take advantage of
this old Shona game. In the process J this ruling authority applied divisive
techniques not only against the Ndebele but also against other Shona soc-
ieties of different and divergent persuasion,as far as their loyalty to the
Company was concerned. During the 1890-96 period of Company rule) the
Shona chiefdoms could no longer solve their internal differences by migra-
ting to new areas of occupation as the boundaries had become fixed and
permanent and therefore could also no longer recede or stretch at the whims
of their chiefs. The feuding parties were thus contained within particular
85Beach: OPe cit. PP. 124-31 and also Ranger: oPe cit: P. 85.
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chiefdoms and when.the risings came in 1896-97, some rival claimants saw
in them a chance to redress their old grievances. To add to these short-
comings, was the Shonapractice of resorting to outsiders to sort their
internal differences. This practice whilst workable in the olden days proved
the cause of Shonaundoing as it played into the hands of a European force)
whose general policy of divide and rule was the primary means of its sur-
vival in the face of larger numbers of able-bodied men in the opposing enemy
86camp.
In shortJit is argued for the purpose of this study,that Shonasocieties
unlike their Ndebele counterpart, were more wlnerable to European inter-
ference and were thus hoisted by their own petard during the risings of
1896-97. When the risings broke outjthe BSACo., pressing on those weaker
points of Shona organization, founda greater quantity of material for col-
laboration against insurgent Shonachiefdoms. A few examples of this Shona
collaborating material may suffice to clarify the point in question here. One
such case is demonstrated by Brabant's extensive raids against the Budja
Chief Gurupira of Mtokoin June 1895 in which Brabant relied largely on the
87support of Zezuru levies from Central MashonaIand. Gurupira in his tum
provided a Budja supporting force to the white troops led by Colonel Alder-
sonJduring the latter's attack against Chief K1DlZwi-Nyandoroat his strong-
hold, Domborembudzi. This Budja alliance with white military forces,
which was in many ways very effective, lasted till April 1897,whenGurupira
himself was killed in action and the Budja abruptly terminated their service
with Colonel Hardmg, readmg in this event the punitive hand of the ancestors
for what came to be considered culpable activities in assisting the white
forces, the greater enemy, against their Shonakinsmen. In the eastern
regions of Mashonaland, Chief Mutasa, the Manyika ruler, readily sided with
Imperial forces against his old rival Chief Makoniof Rusape, obviously con-
vinced that such military alliance was only another round of the these two
opponents' previous conflicts. Similar assistance to the white forces was
86Weinrich: Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: pp. 120-2. The Mangwende
dynastic dispute,dating back to 1880 and lasting up to today (1976),is a
good example of European external interference and the vulnerability
of the Shonapolitical systems to powerful external forces. Vide: J. F.
Holleman: Chief, Council and Commissioner: Royal VanGorcum tid. ,
Assen (the Netherlands) 1969; pp. 79-235.
87Vide Supra: pP.
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also provided by Makoni's cousin and rival claimant to Maungwe cbief-
88taincy, Ndapfunya.
This pattern of Shona collaboration with the white forces against
their kith and kin was also repeated in other parts of the Shona countrJ.
In South-Western Mashonaland for example, a number of Shona chiefdoms
provided assistance against their kinsmen of the Selukwe, Shabani and
Belingwe districts.89 By these means, the Shona were therefore, to
so.e extent, responsible for the collapse of the Shona rising. But in
doing this they were not by any means gambling for economic gains. It
vas .specially their political system which was here at fault. The Shona
were trying to come to terms with the new forces of change on the basis
of old techniques, but when they later realized the extent of white men's
ambitions, they moved from alliance to hostility, as has been indicated
elaewhere.90
Matabeleland provides a different situation to that obtaining in
Mashonaland, as far as the incidence of African collaboration is concerned.
The Ndebele were essentially united during the rising, a carry-over
obvioualy from the pre-1893 Ndebele state. Although differences of
opinion, for example, surfaced between the Umfezela and Nyamanada
sectiona of the Ndebele insurgent forces prior to and during the rising,
these differences were more or less characteristics of a generation gap
and therefore somewhat similar to the differences of outlook between
moderates and militants. The Ndebele differences during the rising, on
the strategy and the execution of the military campaign, were merely a
reflection of various opinions within the royalist movement behind the
scenes, which had been going on since the end of the 1893 war, regarding
the ideal successor to Lobengula. In the dispute, senior indunas, the
moderate faction, led by Umlugulu, the king-maker, supported Umfezela,
whilst the younger ones supported Nyamanda,'Lobengula's eldest son. But
these differences were however minor and the Ndebele were thus able
to reconcile their various views during the course of the rising
and shelve the kingship issue, till the enemy had been
88aeport of the Rebellion in Mashonaland III: by Percy Inskipp:
December 31, 1897: Enclosed in BSACo. Reports on the Administration of
Rhodesia: 1896-97: pp 115-6; R. E. Reid: 'The Capture of Chief Makoni'
~ Vol 32, 1955: pp 52-3; C. Harding: The Far Bugles: Simpking Marshlll:
London: 1969: p 69.
89Extracts from Report of Civil
Year Ending September 30. 1896:
90vide Supra: Chapter I.
Commissioner. Victoria. G. F. Vizard. for
~: pp 137-9.
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dealt with first. Even those Ndebele loyalist leaders; like Gambo, Mjaan and
Faku, who did not come out in favour of the rising to begin with, would not
be cowed into acts of overt collaboration against their insurgent kinsmen as
was the case in Mashonaland and although some of their people were recruited
to serve under C/N/C Taylor as 'friendlies', these leaders were not pre-
pared at all to be used against other Ndebele factions right up to the very
end. On the eve of the Matopo peace indaba for example, they even refused
91to be used in bringing their insurgent countrymen to the conference table.
The solidity of the pre-colonial Ndebele state in the face of misSionary
onslaught,for three decades (1859-1888}Jhad forced the frustrated mission-
aries to look elsewhere for a weapon with which to exert external pressure
onto the Ndebele SOCiety;as we have seen. This external factor and the source
of external pressure was the BSACo. whose advent the missionaries of the
92LMS welcomed with jubilation. In 1896 it was the turn of the BSACo. to
look elsewhere for an auxiliary force of collaborators to face a solidly united
Ndebele insurgent movement. The foreign Africans who were already in the
country and had hitherto survived the ravages of the irate Ndebele forces in
1893 as well as further bands imported from the South on later occasions
provided the necessary material in this instance. The Sotho and the 'Cape
Boys' were among the more obvious auxiliary forces considered by the
Company Administration and officials for further importation from South of
the Limpopo for a number of cogent reasons, particularly economic ones.
It must be borne in mind that when the Ndebele rising broke out in Mata-
beleland in April 1896, the BSACo. was not in an economically strong position
to bear the cost of suppressing the malaise of its pre-1896 maladministration.
Those who were well acquainted with the Company's economic situation were
also quite aware of its problems. In March 1896 ,when the Company published
its Directors' Report and Accounts for the Year 1894-95, the attention of the
Colonial Office was immediately drawn to the Company's financial pOSition I
which was, as Edward Fairfield/the Under-Secretary in the South Africa dep-
artment of the Colonial Office/remarked, a 'very precarious -(one)-', showing
a deficit of £23, 540 in administrative expenditure even before the payments
93
to the Johnston Administration in Nyasaland had been made, in accordance
with the £10,000 annual payment Rhodes and the BSACo. had promised in
91Ranger: OF. cit: PP. 138-44; 240.
92Vide: Supra: PP.3-4
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941889 and had been paying ever since. In view of this economic position,
it was concluded that the only hope for the Company lay perhaps in the dis-
covery of gold in its territories. Sir Hartman Just, a senior clerk in the
South Africa department of the Colonial Office who shared this optimism,
expressed his views as follows:
, ••• it is evident that the financial success of the Company's
administration in the immediate future depends entirely upon
whether the gold industry proves really remunerative. If
sufficient gold is found, ~ adverse balance on the accounts
will easily be overtaken.
Sir Just's optimism was however mlsplaoedjas sufficient gold was never
discovered in the quantities so expected even by the end of CompanyAdmini-
stration in Matabeleland and Mashonaland in 1923. To make matters worse
the Company was reported by May 1896 to be recruiting the more expensive
white police to replace the Ndebele ones,prevlously enlisted from Lobengula's
crack regiments )whohad just deserted with the outbreak of the Ndebele
96
rising inApril 1896. But by far the most serious economic reverse for
the Company was the rinderpest plague which had devastating resultsJas we
shall see later.
It was therefore against this background that the CompanyAdministra-
tion in Salisbury and the Cape Town Office decided to recruit Sotho and 'Cape
Boyr auxiliaries. InApr1l1896, Lord Grey, who had just replaced A.H~"F.
Duncan as the Acting Administrator in FebruaryJfollowing the incarceration
of Jameson, took some action on this issue. He sent Duncan to the South to
secure either 'Cape Boys' or Sotho fighting material, taking care to notify
the London Board of this move at the same time and indicating that the object
of Duncan's mission was to obtain an additional force of '500 white men ~and}-
250 Cape Boys••• ' in order to augment the Company's relief force then in
97
Matabeleland to a total of 1,220 white men and 250 Cape Boys. This arrange-
ment was of course independent of the Imperial relief forces then being organ-
ised for Matabeleland under Colooel Henry Plumer. The Company resented
93C. O. 417/197: MInuteby Fairfield: March 23, 1896.
94Pachal: Malawi: The Htsto1'1of the Nation: loco cit.
95C•O. 417/197: MInute by H.W. Just to Fairfield: May 5, 1896.
96lbid,
97.!!!!!!: Charter, Cape Town, to BSACo.: Cablegram: Apri112, 1896; Lord
Grey to Duke of Fife: Apri113, 1896.
109
relying exclusively on Imperial forces which could, it was then thought, be
detamed by further African risings in Beehuanaland Protectorate.where com-
pulsory slaughter of stock had been enforced to check the spread of rinder-
pest. Thus Lord Grey thought it advisable to proceed quickly with this alterna-
98tive plan. But not all Companyofficials apparently relished the prospects
of recruiting 'Cape Boys' for service in Matabeleland. Some actually pre-
ferred Sotho levies for this type of work and;accordingly,they approached the
High Commissioner with the same demand and one which the latter obligingly
conceded to, allowing the Company to raise as many as 500 Sothos for Mata-
beleland if it so desired. 99
Grey had.for' his part, always been convinced of the capability of the Sotho
to provide the services that a regular white force wouldhave provided in the
rising. To hlm,therefore,it was the Sothowho cmstltu.ted the better solution
than the 'Cape Boys' to the Company's ecmomic problems. Relying on the
judgement of one Colmel Harris of Kimberley, who had tried to raise a white
volunteer force in Kimberley on behalf of Rhodes to the tune of 500 strong but
had been prohibited to take them up to Matabeleland by the High Commisslon-
100er, Lord Grey concluded that the Sotho,·were the most suitable force the
Company could depend on and consequently empowered his asslstant,Duncan,
101to raise a contingent of these as we have seen. These were to be re-
cruited and sent up to Mafeldngunder the charge of white offlcers)generally
acquainted with the Sotho people. Grey even emphasized the relevance of the
Sotho levies, in his own inimitable way, to his superior, the Dukeof Fife, in
the following manner:
They -{Sotho)-might remain as permanent Native Police after
the trouble is over, and we can give them land. These Basutos
will be a much more effective and less costly force than the
Colonial Boys and may be trusted -{as)- Police. Caesar's "
principle of policing Great Britain with his Danube Legion, and
the Danube territories wi~BY' British Legionwas sound and
ought to be initiated by us.
98Ibld: BSACo. to C.O.": February (?), 1896.-
99Ib1d: Charter, Cape Town to BSACo.: Cablegram: Apri118, 1896.-
100F•W. Sykes: With Plumer inMatabeleland: Constable & Co.: London:
189'1:P. 85.
101Vide: Supra: ,p.109
102lb1d: Lord Grey to Duke of Fife: Apr1113, 1896.-
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In Lord Grey's reckan1ng,the Sotho were not only ideal as far as the Company's
primary objective of cutting down military expenses was concerned, but they
were also to serve as the foundation stone of the Company Administration's
pollcy on police affairs once the risings were over and done with. They
apparently fltted the Company's policy on police matters because of the social
and cultural differences between them and the indigenous peoples in the Com-
pany territories and these differences, it was concluded, had to be exploited
accordingly.
The scheme on raising Sotho levies for Matabeleland was sufficiently
popular to win not only official acclaim, but in that it alBo prompted self-
appointed individuals to offer their services as couriers in the plan. One such
offer came from Captain P, Furniss of Maseru in Basutoland, a veteran
commander in previous wars in the Transkei (18'7) and the Sotho Gun War of
1880-81. At the beginning of April 1896, Captain Furniss wrote the Acting
Adm1n1strator of :Ma.tabeleland, Sir Thomas Scanlen, offering his services
to raise Sotho levies for the Company. He stated:
I regret to hear that the Natives of -(Southern)- Rhodesia have
again risen & more especially that the Native Pollce have joined
them. Iwould respectfully suggest for your consideration the
advisability of raising a Native Police force from some other
race than those contained within the limits of the Chartered
Company territory. With this end in view I feel sure that with
the co-operation of the Imperial Govt. (sic) & the officials here
a force of one thous~~f1cked Basutos could be raised for
service in the North.
Besides the Sotho levies, Captain Furniss also volunteered to secure
'good strong ponnies' for the Company,amounting to the equivalent number of
Sotho recruits and some two hundred or more extra remounts to spare. He
was quite confident of his ability to obtain these horses at as low a cost as
104
'eight pounds each', thus) in the prccess.aavtng' the Company extra expenses.
Such a plan was of course obviously to fit in the whole programme of Sotho
levies in the sense that these horses would be used for carrying rations and
enable the contingent to travel lighter and faster to Matabeleland than would
103C. T. 1/19/2: Captain P, Furniss, Maseru, to Sir Thomas Scanlen,
~tabereland:Apri17, 1800.
104Captain Beresford of the 7th Hussars who was at the time buying horses
in South Africa for the Matabeleland Relief Force was actually paying as
much as £18 per beast. Vide: Sykes: With Plumber in ~beleland:
PP. 62-3.
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have been possible to do with wagon transport. The Sotho recruits in question
were to be conveyed by train as far as Kimberley and then march on foot from
tbereJafter the end of the railway line.
In offering to organize and equip the Sotho contingent, Furniss hoped
that,once having arrived inMatabelelandJhe would naturally be allowed to
take charge of the contingent either as its commander or in some subordinate
capacity. All that the Companywas required to do in the circumstances was
to provide sadlery, halters, reins, knee bands and other more expensive
equipment for the contingent as well as a fewwhite men, from places like
Johannesburg) whowere well versed in Sotho language and would therefore act
as assistants and corporals in the force. At the same time/Furniss also
felt quite convinced that the Companyhad to see its way through and obtain
'the Basuto ponny' for service even if the scheme of taising levies should not
materialize. As he informed the Cape Town Office of the BSACo., he was
certain that 'the Basuto ponny' was more serviceable to the Company in sup-
pressing the rising than any other stamp of horse these officials had previ-
ously purchased. 105
Reactions to Furniss' offer were mixed. Lord Grey, the Administrator,
supported the proposal with great enthusiasm and so informed the Cape Town
Omce~stressing the same reasons he had previously conveyed to the Duke of
Fife in private. 106 But the Cape Town Office did not share Lord Grey's
enthusiasm and could only give lukewarm support to the Furniss plan at first.
It doubted whether the plan would be acceptable to Sir Godfrey Lagden,the
British Resident inMaseruJand to I.erotbodlJ the ParamOlDltChief of Basuto-
land. These doubts were evidently based on Lagden's fears and also on the
resentment of the President of the Orange Free state to the idea of arming a
large fighting force of Afrlcans,whlch mJghtbe construed 'as a sign of weak-
107ness on our -{Company'sr part •••• '
In a sense Jwhat the Cape TownOffice had in mind was to salvage the
economic position of the Companywlthout,at the same time J1mplngingon the
myth of white supremaey.whfch had, as part of its ethos, the invincibility and
105C. T. 1/19/2: Furniss, Maseru to Charter, Cape Town, Apr1113, 1896.
106l2!!!: Lord Grey, Bulawayo, to Charter, Cape Town, Telegram: Aprl114,
1896.
107Ibid: Charter, Cape Town to Lord Grey: Apr1114, 1896.-
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courage of the white men all over Africa. On the credit side, the Cape Town
Office felt encouraged by the Imperia1 officials fn SouthAfrica)who urged the
Company to give the scheme a trial) but stipulated that the payment of these
Sotho levies at mmthly rates should not be higher than £6 for sergeants, £5 for
corporals and £3 for privates in. addition to free clothing and rations. The
Imperial authorities also indicated that should these Sotho levies be used for
poUce work in the Company territories after the rising, as Lord Grey had
hinted, they were to be engaged Initially for two years.
InBasutoland itself however, the scheme was complicated by the problem
of labour migration to the gold fields at the Rand and elsewhere, by 1896
estlmated at about twelve thousand men per annum. This state of affairs
left the Sotho Paramount Chief Lerothodi in a dubious positiOll,as to his ability
to raise the five hundred men required for M:a.tabeleland. However,I.erothodi's
anxiety was counterbalanced by the attractive land offers then promised to
these recruits by the Companyin Matabeleland and Lagden's preparedness
to see the scheme a success. The latter, like all other white men in Southern
Africa, resented the kllUng of white settlers which had taken place in Mata-
beleland and was thus more than anxious to help and also provide white·offi-
cers to the contingent in question, whowouldJat the end of hostll1tiesJremain
108
in permanent service to the Company and in charge of the Sothopolice force.
Despite these isolated misgivings, Lord Grey and the Cape TownOffice
of the BSACo. were all the same prepared to accept the services of a Sotho
contblgent in Matabeleland m whatever terms and reiterated oaee more the
land promises they had made for the benefit of the recruits as a reward for
their services. Jack Brabant, who had been ignomJnious!ydismJssed by the
Company from the M:a.shonaLmdNative Department at the end of 1895 and was
then living in East Laldon in the Cape Colony, was put in charge of these
Sotho recruits. Brabant was instructed to lead the Sothocmtingent to the
Matopo Hills in MatabelelandJwhere Ndebele insurgent forces had gathered,
but no further promises were apparent1y made regarding his permanent
109placement with this force. In factJthe command of the force had already
been promised to Griffiths of Basutoland at Lagden's suggestion. As a
108!!WI: Sir Godfrey Lagdm, Maseru to High Commissioner, Cape Town:
Telegram: Apri114, 1896.
109!2!!!: Charter, Cape Town to J. S. Brabant, East lmldm, Telegram:
Apri117, 1896.
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matter of fact ,the Company was quite prepared to accept whatever number
of recruits seemed feasible to raise in the circumstances even if this had to
110be as low as only two hundred Sotho levies. Perhaps to compensate for
the tmexpected shortfall in numbers, Lagden, as obliging as ever, also
offered to provide the contingent with horses and part of the equlpment,in
111much the same manner as Furniss had done previously. The rest of the
equipment, uniform and armaments was to be supplemented at Mafeldng by
Kennedy)the Company official there) who had previously arranged for the
equipment of the 'Cape Boys' contlngent,which had recently also left Mafe-
king for Matabeleland. The Sotho contingent was to be provided, as far as
uniform and other equipment were concerned, by the Bechuanaland Trading
Association, a commercial company inwhich the BSACo. itself held some
shares and me which had also supplied the 'Cape Boys' in this respect. Fin-
ally, it was Kennedy too at Mafekfngwho was responsible for the transporta-
102tion of the Sotho contingent to Matabeleland.
The BSACo. had been caught up in a ftnanc1al crisis when the Ndebele
rising broke out inApril 1896. The rinderpest plague which had broken up
in February 1896 in Matabeleland, a month earlier than in Mashmaland,
contributed its share to the Company's misfortunes) especially in form of
compensation to European settlers for the compulsory destruction of their
118stock as a preventative measure. To solve these problems,the Company
required to suppress the risings at as low a cost as was possible and it was
for this reason that the Sotho and the 'Cape Boys' had become so handy. With
these African auxiliary forces, it thus was hoped the Companywouldwithout
difflculty effect economies in its campaigns against the insurgents. Yet up to
the very end of the Sotho levies scheme, it was riddled and chocked with
protests and misgivings. Right up to the eve of this cmtingent's departure
110Ibid: Lord Grey to Charter, Cape Town, Telegram (received): AprU 22,-1896.
111Ibid: Lagden, Maseru to Charter, Cape Town: Telegram: Apri120, 1896.-
112Ibid: Kennedy, Mafeking to Charter, Cape Town: Telegram: Apri124,-1896.
118The BSACo. Administration paid £20, 785 in compensation to European
settlers for stock compulsorily slaughtered in Matabeleland and
£7, 402 for the same to Mashonaland settlers. Vide: 'Report of the
Civil Commissioner, Bulawayo, E. Ross Townshend, for 12 months
Ending September 16, 1896': in~: PP. 123-4.
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for Matabeleland, some quarters were not altogether happy with the probable
effects of the scheme, which, it was assumed, would be counterproductive.
The Cape Town Office of the BSACo. for example, was extremely worried
by rumours then circulating in Basutoland where the Sotho had got wind of
the rising inMatabeleland through surreptitious channels. In fact, it was
feared that the myth of the white man's superiority would be grievously
harmed as:
••• they ~the 8otho)- may get the idea that the white man cannot
fight the Matabrl\ and therefore wants to get the Basutos to
fight for them.
Some of the worries on the effects· of this scheme were not based on
essentlally racial consideratians)as the Cape Town Omce of the BSACo.
viewed the case. The government of the Cape Colony was/for exampleJmore
worried about the administrative complications the scheme was likely to
produce should the Sotho levies in the service of the Company receive higher
wages than the Sotho police engaged for service In the Bechuanaland Pro-
tectorate. For this reasonJit was therefore convinced that the Company
scheme was likely to damage the prospects for further recruitment of Sotho
police to serve In the Protectorate,due to the unfavourable comparison In
115salaries. But whatever weight these misgivings might have borne, the
Company still went ahead with its proposals. Yet once the recruiting was
over and done with, little is heard of the Sotho ccmtfngent during the risings,
though mention is however made of Brabant's arrivalln the Company terri-
tories with a force of auxiliaries. 116 We can only assume therefore that the
Sotho contingent may have been overshadowed by the two wings of the 'Cape
Boys' contingent)whose history we now examine below.
Similar motives, backed however with a different logic, were appUed In
simultaneously raising 'Cape Boys' contingents. These were apparently as
handy as the Sotho leviesJbut not half as popular as the latter. They were two
battaUcms In number; one under Johannan W. Colenbrander and the other
commanded by Major Robertscm. Here the ccmfuslng term 'Cape Boys' be-
comes apparent. Whether the term was coined with reference to the genetic
114C. T. 1/19/2: Charter, Cape Town to Ketmedy, Mafeldng: Telegram:
AprU 24, 1896.
115DJid: Cape Town Govt. to Charter: Apri114, 1896.-116Andrews: John White of MashoDa1and: Ioe, cit.
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tr t from I.w. ~keB: With Plumer in Matabeleland, (Constable & Co:London, 1897).
distinction of the auxiliaries of mixed blood, the half-castes from the South,
or as a geopolitical term,simply denotingAfricans from the Cape Colony in
general, it is quite puzzling to say. The confusing aspect of the matter is
that the term also became a derisive name commonly adopted by white set-
tlers for any Africans from the Southwhom they had cause to dislike for one
reason or another and}for that matter) the generic distinction was of little
consequence to the settlera.who were not in any way noted for their expertise
117in ethnic specifics. However,Colenbrander's 'Cape Boys' corps appears
to have consisted of a predominantly African membership_)with names of
Xhosa, Sotho, Mfengu and Zulu identities.
In fact it is Colenbrander's 'Cape Boys' corps which provided the back-
118bone of John Hlazo's 'black pioneers' movement, and it is very likely
that Colenbrander may have taken over the leadership of the Sothocontingent
from the discredited Brabane-and coalesced it with those African auxiliaries
already in the country having come earlier on at the same time with the
Pioneer Column or at any other period before 1896. Indeed some of the names
which later became popular in the cause of the movement of the 'Black
Pioneers' are easily discernible in the Colenbrander corps. These include,
to mention only a handful, the Mkeezas, Willie Sakuba, Makena, Jack Mpanda,
Jolm ffiazo ('Ntlago') himself, Phillip Sifuba, Hendrick Maguta and many
others mentioned in the despatches for their services in both the 1893 and
1896wars. In this way the Colenbrander corps of 'Cape Boys',with its ser-
geants JolmW. Sabu, Jim M'Keeza, N'nyatigazi, W.M. Beyney, H. Mareta,
Moses M'Dhloro and others, appears to have formed the nucleus of what
later became the very influential pressure groups of Africans from the
119South during the 1910's and 1920's. The Robertson corps of 'Cape Boys'
on the other hand consisted of a pre-dominantly half-caste membership; a
factor which is quite clearly sfgnified in this instance by the nomenclature
and to some extent the Johannesburg origin of its individual members. Some
117Vide: ~ VI: 'Cape Boys' of the Matabeleland Field Force (picture). In
a discussion between the author and Mr. Mandaza,also of York University,
worldng on ~~ mixed-race community in Southern Rhodesia, there was a
general agreement that due to racism of early Southern Rhodesian
society there was little distinction in offlcial destgnation between blacks
and half-castes from the South.
118NB1/1/3: Petition of Colonial Natives of BulawayoNative lAcation:
Enclosed in Geol'KeP. Mpondo. ActiDgSecretarY to C(N(C. !fp.
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of the names of this corps had peculiarly distinctive non-African surnames
like Hendricks, Henries, Johnnie, Jacobs, Jereboom, Johnson, Kriel,
120Lonfgeldt and so on.
Notwithstanding the genetic differences of these groups of 'Cape Boys',
they were however treated indiscriminately once they volunteered for service
in the Company territories. Moreover1their motives, whether they joined
the relief force in Johannesburg, Kimberley, Mafekfngor elsewhere, were
essentially similar., They were evidently motivated by a common psycholo-
gical and Ideological feeling; a feeling they were quite proud of especially
outside the Cape Colony. This was their extravagant sense of pride In their
status as 'British subjects'. This sense of loyalty and pride shared by most
non-Europeans from the Cape Colonywas evidently sufficient to drive them
121northwards In the service of the Company. Perhaps encouraged by the
quasi-liberal 'native policy' of the Cape Colony.whieh conferred on non-
European citizens privileges undreamt of either in the Transvaal, Orange
Free state or Natal, the 'Cape Boys' felt obliged to offer their services In
1896 during the risings and.In so dOing,further what they considered to be
122a British cause.
The loyalty and resilience of the 'Cape Boys', inwhatever capacity they
served the British cause, obviously made them.eJJg1blefor service when this
was considered by the Southem Rhodesian authorities to be desirable. They
served as menials and grooms to the Pioneer Column and as auxiliaries in
the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893. Besides, some of them had even partiCipated
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in Jameson's abortive raid against the Transvaal at the end of 1895. In the
January 31, 1898. Vide also: Chapter 5.
119C. O. 767/5: W. Beare, Secretary for the S. Rhodesia High/Commisslmer
to Dominions Office (hereafter D. 0.): December 18, 1925: S, Rhodesia
Correspondence, P/R/O, London. This material was revealed when S.
Rhodesia was transferred from the Colonial to DominionsOffice In 1925.
120C.O. 767/5: Beare to C.0.: December 18, 1925.
121For this feeling of loyalty and pride In 'British subject' status, Vide:
Evidence of Rev. James :Mata Dwaneand John Tengo Jabavu: Cape
Colony: November 12 and 16, 1903 In SouthAfrica Native Affairs Com-
mission: 1903-1905: Vol. II: PP. 708-16 and 727-45 (respectively).
122In Southern Rhodesia the term 'Cape Boys' was used In the widest sense
of the word and at times Included any nm-European from the South of
Limpopo. Vide!!!!£!: pp165-6
123Colvin: The Life of Jameson: Vol. II: P. 61,
117
circumstances, it was therefore only logical that they should also form part
of the relief movement in a colony in whose birth they had taken such an
active role before. Jndeed it is interesting to note here that most of the 'Cape
Boys' engaged for the relief of Matabeleland in 1896 were drawn mainly from
Johannesburg and other parts of the T'ransvaal.where hundreds and thou-
sands of British volunteers had also offered their services in suppressfng
the Shona and Ndebele risings, perhaps stung by their culpability in having
let Jameson down and consequently causing the downfall of Rhodes. Thus
some of these 'uitlander' volunteers had indeed to be prevented from enlist-
124
ing by the High Commissioner. The 'Cape Boy' volunteers may also have
been influenced by these extravagant notims of British patrlotismJwhlch
emerged in the wake of the Jameson Raid as a corollary to Anglo-Boer
rivalry and animosity.
In fact, it is interesting to note that the background of these 'Cape Boys;
drawn from the Transvaal and engrafted into the Robertson corps, was not
125a pleasant me. Yet things were not as good either for these recruits on
their way to Matabeleland. The treatment they received at the hands of their
white counterparts smelt too much of their old Spartan abode in the Trans-
vaal. En route to Matabeleland, it was the 'Cape Boys' whowere put in
charge of the dreary mule wagon transport which had been introduced by the
Company as a substitute to the ox wagon transport, m,ost of the cattle havfng
died of rinderpest. The mule transport was unnecessarily slow and incon-
venient and, as if to complicate matters further for this corps, the 'Cape
Boys' were also provided with donkeys to carry their supplies, whilst the
recruits themselves had to trudge the 600 mlles from Mafeklng to Bulawayo
on foot/reaching their destfnation in May 1896, footsore, weary and hungry.
To add to this story of woe, the relations between the 'Cape BoY"J'
detachments and the white members of the relief force were tainted with
many undesirable features. Indeed the Imperial staff Officers had to inter-
124C. O. 417/197: Lord Grey to Duke of Fife Apri113, 1896. About 5, 000
whites volunteered for service from Johannesburg alone: Vide: Sykes:
oPe cit. P. 57.
125The 'Cape Boys' and their ill-treatment as British subjects in the Trans-
vaal actually formed a part of the correspondence between British
Imperial authorities in SouthAfrica and the Transvaal government
between 1895 and 1899. Vide: C. Headlam (ed.): The Milner Papers:
South Africa 1897-1899: Vol. I: Cassel & Co.: London: 1931: PP. 193-6.
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vene when 'Cape Boy' deserters began to appear in Mafeking with harrowing
stories of iU-treatment. It even became essential for the Chief staff Officer
in Mafeking ,for instance,in early May 1896)to Instruct the Commander of the
Second West Riding REgiment, Lieutenant Fraser, on this subject, taking
pains1at the same timeJto point out the conditions under which the 'Cape Boys'
had been engaged and the separate identity of their detachments which had to
be respeoted.espeetally as these recruits had their own officers, equipment
and other paraphernalia. Through these instructions, the Imperlal authori-
ties in Mafeking t1ms tried to check the growing tendency among the white
regulars to abuse the 'Cape Boys' at random and.tn this way, the treatment
of the latter in relation to the rest of the battery was thus, theoretically speak-
126
lng, guaranteed.
The 'Cape Boys' and the Matabeleland ReUef Column commanded by
Colonel Henry Plumer arrived in Matabeleland in the nick of time. The
rising had taken the settlers by surprise, breaking out at a time when the
COlDltry was denuded of colonist troops,which had been arrested and buncD.ed
off to England for their part in the Jameson Raid. This state of unprepared-
ness is clearly manifest in the net total of white casualties throughout the
length and breadth of the country,with 390 killed and 150 wounded; a total of ten
per cent of the white population at the time and a very high price to pay for
127
people who had always regarded white security and life as sacred. Thls
state of affairs as a result inculcated a spirit of desperation and despondence
among those settlers who had survived.
The economic crisis then prevalent in Matabeleland in April 1896Jwhere
the rinderpest had broken out first and had consequently taken a higher toll
of animal wealth, was a sorry tale of the 1896 colanist disaster at its peak.
Food was growing scarce as commlDlication between Bulawayo and the South
had been rendered almost impossible by the total decimation of cattle and
the subsequent incapacitation of the wagon transport. The little food supply
that was then available had actually been brought in at various Intermittent
tim,es by the slow and unreliable mule transport. Besides the transport
126B.A. 2/9/1: Chief staff Olltcer, Imperial CmtiDgent, Makeldng to Lieu-
tenant Fraser, Secmd West Riding Regiment, Bulawayo: May 12, 1896,
R/N/ A, Salisbury: and Sykes: OPecit. PP. 73-85.
127 ,. .
BSACo. Directors' Report and Accounts for Year Ending: 1896-97: PP. 20-1.
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problem caused by the rinderpest plague, the heavy toll in stock meant the
deprivation of supplies of fresh meat and milk the settlers had previously
relied on. In short, the Uttle food that was then available in the country was
Insufficient for the settlers' requirements and could only be obtained at
famJne prices. This shortage also implied frequent scrambles amongst the
settlers for the little they could get and the small Asian community which
had then devoted its energies to market gardening on the Bulawayocommon-
age appears to have benefitted a great deal by supplying some of their pro-
duce to the beleaguered white colonists. 128
In addition to these problems of feeding the white population of Bu.la-
wayo, the cawed transport riders, once the risings and rinderpest had
broken out, were not too eager to risk any dangers to their stock and wagons
by bringing the requisite supplies without guarantees of liberal bonuses from.
the Company officials. Duncan, as Acting AdmJnistrator, had offered such
guarantees to all transport riders from all1m.own centres where food supplies
were procurable in SouthMrica. His successor lord Grey also had to
provide similar guarantees against the risks of war and rinderpest when he
signed contracts with transport riding companies like Messrs J. Wen & Co.
and Messrs Zeedberg; two companies which had Transvaal connections.
Under these contracts, Wen & Co. were,for example, required to provide
quick supplies of food amounting to 350,000 rations then regarded as suf-
ficient to feed a population of 4, 000people for 87 days and 750,000 lbs of
grain for horses and mules. These supplies were to come in via the Sem-
okwe Road to the South into Bulawayo. The contract with Messrs Zeedberg
bound this company to run a dally coach service from the South to Bulawayo
together with 20, 000 Ibs of food supplies and ammunition in addition to
ordinary mail and passenger services, or in the event of the rising spreading
and blocking the routes to the Transvaal, to bring the supplies on a weekly
basis via Palapye and the Tati road in the South-West.
In spite of these strenuous efforts to keep the Bulawayopopulation sup-
plied with food, prospects were stin grim. By May 8, 1896, the Company's
Commissary-General had,fn factJg1ven it to be mlClerstoodthat there was in
the Company's Stores 'only 90 bags of flour and 78 bags of meal. •• ' for the
128._~eport of the Civil Commissioner. for Year Ending September 16, 1896;
in !E!9: Ioc, cit.
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Bulawayo population of 4, 000 strong. The only other sizeable quantity
then available had;in fact.been reserved for the Gwelo patrol, then sent
out to meet the Salisbury Column and Rhodes.on their way from Mashonaland
where the rising had not yet broken out. But even this supply could only last
129for at most ten days. Besides, the restrictive stock leglislation then
evoked by most governments in the sub-continent as a counter-measure to
the plague made the task of supplying food to the beleaguered Bulawayo
residents even more enormous. stock legislation in the SouthJfor example,
required spans used for transport riding to the North to be shot at the end
of the joumey and forbade them to be retumed. It was apparently this re-
130qulrement which most transport riders particularly objected to. All
these conditions mentioned above obviously combined to produce the acts of
desperation, blttemess and host1lity that were later to characterize settler
reactions during and after the risings and It was to relleve these conditloo.s
that Coloo.el Plumer and his forces of white regulars and 'Cape Boys'
arrived to do in May 1896.
Notwithstanding the overall weight of these misfortunes, the beleaguered
white settlers refused to be bogged down by their adversities even before
Plumer arrived with the rellef forces. Most of the able-bodied men formed
vollDlteer groups such as those which undertook military escapades around
the Umgusa River in the vicinity of Bulawayo; escapades which were mainly
undertaken during the day-time to keep the enemy at bay and1at the same
timeJaIlow the colonists to forage for food from the enemy's grain supplies.
Such skirmishes as these initial ones, directed by Captains Maurice Gifford,
Macfarlane and a few other leaders, took place mostly during the period
between April 4 and Apri125, 1896 and the parties involved were composed
of white vohmteers and the 'Cape Boys' who were already in the country;
the survivors of the pioneer and 1893 war era and colleagues of John Groot-
131boom. The Ndebele forces, once the rising had broken out, apparently
129Vide: Lord Grey's Report an the Matabele Rebellion, November, 1896:
in BSACo, Reports on the Native DIsturbances 1896-97: PP. 15-6,
and also C, O. 417/196: Scottish African Corporation Ltd. to C. 0, :
June 27, 1896. (The problem, of food shortage during the risings led to
a general inflation in the prices of commodities - a bottle of milk fetch-
ing 30/-, a fowl £1, a bag of potatoes £30 and so forth. )
130R. S. S. Baden-Powell: The Ma.tabele Campa.Jgn: Metheun & Co., London:
1897: pp. 72-4.
131C. O. 417/197: Lord Grey, Bulawayo, to BSACo., Cablegram: n, cl. ~-
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aimed at concentrating their military efforts on Bulawayo, which as far
as they were concerned, symbolized settler rule and political power and
its downfall would thus mean the collapse of Company rule/m much the same
manner as Lobengu.lahad previously fallen. Here the Ndebele forces
gathered along the banks of the Umgusa to the west of the town. The m-
surgent forces, drawn primarily from the more militant Nyamanda faction,
consisted of 4, 000 men from the JIngen regiment of the Inyati area.led by
Mtlni, the Elibeni regiment of SfglnyamatseJthe populist Ndebele religiOUS
leader, and the Nyamandhlovu regiment of Mpotshwana, whowas chiefly m
charge of the rising around Bulawayo and the neighbourhood Mkwati, the
representative of the Mwarl cult m Matabeleland, Nyamanda and many mem-
bers of the Ndebele royal family were also present for what may have been
. 132
set up as a pyrrhic battle.
It was these Ndebele impis that the early Gifford-Macfarlane skirmish-
ing parties came up against. In their military organisationJthe latter were
made up of the settler-constituted Ddawayo Field Force supported by vari-
ous ancillary parties such as Captain Grey's 'Cape Boys' Scouts, C/N/C
Taylor's Ndebele 'friendlies', Brand's Afrikaner Corps, Meikle's Victoria
vol1mteer force and other individually assembled columns created at the spur
of the moment to protect various areas of white settlement ,prior to the
arrival of Plumer'S Imperial force.
At this early stage of the Ndebele rising, the campaigns of these mili-
tary parties were of a varied kind They included patrol duties to espy the
presence of and reading the movements of Ndebele impis around Fonseca
and Colenbrander's farms on the Umgusa River. Itwas their duty to proceed
to places far and near Bulawayo to check on the property of the white settlers
and to collect food supplies in form of grain and stock; a field In which the
'Cape Boys' were extensively used and highly valued Finally, it was also
part and parcel of the objectives of these small-scale operations to dislodge
the Ndebele insurgent forces from their strongholds where they had dug
themselves In preparation for an onslaught onto Bulawayo. By these activi-
tieS/it was therefore Intended to enforce the Insurgent forces to give up the
whole idea of a total offensive against the Bulawayolaager; an eventuality
closed m Herbert Canning to Cr 0, : April 14, 1896,
132._
~anger: op. cit. PP. 174-5.
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already viewed with paranoia by the laager inmates themselves. Aided by
the Hotchiss, maxims and other heavy artillery, these early skirmishes
apparently proved fatal to the Ndebele insurgent impis. Captain John Sanctu-
ary Nicholson, one of the leaders directing these early operations, admitted
that he had found the 'Cape Boys' quite serviceable, but was also of the
opinion, then characteristic among his compatriots at the time, that they
could only be effective whEnled by white officers. He also blamed the ten-
dency of these 'Cape Boys' to waste ammunition,contrary to the frugal
practices then generally adopted by the white settlers due to problems of
communications and supply.
In spite of these mJnor faults, the 'Cape Boys' were however quite
favourably spoken of and certainly better treated than Taylor's Ndebele
'friendlies'. The former were even better equipped for effective participa-
tion in the war than the latter) who could only rely on assegais and battle-
axes for their fighting ldt andwere in the process compelled to wear 'red
Umbo' to distinguish them from their furious kinsmen. The 'Cape Boys' were
themselves armed with Martin-Henri rifles, carbines and side-arms, a
fact which made the comparison between them and their fellow Ndebele col-
133laborators naturally quite unbecoming. In this capacity, the 'Cape Boys'
therefore once more greatly contributed to the cause of white colonization
m the Company territories. The success of the Apri11896 skirmishes,m
which they took such an active part)demora1ized the Ndebele InsUrgentmove-
ment and raised the hopes of the beleaguered settlers. Indeed it even crea-
ted a sense of false illusions m the minds of the Companyofficials)forcing
them to conclude, as they did, that the backbone of the rising In :Matabele-
land had actually been broken by this time.
What m fact these BSACo. officials feared at this stage of the Ndebele
rising was that the Ndebele might resort to guerilla warfare in their mountain
strongholds and so prevent the white forces from fnfIicting the punitive mill-
tary measures these msurgents deserved; measures then regarded as quite
essential for the restoration of the white men's prestige. Indeed Lord Grey
138._-Report on MlUtary Operations by Captain J. S. Nicholson, n, d. : in
BSACo.Reports on Native Disturbances 1896-97: PP. 31-2. Vide also
Appendix IT(Map):The ·'CapeBoys' and the Gifford/Macfarlane Skirm-
ishes, Apri11896.
123
who appeared more convinced after Umgusa than any other Company official
on this score had even gone to the extent of informing Sir Richard Martin,
the Deputy Commissioner and the Imperial Officer in the Company territories,
that there was no longer any dire need for white forces to put down the Nde-
bele rising and that only African troops were now required for what had be-
134come essentially 'bush fighting'. Lord Grey was evidently a man of
strong notions. His conclusions, which were primarily motivated by the
Company's financial problemsjwere nonetheless ill-founded. The Ndebele
rising was still alive and by June 1896, the situation was made even more
compltcated by the outbreak of another rising In the Shona country.
In the event.Phrmers Matabeleland Reltef Force and the 'Cape Boys'
arrived to face this new development as far as military affairs In Company
territories were concerned. The Ndebele had given up their plans of an a11-
out offensive against Bulawayo and taken to defensive warfare fn their strong-
holds, bespattered throughout Matabeleland. The Thaba-zika-Mambo cam-
paign of June 1896 was the first actual taste of warfare In Matabeleland I:Jr
these new arrivals from the South had and it is of spec tal Interest for this
study because of the prominent part undertaken by the 'Cape Boys' In the
event.
The Ndebele insurgents after the Umgusa skirmishes In April, had given
up all ideas on an offensive against Bulawayo and repaired to Thaba-zika-
Mambo, the epicentre of the fnsurgent movement. Here were gathered the
leaders of the Mwari priesthood in Matabeleland, Mkwati, Tenkela,his wife I
and Sfginyamatshe as well as the Ndebele royal and politico-milttary
leadership, represented by Nyamanda, the son of lDbengula, Mpotswana the
1eader of the Nyamandhlow regiment, Mtfni of the Ngnoba regiment from the
Inyatl area, Nkomo and the Jingen regiment, not excludfng the Ndebele and
Shona followers of these various leaders. 135 The attack subsequently
mounted against this stronghold by Plumer, starting on July 5 and lasting for
several days, was an historic epic in every sense of the word. The problems
faced by the white invading force were imm,ense. These were evidently best
portrayed by a participant in the event, Frank W. Sykes,whose pictures-
que desCription of Thaba-zika-Mambo on that fated day in 1896,remains as
134 C. O. 417/197: Lord Grey to BSACo.; June 9, 1896 and Telegram: May 4,
1896.
135._
~Ranger: OPe cit. p, 229.
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fresh as ever. He stated:
The stronghold itself rises out of -{a)-watercourse, with an
almost precipitous face, to a height of from 500 to 600 feet,
formed of gigantic boulders with innumerable caves of great
dimensions and a perfect maze of thorns and shrubbery. Along
the eastem base of this fastfness the Insungu River is seen,
enclosed by another range of lofty hills, almost as precipitous
and equally as high as the stronghold itse1{'S6The whole group
covers an area of some 25 sq miles (sic).
Here geography, nature and military strategy had conspired to defy even.
the efficiency of heavy European weaponry and the Ndebele were obviously
anxious to exploit these physical advantages presented by the Thaba-zika-
Mambo stronghold. The white miUtary leaders themselves certa1nly
appreciated the problems involved In an attack of this nature and,accordfng~
raised the largest force ever to have fought in the country, leaving only token
numbers of troops in charge of matters at Kha.m1 and the 100 troopers or so
previously sen.t to Mashonaland under Major Watts to tackle the rising,which
had broken out there as well,
In one section of this study dealfng with the Ndebelewar of l8~, we have
referred to the chores of the 'Cape Boys' and their colleagues as havlng
137been mainly of the physical and menial variety. In the Thaba-zika-:Ma.mbo
campaign,the nature of the military operations determinedJto a large extent)
the level of involvement on the part of these African auxiliaries. Though
they were In charge of the forces' cattle, the mobile source of food supply,
and were responsible for providfng labour for the construction of camps and
cattle-folds, it was chiefly through their part in the actual fighting that
victory over the Ndebele was achieved at Thaba-zika-M'ambo. Amongst the
rocks and crevices/which the Ndebele impis were well acquainted with, the
progress of the white troops, used to fightblg in more comfortable conditions
and In set-piece battles, was painfully slow and the task therefore fell onto
the 'Cape Boys' under Major Robertson and Captains Ross and Nash to
promote the cam.paign and play hide and seek with the Ndebele on their own
home grOWldand,in this way)generally bear the brunt of Ndebele counter-
attacks. One of their more conspicuous duties was,as amatter of fact"that
of smoldng out the Ndebele from their places of bidlng, for which purpose,
136
Sykes: OP. cit. PP. 138-9.
137
Vide Supra: PP. 55-6.
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these 'Cape Boys' were instructed to carry armfuls of grass and dry reeds.
They also carried out hand-to-hand individual combats with the Ndebele in
the course of which bayonets, assegais and battle-axes were used at random
registerfng either defeat or victory. Finally, it was the 'Cape Boys' who
captured and herded into custody both stock and human prisoners. Skyes
aptly describes the nature of these combats between the 'Cape Boys' and
the Ndebele, which he freely admits were responsible for Plumer's victory,
as follows:
As the rifle-shots rang out from the valleys and slopes, now
far away in the distance, and now close at hand, one was
strongly reminded of a day amongst birds at home -{Britain)-;
but in this case thel~?ters were Cape Boys, and the game human
beings -(Ndebele)-.
Captain W. J. Boggie, whose all-white military party was assigned the
task of covering Major Robertson and his 'Cape Boys' Corps during the
course of various vanguard operatims, was equally impressed by the role
of these African auxiliaries in the campaign. Boggie's compliment is
evident in a description of the 'Cape Boys' in action,assfgned to him by Sykes
and indicating:
•••I heard the charging cheer, and saw the Cape Boyswith
orange coloured purgarees and swarthy faces clear the
intervening space with leaps and bounds, and in a briefer
space than it takes to tell, they threw themselves upon the
Matabele. The fight was between savage negro and semi-
civilised half-cas_. The intrepid Matabele warriors met the
rush with superb bravery, while the Cape Boys dashed for-
ward with reckless indifference to the storm of b~gff'
assegals, and battle-axes which they encountered
The Thaba-zika-Mambo battle was such a ferocious conflict that it was being
rumoured within the white settler circles, of course with less substance
than the credence these rumours received, that the Ndebele had put up such
a sustained resistance because they were being led either by some 'Civilized'
140Sotho im.mfgrants or white men living among them. Such rumours may
of course have been a product of wild stories based on the knowledgeof the
social conditions of the pre-1893 Ndebele state,in whichwhite adventurers
married to Ndebele girls patronized the state. In this instance,this pre-
138Sykes: ope cit. P. 141.
1391bld:PP. 155-6: Vide: Plate: VII: ~cture)-: 'The "Cape Boys" in Battle'~ ,<6'1(;'
140Ibid: P. 159.-
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colonial state of affairs appears to bave combinedwith the untversal
hostility amongst the white colonists towards those literate Africans from
the Southwho had refused to side with the Companyduring the rising, as
the story of Karl Khumalo demonstrates. In view of such feelings,it is
therefore easier to understand why it became necessary for the Company
officials to execute Khumalo,especially as they suspected him of teaching
141the Ndebele insurgents howto make their own bullets and ammumtton,
Notwithstanding the rumours and suspicions of the war-weary white forces,
everybody was in the end agreed.to some extent, to credit the success of the
142Thaba-zika-Mambo campaign.to the 'Cape Boys'.
In the final analysis, it was essentially the problematic character of
the Thaba-zika-Mambo campaign which pre-determined the option for a peace
settlement,especially when Plumer's forces were faced with an even worse
situation at the Matopohil1s,where the Ndebele strongholds were even more
imposing than the previous ones. Thus it might be said that the value of
the 'Cape Boys' and their fellow collaborators in the Ndebele rising was
vindicated beyond doubt during and after the Thaba1ika-Mambo campaign.
in 1896. Only one man perhaps may bave been displeased with such success.
This was Captain Ross,whom the 'Cape Boys' bad compelled to resfgn. during
the campaign.when they reported to Major Robertson that 00 several occa-
sions when Ross led the attacks against the Ndebele, they bad sustained
heavy losses and their leader was always the first one to run for shelter.
Because of these occurrences, the 'Cape Boys' apparently lost confidence In
Ross' leadership and wanted him removed; a move whichRobertson con-
sequently agreed to In order, as he put it, to preserve the morale of the
143'Cape Boys' Corps.
But before we conclude the story of the 'Cape Boys' and their part In
the mUitary operations during the Ndebele rising, it is imperative to examine
the cases of individual characters who, as in the 1893war, made notable
contribution to the overall war effort. In the Ndebele rising as In the 1893
war, John Grootboom and John Makunga, to some extent, are worth men-
141Vide l!!!!.!: pp. 169-75.
142Lord Grey's Report 00 the MatabelelandRebellion, November, 1896:
Ibid: pp. 19-20.-143B.A. 2/9/1: Major Robertson, Commander, Cape Boys Corps to
Chief-of-Staff, Bulawayo, July 14, 1896.
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tioning. The inimitable John Grootboomwas, as usual, a special asset to
the settler and Imperial forces. His services,especially in the field of
espionage and scouting, made him an idol of the white military circles.
Frank Sykes)who held an interview with Grootboom short1y after the Ndebele
rising at the latter's home, about eight miles from Bulawayo towards the
L. M. S. station at Hope Fountain, has this to say of this Mfengubrave:
His -(Grootboom's)- services as a spy upon the positions
and movements of the enemy have been invaluable. Possess-
ing intimate lmowledge of the country, and the customs and
tactics of the native, combined with courage and self-reliance,
he was just the type of man most ada~~.ry nature and dis-
position for the purposes of espionage.
Grootboom of course undoubtedly had the qualities required for a spy
during the Ndebele rising. Aided by his pigmentation, courage and ingen-
uity, he could easily identify himself with the Ndebele by discarding his
dress, shaving his head in popular Ndebele fashion and generally passing
for one of them. His lmowledgeof English, Dutch, Xhosa and Ndebele lang-
uages as well as Ndebele customs uniquely qualified this black equivalent of
the Scarlet Pimpernel for work requiring a tremendous amount of duplicity.
As early as April 1896/durtng the first stages of the Ndebele rising be-
fore Plumer brought his reHef force and their associated 'Cape Boys' into
the country, John Grootboom was already engaged in reHef work to prevent
the beleaguered white settlers of Bulawayo from being cut off from the main
centres of supply in the South. He was in this case assigned to Brand's
Afrikaner Column,which concerned itself primari1y with the task of keeping
the Tuli road open, as it was the avenue of communicaticmbetween Bulawayo
and the Northem Transvaal. Grootboomjto whom Instructions were given to
join the Brand Column at Dawson's store along the TuH road some eighteen
miles away, was late on the particular April day~dueto the distance involved
from his residence near Hope FountainJwhichhe had to undertake on foot.
Itwas during the course of this journey and before he joined with the Brand
Column at the Manzamnyama River that he met the test of his career as a
collaborator. The difficult circumstances under which he carried out his
instructions,with the Ndebele assailants in hot pursuit, bespeak of Grootboom's
144This Grootboom account unless otherwise indicated is based on Sykes:
Ope cit. Chapter V: pp. 263-9; and Lord Grey's Report on the Mata-
beleland Rebellicm: November, 1896: Ibid PP. 5-22.-
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varied qualities and his loyalty to the white forces of colonization. He told
Sykes about the occasion:
I followed on as fast as I could and at mid-day came to the place
where they -(Brand's Columnj- had had breakfast; half a mile on,
I met a Matabele, He asked me where I was going. Well you
see, I couldn't say I was after the Column, so I told him that I
was on theway to where some of my cattle were, among the hills
at M'glaba, as I wanted to make sure they were safe. 'Very well'
he says, 'I know you, but you had better keep away from the r0af45
as the Matabele are just ahead, being doctored by the M'Limo'.
While this rather friendly Ndebele soldier was prepared to let Grootboom
off the hook and would not interfere with the latter's plans, other Ndebele
insurgents whom Grootboom subsequently met were however not so equally
charitable. They were well aware of Grootboom's commitment to the enemy
side and were thus prepared to make him pay for this alliance with his life.
What was even more irrltating.especially)on this occasion was the fact that
the Ndebele insurgents were intent on cutting off the Tuli road)whlle the Brand
Column aimed at having it open and Grootboom was, in this ease, actually
proceeding to offer his help in the matter. Understandably, the second party
of Ndebele soldiers pursued Grootboom with determination and the latter
could only manage to escape by exploiting some of his many ingenious scout-
ing teebntques.developed over the years. Here he shook off his pursuants
by hiding in the tall grass and taking off his shoes, with the result that the
irate and barefoot Ndebele insurgents consequently mistook his spoor for
one of theirs.
Grootboom's further involvement in the campaign against the Ndebele
insurgents was just as equally daring and ingeniously executed, as far as
his side of affairs was concemed. During the famous Thaba-zika-Mambo
campaign,which we have already discussed, Grootboom had been sent forward
six days in advance of Colonel Plumer's forces to espy the positions and
strength of the Ndebele Impts, Undertaking his mission mainly at night and
entering the Thaba-Zika-Mambo stronghold by stealth, Grootboom had the
chance to note in·most intimate detail all the places in which the enemy
camps were located and also managed to lounge by the enemy's fireside to
discover the qual1-ty, quantity and morale of the Ndebele fighting machinery.
145lbid.
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It was during this mission that Grootboom is said to have encountered, but
without being detected of course, most Ndebele forces which had come over
from Matopo and other areas to consult the Mwari priests and the Ndebele
leadership at Thaba-Zika-Mambo, giving the whole place a somewhat festive
atmosphere.
In spite of this involvement with the white forces during the campaign and
contrary to the eulogistic accounts and biographies on Colonel Plumer and
the Matabeleland Field Force, Grootboomwas not, as far as he was concerned,
Impresaed.fn any wa~ by the manner inwhich his white allies prosecuted
their military operations. Hewas especially surprised and disheartened by
their ignorance on unconventional warfare and thus informed Sykes of his
disappointment as follows:
"The Column ~lumer's)- ••• would march into the hills, have
a fight, and then at night go back to camp. That is no way to
fight the Matabele. Youmust sleep in the hills after the battle
and keep on follOWingthe enemy from one kopje to another, and
ldll so many that you break his heart. But instead of that, you
;whites)- go back to camp, the Matabele think you have had
enough of it, and soon they collect together again, and are more
confident than ever. No,•.• the white men don't understand
fighting among the rocks. They go out in the ~ and let the
Matabele shoot and shoot, and downthey fall. ..
Grootboom's criticism of the military tactics of the white forces in
1896 is important in many respects. In the first place, it underlines the
reasons why the 'Cape Boys' were so heavily committed into the fighting
during the attack against thelhaba-Zika-Mambo stronghold in July 1896 and
why most whites, including Colonel Plumer himself, were prepared for
once to credit a non-European force for the victory, contrary to the spirit
of the times. Secondly, Grootboom's criticism demonstrates too that the
fatality rate among the white forces was not as low as the general conclusions
and estimates given in early Southern Rhodesian historiography would like us
to believe.
However, only one man appears to have wonGrootboom's admiration
during the 1896 campaign in Matabeleland. This was ColonelR. S. Baden-
Powell, Grootboom's scouting parmer. whomhe called 'Colonel Baldng-
147
Powder'. owing to the linguistic similarity of the two names. Baden-Powell,
1461bid:-1471bid:
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unlike his fellow countrymen, was more adaptable to the peculiar deman~s
of this t,ype of warfare and was also generally prepared to play hide and
s.ek with the enemy in their hilly strongholds. Of course, such opinions
as Grootboom may have held on Col. Baden-Powell had been born of the close
co-operation between these two scouts during the rising. Col. Baden-
Povell vas just as equally impressed by his partner and demonstrated this
reciprocal feeling by quoting a white colleague of his, whose racial
views bad hitherto prevented him from having any direct physical contact
vith Africans, as saying of Grootboom:
He tGrootboom+ is not a proper nigger:
black, but he has a white man's heart.
hands with him.148
The colleague in question apparently belonged to the school of thought
his skin is
I will shake
within the European circles which regarded the qualities of virtue as
preserves of the white folk. Nevertheless, the GrootboomfBaden-Powell
combination was a formidable front, as far as the white forces were con-
cerned during the risings.
Baden-Powell's biographer actually does not demur on the advantages
derived by the famous scout from his association with Grootboom during
the campaign. Some of the more outstanding tricks Grootboom taught
Baden-Povell were based essentially on the former's knowledge of Ndebele
customs, the topography of the country and his previous experience in
Bdebele warfare. One such example concerned the Ndebele tricks of
lighting several camp fires around their military settlements at night,
giving the enemy the false impression that several Ndebele impis were in
camp, yet in actual fact all the work was carried out by one or two
people, whilst the rest of the forces lay in ambush some distance away.
Th. second trick involved a deductive process by means of which it was
possible to pin down the specific locations and logistics of the Ndebele
forc.s by tracing the movement of the Ndebele food supplies and following
clues on leaves dropped, especially from Ndebele beer pots. Through
these clues Grcotboom and Baden-Powell were often able not only to trace
the logistics ot the enemy forces but also to estimate the size of
cpposition in terms of military divisions so amassed for battle. The
two scouts struck a very interesting working partnership and the
tricks learnt by 'Impeesa' (the wolf-that-never-sleeps), as the
Udebela nicknamed Baden-Powell, were later of great benefit to
l~aden-Powell: The Matabele Campaign: pp 171.
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The story of John Grootboom's military activities during the Ndebele
rising is an interesting one, but it should not be allowed to overshadow the
contribution of other 'Cape Boys')especially towards the closing phases of the
rising. The part played by the 'Cape Boys' together with Grootboom in
bringing about the Matopo indaba and the peace settlement in Matabeleland,
is a Significant historical contribution often grossly overlooked by uninformed
historians and biographers over-enthused in their designs to place the laurels
for this feat elsewhere. John Grootboom, John Makunga, James M'klza and
other less illustrious 'Cape Boys' were an indispensable factor in the Matopo
indaba. Their importance was engendered not only by their successful per-
suastion of the Ndebele leaders to come to the conference table but also, to
a large measure, by the implications which a quicker finale to the risings
meant to the BSACo., Rhodes and other interested parties. The attitude of
the militant Nyamanda faction and its worthy spokesman,Karl Khamalo)at the
peace talks is a very clear indication that without the services of these 'Cape
Boys' who had already established their own relationships with the Ndebele
leadership and lmewthe proper tendons to manipulate, the Ndebele insurgents
would not have agreed to participate in the Matopoindaba so easily and face
the white people whom they could no longer trust, as Companyrule had
taught them by 1896. Yet in spite of the work of these African auxiliaries,
the Rhodes camp is agreed on' me thing and that is, the fact that the main
beneficiary to credit with this important feat was Rhodes himself. The 'Cape
Boys' are considered as e~sentially of secondary importance and as having
only agreed to participate in the peace negotiations either in retum for fin-
150
ancial rewards or as functionaries of the Native Department.
These statements indicated above.on the participation of the 'Cape Boys'
in the Matopo settlementjare of course purely simplistic overviews which
have no relevance whatsoever to the whole saga of foreign African collabora-
tion as it occured in 1893 and 1896. The role of the 'Cape Boys' was,in fact)
149W. Hillcourt: Baden-Powell: The Two Lives of A Hero: Heinemann:
Londoo.: 1964: PP. 132-44.
150The thesis of financial rewards as the motive for the 'Cape Boys' involve-
ment at Matopo is nu1l1f1edby Grootboom's refusal of a reward in
October 1896 so offered by Rhodes: Vide: Gross: Rhodes of Africa:
PP. 338-9.
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far more complex than Rhodes's biographers and their kind cared to under-
stand. 151 But whatever their motivation, the 'Cape Boys' concemed carried
out their spadework for the peace settlement to perfection. They exploited
their previous acquaintance with the Ndebele leaders to maximum potential
and it is quite probable that though they were fighting on different sides of the
war, they never had cause to renege on this friendship. Makunga for ex-
ample,who had represented Ndebele interests as secretary of Lobengula in
the 1893 war, appears to have remained in close touch with the Ndebele
leadership and royal family during and after 1896. 152
Employing such leverage as they had, Grootboom and Makunga managed
to gather a group of leading Ndebele indunas who subsequently met the Rhodes
party of four white men on August 21, 1896. These men were Rhodes him-
self, Dr. Hans Sauer,his Boer friend, Vere StentJthe correspondent of the
Cape Times land Colenbrander, included in the party on account of his lmow-
. ledge of the Ndebele language and customs and was therefore to act as the
interpreter. Other whitesJlike Rhodes's personal secretary) Jack Grimmer)
who wanted to join the party were prevented from doing so by Grootboom.
The latter was obviously afraid of infringing the promises he and his collea-
gues had made to the Ndebele leaders on the number of white men entitled
to attend the preliminary indaba to be held at a place five miles into the
Matopo stronghold. Evidently there was fear of betrayal on either side. For
the Rhodes party, the tense atmosphere of discomfiture and anxiety was
not at all helped by the intermittent bobbing up of heads of armed Ndebele
'majaha' from behind stones and rock ledges. Only the appearance of Groot-
boom. and Makunga at the head of a procession of forty-four Ndebele indunas
may have dissipated these feelings of fear. The Ndebele indunas were led
by stkombo, Somabulana, Umlugulu, .Dhliso, Nyanda and Bld1~the principal
leaders of the senior and more moderate faction of the Ndebele insurgent
153movement. Thus the first indaba, lDllike the subsequent ones, was mainly
an outcome of Grootboom and Makunga's bridge-building efforts between the
two warring sides. In this manner, these two 'Cape Boys' contributed
tremendously to a movement which decided the fate of the Ndebele nation. and
152Vide: Supra: PP.l-8.
NB 1/1/3: J. C. Makunga, Native Reserve, Bulawayo to W. E. Thomas,
Acting C/N/C: January 5, 1898.
153C• O. 417/197: Lord Grey to BSACo., Cablegram ,August, 22, 1896.
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also balanced the BSACo. 's ledger books.
Yet the subsequent success of the Matopo peace settlement should not
however obscure the issues then involved, as the risings in both Matabele-
land and Mashonaland symbolized by August 1896. This sudden departure in
polley on the part of the white forces) which had avowed from the start that
their Intention was to carry out an exemplary pmlitive campaign of vengeance,
must not be looked at in isolation. For such a sudden deviation in policy and
also to appreciate even more the role of Grootboom~ Makunga and their asso-
ciates, we must turn to the economic factor of the 1896-96 risings.
We have already seen.at the outbreak of the Ndebele rising and the rinder-
pest plagueJh~ the financial problems of the BSACo. forced it to look else-
where for cheapter altemative means for prosecuting the counter-miUtary
154campaign by enrolling cheaper African auxlUaries from the South. This
state of affairs} as far as the Company's finances were concerned, had not
changed and if anything it had even worsened in time scale. The neo-brank-
ruptcy of the Company was: by the time of the peace settlement affecting both
the Company Administration and the white soldiers engaged to participate in
the campaign. The latter were affected greatly at a personal level and had
even been informed, right from the start, about this critical economic post-
tion,with the result that they developed a spirit of adventurism as a form of
response and the only way to meet the shortage)especially in terms of food
ratioDS. But not Infrequently the practice however landed these soldiers into
unfortunate Situations) espec1al1y when the vandalism they so perpetrated in
search for food was against fellow whites. 155 Against Ndebele or other Afri-
can property, such vandalism did not of course matter and indeed later on it
became somewhat professionalJparticular]y in relation to the collection of
commodities to replenish the troopers' bully beef and meal rations. Chicken,
mutton fat, impfl (dried sugar-cane) and grain were amcmgst the popular
commodities white troopers usually helped themselves to from Ndebele
villages to meet the food shortage problem with which they were frequently
faced. 156 There was no accountab1l1ty"either public, collective or personal
154Vide Supra: pp. 108-16.
165The troopers were for instance charged for ravaging the property of
Bulawayo traders left abandoned en route from the South,due to rinder-
pest. Vide: Sykes: OPe cit. pp. 72-3.
156Even Rhodes himseU was involved in these food hunting escapades to
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for these practices against African villages and this)to some extent,helped
to offset the Company's difficulties.157
But these problems of shortage of supplies and their general effects on
the troopers at a personal level were not significant enough to influence the
decisions of top level officials. It is therefore from the hill-top that we
sbould examine the place of the economic factor in the Matabeleland campaign
and to what extent 'Cape Boy' contribution was thus signlflcant. Rhodes, who
was all along quite aware of the gravity of his and the BSACo. 's economic
problems, may well have briefly summarized the position prior to the Matopo
bldaba when he indicated:
What with Jameson's Rald, rfnderpest, famine, and now my house
bU~5i feel rather like Job, but thank God, I haven't had sores
yet.
If these economic 'sores' had not yet appeared, their intention to do so
sooner or later was evident enough to observant economic surgeons. Many
people who were then associated with the BSACo. ranging from Rhodes him-
self, the Company Administration in the territories, London Wall, the Col-
onial Office and others were all aware of the disastrous economic situation
the Company faced then.
As early as Apr111896, Henry Labouchere, that persistent critic of the
Company, had raised the question of expenses incurred in the risings in the
House of Commons requesting assurances from both the War and Colonial
Offices that the British taxpayer would not be saddled with the UabWties on
risings whose incidence was uncalled for and for which the Company was
solely responsible. This move consequently prompted a watchdog mentality
within the Colonial and War Offices. By October 1896,the War Office which
bad hitherto been counting the cost m the matter actually lodged Its claim
for compensation with the BSACo. over the expenses the former had incurred
on various Items associated with the risings in the Company territories. These
Included the transportation of troops from England, local troop movements in
supplement supplies and this is how he and his party came across old
UmzabaJNyanda's motherJOIl a chicken-hunting venture at Sikombo's
kraal in early August, 1896: Vide Sauer: loc, cit.
157The grain which the troopers got freely from Ndebele villages for their
own use and that of the horses actually fetched about £10 to £15 per bag
in Bulawayo. Vide Sykes: loc, cit.
158Hillcourt: Baden-Powen: The Two Uves of a Hero: P. 143.
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Southem Africa, payment of allowances to Staff Officers and men as well
as expenses on remounts, stores, clothing, rations and forage for the
horses. This claim by the War Office amounted to about £184,000 in round
159figures. Moreover) the Companywas held responsible for the pensions
160of those men wounded and disabled during the campaign.
But as far as the Imperial Government side of affairs was concerned,
the BSACo. was fortunate. Its supporters in the Colonial OfficeJwhoincluded
in their ranks Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of state for the Colonies,
were prepared to take up cudgels with the War Office and were,in this way)
able to reduce the size of this department's claims against the Company. In
the endJthe Companywas held responsible and chargeable only for those troops
actually involved in suppressing the risings in its territories and.to some
extentJfor such troop movements as may have allowed the release of more
troops in SouthAfrica for the front. Short of this, as Sir Robert MeadeJthe
Permanent Under-Secretary, argued, the Colonial Office itself would have
been prepared to accept the responsibility and charges. on some aspects of
161the war in order to meet the Companyhalf-way. Thus on the Imperial
level, a faction of acolytes was not prepared to see the BSACo. founder in
economic doldrums.
On the local scene in Southern Africa,matters were however different.
The expenses incurred by the Company,prior to the MatopoIndaba.had be-
come such a burden that even the efforts of the Companysupporters at the
Colonial Office to alleviate this burden were scarcely noticeable. The Com-
pany Directors were well aware of the gravity of the position and,accordtngly,
162informed their shareholders. In fact,the Colonial Office's offer to meet
part of the Company's expenses in relation to Imperial troops did not in any
way include those troops retained in the Company territories after the Matopo
peace settlement, not to mention the likelihood that the Companycould also
be held responsible for the 200 more retained at Gaberones in the Protect-
163orate for emergency purposes.
159C•O. 417/195: War Office to C. 0.; October 23, 1896.
160Ibid: Minute by Graham to Fairfield: November 5, 1896.
1611bid: Minute by Meade to Fairfield: October 28, 1896 and C.O. to W.0.:-November 20, 1896.
162
BSACo, Directors' Report and Accounts for the Year Ending, 1896-97: PP. 83-4.
163C•0•. 417/195: Meade to Fairfield: October 28, 1896.
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For the Company Administration/these additional troop expenses had
evidently become impossible to bear. At the peak of the Ndebele rising and
prior to the Thaba-Zika-Mambo campaign, the strength of the forces under
the command of the Company totalled Cb3, 500white troopers, 179 Ndebele
friendlies and 250 'Cape Boys'. This state of affairs had never appealed to
the local Administration on account of the heavy demands a force of such
magnitude exerted on its limited resources and Lord Grey, in particular, was
very much disappointed by this turn of events. For this reason, he would not
allow the Natal cavalry to be moved to Matabeleland and suggested to Sir
Hercules Robinson the High Commissioner that it could be better kept at
Mafeldng instead. The Administrator was particularly deterred by the dif-
ficulties of transport, then still complicated by rinderpest, drought and
locusts, which could have made the question of feeding a few more mouths in
164those troubled times a pretty difficult one.
From Grey and the Company's point of view, they had hoped that after
the Matopo indaba in August 1896, the Company might get a chance to balance
its acoounts. Not unnaturally the Acting Administrator was incensed and
bitter over what he regarded as Fabian tactics adopted by the Imperial gov-
ernment to prolong the presence of Imperial troops in the country. InOctober
1896, Lord Grey therefore put forward proposals in an effort to persuade the
Imperial government to reduce these troops by a large proportion. This pro-
posal was twofold. In the first place, he suggested that only 700 troops be
retained in the country, of which 4:00or 500would be distributed throughout
the various forts in Matabeleland,but with 100 of them stationed in Bulawayo,
the central pOSitionof the province and ready to go to any point of danger at
a moment's notice. The alternative aspect of the proposal involved retaining
200 troops in Bulawayowhilst the remalning 300 or so, supplemented by 200
'Cape Boys t, would then be distributed throughout Matabeleland.
The Grey proposals were unacceptable to the Imperial representatives in
the oountry, Sir Richard Martin, the Deputy Commlssioner,and Sir Frederick
Carrington,the overall military leader. The author of the proposals was thus
oonsequently furious with these two representatives and the Imperial govern-
m.ent they stood for. They became the target of Grey's scathing accusations
164:C.O. 417/197: Lord Grey to BSACo., Cablegram: October 16, 1896.
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and abuse. This anger on the part of Lord Grey and the BSACo.was apparen-
tly based on'the assumption that the Companywas being deliberately ruined
by impervious bureaucrats, by being compelled to bear the expenses of a
standing army whose services were no longer relevant to the BSACo. Admin-
istration. The Company officials argued that they were being decoyed to
provide about 26,000 Ibs of grain per day for a force of over 3,000 men and
3, 000 horses (the horses feeding at the rate of 6 lbs of grain per day each,
twice the amount required for a trooper), whereas if the forces were reduced)
as proposed)the Company could have a surplus of 13, 000 Ibs of grain a day.
Such computations understandably angered the Companywhich was no longer
as interested in security matters as it was in its own financial position. Grey
therefore considered himself justified in laying the blame regarding the
Company's difficulties at the doorsteps of the Imperial government in strong
languageJindicating that:
It is positively wicked that, by the actioo.of the Imperial author-
itles, we -(the BSACo.)- should not oo.lybe compelled to iDCur,
heavy expenditure which the maintenance of these unnecessary
troops requires, but that they should be C~fDg supplies which
are required to keep starving people alive.
Rhodes who supported Grey's interpretation of the economic situation also
said of these troops that had become the centre of controversy that:
••• -(they)- have nothing to do but Iif8en their backs in dirty
flannel trousers reading Tit-Bits.
The Company naturally had awoken too late from its slumberJonly to find a
borde of economic problems awaiting immediate aolutton,
When the Grootboom/Makunga indaba took place on August 21, 1896,
Grey bad understandably telegraphed the following day.with undiluted en-
167
thustaam, misinforming his superiors that the war was over unconditionally.
Things had however unfortunately not turned out as Grey and the Company had '
anticipated and now they were laying an accusing fingeron everybody. The
bope for the Company in its struggle for economic survival perbaps now lay
elsewhere. As Grey subsequently reported, the prices of farms and stands
in Bulawayo for instance, bad risen by 10%andJbymeans of land salesJthe
Company thus hoped to recoup its losses. It was also expected that but-tax
collection would provide an alternative source of revenue and for that purpose,
165Ibid: Lord Grey to BSACo., October 16, 1896.-166Ib1d:
167Ibid: Lord Grey to BSACo.:13~ablegram: August 22, 1896.
Grey set the Native Department of Matabeleland on a new and firmer footing
with more mature and experienced Native Commissioners engaged for
168
service from Natal to take the places of the younger ones.
The Company's economic problems might have been even worse had the
Ndebele risJng not ended in the manner it did. The Company could have been
faced with prolonged warfare in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland, but for
the bridge-building work of the 'Cape Boys', especially John Grootboom and
Jolm Makunga, this unfortunate turn, of events was checked in time. Yet
proper credit for this important contribution was hardly given to these 'Cape
Boys' who were responsible for effecting the rappro~hment between the
Ndebele insurgents and the whites. In characteristic Euro-centric tradition,
Lord Grey informed LondonWall about the first Matopo indaba)indicating that
the Rhodes party ' ••• went at the risk of their lives ••• ' into the enemy strong-
hold and,in this vein,credited the Rhodes party for the success which It did
169not really deserve. Rhodes, however, viewed the Matopo events dif-
ferently, when,in the end,he persuaded Grootboom to name whatever reward
the latter felt entitled to. Whenthis was not forthcoming, the founder of
the Rhodesias tucked the reward carefully into his Last Will; hence the so-
II d
- - etc ,170
ea e Grootboom legacy of '100 acres of land, a wagon, a span ••••
In the end,it was not only Grootboomwhobenefitted materiaUy,but all the
other foreign African auxiliaries who fought alongside white forces in ..
Ma.tabeleland. 171
In Mashonaland the rfsJng was put to an end in a manner totally different
from that adopted in Matabeleland. There was inMashonalandno dramatic
finale in the form of a peace settlement las the Matopo indaba sfgnified in
MatabelelandJhence no Grootbooms to claim credit for the feat. The Shona
rfsJng was largely 1nfluencedby the absence of a central1zed mllltary and
political core, Shona collaboration and the more hostile reactions of the white
settlers to the outbreak of the risJng in the province. Together all these
168Ibid: Lord Grey to BSACo., October 16, 1896 and Grey's Report onthe
'"'M;itabelelandRebellion, November, 1896: llli,: p 22.
169Ibid: Lord Grey to BSACo., August 22, 1896.-170Gross: OPe cit. PP. 338-9.
171C•O• 455/1: Notice by W.H. Milton, ActJngAdministrator, September 26,
189'7:in BSACo. Govt. Gazettes, P/R/O, London.
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factors precluded anything resembling a peaceful solution as the watershed
between war and peace in the Shonacountry in 1896-97. We have already dis-
cussed the relevance of Shana disunity and the ease with which various poli-
tical groups and factions, vying with ane another,were easily exploited by the
BSACo. to provide the collaborating material that was so essential to end
172the rising. Here we shall look at the role of settler hostility and miscon-
ceptions on Shona society and how these affected the trend of events in the
Shona rising. We shall also look at the foreign African factor and its obviously
minimal role in the Shona rising.
To understand white settler reactions to the Shona rising, we need to
understand their general misconceptions on the Shona peoples and how these
misconceptions shaped black/white contacts in the Shonacountry. The occu-
pation of Mashanaland was, from the beginning, undertaken by the BSACo. on
the basis of several misconceptions on Shona/Ndebele relatt01lSlperpetrated
to provide a credible legal justification to the treaties secured by the occupy-
173
ing agency. These misconceptions effectively influenced the behaviour of
the white colonist community in Mashanaland to such an extent that they also
inculcated a spirit of self-confidence and abandon among these settlers in the
course of their early relations with the Shona and thus no premonitions were
necessary to persuade these new arrivals that the Shonacould ever revolt.
Even after the Ndebele rising in April 1896, the settlers of Mashanaland
never took heed of the eventuality of a similar occurrence among the Shona.
They either volunteered for service inMatabeleland or pursued their day to
day occupations with the same type of abandonwhich had characterised the
whole settler commlDlitysince 1890. This type of behaviour was further en-
gendered by the erroneous conclusion that the Ndebele rising was a carry-over
of the 1893war, then Incompleted.and hence there was no cause for alarm in
the Shona country right up to JUne1896,whenthe killings started. Thus when
the Shona rose up in arms, the reactions of the whites were predictable and
were later well captured by HughMarshall Hole, the Magistrate of Salisbury
and for many years Secretary to the BSACo., when he stated:
It may be remarked that this sudden departure on the part of
172Vide Supra: pp. 99-107.
173For misconceptions an Shona/Ndebele relations: Vide: T. O. Ranger:
'The Rewriting of African History during the Scramble: The Matabele
dominance in Mashonaland': Ioe, cit.
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the Mashona tribes has caused the greatest surprise to those
who, from long reatdenoe in the cotmtry thought they understood
the character of these savages, and to none more than the Native
Commissioners themselves. The Mashona race has always been
regarded as composed of disintegrated groups of natives, having
no common organization and owing allegiance to no single authority,
cowed by a long series of raids from Matabeleland Into a condi-
tion of object puslllanity and incapable of planning any combined
or premeditated action. The result has proved that their intel-
ligence has been tmderrated, and their CtmDing - it cannot b\ 74
called courage - has not been suffiCiently appreciated. (sic)
Marshall Hole went on to describe how the Shona secretively organised
their rising, taking cue from the leadership of the Mwari cult and the spirit
mediums, with devastating effects:
So far from being cowed it is proved beyond doubt that they
~Shona)- have been hording rifles and ammunition for years
past - probably ever since the occupatioo of the country in
1890 with the object, it is presumed, of revolt at a suitable
opportunity. With true Kaffir deceit they have beguiled the
Administration into the idea that they were content with the
government of the country, and wanting nothing more than to
work, and trade, and become civilized; but at a given signal
they cast all pretence aside and Simultaneously set in m~5
the whole of the machinery which they had been preparing.
But the Shooa rising was not so much of the sudden and unusual dep-
arture that Hole and his colleagues presented Indeed what was sudden here
was merely the explosion of myths and the general stereotypes held by
Britons about the Shona peoples. These myths were, as Cairns Indicates, an
outcome of pre-1890 missionary and early European contacts with various
African national groups. In a bid to win over public sympathy and financial
support at home "early missionaries for instance, by design and calculation,
cultivated links with particular African groups on the basis of the Impact
such associations were expected to produce on the public cOllstituents at home
thus generating enthusiasm and ftmds for their enterprise. The Baganda,
the Ndebele and the Makololo in Central and East Africa were some of the
17"Report on the Mashona1and RebeWOIl, Part I:by H.M. Hole, Civil Com-
missioner and Magistrate, Salisbury, October 29, 1896: in BSACo.
Report on the Administration of Rhodesia 1896-97: pp.62- 3
and also H.M. Hole: The Makfng of Rhodesia: Frank Cass: lDndon
(Reprint) 1971: PP. 387-8. For a fuller d1scU8sicmOIl the attitude of the
white settlers towards the Shona and Ndebele, Vide: Ranger: Revolt:
PP. 1-6.
175Ibid:-
141
targets of this missionary courtship, shaped ostensibly an the strength of
176the danger element which working am.ong these more warlike peoples implied:
The Sbona and other African grouP8Jwhich were not as hostUe and dangerous
as their neighbours were.did not obviously fall within the scope of the reckon-
ing of these early missionaries. Any relationship with this latter group of
African nationalities was apparently considered sterile and unprofitableJboth
in the spiritual and economic sense. This somewhat bizarre method of
evaluating the importance of individual African groups certainly had its un-
fortunate results and historical distortions were naturally some of these many
unfortunate products.
In Southem Rhodesia the white settlers were however compelled to come
to terms with reality only after the 1896-97 traumatic events,which shattered
their previous images,borrowed,without any consideratian,from the early
European travellers to Mrica. 'Wlri' Edwards the Native CommisSioner for
the Mrewa district confessed on how these myths had diSintegrated in rela-
tion to the Shona societies after 1896Jas follows:
We mew nothing of their ~Shana)- past history, who they were,
or where they came from, and although many of the Native Com-
missione'rs had a working mow ledge of their languages, none
really understood the people or could follow their llne of thought.
We were inclined to look upon them as a down-trodden race,
who were grateful to the white men for protection against the
ravaging raids of the Matabele and others, which aIJ.cwedthem
to graze their stock and till their gardms In peace.
Such realization was too late to rectify the Ill-effects already produced by
the hitherto unfounded misconceptions white colonists had on Shona societies.
The character of pre-1896 Company rule and the manner in which the Shona
rising was suppressed were both,oonsequently, hfnged on these mlsoonceptions
and attitudes.
The interesting aspect of these white attitudes Is that the Shona peoples
themselves were just equally confused about the impUoatioDS of white-settler
and colonial rule. They only began to reconsider their own mlsoonceptions
on the white community as colOD1alrule started to make its presence felt and,
176Cairns: op. oif;. PP. 16-7, 40, 112; Cairns gives an interesting example
of Livingstone's relationship with the Makololo, especlally his porters
Susi and Chuma, and how these people as a whole aoqu1red special sig-
n1.ftcance to all the Britons In gmeral and the Scotsmen In particular.
177tWiri' Edwards: 'RemfDlsoenoes' Part m: NADANo. 39, 1962: p. 19.
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when their perceptions could not conform with the realities of the new poll-
tical situation, they consequently resorted to a military solution to bridge
the gap between realism and illusion. As the Shona old men of Mrewa dist-
rict indicated to 'Wiri' Edwards after 1896, their own misconceptions on the
pioneers were based on assumptions expressed as follows:
We saw you -{whites~ come with your wagons and horses and
rifles. We said to each other, they have come to buy gold, or
it may be to hunt elephant. They will go again. When we saw
that you continued to remain in the country anC\.",re troubling
us with your laws we began to talk and to plot.
The views of both sides, the Shona and the white settlers, were thus diamet-
rically opposed and obviously irreconcilable. Moreover, the differences in
question were too fundamental to preclude conflict in one form or another
and when this came about, its repercussions had widespread implications on
both sides. Thus in the Shana country the ideological conflict between the
blacks and whites was sharper and the methods adopted as a means to an end
often cruder than any resorted to in Matabeleland.
We have already seen the main problems arising from the fragmentation
of the Shona poUties and how these consequently produced negative effects on
the Shona societies. But in spite of these drawbacks, the Shona rose up rely-
ing chiefly on their traditic:mal religious leadership to provide the necessary
liaison between the various Shona ethnic groups, The Shona rising was.In
every sense) a war of vengeance and in the melee which ensued it was not
only the white settlers who were subjected to attacksJ but also the African
collaborator - the foreign Africans and those local1ackeys of the settler com-
munity. In response to these attacks, the foreign Africans)for instance_,
provided military assistance to the white relief forces.lconstituted from
179
amongst the white population then in laager in Sansbury. These foreign
Africans thus consequently played a role quite congruent to that of the 'Cape
Boys' in Bulawayo inApril 1896Jbefore Plumer arrived with the major army.
In the final analysis, It was these Mrican collaborators.lwho had not redeemed
themselves through last minute repentance by joining hands with the Shona
178'Wiri' Edwards: 'Remfniscences' Part m: p, 23.
179The population of foreign Africans in Salisbury in early 1896 numbered
about 200. Vide: Extracts from the Report of the Civil Commissioner.
SalisburY; (H,Me Hole), for the Year EndfDg September 30, 1896:
1!!,g: PP. 114-5.
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insurgents.,who found themselves in a very unenviable position. They were
killed together with their erstwhile masters, an occurrence onwhich Hotel
the Civil Commissioner for Salisbury, reported in the followingunpleasant
terms:
At Brst there were constant arrivals of refugees - many of
them wounded, all suffering from exposure and privation -
of fugitive Cape and Zambesi Kaffirs, who, equally with the
white men, were objects of attack on the part of the Mashana.
A large number of friendly kafBrs had been murderefsOand
many wounded and tortured in a shocldng manner ••••
Shona vengeance on the African a1l1esof the white settlers was unmitigated.
It was a symptom of the brutal warfare, though of course the propaganda
value of the Hole's report and its author's general negrophobia,concelved in
order to ingratiate himself with the Company, must be taken into considera-
tion. However,when settler- forces themselves were on the march, they
rendered the dictum" that the war was one of 'pacification', a mockery.
InMashonaland very few foreign Africans from the Southwere actually
engaged to suppress the rising and.in fact,those so engaged were mostly
Zulus who had come into the country with the Natal oontingent. This force
had been formerly destined for Matabeleland when it was diverted for use in
Mashonaland}after reaching the Charter district at the time the Shona rising
181broke out. ConsequentIy)it was the Zulu auxlJJ.aryfactor whlohwas heavily
involved in the Shena country. The Zulu levies formed an essential element
in the sklrmishfng parties sent out from Salisbury mto the outlyfng districts
on several oecastcas, between the end of June and the beginning of JUly 1896,
and variously led by Sergeant-Major Edmonds, Troopers Bell, Franklfn and
Duncan, before the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Alderson with the Imperial
troops in MashonaJand. The purpose of these skirmishes was to oollect grain
(measured inwagon-loads) and cattle for feeding the SaUsbury population
then in laager. After Ueutenant-Colonel Alderson's arrival, a mixed con-
tingent of whites and Zulus under Sergeant Fletcher was}for instance,also
stationed permanently at the Chishawasha Jesuit Mission farm to guard the
182
missionaries there.
180 'Hole's Report on the MashonalandRebellion: Part I: Ibid: p. 64.
181!!!!9.
182Ibid.-
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Perhaps the relatively Umited involvement of foreign Africans here may
have been determined by the small-scale and defensive character of warfare
in the Shona rising. Even the massive concentration of white forces on the
pattern of the Thaba-zika-Mambo attack in Matabeleland was not repeated
anywhere in Mashonaland. But on the other hand, the geographically exten-
sive nature of the Shona rising and the fortified mountain strongholdsl
strengthened over the years, caused no small incODlVenienceto the white forces
and obviously it became essential, in view of the increasing poverty of the
Company, to introduce a new factor altogether. This was the dynamite
factor, employed with appalling results for the Shona insurgents. 183 In the
endJit was this new weapon'which won the war very convincingly for the
Company) but not without dragging it up to October 1897)when the 7th Hussars,
an Imperial force led by Aldersc:n, left for Beira.
The only foreign African historical character to have contributed to the
defeat of the Shona rising in a manner approximating the role of Malamga
and Grootboom at Matopo may have been Tom Ntham.ekwana Dhlamini, who
was involved in the"capture''of Chief Makoni at the latter's Gw:lndfngwistrong-
holdJin what later became the Makon! district of eastern Mashona1and To
assess Tom Dh1amfDt's role in the event, it is also essential to examine the
background to his involvement in the rising and his relationship with Chief
Makont.
Chief Mutota Nyamanhfndi Makoni belODgedto a generation of proud and
independent-minded Shana chiefs who came to power before the challenges of
white forces of change became apparent. He had succeeded to the Maungwe
chieftaincy by tbwartfDg all forms of external and internal opposition and by
the beginning of the colonJal era In Southern Rhodesia, his external relations
were princ1pally intertwined with those of the other Shalla chiefs of the region
Uke Mutasa of the Manyika,his main rival, MangwElldeof the Nhowe, Makombe
of the Barwe, later incorporated Into the Portuguese sphere of Influence, and
Gouevia the ub1qu1tous Portuguese/Goanese trader. Through a well executed
system of alUances, Chief Makoni was able to hold his own In Maungwe
during the pre~olonial era and the period of BSACo. rule before 1896. His
chiefdom lay in an area by all means rem.oved from the purview of either
183Note for instance the dynamite attack on headman Manyepera of the
Marandellas district. Vide: Ranger: Ope ctt. PP. 276-7.
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Ndebele Influence or military raids; a factor which Selous the hunter and
Colquhotmthe first Administrator had recognised by signing separate treaties
with Makoni and other chiefs of the area inOctober 1890, to supplement the
Rudd CcmcessionJbutwere subsequently overridden by Rhodes's ruthless
concept of power poUtics; the latter insisting on the adequacy of the Rudd
Ccmcession to accommodate all the Shma chiefs. 184 It was thus lDlder these
circumstances that the BSACo. laid down the f01Duiationsof its administration
InMaungwe and when this machinery began to take root Makoni and his people
were Inevitably affected
In the Maungwechiefdom for example, the land-grabbing and hut-tax
collection activities of . O'Reilly and other white settlers were beg1nn1ng
to pinch onto the people rather severely by 1896. SUchactions on an indep-
endent-minded ruler Uke Makoni could scarcely go unheeded and when the
1851896 risings broke out, Makoni therefore joined the other Insurgents. In
fact,Makoni was so confident of the justice of his people's cause and his own.
capa.biUty to drive the white settlers out of the cotmtryJwhen he joined the
rising, that he even assumed the niclmame Cbingaira (the hawk), implying
by this allegoric title that he would pounce onto the white settlers Uke a hawk
186swooping upcmchicken.
When the rising broke out In June 1896, Herbert Melville TabererJ the
Chief Native Commissimer for MashCR1a1and)was In the Umtall district (then
also including the Makoni chiefdom). Taberer's immediate reaction as well
as that of other Company officials was to try and capture Chief Makmi. Oom-
pany officials and white settlers had actually been all aloog aware of Makoni's
hostility towards Company rule throughout the years. Taberer, however,
abandmed the idea on seccmdthoughts as he could trust neither Chief Mutasa,
Makoni's traditional enemy,who had offered his services to the Company for
the purpose, nor the African poUce,ofwhom many had deserted to Join their
184These treaties are enclosed In C,O, 417/136: Herbert CannIng, BSACo.
to C.O,; June 20, 1894. Makooi himself had signed a treaty with
Selous on October 10, 1890,whUe some of the ShcmaChiefs of the region
treated with Major Forbes, Doyle, Colquhounand Bruoe: all actlng for
the BSACo.
185._-Ranger: OPe cit. pp. 82-5.
186A.""D;-I>.tAbrahams: 'The Principality of Maungwe:Its History and
Traditions': NADA:No, 28, 1951: pp, 75-6,
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•own people here and elsewhere in the Shona country, All what Taberer had
187at his disposal then was a force of white and foreign African volunteers,
In the latter group were two prominent aides, Tom Nthamekwana Dhlamml,
a Zulu from Natal.and Gabultnyana, a Sotho. Both of these had been working
for the Native Department at Rusape; the former serving as a court Inter-
preter when N/C RossJalias Ch!gyerere,held his civil courts,whiletbe latter
acted as a messenger. These two African ilIlJDjgrants were apparently of
the 'black pioneer' class who had come with the Column in 1890.
It was therefore during the period 1890 to 1896 that Tom DhlanUn1had
struck an acquaintance with Chief Makoni,to whom he was popularly mown as
the Native Commissioner's Muturikiri land this was the relat10nship DbJamfnl
later exploited during Major Watt's attack against :Makoni at Gwlndblgwi In
September 1896. Dhlamini persuaded the chief to come out of the stronghold
by playing an the terrible effects of a dynamite attack on his people and their
familiesJ who had taken refuge in their reliable stronghold as usual. He even
informed the chief that no harm would come to him as Ch!nyerere (N/C Ross)
had given assurances that the soldiers would not harm the Maungwe leader.
This discourse between Dhlamtnf and Chief Makoni is actually well recounted
by' _' Mandftshona, a Ndebele former Head Messenger who worked with
the Native Department at UmtaU from 1894 to 1945 and had apparently parti-
ctpated in the Gwlndblgwi attack but only as a groom for the horses. The
chief enquired of Db1amfni from. his stronghold: 'Ndl ka buda a ndl urayiwe?'
(If I come out w1lI Inot be ldlIed?) To this Dhlamtni repUed: 'There is
188
nothing to fear father. Chfnyerere is here to help you. , Using such per-
suasion commingled with traces of deception, Dblamtnl caught Chief Makoni
as he was coming out and the latter was hastUy tried; tied to a grain bin and
shot.
Jolm KhambuIa, a cousin of Tom Dh1amfnl and also a Zulu,who came up
with the whites as a young man from Natal, was present too OIl the occasion.
Kbambula's rule however was mainly conflned to looldng after the horses with
some Uttle ftghtfng.when"of course,the opportunity arose. But he asserted
to the author that Dhlaminl may have actua11y beUaved that no harm would
187Hole's Report on the MashonaIand Rebellion: Part (I): October 29, 1896:
ibid. p 73.
18~. E. Reid (accomt by Mandltshona): 'The Capture of Makonl': NADA.
No. 32, 1955: pp. 52-8; Ranger: Revolt: pp. 273-9.
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befall Chief Makoni as he persuaded the latter to come out)indicating that the
war was not an individual's responsibiHty. Yet at the same time it has to be
noted that Dhalmini was given a £100 reward by the Company for his services
:Inwhat later came to be regarded officially as the 'capture' of Chief Makonr.89
That Dhlam:lni should have been the only African auxiliary to be favoured in
this manner by the Company during the Shona rising, obviously) throws a lot
of skepticism OIl the matter.
Whatever the rights and wrongs Dblam:lni's actions might imply, regarding
the 'capture' of Chief Makonl, his part in the rising once more highlights the
involvement of foreign Africans in the Shona ris:lng as well and in the whole
story of the colonization of Southern Rhodesia. Though:ln Mashnna1and foreign
African involvement was a relatively minor factor, it was however such
incidents as the Dhlam:lni affair, together with the Grootboom and Makunga
case at Matopo and many other forms of assistance to the wars of conquest
in early Southern Rhodesla,that established the raison d'etre for the stake
these African aides developed in the new COlDltry. In MashonaJand it was also
this collaborating foreign African factor which allowed the Administration to
translate the war era :Into a peaceful ane. The Zulu levies were once more
engaged by the newly appomted Administrator, William H. Milton, in quasi-
military operations relating to the resettlement of Shona communtttes, by
removing them from the kop~studded hilly areas, where, it was assumed,
they could be able,:In the future.lto elude the military forces as easUy as they
had done m 1896. These communities were thus moved into open areasJ
easier to supervise/and forbidden to return to their old homelands. The
scheme was apparently successful and the new areas in questim were con-
sequently declared native reserves. Miltm himself was OIl his part quite
pleased with the Zulu contJngant engaged for the purpose and indeed indicated
as he did that they had rendered 'marked good service throughout the opera-
190tiona'. In this manner, reserves l1ke ~e Manyen1 and Narira in the
189Jntervlew with Jom Khambula: November 22, 1975: At the time of the
Interview Khambula was in his 90's alleging to have come to Mashcma-
land at about 15/16 years of age. HiS mother and Tom Dhlam:lni's were
sisters In Zululand. Kbambu1a also claimed to have lmown John Groot-
boom as well, having met him In Southern Rhodesia.
190Report of the Acting Administrator, Mashona1and (w.H. M1ltm) for the
Half-Year ending September 30, 1897:.!2!!!=PP. ,,-4.
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Charter district as well as the Ganga and Mondoro in the Hartley district
191were created even at this early stage.
ill: The Results of Foreign African Involvem.entin the
Risings. 1896-1900:
The overall impact of foreign African collaboration in these wars of
pacification and conquest was far-reaching. Economically, the BSACo.'s
financial position was salvaged,though the Companywas left doddering on the
192verge of bankruptcy. The proposal to raise foreign African auxiliaries
had been.from the start)put forward as an economic solution to the Company's
problems and was accordingly pursued with eagemess by the Companyoffi-
cials. The difficulties of maintaining a standing army of the size Matabele-
land had in June 1896were for the BSACo. fmmense1in the face of transport,
drought and rinderpest problems. Lord Grey,who, as Acting Administrator,
was sadcfiedwith the Company's burdens, was naturally well aware of these
dfffIculties. For this reasoo.,the Matopo peace settlement, a brafn-chfld
of the Grootboom/Makunga diplomacy, was more than a welcome boon. In
Mashonaland, Tom Ntbamekwana Dhlaminf and his Zulu compatriots played
their part,though on a relatively lower key than their 'Cape Boy' counterparts
in Matabeleland, In closing the drama of the Com.pony'smisfortune.
ButJIn the final analysfsJft was not only the BSACo. which benefitted from
an early end to the risings. A small fry of miscellaneous companies was
just as anxious to see the risings ended In both Matabeleland and Mashonaland.
As early as Jtme 1896,oo.esuch company, the Scottish African Corporation,
which had financial Interests predominantly in Mashonaland In form of trading
sites in and near Salfsbury, Umtali and Victoria and some mfn1ngproperties
in the IDmangundi district, wrote to the Colmial Office on what its directors
saw as a threat to their investments. These directors even suggested that an
Indian contingent, the 'Baluchistan' regiment then stationed inMombasa, be
brought down from East Africa to Salisbury where its services were expected
193to be of great value In speeding up the suppression of the risings. When
191 .Beach: op, cit. PP. 415-6.
192The BSACo. is relXlted to have spent over £8,000,000 during the risings:
Vide: Ranger: 'African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonialism In
East and Central Africa' In Gann and Duignan (eds): op. cit;. p. 289.
193C•O. 417/196: The Scottish African Corporation Ltd. to C.0.: Telegram:
J\Ule26, 1896: ; . ~0·dull,
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the suggestion turned out to be inacceptible to the Colonial Office, the
Corporation in question was naturally furious against what it regarded as
the Colonial Office's spineless policy towards the risings. It accused the
latter of 'joking with life & property of men. •• !pointing out,at the same time,
.t.G the critical situation already created by the shortage of food and labour
supplies.
The Scottish African Corporation.was opposed to the absence of a def-
ined policy on the risings on the part of the Colonial Office, especially a
poUcywhich would have allowed for the distinction between 'friendlies' and
'rebels' and one whose effects would not need to scare away the labour supply
on which financial houses with interests in the country expected to depend. In
short. the Scottish Corporation stressed its argument in the followingmanner:
We need labourers & H.M. Government's (sic) whole poUcy
seems to be to punish all the blacks - so that there would 194
be no work done for two years if this sort of action goes on,
The companies with investments in Mashonaland and Matabelelandwere thus
worried about the adverse effects the risings were bound to produce and the
drawbacks which they were to face in the period after 1897. It is therefore
not surprising that even for other private companies, the end of the risings
was quite enthusiastically appreciated.
Exeter Hall too, like the financial companies, was not pleased with the
prospects of a drawn-out struggleJespecia11y in Matabeleland. But its motives
were different from those of the private financial houses. It was,for Instance,
feared in humanitarian circles that, as Fox BourneJthe Secretary of the Anti-
Slavery Protection SocietyJinformed the ColonialOmce, bloody consequences
would result as the white forces, in their quest of revenge, carried out to
the very end retaliatory military raids on the insurgents. To the Ndebele,
this could only compeU them to flee across the Zambesi during the course of
which a large number of themJespecially their women and chlldren)would
perish from malaria and associated hazards. Moreover, it was also feared
that should the Ndebele survivors, in their necessitous conditions, be exposed
to any contacts with hostile communities across the Zambesi,such as their
. 195
traditional enemies the Lozi, this might also have unfortunate results.
J.~417/196: The Scottish Corporatlcm Ltd. to C.0.: June 27 and July 9, 1896.
195!2!!!: Fox Bourne, Secretary; Anti-Blavery Protection Society to C.O. :
May 4, 1896.
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Such speculation as emerged in the corridors of Exeter Hall was not
altogether far-fetched,as far as Ndebele history was concerned. At the end of the l8r
of 1893, Ndebele refugees had after all made their way northwards to join
their Ngani (Nguni) ldnsman, Mpezeni ,in what later became North/Eastern
196
Rhodesia. The same development had been nearly repeated at the end of
the Ndebele rising in 1896, when Mpotshwana, the intransigent Ndebele
leader, attempted to hive off and cross the Zambesi with a pari' of Ndebele
members of the royal family and senior indunasJbut were prevented from
effecting their objective by Letta the son of Lewanika. 197
Equally justified were the fears of humanitarian movements on the puni-
tive aspects of the campaign and the effects this was likely to produce on the
incUgenouscommunities. Exeter Hall had been already scared by settler
demands at the beginning of the risings to have Rhodes reinstated after his
inglorious exit from power consequent to the Jameson Rafd, In putting for-
ward these demands, the Bulawayo residents had in the same breath actually
expressed their deep resentment to the appointment of Sir Richard Martin by
the Imperial government to take over the political control of the Company
territories at this period. They felt that without both Rhodes and Jameson,
the situation in early Southern Rhodesia was bound to deteriorate and ulti-
mately compel them to resort to desperate measuresJwith unfortunate reper-
198cussions.
In a way, what these white settlers demanded in simple terms was a
return to the pre-1896 era in which they had had very little bureaucratic
control and had always had matters their own way. Sir Martin's appointment
naturally threatened to do away with this time-honoured practice. The Col-
onial Office was aware of the implications these demands portrayed and was
also concerned over cries for a commando system to be introduced to deal
with the risings. The bloody character of the commando system was pointed
out in Number 12 Downing Street and it was even indicated also that the
system had had such unpleasant results during the Xhosa wars in the Cape
Colony that it had to be abandoned in 1833. But}atthe same}it was,however,
admitted in some circles of the Colonial Office that some measure of retalla-
196Rennie: 'The Ngoni States and European Intrusion': PP. 326-7.
197Ranger: Revolt: PP. 261-7.
198C•O. 417/196: Telegram from Bulawayo residents including Gifford,
Napier, Wrey et aI. to C.0.: May 10, 1896.
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tion in the Company territories during the risings was justified. Edward
Fairfield, the Assistant Under-Secretary whoheld such views, expressed
them in the following manner:
••• the atrocities committed by natives have been peculiarly
cruel and disgusting, and nothing within reason wouldbe too
bad for those implicated; but all experience shows that when
undisciplined whites ~UDdertooksuch operations)-, they
followed innoceftFd guilty alike and some of those who are
friendly allies.
In Matabeleland this vicious aspect of the mllitary campaign was however
minimized by the Matopopeace settlement organized by Grootboom and
Makunga. In Mashonalandwhere no Grootbooms or Makungascould playa
corresponding role to end the rising, the mood in which the campaign was
carried out is,of course,well underlined by the dynamite factor, to pick out
only one facet of the war.
Even more significant for foreign African involvement in the 1896-7 risings
was the military value' . . which some of these military auxiliaries came to
be associated with in official eyes. The BSACo.had not been the first col-
onizing agency to rely on African levies, but after 1896 the technique began
to acquire new importance. We have already indicated somewhere else in this
study howwidespread the practice of employingAfrican auxiliaries was as a
cognizable factor:in 1he CDlanialerain Africa. 200 In French and British col-
onies in West Africa for example, the rationale for engaging these African
levies for military or para-military purposes was the special respect
accorded to African national groups with strong martial traditions like the
Moslems from West Africa's hinterland. These became eligible for milltary
and police services of the respective coiooial powers simply because it was
assumed that they were easier to train and discipline. Moreover~it was also
assumed that as they had been accustomed to strong traditional leadership,
they were quite likely to regard their European officials in very much the
same light as they had treated their traditional leaders. Emphasis on such
criteria for recruitment to colonial military service was also enhanced in a
large measure by the manner inwhich physical fitness and what became lmown
as the 'best human specimen.s,' were favourably viewed in colonial circles.
This strengthened once and forever the myth that particular national groups
199Ibid: Minute by Fairfield to Just, May11, 1896.
200Vide Supra: PP. 1-8.
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with peculiar physical qualities were essential for colonial military and
police purposes. For the French, these specifications nautrally narrowed
their recruiting ground to a fewnationalities in West Africa such as the Agni
201of Assinie in the Ivory Coast or the Fouta of Djallon. The British pre-
ferred among others the Rausa of Northern Nigeria, as far as West Africa
202was concerned. In Southern Africa, those African national groups which
had provided levies to the BSACo. military muscleJlike the Zulus, the Sotho
and the 'Cape Boys',naturally came to be lUgblyregarded for military pur-
poses in foreign partsJin the period after 1896.
But it must be once more stressed here that the criteria for choosing
particular African national groups as sources of military auxiliaries and
levies were quite complex at the beginning of the colonial era in Africa. Some
European colonial powers like the Belgians and the Portuguese for example,
had little concern for specific qualifications, whether relating to physique
or traditional and military backgrounds, as essential qualities for choosing
the desired African collaborating material. But they were compelled by
circumstances,either at home or inAfrica,to rely on any African auxiliaries
available. The Belgians for example could not obviously afford to provide
the necessary manpower to subdue a colony like the CongoFree state (Zaire),
many times bigger than their owncountry. Thus from the early years up to
1891 they relied on foreign African auxiliaries from West Africa and Zanzi-
bar. Indeed they only abandonedthe practice after they had reached a stage
when they were able to compel the African chiefs under their own rule to
provide the required military material.
The Portuguese) 00 the other hand,were luckier than the Belgians)as
they could rely on manpower from the motherlandJwhichwas prepared to
endure the incooveniences of colooial wars as well as the indignities of low
wages. This type of Portuguese military material oame from oonvicts and
patriotic students; in short,mainly those whocould easily be knocked into shape
203for colooial bush warfare. But even the Portuguese themselves could not
rely exclusively on this sub-standard mllitary material in AfricaJwhere the
depraved nature of their 'native policies' extensively excited general hos-
201Gutteridge: Ope cit. pp. 297,300.
202Ayandele: OPe ott, p. 338.
203Gutterldge: Ope cit. pp.297, 300.
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tility from their African subject peoples. Thus in the wars against the Shona
Chief Makombe in the Barwe country in Mozambique towards the end of the
nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Portuguese,
naturally influenced by their BSACo. neighbours, resorted to South African
non-European levies of Sotho, Zulu, Mfengu, Xhosa and other nationalities.
But since the Portuguese had no political leverage below the Limpopo to match
the BSACo., all they could do was to lddnap these levies with the help of their
Boer allies from those urban and mining centres like the Rand where enormous
African labour forces were gathered. By such means, these conscripts were
consequently put onto trains bound for Delagoa Bay and, from this port, shipped
to the Barwe country where they fought in the Makombe war (1901-4) under
close guard,lest they escaped into the neighbouring British territory of the
204BSACo. and publicized their presence as British subjects. This of course
was a crude way of realizing the utility of African auxiliaries, as far as the
Portuguese were coneemed.but was/all the same/a credit to the 'Cape Boys'
of BSACo. fame for popularizing the value of the African levies in the sub-
continent.
From the above examples, the British and French approach to the
question of African collaboration was certainly much more sophisticated
than that of their Belgian and Portuguese counterparts. As far as the British
were concerned, their approach to the African collaborative mechanism was
influenced by a plethora of stereotypes, myths and attitudes of long historical
origin, and.to some extentJby a tincture of pragmatism. The extensive
character of the British Empire, then as it was, naturally required raising
local levies for maintaining conditions suitable for colonial administration.
Yet the criteria employed in choosing the military or para-military recruits
were essentially influenced by a congeries of ill-considered British attitudes
towards Africa and the individual African nationalities; attitudes shaped and
moulded over the years by the propaganda of early Britons to Africa.. In view
of this, the British adopted an ambivalent attitude towards the African peoples
and the African continent. For example, while they purported that the rationale
for British impertB.lism in Africa was to attain a degree of pacification and
204C• O. 417/371: Swom affidavits of Tom Magegani, Masodza Dumaleng-
wana, George Bogodza et al. before T. B. Hulley, J. P., Umtal1:
December 15, 1903. (These African levies from South Africa, kidnapped
by the Portuguese, later escaped into S. Rhodesia and ended up working
for the raUways in Umtali.)
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order (pax Britannica) and subsequently introduce various aspects of Western
Civilization, they however also admired, like their French opponents, those
African nationalities with strong military tradition. In this way they naturally
admired African national groups like the Masal, Ndebele, the Galla, the
Zulu and others of noticeable military importance,lin spite of the fact that
these were the groups largely resonsible for perpetrating intemecine warfare;
205an evil they allegedly aimed to eradicate. These eonstderattons, indeed J
so effectively coloured British recruiting policies that when the 'Cape Boys'
attained military distinction in the 1896-97 risings in the BSACo. territories,
they too were up-graded and consequently became eligible for similar mili-
tary activities elsewhere in the Empire.
The first request for those 'Cape Boys ~formerly in the BSACo, employ
to undertake military service further afield concemed the 1898 rising in
Uganda) where the Sudanese troops engaged to suppress the Kabaka Mwanga
revolt had mutinied. This plan was however1JDacceptlble to the BSACo.
itself and the 'Cape Boys' themselves regarded the wages offered by the Col-
onial Office as unnecessarily too low. Indian troops were thus consequently
296employed in place of the 'Cape Boys'. Here an interesting amalgam bet-
ween British attitudes and practical demands for a general military strategy
evidently emerged In raising the question of engaging the 'Cape Boys' for
Uganda, the Foreign Office for instance argued that this was a 'practicable'
proposal by which 'the warlike races of South Africa notably ••• the Zulus',
could be raised to constitute a force for military service in this East Afri-
can protectorate as had already been tried in the case of other African national
groups like Dinkas, Shilooks and other Nilotic groups then constituting the
basis of the Sudanese forces in Uganda as well as the case of the Hausa in
West Africa. In all these cases, these recruits had been raised to fight in
'lUlfamiliar surroundings and were alleged to have proved 'capable of excellent
and faithful service. ,207
The Colonial Office too was in a general way in favour of this proposal of
African leviesJespecially the engagement of Zulus,for Uganda, but was dis-
205
Cairns: oB cit. PP. 106-7.
206Report by Herbert Canning, Secretary, BSACo.: April 7, 1898: in BSACo.
Directors' Report and Accounts, 1897-1898: PP.121·2 Vide also:
J. S. Mangat: A History of the Asians in East Africa: Clarendon Press:
Oxford: 1969: PP. 27-62.
207. .C. O. 879/53. Francis Bertie at F. O. to C. O•. January 17, 1898.
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oouraged by the loog list of similar schemes which had failed in the past.
Such schemes included for example the request of the East Africa Protector-
ate in 1889 and that of the Congo Free state the same year to recruit police
forces from amongst the Zulus and Swazis. The War Office had also made a
similar request in 1890 for a regiment or two from these nationalities of
the African sub-continent for service either at Singapore or Hong Kong,with-
out success.
In all these three cases, as Frederick Graham.the Assistant Under-
Secretary and head of the South Africa department in the Colonial Office
since 1896) pointed out, the proposal had encountered some objections. The
Natal colonists for instance were evidently averse to the schemes,stresslng,
as they alleged, that it would be difficult to persuade the Zulus either to
undertake sea-voyages or service in distant lands. These colonists also
pointed out, as they had done on the BSACo. scheme in 1894, 208 that their
security would be threatened should any attempts be made to encourage Zulu
military propensities) especially as by 1898 Zululand had been incorporated
into Natal. Graham too was not optimistio on raising Sotho levies for Uganda
either, indicating that the Sotho mJght raise the same objections as those put
forward in relation to the ZulUs. Simllar plane put forward to the Colonial
Offioe to raise the Zulu levies for service in West Africa equally came to
naught and, so far as Graham was concerned, the mIy hope of aohieving
' ••• some plan of forming out of one or other South African races a military
force available for service in West or East Mrloa. •• ' was to try the 'Cape
Boys' who had already served in Matabeleland. It was this last solution
which the Colonial Office considered more feasible than any other and there-
fore sought an informed opinion an the matter from Sir Marshall Clarke, the
former Resident Commissioner of Zululand and Basutoland then expected to
come to England on leave at the beginning of 1898 before taking a new post in
209
the BSACo. territories.
Graham's pessimism on raising even Zulu recruits for service either in
Uganda and elsewhere in the Empire was however not shared by the War Office.
The latter was especially insistent that should the Zulu scheme fail to pull
through,because of Natal's objections, it was necessary to approach the
BSACo. to release some of the Zulu police then serving in Mashanaland for
208Vide Supra: pP. 91-6.
209 .C. O. 879/53. Graham at C. O. to F. 0.: January 28, 1898.
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the purpose. The Intelligence Division of the War Office, which particularly
supported the idea of Zulu levies for Imperial service, indeed waxed lyrical
an the qualities of the Zulu force then proposed for Uganda. It stated:
Of all the many native races comprised within Her Majesty's
Empire there is perhaps none whose traditions, courage,
physique and amenability to dlscfplfne mark them as more
suitable for military service than the Zulus. The extra-
ordinary success of the military organisation which, under
the great Zulu chiefs Chaka and Cetywayo, rendered that
nation not only the dominant native power in SouthAfrica, but
even a serious menace to white supremacy, is too well lmown to
need more than passing reference, and fully established the
high qualification of a Zulu for a soldier's duty. Especially
noteworthy is their inborn love of military exercises, their
high courage and great powers of endurance, and their
loyalty to their leac;ro' and ready acceptance of the strictest
military discipline.
The War Office would not even accept the objections of Natal colonists
seriously, especially the fears expressed within the Boer section of the Natal
community, on training Zulus in martial arts/which it dismissed an the
grounds that most Zulu police, trained and disbanded from the Zululand
police force in Natal itself had been able to re-adapt to civilian life. From
the War Office's point of view, there was no cause therefore to assume that
Zulu recruits raised for Ugandawould not do the same an their retum after
two years of service. Moreover, it was also argued that a reasonable prop-
ortion of these Zulus might marry Ugandanwomen and settle permanently
in the East African territory. As for the willingness of the Zulus to serve in
distant lands, it was pointed out that such objection was baseless, as the Zulus
were a migratory people by nature, a fact demonstrated, from this Office's
point of view, by their Ndebele and Ngemioffshoots in Southern and Northern
Rhodesia respectively and that even their settlement in Zululand was only of
recent orfgin1as they had come from the North not long before.
To add weight to this argument, the War Office also indicated that Zulu-
land was to some extent already undergoing a process of political and social
change inwhich the power of the 'paramount chief' had been effectively re-
placed by the authority of the 'Great White Queenr, whilst the newwants
imposed onto the Zulu society by the wage economy and labour demands were
210
~: Memorandum by Director of Military IntelUgence: January 20, 1898:
Enclosed in RrH, Knoxat the War Offlce to C,O, : May 14, 1898.
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said to have turned most of the Zulus into labour migrants to the Transvaal
mines. Equally inacceptable to the War Officewas the objection that Zulus
had a natural dread for the sea. This was of course easily dismissed by
pointing out to the increasing number of Zulus then working in the Durban.
harbour by 1898. To give substance to its counter-arguments, the War Office
also turned to the reports of Captain de Moleyns, the Commandant of the
Mashonaland Police, then also on leave in England. These reports on the Zulu
recruits who formed part of the MashonalandNative Police, the 'Black
Watch', were regarded by the War Office as quite encouragiDg,especially so
as these Zulus :In question had come into Mashona1sndby sea via Beira as
well. It was then from the Zulu contingent of the MashonalandNative Police
that the War Office wanted to procure the nucleus of its Uganda regiment,
emphasizing at the same time the conditims under which they were to be
engaged. Their rate of pay was to remain the same as that paid to them in
Mashonaland and it was also indicated that:
••• it should be distinctly explained to them -(Zulus)- that
they will then be in the immediate service of the Queen,
that an attractive uniform should be provided, and that
they should not be asked at first to volunteer for more than
a short term of service - say twoyears.
The optimism of the War Office on the Zulu scheme was therefore strong
and total and not mmaturally this office concluded its memorandum In an
equally optimistic note,lndicating that the success of the Zulu scheme could
be a great contribution towards solving the military problems of the Empire)
particularly in those regions:
where the climatic cmditions are unfavout!if to the maJn-
tenance of large garrisms of white troops. .
These views on the crucial importance of the Zulu contingent of the
MashOllalandNative Police under the employ of the BSACo., so strongly
advocated by the War Office, were supported by the High Commisslmer for
SouthAfrlca. Sir Alfred Milner was convinced too that these Zulu recruits
could be fruitfully employed against the rising In Uganda. Milner also
appreciated the problems placed In the way of recrultfng such a contingent
from Natal Itself,but saw no reason why 'Cape Boys', Zulus and other African
levies from the South,already in the MashonalandNative Pol1ceJshould not be
211!2!!!:Memorandum by Director of Military IntelUgence: January 20, 1898.
158
drafted for the purpose. He was confident that the scheme would succeed J
because.tn the first place, the force was already in existence and secondly,
because the objections of the Natal colonists would not apply to Zulus already
212outside Natal's control
But as a matter of fact, the War Office itself was not as enthusiastic
about the inclusion of the 'Cape Boys' advocated by the High Commissimer
as they were on a pure Zulu force. The Director of Intelligence had serious
reservations on the character of the 'Cape Boys·)though he was well aware
that they had obviously acquitted themselves as a credible fighting material
These reservations apparently appeared to lUnge on contemporary social and
psychological stereotypes held by whites, especially on 'Cape Boys' of mixed
blood. The War Office thus argued as follows:.
These ~Cape Boysr did very well in the 2nd (sic) Matabele
War. They fight pluckily and are amenable to discipline
in the field They require, however, high pay, probably
£3 to £4 a month and rations. Lt-Col Robertson, who
commanded the corps in the second Matibill War, would be
an excellent man to organise and command such a regiment
for service in Uganda.
Yet whilst the War Office was thus prepared to credit the 'Cape Boys'
for their military achievements cilring the Ndebele rising, it would not
altogether recommend the engagement of 'Cape Boys' anywhere else outside
the battle field It regarded their behaviour as generally repugnant in this
context. The Intelligence Division of the War Office thus further commented:
There is, however, a serious objection to their ~Cape Boys)-
continued employment in that country ~Matabeleland)-. The
Cape Boy, although very rellable in the field, becomes diffi-
cult to control and troublesome if relegated to garrison duty.
He is fond of drink, and drinks to excess whenever the chance
offers. His habits are lOOS!lTd he Is Ukely to raid native
villages, rape women, etc.
These views on the character of the 'Cape Boys advocated here by the War
Off1cenaturally poured cold water onto the Imperial scheme in ccmnection
with levies from the BSACo. territories to Uganda. With the arrival of Sir
Richard Martin from Southern Afrlca,where he had spent nearly two years
(1896-1898) as Deputy Commissioner in the Company territories, further
212!2!!!: Sir Alfred Milner to C. O. : n, d Enclosed In Fred Graham at C, 0,
to F, 0, : January 28, 1898,
213lbld: Memorandum by Director of Mllltary Intelligence: January 20, 1898.-
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discouragement was also thrown in the path of the plan.
Sir Richard Martin regarded the plan on 'Cape Boys' and Zulus for Uganda
as a problematic one and accordingly indicated this when he informed the
Colonial Office about the difficulties he had encountered in raising a force of
only 100 Zulus for service In Mashonaland In 1897J In spite of the fact that
he had delegated the task to people well acquaJnted with the Zulus in general
and also men whom he thought they could trust. Sir Martin was not equally
enthusiastic about the Sotho either, whose recruitment was complicated, so
he thought, by the need to provide borsee.smce the Sotho preferred carrying
out their duties mounted. He saw the prOvision of these mounta as an addi-
tional expense which the Imperial authorities could better do without. Flnally,
this Imperial official was just as dismissive of the 'Cape Boys' as the War
Office had been, concluding that 'Cape Boys' were a mixed blessing and that
the Imperial authorities would better think twice before recruiting them. As
far as this Imperial official was concerned, the 'Cape Boys' were, to say the
least, not commendable. He described them In the following unfavourable
terms:
Colenbradner's Boys were only odds and ends. Robertscm's
Cape Boys were a mixed lot. They fight well, but In time of
peace are the most awful scoundrels, and get ~k as soon
as they get near a town, and play the mischief.
Thus like the War Office and the governmEllt of the Transvaal, Sir Richard
Martin's objections to 'Cape Boys' were primarily based on stereotypes then
currently held on this class of people; stereotypes that were frequently and
readily used against 'Cape Boys' in peace times. In the final analysis, it
would appear that it was in every sense a distinct advantage to the 'Cape Boys'
that the Ugandan scheme was after all unacceptable to their former employers,
the BSACo.) especially in the face of all these negative views.
To summarize the implications and general results of foreign African
involvement in the Shona and Ndebele risings of 1898-7, let us look at the
more conspicuous features of this subject once more. On the local scene,
the engagement of this relatively cheap African or ncm.-European auxlliary
force allowed the BSACo. to recoup some of the losses the Company had sus-
tained through the rinderpest plague and the risings. The black/white ccm.tacts
effected between the invading white forces and the Insurgents, especially in
21~Id: Sir R. E. Martln to C. O. ; January 23, 1898.-
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Matabeleland,chirped off some of the bitterness the risings had given rise
to and created a relatively peaceful atmosphere In which both the black and
white camps were able to come to terms with the changed situatioo. of the
post-1896 era. This rapp~chment,effected chiefly by Grootboom and
Makunga's bridge-building activities,assuaged the fears and anxieties of both
the humanitarian and financial interests in a way the blind fury and racial
animosity manifested during the military campaign would not have achieved
But in Mashonaland matters were quite different even after 1896Jas the next
chapter will demoostrate.
Secondly, foreign African military involvement in the 1896-7 risings had
wider implications than the BSACo. had actually bargained for on initiating
the scheme. Imperial officials began to revaluate the military potential and
actual contribution of African auxUfary levies in matters of global military
and imperial strategy within particular geographical focL But even these
imperial calculations were.however; liable to play second fiddle to local in-
terests, with the result that the former were often rendered temporarily or
permanently impotent by the latter, as the example of the Natal colonists
215
demonstrates. The third and more Interesting result of foreign African
involvement in the 1896-97 risings is that It created a permanent 'fifth column'
with seemingly strong claims to the development of Southern Rhodesta, in-
deed it was this permanence of the claims of the 'Cape Boys' to the history
and destiny of Southern Rhodesia that was ultimately to be the cause of con-
flict with their former white masters and employers. It is also perhaps worth
examining at length some aspects of this post-1896 development In the rela-
tionship between the 'Cape Boys' and the white settlers ooce they were out of
the battlefields.
We have seen in this study that the 'Cape Boys' were not bJghly regarded
216
in white colonist circles In many parts of Southern Africa. They were used
In the risings :In the Company territories sim.pIy out of desperatiOD rather
than by sheer preference. But once these traumatic events were over, the
hypocrisy and hollowness of the all1ance between these nOD-European aUXIli-
aries and their white partners began to surface and the alliance therefore
started cracking. The 'Cape Boys', whether black or half-caste, were a
215!!!!!: Sir Hely-Hutchinson, Governor, Natal, to C. 0.: May 18, 1898.
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cultural and social hybrid group, They were generally literate and, unlike
thorough-bred Zulus and Sothos, prided themselves for being the cultural
wards of their white masters,especially the British masters, whose citizen-
ship they enjoyed. But the honeymoonperiod of harmonious relations bet-
ween the 'Cape Boys' and their masters ended with the risings; a fact which
these Creoles of Southern Africa only gradually realized with shock and
217resentment.
In Southern Bbodesta, the end of the risings meant that a new era of
hardships for the 'Cape Boys' was just beginning. Indeed at the close of
1897, Milton, who had just been appointed Acting Administrator of Southern
Rhodesia directly from the Cape Civil Service in July of that year, made
the first knock OD the hitherto privileged role of these 'Cape Boys' and their
allies by introducing a restrictive legislation on their manner of living in
the counrry, Hewas quite convinced on the benefit of the new legislation,
at least as far as his Administration's point of viewwas concerned, and justi-
fied the move by pointing out to what he considered the undestrable character
of the 'Cape Boys' that:
••• in numberless instances Colonial natives wearing discarded
police Wliforms have visited kraals and arrogated to themselves
the powers of policemen and, representing themselves to the
Chiefs as having been sent by the Government to collect taxes
and settle disputes, they have in many cases been allowed to
carzy off fDeP ani goats which 1hey demanded frem lit:iganta:ln JBYIIlEl'lt 218
d tliir aerriees.
It appears that the 'Cape Boys' were taking advantage of their clientship
to the white colonist community and in this manner explOited their mediating
role to the disadvantage of the indigenous peoples and for their owngain.
Yet itwas not primarily out of sympathy with the indigenous peoples that
Milton found it necessary to introduce his legislation. The legislation was
ostenSibly based on the distrust and suspicions of the white colonist community
that the 'Cape Boys' may have after all played a double role during the
risings and incited and led the local people to rise against Company rule. From
thls point of view. the BSACo.Administration concluded that the presence
217Compare the positiCll of the 'Cape Boys' in Southem Rhodesia after 1896
and that of the Creoles in Sierra Leone after the 1860's: Vide Leo
Spitzer: 'The Sierra Leone Creoles 1870-1900': loc. cit.
218C•O. 879/53: Miltcm,Aotmg Admlntstrator to Sir Alfred Milner, High
Commissimer: Deoember 8, 1897.
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of the 'Cape Boys' in the country after 1896was therefore 'a source of con-
stant trouble', hence the need for the new restrictive legislation,namely,
The Settlement of Colonial Natives in Kaffir Kraals Prohibition Regulation of
2191898, which was renewed in 1901.
An interesting aspect of this legislation is its inclusive character. In its
definition of 'Colonial Natives' it embraced any African whowas of foreign
origin including the Tonga, the so-called 'Zambesi natives', inhabiting both
sides of the Zambesi escarpment. Any intercourse between these foreign
Africans and their local compeers could only take place in the urban and
mining centres, where the restrictions did not apply due to the fear that labour
supply might be harmed. But permtsston to enter African reserves was
essential and the foreign Africans were required to get such permission be-
fore anything else from respective Native Commissioners. Chiefs and head-
men were bound by this legislation to report the presence of these foreign
Africans in their areas. 220 In the .end, probably to minimize any possible
contact between the foreign and indigenous Africans, a reserve was set aside
especially for the foreign Africans, to wit the 'Cape BoyReserve' in the Hart-
ley district of Mashonaland.at the tum of the century. However.the plan does
not appear to have received poJlllar support from the foreign African and
half-caste communities for whom.the reserve was so designed,in the first
place. Indeed,as late as 1909,the CompanyAdministration was even com-
pelled to expropriate some of the land from this reserve on the grounds that
its residents were too few.221 Thus after 1897a new drama was beginning to
unfold with the once helpful foreign Africans being estranged from either
their white masters or the Indigenouspeoples.
As far as relations between the indigenous societies and foreign Afri-
cans were concemed, the two sides could not be said to have been on amica-
ble terms after the risings, excepting of course at personal level. They
needed time to adjust from military hostility to peaceful co-existence. The
219C•O. 417/321: Milton to Milner: August 9-12, 1901.
220C•O. 455/1: Notice by Percy Inskipp, Salisbury: November 3, 1898.
221C.O. 417/465: Milton to Lord Selbome: January 14, 1909 and C.O.
417/466: Major Fair to Sir Hely-Hutchinson: June 14,1909. By 1909
there were only 22 tax-payers in the 'Cape Boys Reserve' of whom only
11 were married. Vide: Appendixm (map) 'Cape Boys' Reserve:
Hartley L>1str1ct,1909.
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relations of these two sides after 1896were at times marred by conflicts,
such as those which occurred frequently in Bulawayobetween the Ndebele
and the Xhosa or other South African communities in June 1898. In this
instance, the BulawayoChronicle reported on a two-day battle between the
combatant communities in epic,but derisive 1anguageJas follows:
The first fight took place 00 Stmdayin the valley near
the location, the Matabele outnumbering the Kaffirs
-(Xhosa)-by about three to one -(and)- the weapons used
being knobkerries, fighting sticks, and stones. A number
of combatants were badly cut about, and it took Corporal
Salmon of the BSACo. Police (sic) and the five troopers
under him who -(are)- stationed there all their time to cool
the ardour of the dusky warriors by the application of
riding whips, which suffered considerably in the process.
The police were at the disadvantage of being dismounted,
but eventually the tintillation of their black s~Fduced
the Matabele and Kaffirs to retreat in disorder.
On the followingMondayfight, the Chronicle reporter indicated that the
numbers of the combatants had been reinforced. Both sides amounted to
300 all told.but with the Ndebele still predominant. The reporter then went
on:
The fight started down the railway embankment, and
ended in a pitched battle near the station. The Matabele
drove back the Kaffirs, the latter rallied and charged back
with temporary success, but victory hovered over the knob-
kerries of the Matabele braves, whowere winning the day,
when the troopers -(BSAP)-intervened and wrested the
laurels from their brows. All the whites in the vicinity
had been driven away, but the troopers, three in number,
under Corporal Salmm, were not molested. These latter
were too few in number to interfere effectively, and as things
were getting very warm, showers of stones rattling about
the bulldff:r and fly1ng through the air, three horses were
sent for. .
Though the police always intervened and succeeded in brealdng up these
faction fights by the liberal use of their sjamboks and horses, these con-
ficts manifestly damaged relations between the Immigrant African com-
munities and their indigenous opposite numbers. In Shonasocieties too,the
'Cape Boys' and their allies from the South were not liked either and were
224
still viewed as 'white man's dogs' long after the risings.
222The Bulawayo Chronicle: JlDle4, 1898.
223IbId,
224Vambe: op. cit. pp. 203-5.
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It must be made clear here that this was the kind of conflict which the
Administration's restrictive legislation aimed at preventing. The enforced
separation of the indjgenous and foreign African communities was however
not motivated by any quasi-humanitarian considerations at all. Indeed the
Administration would have encouraged such conflictsJif only they would not
harm the chances of labour supply and the security of the white community in
the country. The white settlers' views on these faction fights were generally
in favour of such occurrences, as the BulawayoChronicle indicated in its
advocacy of a ShangaanpUot scheme; one by which a Shangaancommunity
from Mozambiquewas to be settled in Matabeleland as a labour reservoir in
March 1898. The Chronicle expressed its views on African factionalism as
follows:
It must also be remembered that bringing in two or three
fresh tribes would add to the security of the country. The
whites hold Africa by the feuds between various native
races, and if we have several thousand Zambe~and
Shangaans the Matabele will remain quiescent.
African factionalism was therefore in some ways only another version, albeit
a crude one, ofPax Britannica.
Besides security considerations, white settlers were generally opposed to
the presence of the 'Cape Boys' in areas occupied by indigenous Africans :In
the post-1896 era on what seemed to be quasi-moral grounds,tinged with the
general race prejudice of their environment. The 'Cape Boys' being either
a culturally or racially bastardized comm1Dlityor both, their educational and
moral values were cmstantly under the severe scrutiny of their white masters.
In his valuable work on the psychology of colmization, :Mannon! has argued I
with regard to the French colonial situation in Madagascar, that the atmos-
phere of growing racial hostility between the white colonizer and the black
•colonized tended to leave the half~aste community in a great dilemma. The
pressures generated by the racial cmfllct between the two contending com-
munities made the half-caste community more aware than ever before of
the mixture of similarities and differences which they symbolized in relation
to the two combatant communities. This reaHzatlon, so argues Mannoni, by
the half-caste commlDlityof what they were supposed to represent often had
225The BulawayoChronicle: March 29, 1898.
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226disastrous psychological effects as a consequence. In the same manner,
the growth of racism in Sierra Leone during the post-1860 period, the Darwin
era, equally had disastrous psychological results on the Creoles who had
227hitherto regarded themselves as 'Black Englishmen'.
Inpost-1896 Southem Rhodesia, the 'Cape Boys' were equally estranged
and loathed once their services were over and donewith. Two forms of
argument were employed by the white settlers. For the 'Cape Boys' of
mixed descent, settler hostility hinged on the moral bona fides of these
former aides. As Peter Nielsen, for many years an official with the Native
Labour Bureau and the Native Department in Southern Rhodesia, put it, the
'Cape Boys' of mixed descent were regarded either as psychological misfits
or 'mongrels, unfit to mingle with the pure parental breeds ••• '. The edu-
cated and hence acculturated African from the Southwas dismissed as a cul-
tural aberration,aplng the ways of the white man which he did not understand.
In the case of the latter, a teleological argument then in current fashion was
frequently employed to imply that the mental processes of the African brain
stopped developing at the age of puberty; hence the African was obviously
uneducable and could only understand simple things easily conceivable to
his child-like mental state. Moreover itwas even further argued that a
people's complexion, the sizes of the skulls and intelligence all went hand in
228hand. Thus the 'Cape Boys' and other Africans from the Southwhohad
a long hiStory of educational and European influence behind them, as we have
229seen and as will be further demonstrated, were,in this waY,thwarted and
resented in every way by their former white allies after 1896 in Southern
Rhodesia.
Private landowners and farmers, as a class, were peculiarly hostile to
the presence of these 'Cape Boys' on their properties. . ',,,_.W. Napier, of
Napier & Weir Ltd" a landowningsyndicate inMatabeleland and part of a
larger corporation,the BulawayoEstate and Trust Co. Ltd" for example,
wrote to the Chief Native Commissimer for Matabeleland, Herbert Taylor,
in September 1897,complafn1ng of the presence of 'Cape Boys' on his farms
at 'Matzamhlope' and Douglasdale,whomhe cmsldered were not mly tres-
226Mannmi: Prospero and CaUban:PP. 118-9.
227Spitzer: Ope cit. pp. 100-6.
228peter Nielsen: The Black Man's Place in SouthAfrica: Juta & Co.; Cape
Town: 1922: PP. 10-1, 123-4. Vide also Cairns: OP. cit. PP. 158ff.
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passing)but also interfering with his local African tenants there. Napier
thus requested the Native Department to take action in cmnection with these
230'Cape Boys' to check their activities. The same subject was also taken
up by Napier's superior, Percy Bourne,the General Manager of the parent
company the Bulawayo Estate and Trust Co, Ltd., who put his request to the
Chief Native Commissioner more forcefully by indicating that:
•• , the behaviour of various Cape Boys and other tres-
passers on the farm Willsgrove (late Douglasdale) has
been lmsatisfactory. .
They are reported to be Interfering with the natives who
have been properly located and I think it would possibly
save much trouble were you t~!rnd out to warn off such
Boys who have no right there.
The treatment of other foreign African Individuals was also not very en-
couraging either. Makunga and Khumalo for Instance,depict examples of
individual African l:\dventurers who fared very differently with regard to their
post-1896 relations with the BSACo. Administration.
When Makunga joined the Native Department after 1896 as a civil servant,
he apparently did not forsake the interests of the Ndebele nation, his erst-
while mentors. Inhis new post with the Native Department, Makunga appears
to have tried to mend fences with his new employers,but without breaking
totally with the past altogether. For his contribution to the success of the
Matopo inciaba, Makunga was at first appointed acting 'Registrar of Natives'
in Bulawayo in September 1896,before the peace settlement between the
Company forces and the Ndebele had been flnaUzed. SUbsequently he was
appointed to a permanent post as a clerk In the Chief Native Commissioner's
Office, Matabeleland, and as an assistant to Francis Joseph Clarke, the
chief clerk. 232 Itwas in this capacity as a civil servant in the Native Dep-
artment that he is reputed to have rectified the name 'BulB.wayo'"then incor-
229VIde: Chapters 1 & 8.
230NB 1/1/1: W. Napier & Weir Ltd., to c. N. C. Bulawayo: September 20,
1897.
231NB 1/1/1: Percy H. Bourne, General Manager, The Bulawayo Estate
and Trust Co. Ltd., to c/N/C. Byo: September 21, 1897.
232NB 1/1/3: J. C. Makunga to W. E. Thomas, ActiDg Chief Native Commis-
sioner (C/N/C), Bulawayo, July 16, 1897: and Taylor, C/N/C, Byo, to
Lawley, Deputy AdmfDistrator: February 23, 1898.
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rectly rendered by the whites as 'Buluwayo'.
Of particular Interest too is the fact that Makungacontinued to further
Ndebele interests In their relatims with the BSACo. Administration, thus
translating his own peculiar brand of collaboration to Ndebele advantage as
well. In January 1898 for example, Makungaapplied to the Administration
on behalf of the Ndebele Queens, the wives of Lobengula, for permission
to proceed to the Cape Colony and see their sons who had been sent down
there to be educated by Rhodes, 'their present father', as Makungatheir
interpreter indicated. This royal party desired to proceed to the Cape accom-
panied by Umjaan, the former commander-in-chlef of Lobengula.with Makunga
234
himself as a guide.
From this point of view, it might be safe to surmise that Makungamay
have been forgiven by his Ndebele kinsmen for his part In the risings and
thus continued to maintain friendly contacts with them in the post-1896 era,
contrary to the general tedium of relatiems between the Ndebele and other
groups of African emigres, as we have seen. Makungais also unique even
within the context of the African immigrant communities from the South them-
selves. For instance,whllst he lived with the most m1l1tantvigilante group
of pre-1896 African immigrants, the group led by John Hla.zo)first In the
Ntabazinduna Reserve and later In the FiDgolocation, he was at the same
time not in any manner influenced by the cOillfrontationpolitics of his country-
men. 235 He remained a faithful civil servant to the very end, serving at
236
various times In Bulawayo, Gwelo and Gwandawith the Native Department,;
Whilst the BSACo. Administration had been prepared at first to condone
the activities of Karl Khumalo in the Lippert Concession affaJr emthe grounds
233Personal communiCation from Mr. Makun,a: December 7, 1974.
23~B 1/1/3: MakuDga,BulawayoNative Reserve,to Acting N/C/N, Byo:
January 5, 1898; and Thomas, Acting C/N/C, to Lawley, Deputy
Administrator, Bulawayo: January 11, 1898.
235S• 924/G.125/1: Robert Tanning, N/C Bubl to C/N/C, Byo: November 17,
1909: R/N/A, Salisbury.
236Jolm Makungaserved with the Native Department t111 his death at Gwanda
in 1919. Hewas also one of the people contacted by the A. P, S. on the
Southem Rhodesian land questim in 1914. Vide: Mas. Brit. Emp.
S 22/G. 185: Rev. J. H. Harris, Bulawayo, to Morgan: Private,
January 6, 1915: The Aep. Se (the Anti-Slaven and Aborigipes Protect-
ion Society) Papers: Rhodes House, Oxford: and Personal Communica-
tion from Mr. De MakuDia:December 7, 1974.
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of his lack of underatandlng on the wider political issues involved in the
scramble for Matabeleland before 1890, in the Ndebele rising.the Company
could no longer tolerate Khumalo's pro-Ndebele and consequently anti-
Company activities. The manner in which Khumalo was subsequently treated
was"in a waY,a classical demcnstratioo. of the attitude of the Company
Administration towards educated Africans from. outside its territories as
well as those within who opposed it. Educated foreign Africans were welcome
as long as they were prepared to collaborate and promote the interests of the
Company as allies, but once they were seen or thought to be colluding with
the local people to the disadvantage of the Company}they became personae
non-gratae,
Karl Khumalo,who chose to side with the Ndebele during the risings,
found himseU a victim of the Administration's overtly vindictive policies.
He became the prime target of Company and settler forces who held a unt-
versal view that he was 'a notorious traitor' and for that reasoo. carried a
prize on his head at the very early stage of the rising.especially as it was
thought that Khumalo had somehow taught the Ndebele the technique of making
their own bullets and mending rifles, Consequently, when the white forces
caught him, they immediately condemned him to execution by firing squad on
the outskirts of Bulawayo; an event which Khumalo miraculously survived.
The firing squad assigned to carry out the executioo. did their duty in earnest,
but fortunately only managed to stun him, leaving him for dead. He however
237recovered and escaped. This incident of course had its unfortunate
results and not least of all is the fact that Karl Khumalo became me of the
staunchest critics of the Company duriDg and after the risings, He immediately
took steps to sue the Company for compensation over what he saw as deli-
berate and maliciOUSattempts by the Company to get rid of him, But his
238
claims were discourteously dismissed by the Company officials, During
the Matopo peace negotiations, it was therefore Khumalo,alias Mvulana,
with his knowledge of the political and economic situation of the Company, who
237C, O. 417/284: Chamberlain to Milner: February 15, 1901; P, A, Stuart
(N/C): 'My Matabeleland Experiences, 1897-1903': NADA No, 19:
1942: pp. 68-9; and also Barden-Powell: The Matabele Campaign:
PP. 258-9.
238C. O. 417/284: H. J. Taylor, C/N/C, M:atabeleland to Lawley, April 21,
1898 and Lawley to C/N/C Taylor, April 25, 1898.
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as the leader of the mUitant Ndebele factian, gave Rhodes and his white
colleagues most headaches.ttll the Rhodes party decided to silence him by
bri bing him with a 'handsome' financial gift. 239
At the end of the risings, Karl Khumalo may have got away with his
opposition but the BSACo. had many ways of dealing with its critics,es-
pecially if they were African. Probably as an attempt to make up for its
failure to nail Khumalo OIl any charges arising out of the risings as it did
with Ndebele insurgents, other crimes of devious nature were laid against
him in the post-1896 period. One such allegatian concerned Khumalo's
actions in introducing the Ndebele to the new techniques of challenging Com-
pany decisions in the courts of law. The case arose at the end of 1898)when
Umjaan, one of the Ndebele leaders, approached Khumalo for advice on
matters concerning the ill-treatment of Ndebele labourers at various labour
centres and other generallssues related to the land questim in Matabeleland.
Umjaan himself pointed out to the origin of the charge as:
Iwas talking with Karl Kumalo (Sic). A son of mine had been
killed, and died in a shaft near Mlugulu, and our lands had been
taken from us, we considered our grievances. Karl then told
me that a man called 'Quecha' -11awyer)-would represent us,
and get justice for us. We thought this white man had been
sent by Government, and that he would hear our grlevances'240
and represent them to the Queen, and get redress for them.
Umjaan and those Ndebele leaders who had thus approached Khumalo
were,in every way,convinced of the latter's abillty to guide them to the
proper channels through which their grievances could be redressed. This
confidence was.tn factJweU founded for it' was the very reason why Khumalo
had been allowed to stay in Matabeleland,in the first plaeejand was further
portrayed in Ujmaan's views)quoted by Captain Arthur Lawley, the Deputy
Administrator for Matabeleland, as:
••• he -(Umjaan)- learnt of the existence of such men as attorneys
through Karl Khumalo, who told him, that he mew of one. He
-(Umjaan)- did not understand the white man's law. No one mew
when a man was to be put in gaol, an~4f asked Khumalo if the
attorney would assist in such a case.
When in the event the lawyers In quest100., Walter Dyason and Eillott
St. M. Hutchinson, came to Umjaan 's, where they were introduced by Khumalo
239Ranger: OPe clt. PP. 247-8.
240C• O. 879/57: Statement by Umjaan.
241!2!!!: Memorandum on the proceedings.
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to the aggrieved Ndebele leaders and the character of the Ndebele problems
was also explained to them, it was discovered that these grievances were
quite genuine and substantial. Umjaan and his people had no land and were
actually living as squatters em.Sauerdale, the peeperty of Rhodes near the
Matopo hills. Lawley himself admitted that the Incidence of land shortage
amem.g the Ndebele was high»ut)of eoursejdtd not approve of the new method
Introduced by Khumalo to the aggrieved Ndebele. He refused to recognise
the bona fides of Messrs ~ason and Hutchinson as representing the Ndebele
people, taldng the opportunity ,at the same time, to warn the lawyers in
question that only the Native Commissioners had the right to present the
grievances of the Ndebele to the Administration. In this instance/it was
stressed that it was to the Native Department officials and not to the courts
of law that the Ndebele leaders were supposed to take their grievances. As
for the question of takfng the Ndebele grievances to the Queen, Captain
Lawley indicated that 'Mgen1', (Sir Marshall Clarke) the Resident Commis-
242
sioner, could just as well do.
Perhaps as both a precautiooary m.easure and a general demonstration
of the Company's vindictive policies, those Ndebele leaders who had sought
the advice of lawyers through Karl Khumalo and had met at Umjaan's to for-
ward these grievances, were deprived of a month's salary each. These
inchmas included Faku, M]:,~gulu, Jozana, Mazwi, Hole, Dhllso, Nyameni,
Manyakavula and Hewu. Umjaan himself was struck off the role of Govern-
ment subsidized chiefs em.the grounds that he was ' ••• unfit to be a salaried
Inchma. •• '. 243 Those Ndebele leaders who had not attended the Khumalo
meetfng at Umjaan's, obviously intimidated by the drastic actions of the
Administration against their colleagues, cem.sequently requested the removal
of Khumalo from amongst them. Slkombo, who saw the gravity of this new
factor more clearly than his other loyalist colleagues, indlcated,with regard
to Khumalo's poSition within the Ndebele society) that:
Coming from. the South, and being an educated man, he
oo(Khumalo)- very easily leads our people, because they
imagine they have grievances, and he invents some s~r to
how they can obtain redress, and they follow his lead.
242Ibid: Lawley to Messrs Coghlan and Dyason, November 18, 1898.-243 !2!!!: Memorandum ••• Bulawayo, December 12, 1898.
243ibid: Statement by Sikombo ••• Bulawayo, December 12, 1898.
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Given this bacldng by the loyalist faction of the Ndebele traditional
leadership coupled with the record of the Company's previous tU-treatment
of Khumalo, it is hardly surprising therefore that the Company Administration
should have once more resorted to punitive measures of one kind or another
against this notable immigrant even in the post-1896 period as well. This
movejon the part of the Administration during the years 1898 and 1899Jwas
obviously precipitated here by Khumalo's active support of the movement
to resurrect the Ndebele kingship in the person of Lobengula's son, Njube, the
heir apparent, then studying in the Cape colony. The fact that it was Karl
Khumalo, together with other royalist sympathizers like Somabulana, a
leading Ndebele induna., who were not only corresponding with young Njube
in connection with his proposed return to Southern Rhodesia" but had even con-
vened a meeting of Ndebele leaders at Somabulana's home on the subject in
July 1899, was,certainlyJ unpleasant news to the Company authorities. And
even more unpalatable to the Salisbury and Bulawayo authorities were the
rum.ours and speculations then circulating within the Ndebele society as a
sequel to the Somabulana meeting. From. the point of view of W. E. Thomas,
the Native Commissioner of the Bulalima-Mangwe district, the rum.ours in
question centred on Njube's anticipated retum.whereupon he was to be made
1dng of the Ndebele nation, after which 'he would take all the cattle, goats and
sheep from all natives in the COlBltry who ~werer not "thorough-bred"
Matabele ••• ' and would also treat as enemies 'all those who had remained
loyal to the whites during the late rebellion of '96.' Moreover) after the ex-
pulsion of the whites from Matabeleland had been effected,which, according
to these rumours, would take place sooo after the ascendancy of Njube to
power, ' ••• the "friendlies" '1Werer to go too - or ••• Chief Njube ~ouldr
. th t ,244WIpe em out,
As far as Karl Khumalo was cancemed, his crime naturally lay in the
fact that he was involved not only in the organisation of the meeting at Somabu-
lana's, but also because he had been in charge of the general preparation for
Njube's expected retum and subsequent takeover,which)in this insta.nce"also
included the undermining of BSACo. authority by systematically discrediting
the Company offi.cials in the country in order to wm over the support of the
244NB 1/1/8: W. E. Thomas, N/C Bu.laltma-Mangwe to Chief Native Com-
missioner, Bulawayo: July 10, 1899.
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rank and file Ndebele. In this particular respect ...Khumalo appears to have
played his role very successfully. In the words of one, Msindo, a headman
in the Matobo-Mawabeni district"who attended some of the proceedings in-
stigated by Khumalo, the following picture is painted In the observer's mind:
Mvu.Iane -{Karl Khumalor came to us -iat Somaxegwana's
Villager with a letter in his hand which he threw down in
front of all the men saying 'This letter is to separate the
people who adhere to the King 'iNjube)- from the people who
adhere to the white people.' I replied who is the letter
from? Is it from Mr. Rhodes? He said that Mr. Rhodes had
been put in prison. I said 'Is it from Mr. Taylor -ithe Chief
Native Commissicmerr?' He said 'Who is this Mr. Taylor of
yours? He is only a policeman who is ill -treating us all
(Duba).' Mloo.yeni a y01.Ulgman of my kraal said to Mifulane that
it was a lie that Mr. Rhodes was in prison. I threatened to hit
Mvulane -ifor the liesr and told hiiMf I caught him on the
veldt by himself Iwould beat him.
Whilst loyalist Ndebele traditional leaders like :Msindowho felt threat-
ened by Njube's alleged imminent retum avowed to manhandle Khumalo..,the
bearer of this unpleasant news, the Company Administratioo., which also did
not relish any prospective developments along these lines indicated above...
however_)imaginary these might have been, was naturally bound to take
reprisal measures over the matter. Such measures were of course In accord-
ance with official opbllon,which, in the words of Native Commissioner
Thomas, was apparently quite coo.vfnced that the proceedings relating to
Njube's return were somehow '••• indicative of the mischievous intrigue to
which the late rebel indunas & the King's son Njube, -(werer parties.' As
an appropriate recipe for dealing with the Situation, it was consequently
recommended that the very idea that Njube should look upon himself 'as the
future Kingof Matabeleland' had to be removed from the young prince's mind
and the thinking of his royalist supporters once and for all allegedly 'for the
246peace' of the country. For Khumalo however, more serious measures
were in the pipeline and,for this reason}when the Anglo-Boer war broke out
later that year, he was conveniently Imprisoned. This arrest and detentioo.
of Khumalo at Fort Usher in the Matopo district at the end of November 1899)
immediately a(ter the declaration of martial law all over the country, was
certainly an interesting piece of poUtical victimization. Apparently his
245Ibld: Deposition of Headman Msindo before H. M. G. Jackson, J. P, N/C
~tobo-Mawabeni: September 16, 1899.
246Ibid: Thomas, N/C Bula1ima-Mangwe to C/N/C BuIawayo: July 10, 1899.-
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Mrican co-detainees,at the time,were mostly suspected collaborators with
the Boersjarrested in the BechuanalandProtectorate and thrown into the
BulawayogaoL But these were sooner or later released before the end of
1899.247
Karl Khumalo's case was pecular and more complicated; perhaps even
more so.at this stage, as an interestmg piece of collusion between the BSACo.
and the Imperial Government consequently emerged. While the Companywas
rather anxious to exploit the current mUitary state of affairs in the sub-
continent to forestall further opposition from people of Khumalo's calibre,
the Colonial Office,on the other handJwas in no mood to examine the pros and
cons of the matter. It was simply satisfied with the general ccmtentionthat,
as Sir Hartman Just saw it, because Karl Khumalohad giVEll 'trouble long
ago', there was no need for the Colonial Office 'to take special notice of him
248-(Khumalo)-, beyond enquiring the legality of this long detentioo'. By this
time,it was already twoyears since Khumalohad been detained. But by
these means,both the BSACo. and the Imperial Government conspired to
frustrate the career of one of the most enterprising members of the African
pioneers in the country's colonial era andJin so doing) produced the first
political detainee)lcmgbefore the Nkomos, the SItholes and the rest in the
249country's political history.
In one sense, the Karl Khumalocase certaJnly demonstrates more
starkly than anything else the growing chasm between the early foreign Afri-
cans and their former white colmist patrms in the post-1896 period. Be-
cause of these developments,it might have become evident to this class of
im.mfgrants that the implications of colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia were
indeed more profOlDldand complex than they could at Brst understand Per-
haps to widen the scope of white colonist phobia towards the 'Cape Boys' and
their associates even further in the post-1896 period in early Southern
Rhodesta, itmight be pertinent to also compare the genesis of white colonist
attitudes in both lay and missionary fields. On the reUgtous side of affairs
~7 •C.O. 417/284: Base Commandants OfBce, Bulawayo, to Clarke: October I,
1900.
248lbid: Minuteby H.W. Just to Chamberlain: February 9, 1901.
249For the African detainees of the later period of colonist Rhodesian
history: Vide: D. Mutasa: Rhodesian Black Behind Bars: Jlowbrays:
London: 1975.
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where the process of African elite formation was, in the early phases of
I •
Southern Rhodesian history, a field dominated essentially by black emigres
from the South, it would appear that some of the foreign African mission-
aries from the South were just as badly treated as their compatriots in
secular occupations; in the post-1896 period or thereabout. In this instance)
those African missionaries from the South associated,for instance, with the
Dutch Reformed Church, particularly in Southern Mashonaland,were in no
better position than either Karl Khumalo or other 'Cape Boys'"as far as their
post-1896 lot was concerned. The racial polarization which characterized the
D/R/C mission in early Southern Rhodesia due to its Boer ccxmections was
easily the greatest challenge the African pioneer missionaries had to contend
with as the number of white workers of this body increased,on account of the
more favourable post-1896 conditions of settlement. In the end/it was only
natural therefore that by the close of the nineteenth century, some of these
foreign African workers should desert the D/R/C mission in frustration and
join the relatively freer African Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC). Rev.
Michael Makgatho portrays this kind of reaction to those negative institutional
aspects within the D/R/C body politic,Jwhen he briefly gavejas his reasons
for leaving this church, the following testimony in 1904:
I was a minister with the Dutch Reformed Church; I was sent
from the Transvaal with the Rev. Mr. Hofmeyr to Mashona-
land, and Iwas the first Dutch Reformed minister in Mashona-
land, even before Mr. Louwwas sent there. Mr. Louw followed
me and the Rev. S. P. Helm: they -(bothh •• followed me to
Mashmaland. After the Rev. Helm's return to the Transvaal,
the Rev. Mr. lDuw was not good to me, he was always against
me, and tried to find something against me. A few years
later he almost beat me in church on account of the school.
Owing to personal difwences between myself and Mr. Louw
I changed my church.
This unfortunate rupture between Makgatho and Its Boer colleagues of
the D/R/C missim, which appears to have occurred before the outbreak of
the Anglo-Boer War (1892-1902), may have been prompted by a host of
reasons. By 1898,there was already in Southern Rhodesta a sizeable AMEC
presence under an African minister from Klerksdorp in the Transvaal whose
activities Makgatho should have easily known,as he also came from the same
250Evidence of Rev. Michael (Micah) Makgatho, AMEC, Bulawayo:
Septembe riO, 1904: loc, cit.
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country. This new church was by then effectively making inroads into the
African ctrcles.purportmg, as it did, to provide an alternative religious
ideology more easily conceivable to the African converts; an ideology
characterized by the AMEC's claim to be '••• the church of coloured people';
251obviously a term borrowed from its Afro-American progenitors. In the
second place, African missionaries from the South and especially from the
Boer republics, were quite aware of the differences between what they
popularly termed 'the British Government' as against 'the Dutch Government. '
They knew just too well the various shades of racial attitudes that differen-
tiated these two white races in their dealings with non-European peoples.
Conscious as these African emigres from the South were that the Boers did
not wield any political power in Southern Rhodesia and were thus not always
likely to have it their own way, as they did in the Boer republics below the
Limpopo, it is not surprising therefore that Makgatho and many of his com-
patriots left the D/R/C in response to ill-treatment and abuse, .. to join the
AMEC which was, at least in those early days, dominated by Africans !Tom
252
the South in its leadership and following.
But not all these early foreign African missionaries attached to the
D/R/C took the course of action chosen by Rev. Makgatho. Some remained
within the D/R/C fold and positively exerted their influence on the course of
Southern Rhodesian national developments from within the fold of this mission.
Isaac Khumalo for example, a Transvaal Ndebele, who had also come to work
in Southern Mashonaland as a D/R/C evangelist in the pre-colonial days, is
an interesting case. Khumalo worked among his Nguni kinsmen, the Hlengwe
(Shangaan) of the Chibi district, the people of Chief Vurumela, where he had
been placed in the period 1887-91. But with the passage of time, he became
inexorably involved in other specious developments within his flock and in
1912 was caught up in the tide of Hlengwe nationalism dlampicned especially
by Hlengwe labour migrants to the Transvaal, where they had obviously been
influenced by the tempo of political affairs amongst the African peoples there.
These Hlengwe labour migrants even enlisted the help of the famous Xhosa
leader, Dr. Walter B. Rubusana, in their efforts to unite the Shangaan
people in Southern Rhodesta, the Northern Transvaal and Mozambique and
251Evidence of Rev. Makgatho: loco cit.
252Ibid: pp. 200-1; Vide (also) SUpra: pp.23-8.
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ultimately drive out the Portuguese from their old Shangaan homeland,
Gazaland (Southern Mozambique). Though Isaac Khumalo may not have had
anything to do with this Shangaan movement, which was in all appearances an
external affair, the fact that he was the contact and addressee of corres-
pondence from these dissidents put him into very bad books with the Southern
Rhodesian authorities. Both the D/R/C and the Native Department were
quite convtnced.tn their susplctonsj on Khumalo's malevolent activities and
253thus concluded that he should be kept under scrutiny.
Another imposing character from the early group of foreign African
missionaries of the D/R/C from the South was Lucas Mokwele (Mokwile).
who started work at Madzivire's in the Chibi district of Southern Mashona-
land in the period 1889-1892. Mokwile, unlike Makgatho and Khumalo,
appears to have been quite successful within the context of the Sotho com-
munity of the Victoria Circle as a whole. He was the father of the Johannes
Mokwlle, the president of the loyalist Rhodesian Native Voters' Association
of the 1920's and it was at Madzivire's where Johannes himself was bom in
1894, being later educated at the Londoo.Missionary Society institute at
. 254Tiger Kloof m the Cape.
It is here quite interesting also to observe in passing, the role of these
foreign African missionaries associated with the D/R/C in particular, in
the process of African elite formation and general black/white interaction in
early Southern Rhodesia. Most of them actually later emerged as the nucleus
of the Sotho land-owning elite of the Victoria Circle, a role they attained by
exploiting their connections with the D/R/C mission to acquire land from
Boer private landowners. The British South Africa Company Administration)
which was not generally disposed to show a generous attitude to Africans on
the land question,could not,in any way,prevent these Sotho people from buying
the same from private landowners. The land so acquired consisted of two
farms, the Erichsthal and the Niekerk's Rust and it was in the latter that
Lucas Mokwile had a share.255 Thus the D/R/C mission, capitalising on its
253C• O. 417/510: W. C. Pa]grave, Assistant Native Commissionelj Vtetorta,
to Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland, Salisbury: February 8,
1912.
254J• S. Mokwile 'Native Ideals' NADA: No.2: 1924: pp. 95-7.
255Report of the Native Land Board for the Year Ended: March 31, 1933:
p. 5 and MokwUe 'Native Ideals': loc cit.
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geographical advantages and its bases in the Transvaal, acted as an agency
for introducing a constituent African community from the Southjsomewhat
loyal to D/R/C creed and very active in the process of social change. Butjat
the same time"this process of African elite formation also antagonised white
colonist sentiment to a large extent.
It is against this background of a burgeoning African elite and its poten-
tial to threaten the interests of the white society, particularly the secondary
colonists, that the history of the non-European auxiliaries from the South in
post-l896 Southern Rhodesia should therefore be examined. MoreoverJ a very
strong brand of racial hostility had emerged in the post-1896 era as a result
of the massacres and excesses of zeal during the risings. The white settlers
had become increasingly conscious on matters concerning their security and
welfare,whilBt the BSACo. Administration had also become particularly
hypersensitive to white settlers' views. It was therefore in accordance with
this mood that foreign African aides of yester-year, whether lay or religiOUS,
became the new foes of the Southem Rhodesian white settlers of post-1896 era
and the restrictive legislation against the 'Cape Boys' in terms of their
256habitation, together with Karl Khumalo's detention under the pretext of
257the 1899-1902 martial law, are certainly indicative of this changing
character of the relationship between these erstwhile masters and servants.
The same deductions discussed above can also be applied to the treat-
ment of another African pioneer from the South, namely the former sec-
retary of Lobengu1.a,the Lovedale-educated Khoikhoihistorical character"
John Jacobs. Since the end of the 1893war, Jacobs became easily the most
disliked African in the Company territories and his history of political
detentions, arrests and deportations by the CompanyAdministration dates back
to 1894 ti111923; the very end of Company rule in Southem Rhodesia. In John
Jacob's easejcharactertattc white hatred of educated Africans was here
further complicated by the struggle between him and the BSACo. to recover
Lobengula's wealth, estimated at '£2,800,000 in coins, 36 bars of raw gold,
10 wagon loads of ivory -(and)- 400 diamonds••• '. The bUrial of this vast
wealth had been witnessed by Jacobs and a few Ndebele notables before Loben-
256Vide Supra: pp. 162-,.
257Vide Supra: pp. 168-74;
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gula's mysterious disappearance in 1893. The Company obviously feared
that Jacobs might surreptitiously lay hands on this mystical treasure to his
own advantage.
What becomes quite apparent in the post-1896 treatment of the 'Cape
Boys' and their associates is that as the Company's military difficulties
receded.the former foreign African auxfliartesj espeefally the 'Cape Boys~
gradually sank into oblivion. They had become a spent-force and all what
seemed left for them to inherit were settler contempt and animosity. Although
these former auxiliaries may have managed to retain some of their traditional
occupational roles in the mining and transport industries as wagon drivers and
leaders or the Vachairi up to more recent ttmes of Southem Rhodesian hist-
ory,259 in social and political termsJsettler hostility towards them grew and
mellowed with time. Such hostility from their former patron community is
well captured inKingsley Fairbridge's poem The Bastard )which portrays
the half-caste 'Cape Boys' in the following manner:
Neither the one nor the other, neither the
White nor the Black,
By the side of the dusty wagon outs panned
on the highveld track,
Alone by the dung-fed fire where sad-voiced
night-jars wheel,
Goliath Witbooi the half-caste partakes
of his evening meal.
At odds with God in His heaven, at sixes
and sevens with man,
The colour showing beneath the white,
the white beneath the tan,
Despised and distrusted by the White and
by the Black; wifeless, chUdless, and alone -
Father, how could you have done it! 0 Mother,
you might have mown ..•.
But no. For hope is still present, and hope
is a father to all,
258C•O• 417/615:RobertMcLagan, ofR. McLaganandS.J. Peters,
Bulawayo, to Lord Milner: February 25, 1918: C. O. 417/692: Emest
W. S. Montagu, Acting Administrator to Prince Arthur of Connaught,
High Commissiooer: March 8, 1923 and Extract from The Rand Daily
Mi!:!!: September 7, 1917.
259Vambe speaks of 'Cape Boys' as wagon drivers and leaders in the 1920's
and 1930's economic depression in the Salisbury district. Vide:
OPe cit. pp. 203-5.
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And the long road stretches to Northward -
and he hears the long road call -
And the Veld is a kindly mother, the
bullocks doze at the chain,
Umfaanwill return by morning, and he will
trek on again.
And the fire lights up the wagon, and the smoke
goes by with the breeze,
And he dreams of the good North hunting - old
camps beneath the trees,
In the timbered low-veld country where the game
is as thick as stock,
With never a White Man to scorn him and
never a Black Man to mock.
Yea. good is the road to the Northward through
the sun-warmed winter days
When the fine dust blows to leeward and the
track leads round the vleis,
To sit on the fore-part locker and to drone to the
warm spent wind
The chant of the New~re one and the dirge
of the Old, behind.
Notwithstanding the derogatory overtones. these lines by the famous
Southern Rhodesian colonist poet and founder of the Rhodesia Herald, could
be regarded. under other circumstances, as an unsolictted tribute to a
hitherto ignored ancillary factor in the history of SouthernRhodesia. What
settler hostility implied after 1896was not so much that the 'Cape Boys' and
their allies from the Southwere undestrable as itwas a call for them to
divert their energies into new channels. Actually what the white community
and the BSACo.Administration required after 1896were not African soldiers
and self-appointed visionaries but African labourers. It is therefore the
labour ques tion and the beginnings of an external supply that we shall examine
in the next chapters.
260
Kingsley Fairbrtdge: Veld Verse and other IJ.nes: DavidNutt: London:
1909: PP. 35-8.
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CHAPI'ER 3
Introducing the Abyssinian, Arab and Asiatic Elements:
TheAncillary Labour SolutionsWhich Failed, 1898-1904
Introduction
In the previous chapters we have discussed at length how foreign
African auxiliaries were used in the wars of conquest and 'pacification'
in early Southern Rhodesfa, We have also seen how in the post-1896
period, relatims between these foreign African auxiliaries and their
white colonist patrons eventually turned sour as the latter required labour
supply to meet the needs of such labour-intensive operations as the mining
fndustry. Henceforth, it will be argued that it was basically those un-
desirable features of the labour recruiting activities of the BSACo.Admin-
istration and its agencies which ultimately alienated local African labour
supply,whose place was subsequently taken up by its foreign immigrant
equivalent: thus succeeding, in the process ,in turning SouthernRhodesia
into both a labour-consuming and labour-exporting country within the con-
text of the geographical and economic set-up of SouthernAfrica as a whole.
In the various sections of this proceeding study, it will be argued that
through the deployment of selective labour policies and the general resort
by employers to social and psychological stereotypes to influence economic
decisions in a composite colonial society, the labour problem was griev-
ously aggravated and the conditions of the Rhodesian labour market distorted
out of recognition. 1 By trying to single out ethnic factors as the inherent
causes of negative labour response and shortage and hence their economic
ruination,Southern Rhodesian employers resorted to far-fetched and some-
what artificial solutions to a situation smacking of a complex admixture of
concrete and imaginary problems. Moreover,the drive by these employers
to achieve a balance between cost minimization,on one hand, and a more
meaningful dependent relationship between master and employeeJwhichdid
not involve the risks of frequent disruptions, particularly harmful within
2the context of a low-profit mining industry, on the other, Inevitably
1Vide Infra: Chapter 5: PP. 394-404.
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predisposed the SouthernRhodesian employers to a more than remarkable
degree of reliance on foreign labour and all the advantages it offered over
3 .
the local sources. Thus was initiated a peculiarly SouthernRhodesian
paradox whereby external labour entered the country via the northern Zam-
basi approaches and, through a bizarre revolving-door mechanism, both
locals and foreigners left from the Southern (Limpopo)frontier to the Rand.
Abyssinian, Arab, Asiatic and trans-Zambesian factors were among the
many external solutions that were tried in early Southern Rhodesia, albeit
with various degrees of success, as both employers and officials tried to
arrest a labour situation progressively getting out of hand.
i The North-East African and Arabian Peninsula
Labour Schemes, 1898-1902:
From the Southern Rhodesian colonist employers' point of view, the
period between 1898 and 1904was specially suitable for the injection of all
forms of external African and other non-European groups for labour pur-
poses. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in the case of the Selukwe
mines, the relationship between the 'colonized' and the 'colonizers' in the
post-1896 era was by no means amicable and the question of labour supply
and exploitation tended to emphasize only too well the hierarchical rela-
tionship between the dominant and the subordinate social segments of the
Rhodesian colonial society,with pronounced adverse effects for either the
4
people involved or the employers for whomsuch labour was required.
Given this atmosphere of uneasy truce, poor labour and race relations, as
well as what the frustrated colonist employers regarded as a generally
negative labour response and the inefficiency of labourers from local Afri-
can sources, it is obvious that some of these employers lost all hope with
regard to procuring requisite labour quotas from the local sources. The
Matabeleland employezs.In particularjdemonstrated such a degree of des-
2Phimister argues that the BSACo. andRhodesian employers were aware of
the poverty of the Rhodesian mining Industry as early as the pre-1896
period and that the 1896-7 risings were a result of this poverty. Vide:
I.R. Phimister: History of Mining In SouthernRhodesia up to 1953:
Ph. D (unpublished)thesis, University of Rhodesia: March 1975: PP. 61-3.
3For theoretical analysis m this point: Vide: Infra PP.~ltr-'f<'~
4The Selukwecase study was dealt with in what was Chapter 3 of the original
draftJbut dropped in the end because the work bad become too long. It
will however be prepared for publication purposes.
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pondenoewhen they forbade the Labour Board of that province to carry out
any recruiting activities in Mashonalandand.aecordtngly,withdrew their
5agents from this province between 1900and 1901. Besides. the failure of
the Southern Rhodesian employers to exploit more effectively the labour
sources lately abandonedby the Rand due to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer
War and, in this way,put to good use the temporary suspension of work on these
more profitable mines of the South,whilst the war lasted, strengthened the
resolve of these employers to cast their nets farther afield.
Although this failure to exploit the former labour sources of the Rand
may have been. as in the case of Mozambique. beyond the control of the
Southem Rhodesian employers. given for instance the traditional Anglo-
6Portuguese hostility in the sub-continent. the SouthernRhodesian mining
industry itself also undermined any prospects of reasonable labour supply
from traditionally Rand-orientated areas even during the course of the ADglo-
Boer War. The experiment to introduce labour from the Transkei in 1900and
1901, labour obviously used hitherto to feed the Rand, crumbled because of
the poor labour conditions prevailing in the Selukwemining district where it
7had been initiated. Jndeedno surgical analysis of the causes of these rever-
ses was undertaken and,in accordance with the then prevailing interpretation
of the Southern Rhodesian colonial society, the economic and political aspects
attendant to the failure of labour supply from the Delagoa Bay area of Mozam-
bique for example were also under-played and this Ill-success, especially that
of contracts between Messrs Breyner andWirth of Lourenco Marques and the
Labour Board of Southem Rhodeata.arrfved at in 1900-1)to supply the Rhodes-
ian mining industry with Shangaan labour to the amount of 3, 000 recruits per
annum, was ascribed to issues of little significance/as far as labour explotta-
8tion was concerned.
5Rhodesia Chamber of Mines AnnualReport, 1901: loco cit.
6Vide: Infra: pp. 184-5.
7Vide: Mes. Diary of William Impey Stanform Driver, Assistant Native Com-
missioner (hereafter Ass. N/C) Upper Gwelodistrict 1Selukwe)=. Vols
L
I & 2: October 1896 to June 1898: British Museum: London.
8Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1901: p, 30.
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Some of the causes of this unsuccessful Mozambiqueventure were viewed
by Southern Rhodesian employers in terms of psychological factors,widely
believed to be the main cause of Shangaanlabour attraction to the Rand mines.
For instance, whilst the Southern Rhodesian mining magnates were prepared
to accept.as incontrovertible Jthegeographical advantages of the Rand.In rela-
tion to its proximity to Delagoa Bay and other predominantly Shangaanregions
of Southern Mozambique, they could however hardly admit the effectiveness,
let alone the appreciation by Shangaanlabourers themselves, of the higher
wages offered at the Rand.whieh of course compared quite favourably with
those obtainable in Southern Rhodesia. To the SouthernRhodesian colonist
employer, the operative factors by means of which the Rand was able to
extract about 70%of its labour force from these areas could only be inter-
preted simply In terms of the social and psychological characteristics of the
African labourer. Here for example, the Rhodesta Chamber of MInesbe-
laboured the assumptions that Shangaanlabourers were predisposed to
proceed to the Rand rather than to SouthernRhodesia not only because of the
railway facilities which made it easier for them to reach the Rand mines, but
also because of a large number of their countrymen already there Iwith whom
they could share the fortunes and hazards of mjgrant life, not to mention in
this case too the fabled 'pull' of larger industrial and mining centres, 'full of
attracttons, in which he ~the Shangaanlabourer)- ~could)- readily gratify
his baser instincts. ,9 This state of affairs was not unnaturally a drawback to
the Southern Rhodesian colonist employer,where, as C.T. Holland, the
President of the Bulawayo-basedRhodesia Chamber of MInes/admitted, the
mines were:
••• scattered, the gangs smaller, malaria fever often
~prevailing)- during part of the wet season, no liquor
~was)- obtainable, and. .• no town -{was)-at hand In whicBa
the native -(could)- indulge In his favourite amusements.
For this exodus of Shangaanlabour to the Rand, the Southern Rhodesian
employers considered the Portuguese authorities equally blameworthy,
because of their alleged collaboration with the Rand employers by exerting
their influence to the benefit of the latter in return for 'personal pecuniary
benefits'. Moreover, in accordance with general colonist views which por-
9.!!?!!t PP. 50-1.
9albid.
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trayed the image of the African labourer in negative terms, as then befitting
the social and psychological attitudes of racially hierarchical colonial soc-
ieties, the solutions offered by the SouthernRhodesian employers to remedy
this genesis of Shangaan labour to the Rand, obviously to the disadvantage of
the Southern Rhodesian mining industry, were essentially psychological and
not by any means economic in character, Against a background full of
polttlcal obstacles imposed by the Portuguese whohad forbidden all forms
of migration, even clandestine, into Southern Rhodesia from Mozambique
and the unfavourable economic competition with the Rand, Milton, the Admini-
strator of Southern Rhodesia, saw the provision of 'kaffir beer' as the only
viable solution to thwart these obstacles by)in this mstanee.beattng the
African labourer at his owngame and thus increasing labour supply from this
and other sources.
Bearing in mind the legislative restrictions governing the provision of
beer in general to the non-European races in the country and the undertakings
previously given to humanitarian circles, during the initial annexation of
Masbonaland and Matabeleland, Milton therefore suggested to Rhodes, with
calculated furtiveness, in January 1902 that:
1am sure that in reasonable quantities & under regulation it
-{beer}-wouldbe good for the natives but the mere intention
of supplying 'beer' wouldgive Fox Bourne & Co, a fit. If we 10
could only call it 'Rapoko tea' they ,APS}- wouldbe charmed.
But still no labour was forthcoming from Mozambiqueto meet the require-
ments of Southern Rhodesian employers, especially given in this case the
uneasy diplomatic entanglements which emerged during the Anglo-Boer War.
LondonWall, after sounding the Colonial and Foreign Offices on the matter
11had so informed its local officials in SouthernAfrica in this vein, and
perhaps those employers whowere gradually pinning their hopes on Abyssin-
12ian, Arab and Somali labour still had, after all, some card left to chew,
An interesting aspect of the movement to import labour from the horn of
10Mss, Afr, S,228/CI: Milton to Rhodes: January 25, 1902,
11C,O, 417/311: BSACo" London, to Charter, Cape Town, Cablegram:
October 2, 1900,
12C,O, 468/2: Report of Mr, H. E. Jones, Consulting Engineer, Rhodesia
Exploratioo. and DevelgpmentCo. Ud. I for the Year ending 30th Sept-
ember 1901: Enclosed in BSACo,Reports on Mining in Rhodesia:
1897-1902: p, 320: S, Rhodesia Sessional Papers: P/R/O: London,
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Africa,prior to the end of the Anglo-Boer WarJ was the disdainful attitude the
Southern Rhodesian employers adopted towards the then incipient trans - .
Zambesian immigrant labour supply, especially the Lozi and the 'Zambesis';
a term applied by the white settlers to the Mashukulumbwe, Tonga, Nkoya
and other ethnic groups from the Zambesi region of North-Western Rhodes-
12a
Ia, This attitude was of course a defensive measure by the employers
concerned to counter the negative reactions of these trans-Zambesian recruits
to their various forms of employment in Southern Rhodesia at this early
period of labour immigration Into the country. Specifically, the reactions of
these early trans-Zambesian arrivals were a product of the physical and
psychological problems they faced in Southern Rhodesia's strange environ-
ment and the arduous frontier situation they encountered. Physically debili-
tated, sick and flabby on account of the long distance travel and feeding on
strange food.prepared somewhat indifferently, and subjected to the impersonal
regimen of lDlfam1liar labour agents and touts, these new and 'unseasoned'
recruits, obviously ill-adapted to this type of Situation, concluded that the
conditions of work in Southern Rhodesia were more than they had bargained
for and consequently felt a sense of betrayal by those responsible for their
enlistment.
Such conditions as those encountered in Southern Rhodesia by the early
trans-Zambesian labourers resembled, to a large measure, those appertain-
ing to indentured 'coolie' labourers in the sugar plantations of Natal, the West
Indies and Mauritius. But unlike their Asiatic counterparts, compelled by
circumstances to overlook the calls and tugs of their nostalgia and broken
hearts, the trans-Zambesian labourers in Southern Rhodesia whose homes
were relatively nearer couId only apply the weapon whose effectiveness even
13
their employers could not question: that is, desertion. But for this
desertion and the relatively discouraging physical condition in which these
recruits arrived, some Southern Rhodesian employers therefore naturally
considered Lozi and other trans-Zambesian labourers, at this early period,
not worthy the expense the scheme required in bringmg them down for mine
12aFor a general usage of the term 'Zambesis' in reference to some northern
Africans and its related confusion: Vide: R. C. Tredgold: The Rhodesia
That Was My Life: Allen & Unwin: London: 1968: PP. 30-1 and E. Colson:
'The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia' in E. Colson and M. Gluckman
(eds.): Seven Tribes of British Central Africa: Manchester University
Press: Manchester: 1952: PP. 94-5.
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work, which was even more so in the face of the then promising movement to
introduce Abyssinian, Arab, Somali and Asiatic labour from even further
afield.
As early as October 1898, the physical aptitude of the Lozi and 'Zambesi'
labourers on the mines in Southern Rhodesia had so disillusioned white em-
ployers and officials, largely due to the lack of proper care during the course
of their recruitment and en route to the Southby private recruiters, that
their engagement was left in serious doubt. The morbidity rate amongst
these recruits was indeed frightful. P. A. Stuart, the Acting Native Com-
missioner of the Bubi district in Matabeleland and an enthusiastic advocate of
forced labour for the local Africans)indeed used this state of affairs to promote
his cause. After visiting the Bonsor mine in the Selukwedistrict and the
Queen's Mine, Bulawayodistrict, where, as he put it, the 'Zambesi
-(1abourersr were dying like sheep, ' Stuart, whowas by no means a negro-
phile, cast himself into the role of a redeemer and/in quasi-evangelical terms,
stated:
Is it right? Is it human, Is it Christian, that such a state of
things should continue?
I am no great partisan of the 'SPC to Natives', but in case of
this sort, I feel I must speak, either from a sense of duty,
or for the purpose of proving my argument ~on forced labour)-,
Zambesi - the raw Zambesi - seem to die just the same in
summer, as they 1~in winter, and I cannot - they cannot -
explain the cause.
Stuart's views on trans-Zambesian labourers were corroborated by the
head of the Native Department in Matabeleland, Herbert Taylolj the Chief
Native Commissioner, in his report on conditions at the Selukwemines in
July 1900. Commentingon the state of affairs at the Bonsor mine.where, out
of a gang of 157 Lozilabour recruits, about 152 deserted and only 5 had
remained, and on the Dunraven and SUrprise mines}where a very high rate of
mortality also prevailed and a large proportion of Lozl and Angonl labourers
were in hospital, CINIC Taylor put the blame on the change of climatic con-
13For comparative conditions of indentured 'coolies' on sugar plantation:
Vide: HughTinker: A NewSystem of Slavery: The Export of Indian
Labour Overseas 1830-1920:Oxford University Press: London:1974:
pp. 180-1.
14NB 1/1/6: P. A. Stuart, Acting NIC, Bubi to CINlc Bulawayo:October 22,
1898.
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ditions for these labourers from'the hot latitudes North of the Zambesi' and
the negligence of both the Labour Agents and the Labour Board on the question
of providing their recruits with adequate warm clothing and food, the lack of
which Taylor regarded as a 'shortsighted policy'. In this official's view,
these trans-Zambesian labourers were obviously adversely affected by this
state of neglect with the result that they:
••• arrive in this country ~Southern Rhodestaj- during the winter
months unprovided with any clothing whatever to protect them
from the climate and consequently numbers of them die on the
way down, whilst the majority of those that reach their destin-
ation are in such a weak state of health that they are either
past recovery or subje<j_'irfor a long treatment in hospital before
they are fit for labour.
Such conditions as these which made the trans-Zambesfan labourers
generally vulnerable to dysentry, pneumonia and related diseases,invariably
debilitating them, compelled Southern Rhodesian employers to conclude as
C/N/C Taylor did, that the trans-Zambesian labourer I in point of physiqueJ
was 'greatly inferior' to the labourer recruited locally from the province of
Matabeleland.hence less valuable and serviceable than the latter. The view
gained greater credence amongst the mine managers as they campaigned
16for Abyssinian, Arab and Asiatic labour.
In addition to these misgivings on the labour value of trans-Zambesians,
the colonist employers of Southem Rhodesia were infuriated by these lab-
ourers' rate of desertion, then a practice by no means confined to trans-Zam-
besians anly. However, this proclivity amongst recruits who had cost the
mines 'upwards of £2 per head' to bring them downto work in Southern
Rhodesia was, as the Matabeleland (Rhodesia) Chamber of Mines put it, too
17heavy a loss for the companies involved. Suchconclusions by this mining
body were of course based on grievances of individual mine managers and
other members of this mining organisation. For example, B.G. Byerley,
the manager of Morven mine near Bembesi in the Bubi district, complained in
June 1901,about the desertion of 143 Iabourers.out of a labour force of 214
supplied by both Clarke and Nielsen, agents of the Labour Board,stationed at
15C. O. 417/311: C/N/C Taylor's Report on Native Labour on the Mines in
the SelukweDistrict, July 27, 1900.
16C. O. 468/2: Report of Mr. C.T. Holland, General Manager, Chartered
Goldfields. Ltd. for the year ended 30th June, 1901 in BSACo. Reports __.
1 p. 63.
7Rhodesia Chamber of Mines AnnualReport. 1902: PP. 17-8.
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the Victoria Falls and Bulalima district respectively, 18whilst similar
objections were also raised by H.W. Hodsonof Surprise mine in the Selukwe
district. As Hodson indicated to the Bulawayobranch of the Labour Board of
Southern Rhodesia, out of the first gang of 91 Lozi labour recruits supplied to
his mine by the Labour Board in July 1901, only 71 had arrived at the mtne,
the rest having deserted en route. The second group of 41 Lozi recruits did
not impress the management of the Surprise mine either, apparently having
overstayed their rest days in Gwelo,thus incurring extra expenses with the
Meikle Brothers responsible for their food supply, much to the displeasure of
these recruits' prospective employers. 19 In the final analysis, the Surprise
mine wouldnot be persuaded to take any more Lozi recruits as the mine
management were convinced that they ''1could)- do nothing with them'. 20
Employers in Mashonalandtoo adopted similar attitudes towards their
trans-Zambesian labour supply,albeit for slightly different reasons. Under a
'gentlemen's agreement' between the two branches of the Labour Board of
Southern Rhodesia, the Salisbury branch was entitled to recruit labour across
the Zambesi for Mashonalandemployers from those regions east of the line
running north and south through Zumboon the Zambesi,whilst the areas west
21
of this line of demarcation were reserved for Matabeleland. In simple terms ...
this meant that whilst the Salisbury branch of the Labour Board could not
recruit labour from Barotseland and the rest of North-Western Rhodesia, it
had.on the other hand,exclusive rights over labour recruited mainly from
North-Eastern Rhodesia and British Central Africa (Nyasaland); the home of
the Angoni, Bemba, Senga, Chewa, Chikundaand other ethnic groups which
later formed the bulk of the farm and mine labour of Mashonalandand patronized
the Mtoko-Mlssale and the Feira-Kanyemba-Mount Darwin routes1connecttng
22the two Rhodesias.
18B.G. Byerley, Manager: The Morven @hodesia) Co. tid, Bembesi, to
Secretary, Labour Board, Bulawayo: JlDle18, 1901:!!ili!: p. 61.
19H.W. Hodson, MineSecretary, Surprise Mining ce., Ltd., Selukweto
Labour Board, Bulawayo, July 1, 1901:~: PP. 61-2.
20Walter Currie, Consulting Engineer, The Surerise Gold Min!ng Co. Ltd" to
the Secretary, Labour Board, Bulawayo, September 17, 1901: in!!lli!; p. 71.
21Salisbuq Chamber of MinesReport, 1901: p, 3.
22Vide infra: Chapter 5; and also: J. A. Barnes: 'The Fort Jameson Ngoni'
in Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman (eds): Seven Tribes of British
Central Africa: Manchester University Press: Manchester: 1951: PP. 244-
50.
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Yet even at this early stage of external labour recruitment and during
the campaign for Arab, Abyssinian, Asiatic as well as the all-time popular
Shangaan labour from the Delagoa Bay area of Mozambique, Frank Jolmson,
the president of the Salisbury Chamber of Mines, apparently disillusioned by
the desertion of trans-Zambesian recruits at the rate of about 50 per cent
out of a total of 1,240 brought into the country in 1900-1 at the cost of '22s
7d per head', was also quite prepared to write off any further prospects of
labour supply from across the Zambesi, arguing that such material was
' ••. hopeless ••• for any immediate solution to our labour problem ••• '. 23
Here it must be pointed out that the motives of the Mashonaland employers
in advocating for external labour supply from the far-flung corners of Africa
and Asia were not in any way genuine. In some circles, even the importation
of labour from outside the country was regarded as derisory,especially in view
of the fact that the population of Mashonaland was considered large enough
to meet the labour requirements of the territory and.from the viewpoint of
J. A. Woodburn, the manager of the Rezende mine in the Umtali district,
such foreign labour as the Labour Board and hitherto supplied offered little
24
advantage over the local supply, being in the main 'uncertain and erratic ••• '.
What may have strengthened the resolve of the Mashonaland employers
to resort to external labour sources other than the trans-Zambesian supply
may have been a sense of insecurity amongst these employers; insecurity
engendered not only by the problem of desertion and related aspects of nega-
tive labour response, but also by the threat posed by the planters of North-
Eastern Rhodesia and British Central Africa (Nyasaland). As early as
January 1900, these planters, in alliance with the commercial sector of the
two territories, objected to labour migration to Southern Rhodesia on the
grounds of the moral problems such a phenomenon raised for the African
population of the areas concerned and the economic ruination it implied to
local agriculture and commerce. Accordingly,such a state of affairsJwhich
could not benefit local economic interests in any way)had to be stopped by
administrative fiat. 25
23Salisbury Chamber of Mines Report 1901: PP. 22-3.
24C. O. 468/2: Report of J. A. Woodburn, Manager Rezende Ltd., for the
Year Ending 30th June, 1901: in BSACo. Reports: p. 306.
25A 11/2/8/5: Petiticn prepared by the Committee of the BCA Chambers of
Commerce for presentation through H. M. Commissioner to the Foreign
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Although the genesis of this negative attitude amongst the employers
towards the incipient labour supply from across the Zambesi had its roots
largely in the weaknesses underlying the constraints of a low-profit mining
industry, these same employers would not apply such remedies as would have
rendered their properties more attractive and less repellent to potential
labourers. At the Globe and Phoenix mine for instance, both local and
trans-Zambesian labourers had,at this early date.found desertion a useful
weapon. Notwithstanding the assertions of the local mine management that
26such desertion was without' .•• any reason or cause for complaint ..•• ' the
Native Department came to view the situation at this mine with askance.
The Native Commissioner of the Charter district, W. M. Taylor,observed in
May 1902,the poor compound accommodation provided at the Globe and
Phoenix mine,which consisted of an iron building,divided into eight rooms
'built on bare ground without any floors to them' and the general dislike of
the labourers for this type of accommodation that gangs of labourers actually
preferred to live in the huts 'put up roughly' by themselves on arrival. It
was to the discomfort occasioned by this compound accommodation and the
lack of change of diet that N/C Taylor ascribed the labour problem of the mine,
given especially the high percentage of stokness amongst the labourers
thereon and, with regard to the 128 desertions amongst the 410 Charter
district labourers forwarded thither, Taylor could only comment:
Unless they ~Globe and Phoenix)- have a proper compound,
with hospital and surgery in one, and kept properly clean, it
is impossible, with t}If number of natives employed, to work the
mine satisfactorily.
The high morbidity and accident rates at the Selukwemines were also
some of the direct causes of their chronic problems there too, however much
28the mine authorities denounced both local and trans-Zambesian labour. As
far as the employers were concerned.thetr solution was, at this point in time,
Office, n, d. Enclosed in Robert Codrington, Deputy Administrator, Fort
Jameson, to Chief Secretary, BSACo•• Salisbury: January 31, 1900.
26Theo Haddon, Manager, Globe and Phoenix Gold MinIng Co, Ltd" to
Secretary Labour Board Bulawayo, n, d. in RhodeSia Chamber of Mines
Report 1902: p. 63.
27W.M. Taylor N/C Charter to C/N/C Mashonaland, Salisbury: May 1, 1902:
28 .!!ili!= PP. 71-2.
C.O. 417/311: C/N/C Taylor's Report on Native Labour on the mines in the
Selukwe Destrict, July 27, 1900.
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twofold Like their cousins in the Transvaal,the Randlords,who success-
fully influenced the Secretary for Native Affairs, Sir Godfrey Lagden.and
dictated the form of pass legislation they required as an administrative
weapon to control African labour in 1904 for the benefit of the Rand mining
29industry, the Rhodesian colonist employers began to agitate for pass legis-
lation too and.tndeed.provtded the Administration with their owndraft prop-
osals for the purpose in 1901, stipulating in particular compulsory registration
for the Africans and an increase in the number of Native Commissioners and
30the police force to facilitate the detection and apprehension of deserters.
The labour requirements underlying this pass legislation, adopted by the
Administration of SouthernRhodesia in 1902 and accorded the consent of the
31Colonial Office in 1904, were never in doubt.gfventhe correspmding resent-
ment amongst the white settlers to a similar measure to regulate their own
movements in accordance with the martial law declared at the outbreak of the
32Anglo-Boer War and rescinded in July 1902.
The pass legislation, its vexations not excepted, was viewed by employers
as a germane solution in order to keep all forms of labour supply under check
and in putting an end to a system under which they considered African labour-
ers deserted '.•• in large numbers monthby monthwith absolute impunity~•
while the mining industry had 'to bear the heavy initial cost of importing
33
these men ~Lozi and 'Zambesi')- with no return for work done. ' The other
solution before the Rhodesian employers,which offered an alternative supply
to either local or trans-Zambesian labour,was the AbySSinian,Somali and
Arab labour, the so-called 'North East Coast Natlves'Jfor which the leading
figures in the Rhodesian mining industry were then whippingup support in
341900-1. Thus when the authorities gave a green light to the mining industry
29n.J. Denoon: "'Capitalist Influence" and the Transvaal Government during
the Crown ColonyPeriod, 1900-1906': Historical Journal: XI, 2, (1968):
p. 308.
30Salisbury Chamber of MJnesQuarterly Report. July 1901: PP. 76-82.
31C.O. 417/409: Instructions to NICS, Assistant NICSand Clerks for the
better carrying out of the Provisions of the Native Pass Ordinance No, 10
of 1902: by Chief Secretary, H.H. Casterns, Salisbury: July 1, 1904.
3~hodesia Chamber of MJnesAnnual Report 1903: p.22
3~hodesia Chamber of MJnesAnnual Report 1902: PP. 17-8.
34Vide: Frank Johnson's speech in SalisburYChamber of MinesReport 1901:
PP. 23,26.
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to proceed on the matter, this North-East African venture was indeed wel-
comed with enthusiasm at first,especially by those mines considered un-
35popular locally.
The implementation of the North-East African labour venture in 1900 and
the takeover of its architect, John Kusel, by the Rhodesian employers in 1899~
demonstrate various crucial aspects of the Southem Rhodesian labour problem
and the complex political and ethnic content of its foreign quarry. John Kusel
was a German subject, apparently a former resident of German East Africa
(Tanganyika), but currently in the employ of the Consolidated Goldfields of
SouthAfrica Ltd., one of the giant mining companies foundedby Rhodes and
36operating on the Rand. Kusel's work as a purveyor for possible labour
supply from North-East African to the Rand, for which he had been engaged,
was somewhat prematurely put to an end by the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer
War in 1899 and.for this reason, the Southem Rhodesian mining industry took
over both the venture itself and its purveyor: most likely with the tacit appro-
val of the Consolidated Goldfields. 37 This development.In a nutshell, demon-
strates the reliance of the Rhodesian mining industry on the Rand and how far
it was prepared to exploit this relationship to its advantage,as we shall see
later. Secondly)the entangled ethnic and political web in the area chosen by
Kusel as his zone of operation, greatly complicated the judgements of the
employers as to the merits and value of this class of labour supply and.In the
end, on account of the diplomatic issues which the recruitment of this labour
entailed, consequently frustrated the activities of the purveyor and his col-
leagues in this region.
Here it is important to observe,in connection with this North-East
African scheme.that the common practice of the Rhodesian colonist employers
to pigeon-hole the various classes of labour supply under their ebarge.on the
basis of ethnic origin and in accordance with the whims of individual mine
managers and officials was undoubtedly thwarted by the complex distribution
of national groups in the hom of Africa)which symbolizes those peculiar
characteristics of the African boundary problem in the colonial era. The
35Walter CUrrie, The Surprise Gold Mining Co, Ltd., to Secretary, Labour
Board Bulawayo, August 26, 1901: in Ibid: P. 63.
36Gross: Rhodes of Africa: PP. 130-1.
37Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1901: p. 71.
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•interchange of peoples between Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and the three Somali
territories, namely British Somaliland at Berbera, Italian Somaliland at
Mogadishu and French Somalfland (Djibouti),and the historical connection
between Ethiopia, Somaliland and the Arabian peninsula as well as the attend-
ant exchange of cultural influences between Christianity and Islam, make it
quite difficult to determine what groups of epople were actually recruited by
38John Kusel and other emissaries of the Southern Rhodesian mining industry.
In short, the horn of Africa represented a classical conflict between super-
imposed and anthropo-geographical boundaries and consequently the problem
of arbitrary political boundaries which cut across cultural, linguistic and
historical features of human settlement. 39 John Kusel and Alexander
Tulloch, the first Rhodesian emissaries to North-East Africa,did not pay
sufficient heed to these factors on their labour mtsstons and naturally their
initial blunders foiled the programme to import regular and permanent labour
supply from this region.
Kusel's appointment as any envoy for the SouthemRhodesian mining
industry was perhaps justified by the extensive surveys and connections he
had made in 1899,in his effort to lay downa soUd foundationfor permanent
labour recruitment from North-East to Southern Africa. In these surveys,
Kusel had been able to establish a network of agen.ts and acquaintances, ready
to assist him in the process of recruiting labour for SouthemAfrican employ-
ers, especially the miners, and was thus able to surmount some of the
poUtical and diplomatic problems likely to have choked the Abyssinian labour
scheme even at this early period of its inception. These acquaintances
included amoog them, ManoU, a Greek representative of a NewYork firm,
the Livierato Brothers, whose interests ManoUwas in charge of in Harrar:
40then. the mp1ta1 of Southern Abyssinia (Ethiopia). ManoU,who knew no
38For a background to the complex poUtical, historical and ethnic problems
of North-East Africa, Vide: E. UUendorf:The Ethiopians: An Introduction
to the Country and People: Oxford University Press: London:1965:
PP. 32ff and also: M.W. Mariam: 'The background of the Ethio-Somalian
Boundary Dispute': The Journal of Modern African Studies: VoL 2, No.2,
(1964): PP. 189-219.
39For a theoretical approach to the African boundary problem: Vide S. Tagfl.
'The Study of Boundaries and Boundary Disputes' in C.G. Widstrand
(ed): African Boundary Problems: Almquist & Wiksell: Uppsala: 1969:
PP. 22-5.
40A 11/2/8/2: John Kusel, Djibouti, to Watson, Manager, ConsoUdatedGold
Fields of SouthAfrica ltd" November 4, 1899.
194
English and could only read and write Greek and Arabic, had the added
advantage for Kusel in that he had had wide experience in his previous employ
on the Arabian peninsula,where he had been chief of the coast guards to
counteract all forms of smuggling by Arab dhows in the Turkish-ruled terri-
tory of Yemen.
From Manoli's lmowledgeof the whole region between the hom of Africa
and the south-westem coast of the Arabian peninsula, Kusel therefore con-
sidered him a very valuable asset indeed; more so as this man had consented
to act as Kusel's labour agent at Mokka (or Mokha), a sea-base on the Yemen
coast. The latter was to recruit and forward HamUlabour recruits from
this point to Assab in the Italian territory of Eritrea, one of the two ports
chosen by Kusel as the points of embarkation to Southern Africa. But in spite
of the very high opinion Kusel held for these HamUArabs as suitable material
for minework, Manoli could only promise, from the Mokkabase, at least an
average of 300 recruits per mensem in return for a premium of 5/- per head,
due to the inadequate communications system between this base and Assab,
Room for increased supply was,nevertheless, left open, in the event of
41improved transport facilities.
Other contacts who had volunteered their services in promoting Kusel's
labour schemes from this part of the world were no less significant. There
was,for instance,the British consul in Harrar, John Gerolimantojwho was,
Uke ManoU, connected with the Livierato Brothers, in his private capacity
in this part of Abyssinia. Gerolimanto's consent to act as one of Kusel's
agents in this heartland of the Moslem population of Abyssinia was important
not in the least for the paltry figure of 2000 Somali and Galla recruits that
this official promised in return for a remuneration of '41/- per head' so
delivered, but primarily for the political advantages Kusel's scheme derived
from such co-operation. Kusel's admiration of Geralimanto's 'personal
. 42
energy••• good relations with the Abyssinia government••• , ' must here
certainly be viewed in relation to his earlier pessimistic assertions on the
.l
" .
41A 11/2/8/2: Report of John Kusel to Consolidated Gold Fields of S.A, Ltd.,
Johannesburg, November (?), 1899. (Vide also Appendix -(map)-Vl:'The
Kusel/Tulloch Trips in North-East Africa, 1899-1901'. -
42lbid
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APPENDIXlV: THE KUSEL/TULLOCH TRIPS IN
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(Sketch based on a modified map in E. Ullendorff: The Ethiopians:
An Introduction to the CountryaripPeople; Oxford University Pressj London: 1965.)
problems raised by the restrictive policies of the same governmentjwtth
regards to labour recruitm.ent for service in foreign parts; restrictions which,
as Kusel had given it to be understood, he would have run the risk of brealdng
if only to meet his obligations under this Southern Mrican scheme.43 The
enlistment of the British consul may have thus been expected to exert the
necessary leverage on local Abyssinian officials,especially the governor of
Harrar, Ras Makannen,the hero of the battle of Adwa against the Italians in
1896, a cousin and right-hand man of King Menelik and the father of Emperor
44
Halle Sellaise. The same may be true of Artu Mercia the governor of
Dgialdessa, a sub-division of Harrar, whose consent to supply labour and
friendship with Kusel in these ventures appear to have been cemented by
copious supplies of cognac. 45
Other minor lead ers also co-operated with Kusel in his labour scheme
with varied degrees of success. Sultan Lueta for instance, of whom Kusel
spoke in favourable terms as quite influential in Djibouti and 'much patronised
by the French government', was also prepared to raise a sizeable proportion
of Somali, Abyssinian and Galla labour recruits,at 2 francs per head in
remuneration as well as 5/- to 6/- per head in transport expenses,and to for-
ward them in person to Assab for shipment to Southern Africa. Similar offers
were apparently made by the chiefs in the neighbourhood of Assab,in connect-
ion with labour recruits from the surrounding Danak11 peoples. But these
offers were unfortunately turned down by Kusel who doubted the fitness of
these recruits as manuallabourers,in spite of their superficial appearance
as 'well built -{men)- with good muscles and -{an)- easily contented -{nature)-
•••• ,46 The Danaldls, also known as Afars, may have fallen victims to their
historically unpopular image in foreign eyes as 'cruel and merciless'; an
image generally associated with their reputation for massacring expeditions
47
and caravans.
43Ibid: Kusel, Djibouti, to Watson, Johannesburg: November 4, 1899.
44C. O. 417/364: Arthur Keyser, British CODSulGeneral, Berbera, to Sir
Clement Hill at F. 0.: April24, 1902: Vide also tnlendorff: The Ethio-
pians: PP. 92-3.
"
45A 11/2/8/2: Kusel to Watson: November 4, 1899.
46Ibid: Report by John Kusel to Consolidated Gold Fields ••• November (?),
1899.
47ffilendorff: OPt·cit. PP• .to-l.
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Whatever criteria Kusel may have used in sampling out labour supplies
for his employers in Southern Africa and in the process building up bridges
to facilitate its extraction, his approach and judgement ,however, appear to
have been largely influenced by the general trend of European social and
psychological stereotypes in dealing with the non-European world. His
selection of labour material for the mines in Southern African followed
particular specifications of his own creation. Whilst the Danakils could only
48be recruited in form of 'a small trial batch', other ethnic groups were
treated as special priorities and were,therefore,particularly eUg1ble for
the Kusel plan. The Hamals (or Hamils) for instance, a nomadic people
based in the Yem.en who plied both the Arabian peninsula and the hom of
Africa and were considered to be 'the low and principal working class' in
those parts, had favourable reckoning with Kusel as an appropriate labour
material.
Notwithstanding the general opposition of the '1ilrklsh authorities in
Yemen to large-scale emigration of contract labourers, an official attitude
Kusel was apparently quite aware of. he still ran the risk of stationing one
of his principal men. Manoli, the Greek agent/at Mokka with orders to 'tip'
the governor with presents worth '£30 to £50' at a time, to forestall any
49obstruction of dhows conveying these Hamal recruits to Assab in Eritrea.
The Abyssinians, Gallas and Somalis were ranked second best in Kusel's
estimation; the Gallas especially so as they were also regarded as 'the working
class in Abyssinia.' Thus such arrangements as Kusel made with Geroli-
manto, Artu Mercia and Sultan Mahomed Illeta focussed primarily on the
50
proviston of these classes of recruits either from Harrar or DjiboUti.
The justification for the criteria applied by Kusel in these preparatory
activities may be whimsical,but it wasbowever.on these conclusions that he
had assured employers of labour in Southern Africa on his ability to supply
an estimated total of about 700 recruits monthly or over 7, 000 labourers
annually; with,of course.poasfhle increase in numbers of these recruits should
communications between the hinterland and the North-East African littoral
improve. The cost of delivery of these recruits from either Aden or Assab
48
A 11/2/8/2: Kusel's Report to Coosolidated Gold Fields ••• November (?),
1899.
49lbid
50lbid.
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to Delagoa Bay in Southern Mozambique, according to arrangements with the
'Konig' or 'Herzog', steamers of the German East Africa (Deutshe Oat Africa)
Line, ranged between 80/- and 85/- per head,all costs included. The rec-
ruits were to work specially underground on the mines for at least two years
at a wage of £1 per m onth.but with prospects of increase in wages 'as soon
as they -(were)- found to be ordinary workers •••• ' Return passage was free
at the end of their service,as long as the batches amounted to no less than
300 labourers at a time; a stipulation obviously well calculated to prevent any
51desertions.
These esSEntial features of the Kusel scheme were retained in October
1900, when the Southern Rhodesian mJning Industry engaged this GerDUUl
connoisseur and Alexander Tulloch, a pioneer resident of Southern Bbodesfa,
52apparently well respected in white-settler circles, to pick up the pieces
of the North-East Africa labour project from. the point where ConsoUdated
Gold Fields had left: off in January 1900,when the Anglo-Boer war had com-
pelled it to postpone the same 'indefinitely', but at the same time advising
Kusel and his contacts 'to keep In touch with sources of supply in order that
they may be in readiness. ,53 Indeed,it could be said that the Kusel scheme
and its promises of plentiful labour resources in North-East Africa may have
largely pre-conditioned the attitudes of these envoys and their Rhodesian
paymasters at home with regards to the manner in which they subsequently
overlooked all forms of alternative sources of supply en route, notably in
East Africa.
Inhis report to the BSACo. Administration1relattng to this North-East
Africa mission, Alexander Tulloch hinted on the probabiUties of obtaining
labour from such areas in East Africa as northern Mozambiquelwith special
reference to the regions bordering on German East Africa (Tanganylka), the
Nyassa province and the Mozambique coast. Here in a country inhabited
chiefly by the Makua, Yao, Makoo.de and the 'half-caste Arabs' (Swahili) and
51!2!$ Memorandum by theJoint Management of the Gold Fields of S,A, Ltd"
re: AbySsinian Labour: August 26, 1899.
52Correspondence re1a.t1ng to the Regulation. and Supply of Labour in Southern
Rhodesia Cmd, 1200: HMSO: London.: July 1902: PP. 57-8.
53A 11/2/8/2: E. Birkenruth, Consolldated Gold Fields of S. A, ue., Cape
Town, to John Kusel: January 5, 1900.
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with an adult male population which he estimated at about 50,000 souls,
accustomed to work on the adjacent islands of Ibo, Querimba and others con-
stituting the Portuguese off-shore archipelago, Tulloch was confident that.
through the co-operation of the Swahili chiefs and the Portuguese authorities,
Rhodesian employers could successfully exploit this reservoir of labour supply.
Similar prospects were apparent, as far as Tulloch was concerned, with
regard to labour recruiting from Buganda and Bunyoro in the Uganda Protect-
54orate as well as from the Hehe country in Tanganyika. But any such pros-
pects as these ,which may have appeared somewhat obvious and apparently to
the advantage of Rhodesian employers, were not, at least immediately, pur-
sued. The factors responsible for this disregard may have been partly
Tulloch's own confessions that the French procured their labour requirements
for service, ' in Madagascar from those areas of Mozambiquehe referred to,
whilst the Germans in Tanganyika depended an imported Indian labour for work
55on the railways. In any case,the Rhodesian em.ployers and the BSACo.were
then too enmeshed with Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labour to pay sufficient
heed to Tulloch's proposals on altemative sources from East Africa and
were obviously averse to such types of labour, as they indicated on the prop-
osal of Swahili labourers from Mombasa in 1902, hitherto used mainly to
56
railway rather than lmdergrolmd minework,.
The achievements of the Kusel/Tulloch mission of October 1900 to
January 1901 were mmimal,in spite of the hJgh degree of optimism shown at
its first stages by its sponsors, the Rhodesian mining industry and the BSACo.
From the start, the whole scheme to recruit labour in North-East Africa for
the benefit of Southem Africa was, in a way.shaky. Kusel, the main promoter
57of the scheme had indicated, as we have seen in his solo surveys, some of
the variables likely to determine the outcome of this project. These included
the diplomatic problems posed by rival claims of different sovereign states
over the control of the movement of peoples, a large proportion of whomwere
nomadic by occupation and whose allegiance to particular states naturally
54Ibid: A. Tulloch to BSACo., Secretary, Bulawayo, March 1, 1901.
551bid: Vide also: Mangat: Asians in East Africa: PP. 46-9.-56Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1902: PP. 96 -7.
57Vide Supra. pp 194-8.
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fluctuated with the course of their activities, not to mention the complex
intercourse and distribution of the various cultural, religious, political and
linguistic groups in this melting pot of Hamitic (Cushitic), Semitic and
58Negroid habitation.
AlthoughKusel had previously assured Consolidated Gold Fields about
his capability to out-play the diplomatic factor m November 1899, if needs
be, on this occasion he and Tulloch were caught in the grips of this vice.
Perhaps to further complicate matters for these envoys, there was also the
question of transporting recruits from the hinterland to the Uttoral of North-
East Africa,whence they would forward these recruits to the port of Beira and
then to Southern Rhodesia by land. In this particular case, the transport
problem was aggravated not only by reasons of its inadequacy, but also by
the diplomatic moves and dicta of different political authorities as to where,
how and when labour recruits from specific areas could move. The emissaries
of the Rhodesian mining industry here thus onlyweakened their cause by res-
orting to unorthodox methods of recruiting and forwarding their cargo. More-
over, their scheme had never been str~ enoughto stand the test of time ,as
it relied exclusively on the co-operation between the labour agents and the
top-level officials in the zones of operation, either out of bribery and ex-
change of gifts or token friendships at the expense of the labour recruits
themselves. Suchexclusim of the major partners in the scheme by commer-
cially interested parties mexorably led to misrepresentat1ms and gross
misunderstanding with harmful results on all prospects of further labour supply.
In short, Kusel's labour-recruiting empire in North-East Africa was built on
foundations of clay and any efforts to exploit it to its maximum potential
were bound to produce unwelcome results.
Tulloch's brush with the diplomats1in connection with his activities in
British Somal11andand Djibouti (French Soma1iland)Jandthe dubious manner
in which he raised and transported the first batch of Abyssinlans, Arabs and
SomaUsJwhoarrived in Southern Rhodesia in December 1900, is the first clear
indication of the wealmesses which later undermined any prospects of per-
manence for the North-East Africa labour scheme. Perhaps the Tulloch/
Kusel mission may have taken place at an inauspicious time. During this
58Vide Supra: PP. 194-7.
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ten-months period,ranging from January to October 1900, many changes,
mostly of a political nature, had occurred, especially in Abyssinia, with the
result that, as Tulloch confessed, the Kusel arrangements of yester-year
were shattered. Besides, the authorities at Aden, a port these agents in-
tended to use for shipping purposes, apparently refused to recognise them
officially. Consequently the delays involved cost these two emissaries dearly
in recruiting opportunities missed ,whilst the number of recruits they had
amassed began to dwindle gradually but steadily.
Similarly, the French government in Djibouti refused to allow any form
of labour recruitment and emigration to Southern Rhodesia, apparently
regarding such actions as a breach of French neutrality in the Anglo-Boer War.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive the possibility of any authorlzatim of
labour recruiting for the BSACo. envoys in this territory, military and
diplomatic considerations excepted, taking into account that the French
themselves used Djibouti to supplement their labour resources in MadagascarJ
where the Malagasy had proved particularly unco-operative on the labour
t" 59ques Ion.
Given the fact that these BSACo. agents were not allowed to recruit
labour in any British possesstca in North-East Africa as well, not to mention
the fact that the employers they represented were not particularly keen to
operate within the framework of a restrictive political straight-jacket, it is
scarcely surpris:lng ,therefore,that these envoys ended up in a tug-of-war with
the diplomats. A peculiarly devious mechanism they adopted was one which
involved increased participation of local labour touts on whom they,accordlngly,
relied to forward labour from restricted regions in the hinterland to the
coast. One such scheme Jwhich later created enormous controversY,involved
a Galla agent, 'George,' formerly employed by the Beira-Mashonaland
Railway line running between Beira and Salisbury. George played a crucial
part in raising a Sizeable amount of Abyssinian, Galla and Somali recruits
from Harrar in Abyss1n1a.thencedespatching them on the 2000 mUes journey
into the French territory of Djibouti, where Tulloch collected them to Zeyla
60in British territory and then to Aden for embarkation.
59!2!!!: Tulloch to Secretary, BSACo., Bulawayo, March 1, 1901.
60Ibid: Tulloch, Aden to Her British Majesty's Consul General, Berbera:
November 23, 1900.
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The primary motive in adopting such a circuitous course was not by
any means the false assertion made by Tulloch himself that there were
better shipping facilities in British Somaliland for forwarding his recruits to
Southem Africa. 61 Indeed)in this respect, the British consular officials
vouched that Djibouti offered superior shipping facilities than either Zeyla or
Berbera not only in terms of accomm.odationfor recruits; but also in respect
62of regularity of voyages between the mainland and the port of Aden, Tull-
och may have had in mind that, in spite of being forbidden to recruit labour
63in Djibouti and at ZeyIa in British Somaliland, once his labour gangs start
moving down through these territoriesl they would, like rolling stones, gather
moss as they moved on.whtlst the authorities at a British base would
obviously be impotent to prevent enlistment of labour recruits from areas
outside their sphere of influence, Sucha theory was at least accepted by
Arthur Keyser, the Consul General for British Soma1iland,whourged even
greater vigilance in cases like that of Tulloch in 1900-1.
In many respects) Tulloch's choice of a British possession and ZeyIa in
particular, as a base for his labour forays into neighbouring foreign terri-
tories and the subsequent errors of omission that these escapades entailed,
appear to have been quite consciously executed. This agent appears to have
deliberately taken advantage of the conditions at Zeyla which provided an
obvious weak point in terms of political and diplomatiCcontrol. Here,at this
sub-station of the British Consul in Berbera further south, the consular
official was an Indian, Khan Sahib Aderjee SurabjeeJwho, in spite of his
eighteen years' experience as the Su~rfntendent of Her Majesty's Customs,
viewed his white customers in terms peculiar to the current racially hier-
archical structures colonial societies represented. Thus Khan Sahib Surab-
jee had been misled by Tulloch's assurances to proceed via Berbera to Aden
64
because he thought Tulloch '••• appeared to be a European of position'.
Such implicit confidence in the veracity of a white visiting official was cer-
tainly enhanced by the fact that the ZeyIa post was also manned by other non-
61Ibid: Tulloch to Secretary, BSACo.Bulawayo:March 26, 1900; Vide also
FUe: C, 0,417/337: PIR/O, London.
62C.O. 417/364: Keyser, Berbera, to Hill at F,O, : Apri124, 1902.
63A 11/2/8/2: Aderjee, Superintendent of H,B,M. Customs, Zeyla, to
Tulloch: ZeyIa: November 20, 1900: Vide also FUe C,O. 417/337:
P:\t.O .... London.
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European officials,mostly Sudanese/and, as Keyser admitted, the visit of
a European/such as that of Tulloch and his recruits/was treated with more than
average 'interest and curiosity' and aroused 'considerable comment. ,65 Once
he had left Zeyla with the recruits for Aden, a locality well removed and
independent of all forms of control by the authorities of the British Somali-
land Protectorate, Tulloch was bound to be very favourably placed, as the
slow and inadequate telegraphic and postal communications between these
two citadels of power fnevltably safeguarded him against any move to re-
trieve the labourers.
But it was particularly from the diplomatic point of view that objections
were raised against Tulloch's bizarre activities in recruiting labour for
Southern Rhodesia. British officials inNorth-East Africa conceded that
whilst the main charge against Tulloch was that of leaving a British port with
emigrants for whomno authority had been given, there were even graver
issues at stake on the political front. 11was fnd1catedhere, as we have seen
before, that most of the govemments of North-East Africa were opposed to
any form of labour emigration fnvolving their peoples. In respect of Abys-
sinians who formed the major proportion of the Tulloch batch of recruits, it
was understood that Ras Makonnen, the governor of Harrar,was 'averse to
subjects of King Menelik leaving in any numbers.' In any case, it was felt
that the proper procedure for enlisting Abyssinian labour for a British Col-
ony like Southern Rhodesia was through Colonel Harrington, the British rep-
resentative in Addis Ababa,particularly so in a case like this involving as it
did, mine labour ,which required the approval of both King Menelik andRas
Makonnen ,with regard to the terms of service and other agreem.ents.
British officials in this part of Africa reacted rather critically to Tulloch's
activities, apparently on account of the 'great excitem,ent' that this agent was
said to have caused fn Djibouti, whilst in Addis Ababa it was reported that:
••• persons inimical to Great Britain took immediate advantage
to caution the Abyssinian KJng aga.1nfeallOWing his subjects to
be recruited for the Transvaal War.
On the local poUticailevel, British officials wouldnot treat seriously
64C.O. 417/363: Aderjee Surabjee, Zeyla, to Acting British Consul,
Berbera: August 20, 1901.
65!2!!!: Keyser to Hill, Apri124, 1902.
661bid.
203
Tulloch's declarations of innocence of all wrong-doing, by aaeertlng.espeetafly,
that such recruits as he handled were not British subjects and therefore no
concern of British officials. What Tulloch and his sponsors appeared unaware
of were the local conventions amongst North-East African administrators
with regard to the forms of poUtica! control appUcable to their nomadic sub-
jects. Thus the activities of Tulloch could hardly be tenable viewed in this
context and Keyser accordingly explained that:
As is well known the SomaUs are a nomadic race and it
is difficult, even. for the officials on the coast, to be always
certain under which Government individual sub-tribes may
dwell, since their stopping place will vary according to the
rainfall season of the year~"
Wherever they may be they are naturally subject to the It"¥
of the locality whether Abyssfnian, French or British. ••
In the final analysis, Tulloch's labour recruiting escapades in North-East
Africa displeased the Colonial and Foreign Offices who took the opportunity
to remind the BSACo. Board that its Administration In Southern Rhodesia
ran the risk of losing the confidence of the British Government in further
labour schemes, should they resort to the type of clandestine methods adopted
by Tulloch to promote the BSACo. and Rhodesian mining industry's cause as
he did. 68
Tulloch's tussel with the diplomats was only ane feature in the continuum
of factors which contributed in several ways to the dismal failure of the North-
East African labour supply. Another compUcatlng feature of this external
labour scheme was the lack of communication between the recruits and the
labour agents and consequently between the labourers and the employers.
This unfortunate developm.ent wasJto say the least, a result of the exclustve-
ness which foreign labour recruitment entailed as a eommeretal venture.
The rappro;.chment between employers of labour, the labour agents and
officials in the source areas did not always embrace the labourers themselves
and.tn most cases) the coo.ditions of service and wages were not adequately
explained. Indeed,any concrete elaborat100.s to the recruits would have been,
after all, contrary to the spirit UIlderlyfDg the whole system of foreign 0011-
67UllcC
68A 11/2/8/2: Martfn GosUn, at F. O. to BSACo", November 16, 1901· and
., '
C. O. 417/36<1: Clement L. mu, at F.'O. to BSACo.: December 19, 1901:
Vide also File A 11/2/8/3: Rm/A. Salisbury.
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tract labourers. For one reason, the very essence of contract or indentured
foreign labour was its value as a residue of the slave importation system."
designed primarily to benefit colonial magnates, overseas financlal houses
and middlemen; all of them with vested commercial interests in the venture.
The attitudes of the employers who were m.ore interested in the products
accruing from the indenture labour system and of labour agentsl also more
concerned with the nature of the bargains they drove with their sponsors,
could hardly be said to have taken into consideration the welfare of the chattels
69they so handled.
Kusel the chief agent in the North-East Africa labour scheme, whose
appointment by the Rhodesian mining industry was prompted mainly by his
long years of experience '••• as a Labour Agent in Somal11and, Djibout~i)-,
70and adjacent parts of Arabia and the mainland. •• ', naturally,manifested
some of those characteristics peculiar to his predecessors of a bygone era.
Of special observation 00: this score, were Kusel's lack of judgement and
sensitivity pertaining to the whims and idiosyncrasies as well as the habits
and suitahiUty of his recruits for labour on the mines ,whither they were
bound,. Thus the British Consul at Barbera explained to the Foreign Office
in Apr1l1902 .In relation to the recruitment of SomaUs by Kusel and Tulloch
for minework in Southern Rhodesia Jthat:
The Somal1s, a pastoral people, are absolutely tmfltted for
work in the mines,' Should they appear to go wI111ngly for
that purpose it can only be because such conditions of labour
are altogether beyond their knowle~e and experience, and in
such a case It would be necessary for the officers of the
Govemm.ent to whom they look for assistance and advice to
explain to them the work for which they are engaged. • •• Had
Mr.' Tulloch gone to Berbera ~here)- the terms of their
contract would have been explained to the recruits ••• it is
doubtfullf any of the SomaUs would haYfl ccnsented to leave
even had they been permitted to do so.
What may have been true for the Somali labour recruits appears to have been
appUcable with equal force to the rest of their kinsmen who comprised the
material despatched by Tulloch and Kusel to Southem Rhodesia, part10ularly
69For a good discussion on the effects of slavery on employers' attitudes
towards indentured labour: Vide: Ttnker: A Nsw System of Slaverx:
pp. 19, 178-91.
70 _,
M.emorandum by Jc:mes, Secretary, BSACo. to C. 0.: November 29 1900
71 in ReguJ.a.tlan and Labour supply: loc:~ cit. '
l!!!!!: Keyser to HIll, AprJ124, 1902.
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so in the case of the Gallas with whom the Somali have very close historical
72relationship.
It is therefore against this background that the 'revolt' of the Abyssinian,
Somali and Arab recruits at the port of Beira in Mozambique in January 1901
must be viewe~' The incident had significant consequences for the recruits
as they woke up to the realities of the kind of situation they had involved
themselves into; a classical testimony here of the tragic effect of misrepres-
entation by labour recrulters,whose lack of vision was apparently obscured
by their own vested interests and thus ,inadvertently, marred all prospects
for further labour supply, much to the disadvantage of their labour-hungry
sponsors. Indeed the Beira 'revolt' demonstrates some of the unpleasant
aspects of foreign labour recruitment by private agents who, in their deal-
ings with what they considered ,~•• ignorant and gullible natives, and. ••
inexperienced employers, '•• ' took to labour recruiting as '••• a profitable
altemative to big-game shooting or prospectlng, -(andwere)-lavish in
-(their)- promises to employers as well as native; so long as -(they)- secured
",. 73
a substantial first P3¥Dlenton account for expenses, : •• ' The subsequent
dfsmusionment of both the recruits and the employers in the circumstances
is quite obvious;
The North-East Africans did not take too lightly the desCriptions on
labour conditions in Southem Rhodesia as given to them by sailors and other
passengers aboard the German steamship 'Herzog', engaged for their del-
ivery at Beira. These descriptions obviously did not tally with the promises
made to them by Tulloch and Kusel before the recruits left their hom.elands,
more so in this particular case whereby the labour agents had evaded the
normal channels which such emigration required them to go through. More-
over ,there was no independent arbiter to verify and guarantee the implemen-
tation of the promises in question.' As reports on the Beira 'revolt' poured
in, indeed it was proven beyond doubt that the labour conditions under which
these recruits were destined to work were the bane of contention behind the
incident.' Ralph Belcher, the British Consul at Beira,thus informed Sir Clarke,
theResident CommJssioner)on January 5, 1901)that the main problem was that
72Mar1am describes Somalis as 'Jslam1zed' and 'Sem1tized' Gallas; Vide:
Mariam: 'The Background of the Etb1o-Somalfan Boundary Dispute':
'".~ .
73 PP•.?~~-5. ,
G. at. J. Orde Browne: The African labourer: Frank Cass & Co.: lDndoo:
206
these recruits had been told aboard the 'Herzog' that:
••• they were to be taken in chains to work underground
in the mines, fl{4_dthat they had-been sold as slaves for
their lifetime. •
Such language and imagery to recruits whose region had served for genera-
tions as the epi-centre of the Arab slave trade, evidently had special impli-
cations among them. In addition, with the assertions that these potential
75labourers 'would be badly paid' and that in volunteering to come downto
Southern Rhodesia ' .•• they were going to certain death by working in the
76 77mines', assertions which were essentially true in many ways, the
feeling that they had been badly done-by gained credence amongst the North-
East AfricansJwho had also had the misfortune of travelling as deck passen-
gers from Aden under condttions.descrtbed by the Rev. Cripps as 'drippy
and wretched. .• '. 78
The consequences of the Beira 'revolt' wereJwilly-nilly, disastrous in
terms of physical and political costs, not to mention the damage to the
economic goals for which the scheme was primarily designed. The physical
aspect was apparent in the carnage and victimization that the incident en-
tailed. Although officials inclined to vi8w the treatment of subject races as
)
one demanding a firm hand at all times, praised, as the British Consul at
Beira did, the Portuguese police for having performed their duty 'with con-
siderable pluck' against recruits who had ' ••• given a lot of trouble and•••
naturally annoyed' the authorities, 79 less disinterested witnesses did not,
however, share such views.
Rev. Cripps, whowas then paying his first visit to Africa and was also
on the 'Herzog' on his way to join the Anglican mission in Southern Rhodesfa,
1967 (2nd Edition): p. 53.
74C.O. 417/319: Ralph ReIcher, H.M. Consul, Beira to Clarke, Salisbury
(EnclOSingNewspaper cutting): January 5, 1901.
b.USteere: GodS Irr:r:rnlar: Arthur Shearly Cripps: A Rhodesian EpiC: S,P,C" i(.:
76 London: 197: F 19.
Rhodesia Chamber 0 Mines AnnualReport 1901: PP. 37-8.
77vide:~a:_ Chapter 8.
78Steere: God's Irregular: loe cit.
79C.O. 417/319: Belcher, Beira, to Clarke, Salisbury: January 5, 1901.
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but had gone to sleep during the course of the affray, stated:
The Roman Fatber -{acompanionj- who saw it told me it
was a horrible scene. The Portuguese rushed these peoPJN
with drawn swords and tried to bundle them into a barge.
In consequence, two of the recruits were ldlled, 10 'severeJy woundedand
30 'slightly'. Of the several number who had.jumped into the ship's lighter,
eight were later picked up, but the rest were swept away by the current. As
a punitive measure,about 33 were arrested and goaled as ring-leaders and
only 55 out of the original batch of 136 recruits remained on board before
81they were later taken overbyRhodesian authorities.
The reactions of the Rhodesian employers and the general white public
to the Beira Incident were bitter and scathing at what they regarded as rank
insubordination by labour recruits whose Introduction into the cmmtry had
been prompted,in the first place, by a search for docUe labour. Thus they
accused this Noeth-East African labour batch'of being:
••. about the most useless things on the face of thf81arth,
and ~kely tOr die like rotten sheep in Rhodesia.
Employers' reactions naturally reflected their frustr$tion and disillusion-
ment with a labour source they had been awaiting with a marked degree of
optimism. Higher placed officials were obviously embarrassed by the Beira
incident and the poUtiaal repercussions it foreshadowed. As far as Milner
was concerned, the incident discredited Southern Rhodesia as a field of
African labour and manifested the administrative wealmesses so common
throughout early Rhodesian history. What heeapectally deplored was the
choice of labour agents in the scheme; a choice which smacked of the 'un-
suitable men and methods' employed in the country's past}with the result
83that all prospects of labour supply from North-East Africa were endangered.
Milner's conclusions were!vindicated by the intransigence of the Aden
84authorities over the question of co-operation with BSACo. labour agents.
80
81Steere: op. cit. p. 20.
82C,O. 417/319: Belcher to Clarke: January 5, 1901•
.1bid.-83Ibid:Milner to Chamberlain, February 6, 1901.-84C.O. 417/337: H.M, Hole, Aden, to Wilsm Fox: July 9, 1901.
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More fundamental than political criticisms and platitudes, was the
manner in which the Beira incident pre-determined the modicum of inter-
action between these new arrivals and their employers in Southern Rhodesta,
It was thus their reception and subsequent treatment in Southern Rhodesia
rather than anything else which certainly shaped and distinguished the
reactions of Abyssinian, Arab and Somali Iabourers.etther on mines, road-
85work or other areas of employment. The suspicions of Rhodesian employers)
who had failed to procure requlstte docile and more dependable labour supply,
on the one hand, as opposed to an external labour force)utterly disillusioned
and despondent about what they considered deliberate trickery and deception
by both recruiters and employers, evidently played a part in shaping this
unfavourable employer/employee inter-relationship. It was Indeed a
situation In which onzythe private labour agent stood to gain and one approxi-
mating to that described by Orde Browne In which:
••• employers were robbed and furnished with utterly useless
labour, natives were cheated and seriously discouraged from
further efforts to seek work and, in addition, were rendeged
suspicious of all promises by strangers in the future; •••
In short, it is argued here that the Beira revolt by the North-East
Africans demonstrated the potential of these recruits to challenge the
authority on which was founded the very essence of a hierarchically strati-
fied colonial society and from which the employers derived their right for
dominance over their subordinates. The restrictive measures adopted
towards these new arrivals and the accusations directed against them,
manifestations of verbalized hostility in a ccnfrontation situation, were
attempts to contain this potential threat by the employers and their sympa-
thetic officials.
mdeed.as a residue of the Beira disturbance, the allocation of the 170
AbYSSinian,Arab and Somali recruits to the Surprise mine in early 1901 ion
condition that 'a sufficient body of police' be stationed at the same mine 'to
maintain law and order', was a very clear indication of the att1tudes of the
employers towards these labourers; employers whowere still not yet con-
85Van Onselen emphasizes the proletariat solidarity of these labwrers at
the expense of the ethnic, political and social factorsJwhich is the main
concern of this study: Vide: van Onselen: Chlbaro: African Mine Labour
in Southern Rhodesia. 1900-1933: PP. 81-3.
86Orde Browne: OP. cit. p. 54.
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vinced that these recruits had been sufficiently punished for their misdemean-
87 So °1 1 lt ° d hours. inn ar y, 1 IS easy to etect t e nervousness amongst these
employers and officials over reports that some of these labourers who had
been distributed to Beatrice Mine in the Marandellas district, were 'dis-
satisfied' by insufficient accommodation and poor food conditions under
which they worked. A perceptible degree of sensitivity was shownjespectally
by the offtctalswho feared any repetition of the Beira incident. The Resident
Commissioner for Instance.cautioned the Administration and the mining
companies in March 1901, advising them to ameliorate the conditions of the
North-East African labourers and to ensure regular pay, 'fair treatment'
and due attention to their physical ailments. 88 Apparently the Resident Com-
missioner's drive to ensure a 'peaceful attitude' amongst these immigrant
labourers failed to influence the employers and.Indeed.before the end of the
same monthjSrr Marshall Clarke himself was compelled to report on a march
by these labourers from Marandellas into Salisbury) whereupon:
••• they assumed a threatening attitude and after the police
had been called in the labourers in questiOU9were allegedly
lodged in the gaol compound for the night.
These symptoms of protest on the part of the North-East African
labourers reinforced the opposition in some colonist quarters on further
importation of this class of labourers. The anti-Abyssinian labour lobby
within the white colonist circles in Southern Rhodesia based its agitation
against further importation of this class of labour on the grounds that Kusel
90
and Tulloch had recruited their labour from the 'slums' of Aden, whence,
as Milner"who also had no confidence in Abyssinian and Arab labour; put it,
they, '••• literally collected the scum of unsuitable men without any dis-
i ° to ,91cr mma Ion.
Such opposition as thisJof course,benefitted greatly from some of the
unfavourable reports forthcoming from various centres of employment) where
the North-East Africans had been distributed. The management of the Sur-
prise mine in the Selukwe district for instance, whilst satisfied with Abys-
87Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1901: loco cit.
88C• O. 417/319: Clarke to Milner: March 15, 1901.
891!ll!!: Clarke to Milner: March 18, 1901.
90Ibid: Milton to Clarke: March 13, 1901.
91C. O. 417/319: Milner to Chamberlain: February 6, 1901.
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stnians, to some extent, was ostensibly disenchanted by the Somali recruits
:J
amongst the North-East Africans)allocated to their property and were clearly
doubtful as to the labour value of this particular group whose physique they
considered quite below par for underground work. Thus Edward Dicey, the
Manager at Surprise mine concluded in his report in Apr111901that:
••. the Somalis are unfitted for either surface or underground
work. They have absolutely no energy, and little or no idea
of howto exert their strength which at best is very poor, and
very fewwish to work underground, even with the prospect
of receiving a higher wage. They apparently do not value
money and are pwectly satisfied as long as they have
sufficient to eat.
This trend of opinion amoogst the Rhodesian colonist employers towards
these foreign labourers, which obviously verges on the extremes of social
and psychological stereotypes, was supported by some officials who regarded
the North-East Africans generally as 'a failure' and 'practically useless',
as the Inspector of Compoundsfor the Gwelo/Selukwedivision, Frederick
George Elliott, indicated. 93 Yet with regard to the Somalis for example,
the resentment of the employers in SouthernRhodesia against what they cm-
sidered deliberate misrepresentations by Kusel, the connoisseur on labour
matters in North-East Africa, may be viewed in the context that this parti-
cular group was peculiarly inadaptable to all forms of labour, essentially
94nomadic and pastoral as they were by occupation. Indeed,one could conjure
only a ridiculous picture of Somali mine labourers, with hind-sights of
course, especially in the light of a recent portrayal of the harsh conditions
obtaining among the Somali nomads and their environment,as described by
Mariam in 1964Jthat:
92 SC.O. 417/320: Report by the :Manager,Edward C. Dicey, urprise Gold
MiningCo. Ltd" to April 5, 1901.
93C.O. 417/320: special Report by the Inspector of Compounds(F, G. Elliott)
regarding the Abyssinian, Arabs and Somalis at present employed on the
Surprise mine, Selukwe, April6, 1901:Vide also File N B 6/5/3/2:
.. R/N/A, Salisbug.
94In 1952and 1955U.N. Commissions reported that about 70per cent of the
population of Somalia were nomadic and that of the agricultural section
in the Southern portion of the cwntry, the larger proportion were of
Bantu-spealdng and Negroid stock: Vide Mariam: op. cit. PP. 191-2, 193.
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Extreme individualism and utter lack of discipline are character
traits attributed to the Somali nomads. The acute struggle for
existence in this harsh environment often expresses itself in
group confli§~ over wells or grazing land, with. •. -{heavy)-
loss of life.
The recruitment of this kind of labour in North-East Africa by Kusel and
Tulloch in 1900-1,was, to all appearances, an ill-advised ecological revolu-
tion unwelcomed by both the labourers themselves and the employers.
Added to the anxieties generally caused by these labourers as a result
of the Beira disturbance, the Rhodesian white public and employers were
evidently no longer enthusiastic about this class of labour. 96 These hostile
colonist attitudes were, to some extent, reflected in the comparatively low
wages the North-East Africans received. At the Surprise mine for instance,
although it was alleged that some of these recruits, especially the 'Arabs'l
had proved to be good mine labourers and also shown themselves to be 'equal
to Shangaans in the daily footage -(theYr drilled', their wages were still
fixed at the following rates:
SUrface 'boys'
mine 'boys'
mine headmen
·.. 20/- per month
25/ - per month
9730/- per month
• ••
·..
In simple terms, the employers still treated these North-East Africans in
the same way they treated local labourers, who were by no means amongst
the favourites of the Rhodesian colonist employers, as opposed to the Shan-
gaans.then said to be receiving as much as 60/- in monthly wages at this
98mine.
Employers in Southern Rhodesia also felt frustrated by the rise in food
expenses entailed to meet the food supplies of the North-East Africans. In
spite of Kusel's assurances that these labourers would be satisfied with
'ordinary native food~normally issued to African labourers at the cost of
'7id per diem', the employers would not take kindly the refusal by these
labourers, especially the Somali, to touch any 'nyauti' and millet meal rations,
95Mariam: OPe cit. p. 193.
96Vide: Ananymous:'Notes an the Somali' NADANo. 25, 1948: PP. 85-92.
97C. O. 417/320: Report by Dicey to Miltan: April 5, 1901.
98.!2!.!!: Special Report by Inspector of Compounds (Elliott): April 6, 1901.
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preferring as they did, only rice or rice mixed with ghee for their food, which
consequently cost their employers about '11id per diem' in food expenditure
99
per head. Such extra costs were naturally unwelcome to employers who
required mere cheap unskilled labour andwere not yet assured that this class
of labour from areas within the tropical latitudes could stand the colder
Rhodesian winter months, more so as a large proportion of them (40out of
156 by April 1901)had gone downwith dysentry, malaria fever and colds on
their arrival. 100
The Southem Rhodesian employers too were still dissatisfied with what
they regarded as lack of dlsetplme amongst their new charges and doubted
the bona fides of these recruits as labourers. The Inspector of Roads, (
Mr. Coope, whowas in charge of a party of these labourers assigned for
road work expressed this characteristic resentment amongst the Rhodesian
employers; resentment which was largely tainted by the ill-feeling aroused by
the Beira affair. Coope reported to the Labour Board that:
.•• they -{Abyssinians and others)- do not perform as much
work as a local native. They are extremely lacking In
discipline & have little or no respect for the white gangers.
They are lazy & unreliable & appear to have been drawn
from a bad class of people and arrorostly loafers who are
unaccustomed to honest work. •••
Itwas therefore, these attitudes)which, in the final analysts, influenced
Rhodesian labour recruiting policy in the hom of Africa and the Arabian
peninsula. These negative attitudes also Significantly strengthened the views
of those officials acquainted with the scheme)but who had been, from the
very start, openly pessimistic about the feasibility of what appeared to them
a rather far-fetched solution to Southem Rhodesia's labour problems. One
such official who had his doubts over the scheme was Lord Cromer of the
Egyptian Administration, who expressed these misgivings to Sir Alfred
Milner)the HighCommissioner for SouthAfrica)1n January 1901. Lord
Cromer's views were based on the dubious value of Abyssinians as labour
material and on the restrictive conditions imposed by the reluctant monarch
99Ibid: Report by Dicey to Milton:April 5, 1901.- .10012!!!: Special Report by Inspector of Compounds(Elliott): April6, 1901.
101
A 11/2/8/2: Inspector of Roads (Mr. Coope)quoted in Secretary, Labour
Board, Bulawayo. to Chief Secretary. Dept. of Administrator,
Salisbury: Telegram: April.26, 1901.
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of Abyssinia, King Menelik, with regard to the recruitment, repatriatlcm
and protection of Abyssinian subjects.102
In the end, so prejudiced against Abyssinian and other labourers from
the horn of Africa were the Rhodesian employers and BSACo. Administration
that their future recruiting policy consciously excluded these areas altogether.
Indeed,not even late offers by private companies operating in the region could
distract Rhodesia recruiting poltoy.as the Abyssinian Exploration Company
,gg._ discoveredjwben it volunteered in November 1901 to supply Southern
Rhodesia with '2, OOO-very good underground-labourers for a term of three
103
years •••• r In spite of the assurances by these self-appointed recruiters
that the chance was 'too good to be lost', the BSACo. Board in Londcm would
not accept this class of labourers whose introduction had already aroused
104such amount of excitement amongst the Rhodesian employers.
In fact, what the BSACo. and its Administration in Southem Rhodesia had
in mind was to restrict any further recruiting activities to the Arabian pen-
insulaJin areas around the Aden Settlement and)if possibleJin the Turkish
territory of Yemen) where, it was generally believed, Arab labour of good
class could be procured. To maximise the chances of success in this second
scheme, the Administration itself even assumed all responsibility on the
sehemejsendmg as its envoy, Hugh Marshall Holejthe trusted Secretary of
105the BSACo. in Southern Rhodesta, who replaced the more abrasive
Alexander Tulloch, whose methods had given rise to so much furore within
the diplomatic circles. 106 John Kusel was, however, given another chance in
the new scheme on account of his lmowledge and experienceJrelating to those
parts of the worldJand)in spite of the differences of opinion between the Labour
1021!!!!!: Lord Cromer, Cairo, to High Commissioner, Johannesburg:
Telegram.: January 29, 1901.
103lbid: Henry St. John Wileman, General :Manager, AbYSSinia, quoted in
G,W. Thompson, SecretarY The Abyssinian. Exploration (Parent) Co, '
Ltd,. to BSACo" Board, Lca1don: December 24, 1901.
104 Jones, Secretary, BSACo., to Secretary, The AbYSSinian. Exploration
(Parent) Co, Ltd, Londm: December 31: 1901,
105H, M, Hole retired from BSACo. service on pension in November 1913 to
devote his time to literary defence of his former employers. Vide
File C.O, 417/536: PIR/O: LondOn,
106A 11/2/8/3: Miltm to BSACo" London: Confidential Cablegram: June 2,
1901.
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Board of Southern Rhodesia, then avidly pro-Kusel on the matter, and the
Administration) which totally disapproved of his handling of the Beira 'revolt'
107and consequently put the blame over the affair squarely on his shoulders.
This new move to bring down labourers mainly from the Arabian pen-
insula apparently enjoyed the support of Rhodesian colonist employers and
related private economic interests. Walter Currie, the Consulting Engineer
for Willoughby's Consolidated ComEany Ltd. and consequently of its subsidiary,
the SulJ>rise Gold Mining Co. Ltd., was, for tnstance.qutte positive about
the attitudes of his managers towards Arab labour supply, provided it was
of the same class as what was considered the 'better' material brought down
by Tulloch and Kusel and subsequently employed at the Surprise mine. Pro-
vided these labourers were capable of standing the Southern Rhodesian winter
season, Walter Currie was prepared to proceed with the importation of a
further experimental gang of Arab labourers, about 250 of them for the
108
Surprise mine aloneJat a cost of £6 per head in recruiting expenses, Per-
haps to strengthen the claims of his companies and their stake in the Arab
labour scheme, CUrrie further pressed another order of Arab labourers for
the Bonsor mine to the tune of 600 recruits in August 1901, especially as by
109
that time the scheme looked at least feasible.
Similar orders on Arab labour poured in from other mining companies as
soon as sufficient guarantees over the implementation and success of the
imminent Hole/Kusel mission to Aden were provided by the BSACo. Admini-
stration. The Globe and Phoenix mine at Sebakwe (Que Que) also put an order
in May 1901 and,Uke the Surprise Gold Mining Co" was amongst the first
mining properties to indicate to the Administration its willingness to bear the
107!2!!!: A. H. Holland, Administrator's Private Secretary to Chairman,
Labour Board, Bulawayo; Telegram: May 16, 1901, (Even the Salisbury
branch of the Labour Board was also at first opposed to the appointment
of Kusel for the second time till it had to be coovinced by the Bulawayo
branch that if Kusel were not appointed he would give his services to the
Rand instead. Vide A 11/2/8/3: H. E, 0,' Green, Secretary. Labour
Board, Bulawayo to Salisbury Branch: May 7, 1901,)
108A 11/2/8/2: Walter CUrrie, Consulting Engineer, The Surprise Gold
Mining Co, Ltd,: to Secretary, Labour Board, Bulawayo: April12, 1901.
109A 11/2/8/3: Labour Board, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary, Telegram:
August 28, 1901.
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expenses involved in repatriating these Arab labourers at the end of their
three-year contracts, notwithstanding the misgivings previously expressed
on the matter by the Labour Board supervising the importation programme~10
By July 1901}the Ayrshire and the Beatrice mines too submitted their
orders.to complete the list of companies with directly vested interests In the
111Hole/Kusel mission to the Aden peninsula.
Special reference to the application of the Beatrice mine is pertinent
here, particularly in view of the earlier issues raised by the allocatton of
Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labourers to this mining property in the Maran-
dellas district. It was here, as we have seen before, where dissatisfaction
amongst the North-East African recrutts,regarding food and accommodation}
had led to the march by these same labourers into Salisbury to protest in
March 1901.112 The Rhodesian Administration, conscious of the embarras-
sment such protests had produced previously, was,on this second oecaaton,
more than ever anxious to avoid similar incidents and)in order to procure
the co-operatton of the LondonBoard, the Colonial Office and the Aden
authorities, credible labour conditions were promised to safeguard the wel-
fare of these potential recruits. These conditions concerned the provision
of proper compound accommodation and rations and their adoptionwas con-
sidered essential for a permanent and regular supply of labour from the
Arabian peninsula. The arrangements between the Administration of Southern
Rhodesia, the Portuguese authorities and the officials of the Beira-Mashona-
land Railways to construct a compoundat Berra.to prevent the Arab recruits
from entering the town proper on landing, were also a step in this direction
113
to improve the scheme.
In harmony with these requirements, the management at the Beatrice
mine also promiBed to carry out some reforms to render the engagement of
Arab labourers at this property more attractive. The mine had hitherto
provided 'a number of huts' to accommodate its labour force.ccmpoaed mainly
110!21!!: Acting Chairman, Labour Board, Bulawayo, to Milton, Salisbury:
May 9, 1901.
111Ibid: H. M. Hole, Aden, to Milton, Salisbury: July 19, 1901.-112Vide: SUpra: p.210.
113!!ll!!: J. Robertson, Clerk, Executive Councfi, Salisbury, to Administra-
tor's Private Secretary, Bulawayo: Telegram: June 1, 1901.
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of Shangaans, Chopi and other aliens from Delagoa Bay and Inhambane in
the Portuguese territory of Mozambique, to which a number of the North-East
Africans of the Kusel/Tulloch mission had been added at the beginning of
1901. Their food consisted mainly of 'munga -(mhunga)-' and 'rapoko' rations
mixed with salt; an obviously outrageous diet to the rice-eating northerners.
But for the success of the Arab labour importation scheme, the Manager at
Beatrice mine, Mr. A. Turnbull, was reported to have agreed to insti-
tute some reformsJstart1ng with the construction of an iron and wood compound
for the labourers, for the purpose of which he had ordered material from the
114urban settlement of Marandellas.
Notwithstanding this belated liberalizatioo of its labour conditions}
primarily to meet the needs of foreign governments and labourers, Beatrice
completed the list of those assorted mining companies with a peculiar
reputation of their own and which sponsored the Arab labour scheme for a
purpose. The labour quotas these mining companies applied for were.fn order
of preeedencejas follows: Globe and Phoenix 500 Arab labourers; SUrprise
115mine 200; Beatrice 300; Ayrshire 250 and Bonsor 600. The significance
of. this impromptu association of mines, with more than fleeting interest in
foreign labour, was that they together symbolized, in one aspect or another,
a wide spectrum of what were regarded in local African labour circles as the
most unpopular mines in the country. Without assistance from the state or
the Native Department.to be more specific, such mines could have hardly
116secured adequate local labour supply. Foreign labour was therefore a
logical option to this class of mines and thus it was primarUy for this reason
that the North-East African labour scheme ever came into existence.
These mines and their companies mentioned above naturally attached
great importance to the Arab labour scheme and accordingly looked forward
to its fruition with a noticeable degree of optimism and anticipation. Like the
Labour Board, the mining companies in question still retained their con-
fidence in Kusel, Hole'S companion on the misSion, whose twelve-year
114_
~: Report on Arab and Native Accommodation at the Beatrice (Rhodesia)
Co, Ltd,. by R,K, Eustace, :Manager, Labour Board of S, Rhodesia:
July 6, 1901.
115!2!!!: A. H. Holland, Administrator's Private Secretary, to Labour Board,
Bulawayo: Telegram: September 10, 1901,
116
Vide Infra: .' :Chapter 8,
217
experience and expertise in North-East African languages and affairs they
117
greatly valued, whilst the Administration)on the other hand,considered
their right-hand man, H. M. Hole, a proper asset on the mission and.tn like
118manner, accredited him to authorities concerned. The success or failure
of the Hole/Kusel mission to the Arabian peninsula and of the Arab labour
scheme must therefore be viewed against this complex background; a back-
ground reflecting generally an admixture of real and superficial problems
against which even far-fetched solutions could only produce little impact.
The previous missions to North-East Africa, first by Kusel for the
Consolidated Gold Fields of SouthAfrica Co. Ltd. in November 1899 and
later by both Kusel and Tulloch between October 1900and January 1901, had
led to one conclusion; the need to institute a scheme to procure what these
119emissaries described variously as 'excellent boys' or 'the pick of the
labourers,~20 in their reference to Hamals and other groups of the Arabian
peninsula. In their assertions, these emissaries repeatedly also pointed out
':)the importance of Aden as a suitable port of embarkation as well the need
for the co-operation of Aden authorities and the Government of India In the
venture.121 Hole and Kusel thus undertook their mission to Aden In June 1901
under the effective aegis of the Administration of SouthernRhodesia and the
122blessings of the Colonial Office. Quite naturally, it was expected that the
co-operation of the Aden authorities and the Government of India would be
automatic and forthcoming. Yet it was this factor, among many other things,
117!2!!!: Labour Board, Bulawayo, to Milton, Telegram: May13, 1901.
118Milton, Salisbury, to The Political Agent, Aden, June 4, 1901: Vide also
ResuIatlon:and Labour SUpply:PP. 79-90: and also File C,O, 417/337:
PIR/O: London.
119A 11/2/8/2: Kusel's Report to Consolidated Gold Fields: November (?),
1899.
120Ibid: Tulloch, Bulawayo, to Secretary, BSACo., Bulawayo:March 1, 1901.
121TheAden Settlement was ruled as part and parcel of the Bombay Presi-
dency (India) up to 1935, Vide: R. C. Majundar, H.C. Raychaudhuri and
K. Datta (eels): An AdvancedHistory of India: Macmillan: London: 1961:
pp, 923-4.
122C.O. permission in this scheme was given on condition that necessary
legislation for the control of these and other foreign labourers were
introduced. Vide:Sir M. F. Ommanney to Milner: June 14, 1901: in
Regulatlon and Labour SUPPlY:p. 72.
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which significantly influenced the outcome of the mission.
In his correspondence soon after the Rhodesian envoys arrived In Aden
at the end of June 1901, Holewas remarkably optimistic about his and Kusel's
prospects of obtaining labour from this part of the world. Indeed)it was this
optimism which formed the basis of Hole's preparations for the recruiting
campaign on the Arabian peninsula, although the British Resident, General
Maitland, who had only been one week old in the job, and his junior :Major
Davies, the First Assistant Resident, appeared more cautious and less en-
thusiastic about the mission. HoleIhowever, reported to Milton the Admini-
strator of Southern Rhodesia radiating a tremendous amount of confidence In
the scheme and stated
I am certainly feeling sanguine abolt this labour business.
Kusel does know this country thoroughly, and is on good terms
with all the leading Arabs as well as the European agents.
I think also that he is to be trusted. •• I think we shall induce
the shipping companies to carry boys at £2 5s Od or at any rate
£2 lOs Odfrom Aden to Beira. They are much more Interested
in the business 1f~ that they see there is a prospect of its becoming
a big thing now.
Hole was, at this stage, still a greenhom in the foreign labour-recruiting
business and the intricate detail it entailed. He did not sufficiently appreci-
ate the problems facing them even at the very start of their mission. For
instance, his first report in June dropped a number of hints serious enough
to cause some degree of concern even among his enthusiastic sponsors)
especially when he demonstrated the limitations of the mission's field of
operations) both in scope and depth. Right from the beginning, only the Arab-
controlled territory of Hadra :Math, to the north-east of the Aden settlement,
appeared to offer tangible promises on labour supply, whilst in the Yemen
territory on the South-Western coast of the peninsula, any form of labour
recruiting was impossible without some diplomatiCunderstanding between
Londonand Turkey}as was the case in this particular mtsston, and Hole and
Kusel couldjthereforejonly bank on the whims of the local authorities - the
sultans (Chiefs) - whose decisions were fortunately subject to influence,
depending on the amount of bribery these officials received. Within the Aden
settlement itself, the Rhodesian envoys had to reckon with not only the opinion
123A 11/2/8/3: H.M. Hole, Aden, to Milton, Sa1~sbury, June 30, 1901. Vide
also for this correspondence: File C.O, 417/338: P/R/O: London,
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of the government of India and the India Office"but also with local opposition
from the Aden commercial community. For this section of the Aden residents,
it was feared that any form of labour recruitm.ent wouldnaturally raise the
wage tariff, then described by Hole as 'ridiculously low', and thus consequently
124
ruin their occupations.
Yet whilst the problems mentioned above loomed in the way of the Hole/
Kusel mission to Aden and, in several ways, influenced the outcome of this
mission, the list of all the obstacles and bottle-necks which the Rhodesian
envoys had to reckon with was by no means completed. Hole himself made
passing references to these problems in his reports but did not attach much
importance to their weight at first. In Hadra Math for example, a territory
named by Hole as a suitable recruiting ground with proposed bases at Mkella
and Shugra-bin-Ali for the purpose, the expected large supplies of labour were,
in mid-1901,seriously threatened by the military conflict between the Sultan of
Mkella and the Bedouins of the hinterland. Not unnaturally, the Sultan of
Mkella required all his men for the campaign, much to the disadvantage of the
125Hole/Kusel venture. Moreover,even if recruitment were possible anywhere
on the Arabian peninsula, Hole and Kusel were outrightly unable to transport
any of the recruits to the port of Beira in Mozambiqueas the monsoon winds
would not permit any transportation of deck passengers then tUl the beginning
of September. 126 Suchunexpected obstacles and the delay which they obviously
entailed were understandably exasperating to Holejwho conveyed his feelings
to Milton at the beginning of July in an unmistakable tone:
••• the comparative inactivity imposed thereby on me -(is)-
exceedingly irritating ••• for even if we were free to commence
recruiting at once it wouldbe inadvisable to do so seeing
that the labourers cannot be shipped until September and
would 1>f2<.f1our hands for the whole of the intervening
period.
A vastly significant factor grossly underestimated by the Rhodesian
envoys to Aden, was the role of the Aden authorities and the government of
India whose co-operation on the use of the Aden port and other facilities was
124_12!2: Hole to Milton: June 30, 1901. (Vide:Appendix (map)U: The Hole/
Kusel Mission to Aden, June to October 1901,)
125Ibid: Hole to Milton: July 4, 1901.
126Ibid.
127!.!ili!: Hole to Milton: July 8, 1901.
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crucial for the success of this Arab labour scheme. Perhaps these envoys
and their sponsors may have been deluded by their self-confidence having won
the support of the Colonial Office on the matter as they had. But this mis-
calculation on the intransigency and resilience of these authorities grievously
impaired the Arab labour scheme for Southern Rhodesia not to mention the
accompanying resentment it also brought about in consequence. As far as
Hole, the political ambassador of the Southern Rhodesian Administration on
the mtsstonjwas concerned, this sense of faIse confidence was apparently a
result of the amicable dtsposttton of the newResident at Aden.whom he des-
cribed quite favourably.at first)as:
•.• showinghimself anxious & willing to give me all the
assistance in his power, but as he has only been here
~Aden)- a week it is natural that he shouIC\~?1his way a
little before allowing me to take any step.
Hole may have understood General Maitland's reactions on a personal basis,
but certainly failed to interpret this worthy official's behaviour within the
context of official protocol and was therefore consequently ill-prepared to
absorb the shockjwhen the tum of events produced different results altoget-
her.
At an early stage, the Aden authorities, in whose sphere of control no
labour recruitment was permissable, had proved themselves overtly opposed
to such recruiting activities even in areas on the borders of their settlement.
They would not even permit the establishment of a recruiting base at Sheik
Othman, an urban settlement about 8 miles from the port of AdenJchosenby
Hole for the purpose because of what he regarded as 'the many attractions for
Arabs there which -{would)-deter them from nmning away during the period
preceeding embarkation. ,129 For the Aden officials,whoproposed the alterna-
tive base at Lahej, about 25 miles north ofAdenJwhencethey also procured
labour for their ownuse, their objections were prompted by the medical;
financial and administrative responsibilities in which they were likely to
enmesh themselves once such co-operation had been agreed uponwith the
Rhodesian envoys.
Itwas felt in Aden that, thoughthe BSACo.had agreed to assume all res-
128!!!!!!.: Hole to Milton: July 4, 1901.
129Ibid:Hole to Milton: June 30, 1901.
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ponsibility on the matter, the local Administration could be faced with a
situation in which they would inevitably be forced to meet extra expenses in
the provision of registration and medical examination facilities as well as
policing and sanitary arrangements. Basing their arguments an previous
experiences in which case both depot and embarkation facilities were provided
to Tulloch and Kusel at Little Adenby the then outgoingResident, General
More McGovern, but were subsequently withdrawn due to the outbreak of
cholera in the interior and the influx of people into the Aden Settlement,
Aden authorities strongly objected to the use of their territory as a base and
depot for labour recruitment on medical grounds. Thus the new Resident
informed the Viceroy of India in July 1901 as follows:
••• I deprecate strongly the formation of a large coolie depot
at Aden annually which is what Mr. Hole's plans would entail.
General Maitland also continued:
Annual formation of -(a)- coolie camp at Adenwould add to
-(the)- difficulty of preserving -(the)- health of -(the)- settle-
ment and garrison. Impossible to establish depot elsewhere
on coast within our Protectorate as separate medical
establishment wouldhave to be provided'lgdso police, and
probably troops which can ill be spared
In one respect, the Hole/Kusel mission was perhaps adversely affected
by factors beyond the control of either its activists or their sponsors. This
was in connection with the political unrest which surfaced in those areas of
the Arabian peninsula in which these envoys were specially interested. Just
as political upheavals in Hadramath (or Hadra Math) threatened to undermine
any chances of labour recruitment in this Arab-controlled domain in the
north-east of Aden, similar developments were also taking place in the
southem parts of the Turkish province of Yemen,with all the likelihood of
spill-overs into the northern regions of the British protected territories north
of Aden. IndeedJthemovement of troops in both the Turldsh and British
spheres of control on the peninsula in July 1901compelled Hole to complain
of the 'unsettling' effects such a state of affairs was likely to produce amongst
the local ArabsJespecially in Lahej and those northem domains where the
131chances of labour supply for him and Kusel were apparent.
130Ibid: Summary of a letter by Resident at Aden to Viceroy, India; Quoted
in Hole to Milton: July 19, 1901.
131!!!!!!:Hole to Milton July 19, 1901.
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From another point of view, the political unrest and the then imminent
military conflict between Turkish and British troops further minimized any
hopes Hole and Kusel might have entertained to carry out "labour poaching'
activities in the Yemen province with Aden as their base. Even less likely
in this venture was the hope on any co-operation forthcoming from the Aden
authorities whohad quite sensibly advised the Rhodesian envoys at the very
beginning that more labour could be procured from the Turkish territory, as
long as these emissaries dealt directly with the Turkish authorities on their
own or through the Southern Rhodesian Administration and without either
132involving or relying in any way onAden. In the light of this mid-1901
Anglo-Turkish bout of misunderstanding, the Rhodesian emissaries to the
Arabian peninsula had very few alternatives left in this quest for Arab labour.
Of particular relevance to the Aden mission in 1901was the questioo of
principle and the application of British imperial ideals to a part of the world
largely under the umbrella of general developments in India,where Indian
coolie labour emigration overseas was becoming the focus of oppcstnon.stnce
the restrictive legislative measuresimposed under the India Em:igrationAct
133
XXI of December 1883. The BombayPresidency, to which the Aden
Authorities were answerable, was in favour of extending this legislation and
its restrictions to Aden on the occasion of the Hole/Kusel mission, notwith-
134
standing Rhodes'spersonal appeal to the Viceroy at Simla.
The demands under this Indian government legislation)stipulating that
labour recruits should be supplied with written information on the form of
employment they were being recruited for and on details concerning wages)not
to mentioo the imposition of penalties on offendingemployers, were quite out
of tune with the general expectations of the sponsor;s of the Hole/Kusel mission.
Indeed,Hole's disappointment with the demands of the Bombaygovernment
and the relevance of the India Emigration Act to the Adenpeninsula and the
Arab labour scheme of which he was the chief ambassador, epitomizes the
resentment of his spoosors in general. In this agent's own dramatic desertp-
tion of the controversial Act and what he considered could be the inevitable
harmful effects it was bound to produce on any efforts by RhodeSian employers
132!!ili!: Summary of a letter by Resident, Aden, to Viceroy, India: July 19,
1901.
133Tinker: Ope cit. pp. 269-71.
13~id: Hole to Milton:August 24, 1901.
223
to procure labour from this part of the world, the legislation was outrightly
135'fearful' and its requirements 'appalling in number'. Thus with obvious
despondence, Hole could only conclude:
••• tt is impossible to carry into effect -{the)-requirements
-{of)-this Act -{and)-under -{these)- circumstances it will be
necessary -{to)-lpdon the project if Bombay refuses to alter
-{its)- decision.
Imperial intervention however, diluted the demands of the Bombay
government and.In this way,enabled the Arab labour scheme for Southern
Rhodesia to proceed. The India Office,in particular, compared the Rhodesian
labour scheme at Aden with previous demands through the Foreign Office,
such as the occasion when the Italian government in Eritrea successfully
applied for labour from Aden and was accorded the consent of the India
Office on condition that the recruits so engaged should not be 'natives' of
India, whilst similar requests by the UgandanAdministration in March 1898,
for camel drivers to promote the protectorate's transport system;were also
sympathetically treated and approved in deference to 'imperial interests'.
Itwas, therefore ~ainst this background that the India Office agreed to the
request from the Colonial Office to allow labour recruitment from the Aden
peninsula for the Rhodestan mines, as long as these recruits were freely
procured and were neither residents of the Aden settlement itself nor British
subjects}whose enrolment would obviously raise a number of issues under
137the India Emigration Act of 1883.
In accordance with the India Office ruling, the Aden authorities allowed
Hole and Kusel to carry out their recruiting activities at the eleventh hour
under tightly circumscribed conditions, even more so in the wake of Anglo-
Turkish military and political conflicts <n the peninsula. The Rhodesian
envoys were consequently given the approval to recruit in Lahej (Abdali) and
the Hadra Math,but only as far as the town of Shugra-bin-Ali,to avotd, also
in this region, those centres like Mkella,where political unrest prevailed.
Similarly, in the north of the Aden settlement, no recruitment was allowed in
sensitive areas bordering on the Turkish territory to minimize further poli-
135Ibid.
136!2!!!: Hole to BSACo., London, Cablegram.: August 22, 1901; Vide also
File C,O, 417/338: PIR/O: Londm.
137C•O. 417/337: Sir Lee Warner, India Office to C. O. June 5, 1901.
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tical complications. Thus in this respect.those areas like Dthali, Misimir,
Jimil and Subaihi to the northern and western frontiers of Lahej, were
essentially out of question as sources of labour for Hole and KuselJalthough
they fell within the sphere of British settlement of Aden.138
For their entry into areas where labour recruitment was permissible,
the Rhodesian envoys and their agents had their movements strictly checked
by the authorities) through demand for prior arrangements and letters of
139introduction to the Sultans concerned This was apparently to avoid the
recruitment of labour by coercive means or the exploitationJby the labour
agents)of the prospective recruits' ignorance of the conditions under which they
were enlisting, consequently leading to misunderstandings as had happened
before, especially in 1898)when the Italians were allowed to recruit labour
140from Aden for Eritrea. These restrictive measures were also clearly
explicable in terms of the political consequences the Aden authorities were
anxious to avoid and could hardly be interpreted as demonstrating any sort
of paternalistic attitude on the part of those same authorities towards their
proteges. Indeed, as Hole Indicated to MiltonJat the beginning of September
1901, the Aden authorities were quite clear-minded as to the Une of demar-
cation between polit1callnterests and administrative patronage; at least as
far as they were concerned at a personal level. Thus after a conversation
with the Resident, Hole summarised the latter's attitude in the following
manner:
••• in conversation with the Resident -(General Maitland)-
Igot him to say that he practically did not care where the
boys came from as long as they belonged to the protected
tribes and were not Turkish subjects, and that he did not
care where our native recruiters went to as long as Kusel
and I kept clear ~'pte districts interdicted which were
dangerous (SiC).
Itwas,however, in respect of medical and health restrictions and the
manner in which the administrative requirements at Adenwere laid down
that these significantly affected labour recruitment by Hole and Kusel as
well as the quantity and quality of their recruits and also their mode of em-
138Vide map: AppendixII.
139A 11/2/8/2: Major J. Davies, First Assistant Resident, Aden, to Hole:
August 28, 1901.
140C•O. 417/337: Sir Lee Warner to C. O. : J'lme5, 1901.
141A 11/2/8/4: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901.
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barkatiori from Aden to Beira. The medical problem and the fear of out-
breaks of epidemic diseases of one type or another, as a result of larger-
scale movements of people from the interior into the Aden settlement,had,
from the start, formed the lynch-pin of the opposition by Aden authorities to
various schemes (II. labour emigration and recruitment. 142 Given the gen-
erally restrictive character of both imperial and local policies at Aden in
1901)especially insofar as these concerned the Rhodesian labour mission, the
Aden authorities certainly left no sluice-gates open through which such
activities as those advocated by Hole and Kusel could undermine the health
conditions of the settlement. For these and similar reasons, the labour
depots and centres for medical exammattca and registration ri. labourers were
decidedly located either on the fringes of the Aden settlement.such as at Sheik
Othman, about two miles away from the border and at Dar-el-Amir also about
143one and a half miles outside the settlement. According to official direct-
ions, labour recruits to and from these points required police escorts.who,
together with the medical officer, also supervised the sanitary conditions at
the main labour depot of the BSACo. envoys at Twin Island, a detached island
where conditions were such that:
Once the boys get on to -(it)- theYl~~ould)- have no communi-
cation with the outside world. •••
Corresponding restrictions also govemed the registration of the recruits.
Hole, as chief spokesman of the Rhodesian mtseton, did not appear at
all opposed to these restrictioo.s and was,at first)quite partial to such actions.
insofar as they related to the labour depot on Twin Island,where, as he con-
cluded, the presence of rough old buildings would save them the expenses
of constructing camps over and above the equipment these envoys had already
bought in form of food utensils, mats, blankets and tents. Even the thorough
medical examination prescribed by the authorities did not, at first appear too
disadvantageous and Hole actually supported it (II. the grounds that:
••• no unsound boy should be passed -(as medically fit)- otherwise
we should import boys who would be likely to lm<f.l'l>upshortly
after arriving & would be an encumbrance to us.
142Vide Supra: PP. 221-2.
143Ibid: Major Davies to Hole: August 28, 1901.-
14~ld: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901.-145Ibid.
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Yet sooner or later Holewas compelled to voice some measure of dis-
approval due to the expenses which the medical requirements involved and
what appeared to him the excessive charges, at Rs. 5 (five rupees) per head,
demanded by the medical officer assigned for the duty by the authorities.
Given the freedom of movement in respect of the ingress and egress of people
from the interior into the settlement, Hole concludedwith obvious resentment,
that the whole affair was 'a farce'. Finally, Hole could not alter his views
over the registration and poltcmg requirements prescribed by the Aden
authorities,which obviously meant extra expenses for the BSACo. envoys. For
example, although the registration of the recruits was undertaken and wit-
nessed by a Eurasian friend of Kusel's, Holewas opposed to the idea of
moving recruits between Twin Island and Aden harbour, the point of departure)
not only on account of the cost in transport costs, but also because of the
expenses required to maintain police guards in the process; ftmctionaries des-
paragingly described by this BSACo. agent as a 'useless &••• expensive
146encumbrance' •
The above aspects of the Hole/Kusel Arab labour mission, from a btrd'a-
eye view, naturally exercised immeasurable influence on the course of this
importation scheme and inhibited any maximum operation that its architects
might have had in mind. But in its structure so far, it does not by any means
demonstrate the role played by the Arab recruits themselves and to what
extent their response to the approaches of the envoys of the Southern Rhodesian
Administration and employers coo.tributedeither to the success of failure of
the project.
In the survey on Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labour from North-East
Africa, it has been argued that because of the methods adopted by Kusel and
Tulloch in carrying out their deals with the officials in that part of the world
over the heads of the recruits, these agents failed to take the recruits into
their confidence and consequently some measure of misunderstanding could
147
hardly be avoided,as the Beira incident later demmstrated. These distinct-
ive features of the earlier North-East African labour plan were also evident
in the succeeding scheme for the Arabian peninsula. Kusel may have had his
shortcomings as a private labour agent,otherwise interested only in the com-
146Ib1d
147Vide Supra: PP. 206-10.
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mercial aspects of this venture, but the reactions of Hole to the requirements
of the India EmJgration Act and its relevance to the Aden peninsula largely
manifest, in several ways, the drawbacks of labour importation under the
aegis of a restrictive political and economic system,which the BSACo. Admini-
stration in Southern Rhodesia epitomized. It is,therefore1within the constraints
of such limitations that the reactions of the Arab labour recruits must be
gauged.
As in the North-East Africa scheme, the Arab labour project depended
on a network of agents and contacts laid downby Kusel,whose activities
attracted so much admiration from his superior, Hole, that the latter was
forced to confess:
I am very pleased with Kusel. He is conscientious & alth0Ylft
very unbusmesa-Ifke he is quite at home with these Arabs.
Local officials also played a prominent part as agents in return for economic
fringe benefits. Two such leaders whose activities failed to escape Hole'S
attention were the Sultan of Lahej and • Sheik Saleh, with whom the two
Rhodesian envoys established contacts in Aden. Indeed it was from Lahe],
where, as a matter of fact, the Arab labourers) later forwarded to the Globe
Phoenix mine at Que Que.were procured; a labour force consisting mainly of
Bedouins and Jebels, described by Hole in somewhat unfavourable terms as
'peasants & hill boys'.
In essence, the part played by the ruler of Lahej, north of Aden, is
blurred by what surfaces as some form of misunderstanding between the
Sultan and Hole. This misunderstanding was caused by two things; namely,
the Sultan's lUlfulfilledpromises to supply the BSACo. envoys with labaur to
the tune of 2,000 recruits, yet all he could produce in the end were only 50
men. The second reason may have been the Sultan's demands for commission,
at Rs 3 (three rupees) per head for the labourers he forwarded to the Rhod-
esian envoys,notwithstanding the presents the latter had previously given to
this ruler in return for his co-operation. In the end, Holewas openly dis-
pleased by the Sultan's commission demands and only paid the same under
149duress and aut of fear of being accused of 'a breach of faith'.
Hole's views on the SUltanof Lahej, as more or less an economic liability
148A 11/2/8/4: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901.
149. Ibid :: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901.
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rather than an asset in labour recruiting there, must not unduly influence
the reader on the negative role of this ruler in promoting the BSACo. labour
scheme <Xl this occasion. Instead,it should be borne in mind that the accom-
modation facilities used by Hole and Kusel at their labour depot at Dar-el-
Amir, about 2 miles from Sheik othman, belonged to this ruler. Hole had)
in fact,initia1ly expressed himself to Milton as being quite grateful to the
Sheik of Lahej for this favour which ruled out any further need for the con-
struction of sheds for the labourers,whilst they waited for their registration
150at this point in September. From the Sultan of Lahej's point of view, it
was obviously logical to expect corresponding favours from the BSACo.
envoys.
A more promising labour courier with whom, Hole and Kusel established
contacts in the final stages of their mission, was ( _ Sheikh Saleh, a mer-
chant by trade and a man whose interest in the Arab labour emigration scheme
was essentially influenced by the potentialities of the scheme as a permanent
economic venture. Although this man's activities on the occasion of Hole and
Kusel's visit may have been limited, it was because of Hole'S faith in him,
however, assisted,in the process, by another agent called Schmuck, that the
BSACo. representative had even hoped to establish a permanent Arab labour
schenaand a regular supply system from the Arabian peninsula to Southern
Rhodesia for future purposes, with Kusel as the scheme's general supervisor
151
based at Aden.
Supplementing this list of officials and agents, was a small fry of
messengers and other minor functionaries employed by Hole in the recruiting
field on the peninsula and also as leaders of recruits proceeding to Southern
Rhodesia. The appointment of these functionaries, however, depended less on
imperical criteria than it did on the whims of the chief representative on the
Aden mission. Some of these auxiliaries, appointed for one reason or
another connected with this Arab labour mlliBion, included Aboukir and Sali
Sayyidwho were to act as leaders of Arab labourers to and in Southern
Rhodesia and whose privileged treatment was regarded as an essential mechan-
~ ~
150Ibid.
151Ibid: Schmuck's appointment as a permanent labour agent at Adenwas con-
firmed by the Southern Rhodesia Labour Board by November 1901. Vide:
c. o. 417/338: Milton to BSACo. Telegram: November 15, 1901.
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ism for popularizing Southern Rhodesia as a field of labour in these labour-
ers' homeland. For this reason, Hole appealed to Milton on behalf of Abou-
kir, 'a very superior Somali'}formerly engaged as a guide and Interpreter to
European parties on the Arabian peninsula; skills Aboukir may have placed
at the disposal of the Hole/Kusel mission and consequently ingratiated
himself in this manner. Hole's pleas to Milton in September 1901,at least
betray the pre-exlstence of this type of relationship,as the former stated:
, , ,Aboukir must be treated with rather more consideration
than the ordinary black man. He is a person of standing here
~at Adenr, and I have seen him sitting dawn and smoking with
white men, He is engaged ~for Southern Bhodestaj- at £10
per month and if he is not required in MashCfWsnd should be
sent back with a 3rd class passage to Aden.
Taking into account the generally negative attitude of the Rhodesian
employers towards these recruits,especially the Somalis brought down in
the gang of North-East African labourers between December 1900 and Jan-
uary 1901, Hole'S testimonial, vouching what he obviously regarded as the
superior social standing of this Somali recruit, is quite remarkable; not to
mentim the distinctive role played here by arbitrary colonist attitudes in
influencing economic decisions. Similar favours were to be conferred also
on Sali Sayyid of Lahej, another 'superior type' of labourer on whom Hole
reported that he had taken 'a great fancy', apparently) for the former's role in
helping to promote the engagement of the Lahej labourers forwarded to the
Globe and Phoenix mine and over ..whom Sayyid himself was appointed 'the
native head.,. I, But from Hole'S point of view, Sali Sayyid's services were
more or less in greater demand as a labour tout in Aden than as a 'boss boy'
on the Rhodesian mines, For this reason,it was suggested that Sayyid should
be sent back to Aden to report 'after spending a week or two at the -(Rhodes-
ian\... in ,153r m es""
The employment of these minor ftmctionaries was Significant in many
respects, For one thing, their engagem.ent as leaders of their own people
could mean not only an effective device in both the exploitation and control of
154larger labour supplies at little expense, but also the instituting of a buffer
152!2!!!: Note that the wages of ordinary Arab labourers ranged between 20/-
and 45/- monthly. Vide File C,O, 417/337: PIR/a: London.
153Ibid.
154Van Onselen: 'The Role of Collaborators in Rhodesian Mining Industry
1900-1935': loco cit,
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system whereby these gangers and touts would act as an interpolating
mechanism in a situation which demandedboth harsh and exploitative treat-
ment of the labour reerutts.mueh in the same manner as the Indian drivers,
sirdas and Kanganis were employed on the sugar plantation to control their
fellow overseas Asiatic labourers and thus insulating the planters and mana-
gers In the West Indies and elsewhere from charges of barbarous treatment
155of indentured labourers.
In the case of the Southern Rhodesia Arab labour mission In 1901, the
need for intermediaries for the enrolment and control of recruits could hardly
be over-emphasized. The Rhodesian emissaries may have foundthe sultans
and other local dignitaries ready to co-operate In reciprocation of mutual
favours of one type or another, but this was hardly true In relaticn to the
response of the labour recmits themselves. It appears that in undertaldng
the second mission to this part of the worldJto procure labour for the Southern
Rhodesian mines, the envoys in question and their sponsors had underestt-
mated the historical, cultural and geographicalllnks which formed the basis
of the symbiosis between the Arabian peninsula and the horn of Africa. They
were however crudely awoken to the realities of these links through some of
the residues of the Beira revolt of January 1901,inwhich the labour agents,
the Portuguese authorities and the Rhodesian employers falled to appreciate
156the significant and fundamental aspects of this historic event. Hole and
Kusel were in the circumstances, forcibly made heirs to the repercussions
of this earlier IncidentJapparentlYJasan additional accreditation to their bona
fides as torch-bearers in the labour importation scheme they so represented.
The repercussions of the Beira incident nonetheleas began to surface as
the Rhodesian envoys undertook their recruiting campaign In Lahej in
August 1901 and it is quite probable that it was the spirit of Beira which may
have contributed to the failure of the SUltanof Lahej's effort to supply the
large quantities of labour,he had initially promised Hole during their meeting
in Aden. Whatever effects this spirit may have had on the Sultan, it was
particularly evident amongst his people and Influenced, to a large extent, the
response of the Bedouin and Jebel recruits Jwith devastating results for Hole
and Kusel's efforts to recruit labour in the territory. These effects of the
155Tinker: op, cit. PP. 222-3.
156Vide: Supra: pp, 206-10.
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Beira affair were well captured in Hole's reports to Salisbury, in the following
manner:
Here -(at Laheji)- on the first day many boys offered them-
selves voluntarily. On the second day none came, & those
who had engaged the day before cried off. On enquiring I
found that one of the Somalis whohad mutinied at Beira was
there and was concocting all sorts of stories to frighten
away the Arabs. I reported him and he was bas~grL
We have had a great many many repetitions of this.
In respect of Lahej recruits, the effects of the reports by these former Beira
veterans were ,of course,quite decisive. Out of the labour force of about 340
recruits secured by Hole and Kusel in the region, nearly half of them had
deserted by the time the recruits arrived at the BSACo. labour depot at
Dar-el-Amlr on the borders of the Aden settlement,some 25 mlles from
Lahej.
These reports on the conditions of engagement and treatment in Southern
Rhodesia by the Beira survivors were by no means tantalizing. Even within
the confines of the labour depots at Dar-el-Amir and Twin Island, the
spill-overs of the Beira affair persisted and made the control of recruits a
particularly daunting task. In essence.the reports of these old labourers and
their previous experiences in Southern Rhodesia were of the sam.e genre as
those factors largely respoos1ble for the Beira revolt. As a resentful
Marshall Hole reported a(ter some effort to persuade a group of recruits)
reluctant to proceed to the depot of Twin IslandJand in spite of his assurances
on good accommodation and food supply, the adverse affects of the Beira
incident were not easy to overcome.hence the irritation that:
The mischievous Somali had told them -(recruitsr we were
going to induce them on to dhowsby craft & then take them &
sell them as slaves to the Turks. • •• In fact every moment
of the day we have to counteract some absurd 1lflHpn they got
into their heads chiefly prompted by Somalies.
It is evidentJin the circumstances) that the fear of misrepresentation on
labour conditions in the destination area or of kidnapping through some subtle
means by these foreign labour agents, induced the Arab labour recruits to
protest in some direct and open way. At this stage of their enlistment, it
157~: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901, and also Rhodesia Chamber of
Mines Annual R9bort 1901: pp. 96-7.
158Ibid
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could hardly be said that the BSACo. envoys had acquired the necessary
dominance over their charges to expect the latter to acquiesce and resign
themselves to their fate in a manner their predecessors did after arriving at
Beira and in Southern Rhodesia at the beginning of 1901. These recruits, it
must be realized, were voluntary recruits and were.therefore.Iese commit-
ted to labour emigration than either forced labourers or debt-peonage
recruits and, from this point of view, were more susceptible to resist and
challenge any attempt to press-gang them into a situation whose implications
they did not clearly comprehend Precisely for such resistance, these rec-
ruits)like their predecessors from the horn of Africa, ran the risk of cros-
sing swords with the Rhodesian envoys and their sponsors/whose quest for
docile labour was a primary objective.
Indeed.as far as the relationship between the Arab recruits and their
superiors, the Rhodesian envoys, was concerned, further points of difference
were raised by the medical examination and other sanitary requirements J
prescribed as pre-conditions to any recruitment by the Aden authorities and,
to some extent, supported by Hole as a means of screening the physically
159weaker recruits. These preconditions and the subsequent discovery by
Hole during the medical examination that most of the adult Arab recruits
suffered from one medical defect or another, such as enlarged spleens or
livers, weak hearts and rupture, allegedly caused by camel-riding and
affecting,especiallyJ the genital organs and other lower parts of the body, may
have naturally occasioned unusual strictness in the form of medical examina-
tion required for these prospective labourers. The statistics on one group at
least, the Lahej batch, undoubtedlydemonstrate the strictness of this medi-
cal examination,as Table I shows below:
Table I:
Original number of recruits engaged at Lahej = 338
Desertions at lajeh and en route = 150
Desertions to avoid examination = 60
Rejections as medically unfit = 32
Balance enlisted = 96
Losses through desertion and examination = 243
~lst reports on the unfavourable conditions for which these Arab lab-
159Vide: Supra: pp.185-90.
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ourers were thus being recruited bad.fn consequence,scared a sizeable
number and compelled them to desert, the remainder were obviously anta-
gonized by the medical examination requirements Jwhich impinged on the
sensibilities of their Moslem traditions and culture. Marshall Hole accord-
ingly reported on these medical problems and Arab response thereto as
follows:
The Arabs protested vehemently against the exposure necessary
to satisfy the doctor that they were free from venereal disease.
It is contrary to their religion & they are a nervous -(and)-
highly strung race whose suspicions are easily aroused. It
looked at one1'iJweas if we should lose them all on account of
this scruple.
Hole'S conclusions were quite accurate. The Bedouins from Lahej refused
to undergo such an examination and, in defiance of the Aden police guarding
them, escaped at night. Perhaps even more would have done so had the
vigilance of this guard not been increased. The medical requirements rep-
resented here an unusual occurrence in foreign labour recruiting circles
whereby the common practice of passing as fit all recruits not suffering from
obvious physical malformation or showing other conspicuous evidence of
161disease, was over-riden by the political interests of the host territory
and,consequent1y,conflicted with the national traits of the recruits themselves,
As a final fling against a situation in which those Arab labourers who
had engaged for emigration to Southern Rhodesia and satisfied the necessary
medical requirements found themselves in, some of the recruits would not be
persuaded to embark for Beira,when the time arrived, till the India Office in
London stepped in and instructed the hitherto neutral authorities at Aden to
rescue the Southern Rhodesian labour scheme and facilitate the transportation
162of the recruits in question. From all appearances, the Rhodesian envoys
had failed on their own to counter the reports) circulating within the circles
of these recruits, that they were going to 'be killed, imprisoned, -(and)- 111-
treated in RhodeSia;,163 an obvious development from the Beira incident. 164
160Ibid: Hole to Milton: September 20, 1901.-161Vide: infra: pp.
162C.O. 417/338: Sir Lee Warner, India Office, to BSACo. October 25,
1901.
163!2.!2: Hole to BSACo. London: Telegram: October 13, 1901.
164__
-Vide: Supra: PP. 206-10.
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Hole.therefore.could only appeal to his superiors, the London Board.and ,
through this directorate) to the Colonial and India Offices to authorize the Aden
authorities to repudiate what the BSACo. Board considered to be 'wholly un-
founded. , , rumours and,; •mischievous impressions." , calculated to impair
the Southern Rhodesian labour scheme 'in the minds of ignorant and credu-
lous natives.,., ' and.through these authoritative dentals.assure the chiefs on
the guarantees of fair treatment for their people proceeding to work in
165Southern Rhodesia.
The involvement of the Aden authorities,who had some measure of dom-
inance over the recruits,clearly indicates that the Arab labourers would
neither trust nor readily submit to the demands of foreign labour agents, as
the Rhodesian envoys signified in their eyes. Their restistance may not have
been as dramatic and vigorous as the mob riots in Delhi and other Indian
cities against clandestine recruitment of 'coolies' for the West Indies and
other overseas colonies at the turn of the nineteenth century, 166 but.even in
this weak formjdemonsrrated their disapproval of a situation in which they
found themselves involved willy-nilly, Moreover, these problems, which
marked the relationship between the Rhodesian envoys and their cltentsjserved,
to some extent,as harbingers on the futile character of the whole Arab labour
scheme for Southern Rhodesfajnotwfthstandlng the optimism of the top offi-
cials on its permanence as well as the hopes of its representative official,
167the so-called Protector of Immigrants.
The reactions of the labour-hungry colonist employers to the arrival of
the Arab labour recruits in Southern Rhodesia} in the second half of 1901}were
positive at firstJbut this did not last long. Those mining properties seriously
threatened by labour shortage for reasons of their own, were evidently anxi-
ous to put to immediate good use these new arrivals and.In this manner, arrest
any demands for reforms in labour conditions at their mines. The Ayrshire
mine was one of these properties. Its boss, Dr. Hans Sauer of The Ayrshire
Mine and' Lomagundt Railway Co, Ltd,) had apparently written to the Admini-
strator in mid-September 1901,)enquiring about the arrival of the Arab labour-
ers on whom his company had placed an order and.at the same time )requesting
•
165,!!ili!: BSACo. to C. O. : October 25, 1901.
166Vide: Tinker: ap, cit. pp, 124-9.
167C•O• 417/338: CoO, toBSACo" August10&28, 1901,
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the Administrator to 'use ~s)- influence with the N/Cs -{NativeComission-
ers)- with a view to inducing them to give all the help in their power to our
168Manager at the mine;' a request which was quickly responded to by the
Native Department in form of instructions to the Assistant Native Commis-
sioner of the Lomagundidistrict to apply some form of pressure and 'use
169every effort to keep this mme well supplied with labour. ' The Ayrshire
mine could no longer cope with its anticipation and was here compelled to
rely on reluctant local labourers procured by administrative coercion, but still
banking on the arrival of the Arab labourers, at the same time.
The Globe and Phoenix mine at Sebakwe, whichwas entitled to receive
the first apportionment of Arab recruits, was equally enthisiastic about the
prospect and it was to this property that the first batch of Arab recruits, the
Bedouins and Jebels from Lahej, were destined to arrive at the beginning of
170
October 1901. The painstaking arrangements undertaken by both the
Administration and the mine management to meet these new arrivals were
indicative of the anxieties and optimism of omcial opinion that the scheme
had to work. As the Administrator's private secretary, Alfred H. Holland
indicated}in his arrangements with the officials of the Beira and Mashonaland
Railways and the Globe and Phoenix mine management, with regard to the
issue of conveying and meeting the Arab labour recruits at the end of the
railway line in Salisbury, I 71 Miltonwas said to be
••• very anxious, ••• that there should be no hitch or trouble
-{in)-communtcati0lfrlftween the Arabs and the people along
the -{railwaYr line.
Yet whilst administrative precautions were designed to forestall anything
resembling previOUSviolent disturbances amongst these recruits, the Globe
and Phoenix mine management was more concerned with the material side
168A11/2/8/3: Dr. Hans Sauer, for The AYrshire Gold Mine and LorliagUndi
Railway Co. Ltd., Bulawayo, to Milton, September 18, 1901.
169!2!!!: A. H. Holland, for C/N/C Salisbury, to Ass. N/C Lomagundi,
September 23, 1901.
170Ibid: Hole to Milton: Telegram: September 26, 1901.
171There was no railway connection between Salisbury and Bulawayobefore
1902,hence no railway transport up to Que Que (Sebakwe)between these
two points. Vide: Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1904: p, 31.
172A 8/2/8/3: A. H. Holland, Administrator's Private Secretary, Salisbury,
to Piper, Gold Fields: Bulawayo:Telegram: September 26, 1901 and
Holland to O. Ormsby, Railway Construction Camp, Sallsbury: September
30, 1901.
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of the welfare of the Arab arrivals and therefore undertook to deal with
the provision of food and blankets as well as guides from Salisbury to
Sebakwe.173
Such pre-occupation with the reception of these Arab recruits at the
Globe and Phoenix mine must have been essential for cosmetic reasons on
a property where the Inspector of Compoundsfor the Gwelo/Selukwe division
had in July 1901 found the accommodation and general sanitary conditions so
poor that he had to issue a warning in form of legal action against the manage-
ment. Although the Native Department officials had also repeatedly advised
the mine authorities that the poor labour conditions at their property were
174the cause of its unpopularity, desertions and labour shortage, no
measures had been taken for a reappraisal of the situation. Indeed,the mine
management at the property in question were quite hostile to such criticism
as F. G. Elliott, the Inspector of Compounds, discovered. In his report,
Elliott had indicated that due to the inadequate accommodation facilities at
the Globe and Phoenix mine, the labourers were consequently compelled to
live in 'dilapidated grass huts••• not fit for human habitation' and that the
175
compound at the property was 'in a most disgracefully dirty state ••. "
that on this account he had to warn the manager, Mr. Allrfght ,that unless
satisfactory improvements were undertaken in the form of provision of
adequate compound accommodation, hospital and lavatory facilities and the
removal of the cattle kraal and rubbish heap,which were situated near the
compound, legal action wouldbe undertaken under the relevant provisions of
176the mining law.
But for the Globe and Phoenix mine management, which was.at this stage J
pre-occupied with its own arrangements to secure foreign (Arab) labour,
such threats were scarcely heeded and therefore futile. In fact, the Landon
directorate of the Globe and Phoenix mine viewed such analytical examination
of labour conditions at its property as unwarranted officiousness which merited
173nili!: Haddon, for Gold Fields of S.A. Ltd., Bulawayo,to Milton: Salisbury,
Telegram: September 27, 1901 and Holland to Piper: Telegram: Sept-
ember 30, 1901.
174Vide: Supra:p. 191.
175C.O. 417/338: Extract from the Report of the Inspector of Native Com-
pounds. Gwelo/Selukwe District, for July 1901.
176Ibid: F. G. Elliott to Allwright. Manager, Globe & Phoenix Mine, July 28,
1901.
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little attention. In view of this attitude, it ,therefore ,discounted the general
contention in Southern Rhodesfa.especfally common amongst the Native Com-
missioners, that ' ••• Our mine ~Globe & Phoenix)- has become unpopular with
"Boys" •.• ' as 'unfounded', and.at the same time,warned London Wall against the
excesses of its officials in Southern Rhodesia whom the Globe and Phoenix
directorate regarded as being:
••• too exacting or over-zealous, in urging this Company
-(Globe & Ph~,ro expend money which appears to
be utterly useless.
In a nutshell.the Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Company clearly indi-
cated that it would not get involved in extra expenses over hospital and
accommodation facilities which the African labourers did not use or for the
178sake of pleasing 'numerous local officials who ~eld)- various views •••• '
Given the imminent arrival of this company's order of Arab labourers, it
appears the Globe and Phoenix mine was prepared to put all its eggs in one
basket and thus rely exclusively on one class of foreign labour or another.
The confidence of the Globe and Phoenix mine in Arab labour was, at this
stage, shared by other mining companies which had also sponsored the
seheme.aa we have discussed already.179
However, by the close of 1901J the views of the colonist employers in
Southern Rhodesia were changing fast and their attitudes were gradually
hardening towards their latest foreign labour acquisitions and,once more.the
future of the Arab labour scheme became obscure,as it began to appear to these
same employers that the Arab labourer, like his North-East African ally,
was not after all the 'ideal labourer' they were looking for. In the first in-
stance, it must be pointed out that when the whole issue of importing Arabs)
exclusively. as labourers into Southern Rhodesia was raised.after the failure
of the North-East Africa project primarily due to the diplomatic problems it
had aroused, some officials within the Southern Rhodesian Administration
and elsewhere were not pleased by the prospects and had,therefore,advised
total abstinency altogether. The Native Department,in particular,was not
177!!2!!!: J.M. Ramsden, Secretary, The Globe and Phoenix Gold Mining Co.
Ltd, to BSACo, London: September 19, 1901.
178Ibid,
17~ide Supra: p 217.
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satisfied by the absence of compulsory repatriation provisions in the con-
tracts and restrictive measures against these potential labour immigrants
and for this reason the Chief Native Commissioner of Matabeleland protested
in May 1901 against what he called
.•• allowing these natives to wfft8er about 'ithe)- country
contaminating our natives.... .
Such Native Department objections as these indicated above were ,of
courae.conststent with corresponding restrictions imposed onAfrican immi-
grants from the South and elsewhere nearer home,provided by the 1898 legt-
181slation for the purpose. But in respect of Arab labourers, most officials
in Southern Rhodesia and the Labour Board.In particular, were at first simply
nervous about the cost of repatriation involved,which, it was feared, might
altogether scare the mining companies then supporting the scheme. As a
more obvious pretext, it was also assumed that the recruits in questlon ''ihad)-
no desire to retum -{home)-owing to the crowded state ~of)- their own
182country. ' This attitude however changed,in the long run,due to the
promises by the mining companies to the Administration, to bear the repatri-
ation expenses}provided that the Arab recruits had worked satisfactorily
183and continuously for three years or more.
Humanitarian circles also supported these objections of the Native
Department in respect of the importation of labour from both the Arabian
peninsula and the hom of Africa, but for different m.otives. Apart from the
traditional resentment of Exeter Hall to labour recruitment under 'suspi-
cious circumstances' from 'a notorious resort of slave traders', as Fox
Bourne, the Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society,pointed out to the
Colonial Office in March 1901, humanitarian circles were apprehensive on
the risks involved in a foreign labour importation. schem.eby private con-
tract and enterprise,without strict supervision by either Imperial or local
180A 11/2/8/3: C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary, May 10, 1901.
181Vide SUpra:PP. 162-3.
182!2!,g: Acting Chairman, Labour Board, Bulawayo, to Milton: Salisbury:
May 9, 1901.
183!2!!!: Holland, Salisbury, to Chairman, Labour Board, Bulawayo: May 11,
1901 and Labour Board to :Mllton.: Telegram: May 13, 1901.
239
th den· abus 184authorities to minimize e inci ce of ea. Thus they requested
the Imperial government to make the prevention of abuses in the traffic its
main object, should any assistance to the mine-owners and managers be
offered in this regard
Humanitarian circles were obviously concerned about the diplomatic
complications caused by Tulloch's activities in North-East Africa and the
adverse repercussions of the Beira affair. Thus not unnaturally they em-
phasized the importance of official and disinterested supervision to avoid:
•.• the risk of natives being enticed from their owncountry,
under specious promises and spurious contracts -(consequently)-
••• finding themselves, on arriving at their destination, in a
condition akin to that of fllhvery, with small prospect of
adequate reparatim ••••
In the circumstances, Exeter Hall felt that tighter imperial supervision
could iron out some of the more obvious misrepresentations by private
recruiters to their own advantage. But,unl1kethose of the Native Depart-
ment, the objections of the APSwere hardly taken note of and the Arab
labour scheme progressed under shadowy legIslatf.ve supervision by a less
disinterested BSACo. Administration. 186 The mining industry in the circum-
stances had its ownway and eventually emerged the winner in the process.
What in fact the Bhodestan oMcials and the mining industry did not
appear to take sufficient note of,even after their handling of the North-East
Africans, was the degree of submission and subordination these foreign
labourers were prepared to stand under the legislative restrictions govern-
ing their working lives in SouthernRhodesia,which also incorporated some
of the more crude requirements of the Southern Rhodesia :Master and
187Servant Ordinance 1901. In what must appear a strange streak of irony,
the recipe for a turbulent relatimship between the Rhodesian colonist
employers and the Arab recruits was apparent even before official approval
and co-operation was granted to Hole at Aden. For, as Lord Hamilton, the
184
C.O. 879/69: Fox Bourne, Secretary, APS to C.0.: March 26, 1901:..
,.
185Ibid: Fox Bourne to C.'O.~March 26, 1901.
186Ibic:t.-187
Vide: Contracts of the Labour Board with the Arab labourers: Enclosed
in C,O, 417/337: BSACo. to C.O. July 23, 1901.
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head of the India Office,responsible for Aden and the adjacent protected areas
of the peninsula, confessed during a House of Commans debate on the Rhodes-
ian labour mission in August 1901, whilst the Aden authorities and the Govern-
ment of India had no representative in Southern Rhodesia,hence no means of
exercising leverage on the Rhodesian employers to ameliorate the cmditions
of service under which the recruits were destined to work, it was) however,
hoped that these recruits would be capable of looking after their own interests
in this respect. For this reason, Lord Hamilton stated:
••• these Arabs wlll not work unless they are well treated; and
therefore yfllshave in that fact a guarantee for their good
treatment.
In the event, it was their resistance and noncomformity with their restrict-
ive conditions which earned these labourers the disapproval even of their
erstwhile sponsors and admirers amongst the Rhodesian employers.
By the end of 1901, the changed mood of the employers and mining
companies towards the Arabs together with the rankling disappointment with
the earlier Kusel/Tulloch missian to Abyssinia and Som.aliland had become
somewhat manifest,with general opinion decidedly hostile. Even the former
stalwarts of the Arab labour scheme like the Globe and Phoenix and the Sur-
prise mining companies had undergoae such a volte-face ,with regard to the
psychology of employee/employer relationship,that they could hardly be per-
suaded to entertain the idea of engaging any more Arab labourers at their
189properties, by December 1901. The reactions of these foreign labourers
to labour conditions on those properties in Southern Rhodesia Jwhere reforms
were long overdue but were constrained by the marginal profitability of the
190
mining concerns involved, and the general limItations of a restrictive
administrative system with less regard for the welfare of the lower echelons
of a racially stratified colonial society, were here regarded as simply indi-
cative of low ascriptive or negative traits by the colonist employers and,
l8SC• O. 849/76: Statement by Lord Hamilton to Sir Charles in: Extract from
The TUnes: August 9, 1901.
189C. O. 468/2: Report by Piper. General Manager. Globe and Phoenix Gold
Mining Co. Ltd. for the year ended 31st December 1901: (in BSACo.
Report ••• p.172) and Report by Walter Currie, Consulting Engineer.
Surprise Gold :Mining Co, Ltd, for the 12 months ended 31st December
1901: Ibid: pp. 390-1,--190For the Globe and Phoenix mine case: Vide Supra: PP. 191; 236-8.
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therefore,sufficient basis for rejecting this particular class of labourers.
The persistence of poor labour conditions as an additional disadvantage to
those foreign labourers, whowere in no manner acquainted with mining work
and were 'more or less nervous about going underground', was in itself a
strang deterrent to any attempts to turn these Arabs and their North-East
African associates into a permanent mining labour force, and,at the Globe and
Phoenix mine in particular, led,by November 1901}tothe desertion of some
191of their more respectable leaders like the interpreter,Jamma Awat. The
same state of affairs was reported at the Beatrice mine in the Marandellas
district where the Arab recruits had refused to work underground, thus pro-
viding the mining companies with good reasons to reject any further importa-
192tion of these labourers.
At the Surprise mine in the Selukwedistrict, the reduction of wages in
January 1902by about 6d per shift from the rate these Arab labourers had
hitherto received since their arrival,on the grounds that it was 'too high' ,193
was the source of strong feelings of resentment during the visit of the
Inspector of Compounds and an immediate cause of 34 desertions amongst
both local and foreign labourers. From another perspective, these wage
reductions may have also contributed to the growing dissatisfaction amongst
the Arab, Abyssinian and Somali labourers at &J.rprise mine,where the labour
and health conditions for the non-white labourers as a whole were then said
to be deteriorating with consequent adverse effects on the labour force.
Amongst those labourers from North-East Africa and the Arabian peninsula
for instance, out of the original total of 156 labourers allocated to the property
in 1901, by the beginning of 1902,only 89were still working there; the rest
194having either died or deserted. Similar developm.entsat the neighbouring
..
191NB6/5/3/1: Special Report of Inspector of Native ComJ?OU!lds.Gwelo-
Selukwe Diviston (F.G, Elliott) on certain Natives of tbe North East
Coast tribe employed at the Globe and Phoenix mines (received: Bula-
wayo): November 5, 1901.
192-"Rhodesta Chamber df Mines Annual Report 1902: p. 19.
193The wages which were reduced ranged from.25/- to 35/- per month for
surface labourers and about 45/- for hammer boys which was contrary
to the £1 monthly wage in the contract.
194C.O. 417/343: W1al Report of the Inspector of Native Compounds,
Gwelo/Selukwe DivisiOn (F. G. Elliott) on Arabs employed at the Surprise
mine filomFebruary 1901, to January 1902,
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sister property, the Bonsor mine, could hardly be regarded as promising at
all due to the resilience of the high mortality and accident rates prevailing
195
there.
In conclusion, it could be argued that though the more unpopular Rhodes-
ian mines had lumped together to exercise maximum effort to promote the
Arab and North-East African labour schemes as a solution to their chronic
•
labour problema, their failure to adopt positive labour policies in form of
reforms in labour conditions on their properties was short-sighted. Their
drive to procure alien contract labourers, isolated from their home environ-
ment, families and com.munities and hence wlnerable to administrative con-
trol and economic exploitation, foundered when these alien recruits began to
resist all such forms of political and economic subordination. Under the
cfrcumstances, the confession by the Rhodesian colonist employers by 1902,
that the schemes to import Arab, Abyssinian and Somali labourers had been
196
in every respect fatal errors of judgement based on erroneous impressions,
was a proper assessment of the superficial facets of the labour problem in
a colonial situation.
Obviously, this somewhat unorthodox behaviour from a subordinate social
and economic stratum within the framework of a hierarchically stratified
plural society, was unacceptable to the superordinate community, the white
settlers of Southem Rhodesia. As amatter of fact, those Arab and Abyssinian
labourers, who refused to work in the mines, resorted to one of the following
alternatives. They either found their way back to Beira and, after working
for some spell in the Portuguese territory, secured passes to their homes,
or remained in the country seeking other forma of employm.ent inurban cen-
tres as servants, waiters and store-boys,for which occupations they were
197
found to be 'more suited than to work on the roads, railway and mines'.
Some found employment with the British South African Police Camp and the
195C• O. 417/382: Special Report byt1l~ Irispector of Native Compounds.
Division No.1, (Gwelo/Selukwe) with reference to the death of nine
Natives who were 'accidentally killM at the Bansor Mine, during Sept-
ember;1902: Enclosed in F. G. Ellfott to C/N/C !ulawayo: December
10, 1902,
196Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Atmual Report 1902: Ioe, cit.
197 C. O. 417/343: Milton to Milner: February 20, 1902.
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hospital in Bulawayo, 198 whilst it was the-so-called 'insolent, lazy and
incompetent' Somali road party which took up employment with the railway
works,after their discharge from roadwork. 199
Apparently, the Rhodesian colonist employers, disappointed as they were
by this class of labourers, were no longer interested in restraining these
foreign recruits in their quest for altemative employment where conditions
differed in one way or another from those at the mines especially. Indeed,
the absence of restraint on Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labourers as they
divorced themselves from the specific forms of labour, for which they had
initially engaged,is evident in the Administrator's report to the High Comm-
issioner in February 1902, which succinctly portrays the feellngs of the
Rhodesian employers) with reference to the basis of their spinelessness on
the matter, to the effect that:
••• a majority of these labourers have proved refrac~<ll and
worthless and failed to carry out their contracts ••••
In short, these labourers had proved difficult to control and their former
employers were pleased to get rid of them.
One group of Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labourers whose presence in
the country did not seem to please the white pubUc had somehow found its
way to the town of Bulawayo,where they Uved for some ttme.at the sufferance
of their white hosts. According to a report in the Bulawayo Chronicle on
August 21, 1901, this group of foreign recruits, a fall-out from. the Kusel/
Tulloch mission, had 'refused to work' and could not,thereforeJget employment
without the assistance of the Administration,as employers resented engaging
them. In the meantime, they secured some accommodation in Bulawayo's
Wilson Street where they lived and shared their quarters, to the number of
10 individuals to a room not larger than 1, 000 cubic feet and normally desig-
ned for the use of only two people, thus attracting the hostility of their white
neighbours, who complained of over-crowding and 'insanitary conditions' in
201
the area.
198C• O. 417/321: Report by C/N/C 'l'aylor re: 'DIstribution of Abyssinians'J
to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, October 2, 1901.
199C• O. 417/343: Milton to Milner: February 20, 1902.
200lbid
201C. O. 417/321: Extract from Bulawayo Chronicle, August 21, 1901: Enc-
losed in Clarke to'Milton: August 26, 1901. -
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The presence of these North-East Africans1right in the centre of the
urban settlement of Bulawayo,was evidently contrary to the spirit of spatial
segregation in a racially conscious society and the Bulawayo TownCouncil
thus called upon the Administration, as the one body responsible for these
recruits, to help meet the council's pledges}to its constituents,'to keep -{the
townj- in a good and sanitary condition'; goals which these squatters were
obviously wrecking to pieces. 202 For its part, the Administration, through
the Native Department, was consequently bound to provide alternative accom-
modation to these North-East Africans in the Labour Board compound and
also some form. of employment other than that offered on the mines, for which
the recruits in question had refused to re-engage at the expiration of their
203contracts.
As a by-product of the agitation by the Bulawayo restdents, a feeling
emerged within the official stratum that adequate control and supervision of
the immigrants from North-East Africa and the Arabian peninsula were not
exercised in accordance with the restrictive requirements of the ImmJgra-
tion Ordinance of 1901, whose implementation had been made preconditional
to the approval of the Imperial government. Thus instructions for tracing
the movements and whereabouts of these labourers were issued with the
204
object of satisfying the anxieties of specified diplomatic quarters. The
statistics relating to the North-East African labourers alone, issued by the
Labour Board in October 1901with regar~ to the progress of these people
in Southern Rhodesia, in fact,revealed a haphazard state of affairs and a
more than average rate of desertion. According to Robert K. Eustace, the
Manager of the ):,abourBoard of Southern Rhodesia, the reckoning of the two
groups of labourers, brought down by Kusel and Tulloch between December 1900
and January 1901,was by the beginning of Oc1x>ber1901 as laid down in
Table II below:
Table II:
411 orfginal number that left Aden
202Ct. The agitation of the Salisbury residents in November 1913 against the
construction of a labour depot by the Labour Bureau on the windward
side of the town. Vide: Ftte A 3/18/30/29: R/N/A, Salisbury,
203C. O. 417/321: Milton to Clarke: October 4, 1901.
204--n>ld: Clarke to Milner: October 7, 1901.-
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385 reached Beira
349 left Beira
267 reached Salisbury and Marandellas
237 sent to mines (Surprise mine) andRoad party
200 reached Surprise mine andRoad party
33 deserted en route to Road party and Surprise mine
82 deserted en route from Beira
29 deserted from Salisbury and Marandellas
4 died en route to mine
156 reached Surprise mine
20544 reached Road party (Mr. Coope).
With a total loss of over half the North-East African labour force be-
fore their engagement through desertion only, the Abyssinian, Arab and
Somali labour schemes did not look at all promising. The reception of
these recruits, their treatment and reports on labour conditions in Southem
Rhodesia seriously prejudiced further efforts to perfect the plans for labour
importation from either the hom of Africa or the Arabian peninsula. The un-
successful introduction of mme Arabs by October 1901could not rectify the
serious misgivings underlying the wholemovement. The Southem Rhodes-
ian colonist employers on their part were naturally disappointed, whilst the
Colonial Office, which had at first concluded that only the provision of ade-
quate food and related amenities wouldguarantee the success of these
206schemes, was now at a loss with regard to those recruits, who, as Grindle
put it in allegoric language, had simply 'melted away' and thus seriously dis-
crediting not only the whole labour programme J but also the credlbillty of
207the Colonial Office before the India Office.
In conclusion, it is argued in this study that the failure of the AbYSSinian,
Arab and Somali labour importation plans was inevitable, given the rationale
for its implementation and the restrictive framework of the Rhodesian col-
onial labour market. As we have already indicated somewhere else, the
205l2!!!: Report on 'North East Africans' by R. K. Eustace, Manager, Labrur
Board, to Milton: October 2, 1901.
206C.O. 417/337: Minuteby Harris: July 16, 1901.
207C.O. 417/321: Minuteby Grindle to Ommanney:November 20, 1901 and
Graham to India Office: November 30, 1901.
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labour problem in early SouthernRhodesia was not necessarily an economic
phenomenon, but was a complex admixture of economic, social and psycho-
logical factors salient in a racially composite colonial society,whereby econ-
omic policies were not infrequently susceptible to non-economic factors
arising essentially from those features underlying the inequitable distribution
208
of economic, political and military power. These power differentials
influenced not only the character of labour supply)but also the attitudes of the
employers, as a dominant social and political segment, towards labourers
from subordinate social strata.
Through their resistance, first at Beira and later at the different centres
of employment in SouthernRhodesia, the labourers from the Arabian penin-
sula and North-East Africa proved themselves inamenable to this system of
employer/employee relationships and consequently the scheme foundered.
Secondly, the informal methods,usually applicable in SouthernRhodesia to
procure compulsory labour,were not relevant to an alien environment,whllst
the reliance of the Rhodesian colonist employers andAdministration on Kusel,
a private labour agent whose interest in the venture was based on mercenary
motives, and Tullochjwhoae integrity was later seriously undermined by divers
209short-comings in his economic affairs, were, to say the leas t, serious
errors of judgment. In the final analysis, when these purveyors of labour had
demonstrated little respect for diplomatic protocol in their activites, neither
the Colonial nor Foreign Officewouldcome to their rescue as they showed in
connection with requests by the :5SACo.to negotiate with the Turkish govern-
ment on the possibilities of labour supply from Yemen on the Arabian penm-
Ia, 210su
The causes of the failure to bring the Arabian, Abyssinian and Somali
labour projects to fruition were therefore a reflection of those features pecu-
liarly endermic to the Rhodesian colonial system and not merely an aberra-
. 211tion complicated by alien geographical and political foci. What the Rhodes-
208Vide the discussion 00 labour exploitation and supply in chapter 5.' ,
209Tulloch whowas farming in the eastern districts of Mashonalandended up
being sued for bankruptcy in court at Umtali in 1905: Vide FUe C.O.
417/418: PIR/O: London.
210C.O. 417/338: C.O. to BSACo.: August 10 and 28, 1901.
211Vide: Mackenzie: 'Colonial Labour Policy and RhodeSia': p. 9.
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ian employers and their agents were attempting to dowas to adopt their own
norms of labour exploitation in an otherwise different arena)with dismal
results. The Imperial authorities did not object to labour importation from
North-East Africa and the Arabia peninsula out of either meanness or other
212preconceived vindictive designs, as some writers would like to imagine,
but simply disliked the methods adoptedby the envoys of the Rhodesian col-
onist employers and Administration as such. Whatwas now left for these
employers to do next was to look for sources even further afield;in this case
as far as away as India and CbJnaand.by this process,colonist employers
tried once more to introduce yet another external factor into Southern Rhodes-
ia.
Ii: The Chinese and Indian Labour Solutions, 1898-1904
The movement to import Asiatic labour into SouthernRhodesia)which
gathered momentum especially after the Anglo-Boer War,was in manyways
similar in racial ideological orientation to some of the parallel movements to
import African and sundry non-European groups into other countries of
213Africa. For one reason, India and China had replaced Africa after the
mid-nineteenth century as sources of cheap labour :in ronn of indentured
'coolies'; a substitute for the hitherto more dominant labour transfer insti-
tution - the slave trade. In India for example, those regions in the southern
part of the country, especially among the Telugu and Tamil ethnic groups)
which had also supplied slaves to planters in :Mauritiusfor a long time in the
past, later came to serve, given India's vast population, as suppliers of
'coolie' labour to the West Indies, Fiji, the Straits Settlement and Natal since
2141835. The same applied to the Kwangtungprovince of China,which,by the
mid-nineteenth century,was the Chinese labour reservoir for not only the
planters in the West Indies.but also for the gold mines and other species of
215
employment in Canada, Australia, NewZealand and California. Thus when
the employers of SouthernRhodeaia, as well as those of SouthAfrica with
212vide Gann: Ope cit. p, 9.
213For the genesis of Indian presence in East Africa and Nyasaland: Vide
Mangat: op. cit.: chapters I and It
214Tinkers: Ope cit. pp. 61-115.
215p•C. Campbell: Chinese Emigration to Countries Within the British Em-
pire: p. S. King & Son: Landon:1923: chapters I and n,
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whom they vied for Asiatic labour, turned to this source of labour at the
beginning of the twentieth century, they were taking cue in a long-established
tradition, with, at first, little reason to doubt their ownchances of success.
In following this longbeaten track, the Rhodesian colonist employers
were exposing themselves to some of the traditional views and attitudes of
British Victorian society towards the Asian world; attitudes which conse-
quently shaped their conclusions in regard to the potential of the Asiatic races
as eligible labourers. Basing their perceptions on traditional European
Orientalism, itwas generally believed,within British circles both at home
and in the colonies,especially,in Africa, that the Indianwas a more useful
colonial subject than his African counterpart on account of the former's
'industrial energy, ' appearance and cultural heritage as compared to the
African's 'laziness' and 'savagery', which the capital-conscious British col-
onials could not tolerate.216 For this reason,the Indianwas deemed an
essential asset in a polygenetic programme for the development of Africa,thus
enabling the white man, in his superordinate position, to confine himself to
217matters of mere administrative and political concern. From this point of
view,the Chinese was even better, as he was ranked higher than the Indian.
Indeed 'John Chinaman' being an epitome of all the virtues required of sub-
ject races within the hierarchical social and ecooomic structure of the col-
onial situation, was clearly regarded as '••• industrious, expert, obedient
218
and thrifty' in every way.
An interesting connection between this traditional European Orientalism
and the movement to import Indian labour,for lnstance,into SouthernRhodesia
was the significance placed on those ethnic groups of Northern and Northern/
Western India,as the precise labour material required for the Southern Rhodes-
ian mining industry. Thus the demand by an association of Rhodesian economic
interests to important the MoslemMoplas of the Malabar coast in the Bombay
219Presidency and the voluntary offers by private individuals connected with
216C. Bolt: Victorian Attibldes to Race: Routledge & Kagan Paul: London:
1971: PP. 198-201.
217A champion for the exploitation of this polygenetic theory to economic
advantage was Sir Harry Johnston of Nyasaland. Vide F. Dotson and
L. O. Dotson: The Indian Minority of Zambia. Rhodesia and Malawi:
Yale University Press: NewHavenand London:1968: PP. 43-7.
218Bolt: Victoria Attitudes to Race: loe, cit.
219Vide: C.O. 417/382: Memorandumby the PrOvisional Committee of the
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India to recruit ex-SHill soldiers and policemen as labourers for Southern
Rhodesia, 220 were all part and parcel of the same coin. These instances
reflected in a nutshell, some of the characteristics pursued in Africa in
attributing negative and positive qualities to individual African ethnic groups
at the whim of either influential officials or missionaries. 221 Like the
British attitudes to the Baganda, Ndebele and Zulu in East and Southern Africa,
the more belligerent ethnic groups of India, especially the Moslems, were
revered and highly regarded in terms of labour and other positive qualities.
The Hindus and their claims to Aryan origin were Similarly treated in Brit-
ish Victorian scale of human estimation, whilst the aboriginal darker-
skinned ethnic groups of Southern India came off worst. 222
These so-called socially respectable Indian ethnic groups,of course,also
provided the material for the army and police services,with the result that
the Ptmjabis, Sikhs and Nepalis of the United Provinces and the Brahmans
and Rajputs of Bengal in Northern India were specially associated with these
services in British India and were,therefore,ineligible for 'coolie' labour
emigration. Consequently, 'coolie' labour emigration for overseas purposes
became a predominantly low-caste affair; the poor, the landless and the
'Untouchables' of Southern India, amongst whom the Tamil and Telugu were
223included, providing the largest proportion. But it was not these socially
inferior castes, predominantly from the Madras Presidency, which had hitherto
provided Natal with its 'coolie' labour for the sugar plantations, that
Rhodesian colonist employers desired. They looked to the North of India and
along the Malabar coast for a better class of labourers.
Indian or Asiatic presence in Southern Rhodesia before the beginning of
the twentieth century, as such, was inSignificant. Although some attempts had
been made to bring into the country Indian 'coolie' labour for the construction
of the Beira-Mashonaland railway line in 1895, these 500 or so labourers
seem to have dissipated.either because of the predominance of malaria fever
in the area of operatton.whtch might have been responsible for their decima-
224tion, as is normally believed, or through dispersal into the neighbouring
220
C. O. 417/308: H. F. Thornton, formerly Major General R. A. Madras, to
BSACo. : December 18, 1899.
221 .
222Cairns: loc, cit.
223Bolt: ope cit, pp. 182-90.
Tinker: Opecit.: PP. 52-3 and 59-60.
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territory of Mozambique with which Goan Indians and half-castes had a long
historical ecnnectlon, 225 The latter alternative appears to be the more
plausible in view of the fact that Asiatic immigration later became such a
major concern for the Portuguese authorities that they had to prohibit it in
226February 1903 under pressure from the colonist traders of Mozambique.
However, the Rhodesian Asiatic community appears to owe its origin
mainly to South Africa. In this respect,Southern Rhodesia was to South Africa
what North-Eastern Rhodesia (Zambia) appears to have been in its relation-
ship to Nyasaland. These two areas played hosts to the ASian ecological
movements from the neighbouring territories quite unlike the well organized
Asiatic importation drive for the coastal sugar planters of Natal since 1860 or
the administrative fiat adopted by Harry Johnston to recruit Sikhs from
India for military and police services in Nyasaland. Thus in early Southern
and Northern Rhodesia, Asiatic immigration appears to have taken in forrn,
something akin to 'passenger' (free) Indian movement rather than anything
227carried out under official aegis altogether.
In fact, as far as Asiatic presence in Southern Rhodesia is concerned,
the South African connection is quite interesting. Those Indians who had
chosen to come into the country from the South,in the early pioneer period)
appear to have shared some of the British imperial citizenship concepts
with their white and 'Cape Boy' colleagues; a development arising essentially
from the Anglo-Boer rivalry then dominant In the African sub-continent below
the Limpopo. Indeed by April 1896Jwhen attempts were made to restrict the
privileges of the Indians of Southern Rhodesia to purchase and consume liquor
and thus imposing onto them disabilities similar to those affecting the Afri-
can population, the Indian community of Bulawayo resisted the moveJpleading
224A. J. Hanna: The StOry of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: Faber & Faber:
London: 1964: pp. 147-8.
225Between 1722 and 1735, the Indian population of Mozambique already
amounted to between 178 and 200. Vide: M. D. D. Newitt: Portuguese
Settlement on the Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule
in East Africa: Longman, London: 1973: PP. 140-1. For the activities
of the Goanese half-caste Gouevia in Mashonaland before 1890: Vide:
Ranger: Ope cit. PP. 31, 82.
226
C. O. 417/378: Martin Goslin, H. B. M. Consun to Lord Lansdowne at
F. O. : February 13, 1903.
227 .
F. Dotson and L.O. Dotson: The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia
and Nyasaland: pp. 27-8.
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· 228for their rights as British ctttsens,
The move against the Rhodesian Indian community on this April 1896
occasion stemmed from their origin. Beingprimarily a deflection from the
predominantly poor and lower-caste immigrants whohad made their way to
Natal and other parts of SouthAfrica as indentured labourers to escape from
the economic problems of a congested environment and the social degrada-
229
tions of the Indian caste-system, they did not earn for themselves as
much respect from the white colonists as the more affluent Gujerati traders
of the later period andwere.thereforeoften dismissed as a flotsam of human-
ity. Thus in taking up this initiative to restrict Indian rights on liquor in
Southern Rhodesia, the BSACo.officials argued:
In Rhodesia the Indian community consists almost entirely
of a poor class of Coolies, dwellingprincipally in the lower
quarters and outskirts of the town, in gardens beyond the eye
of the Police, and in Locations in close proximity to Col-
onial Natives, to l§sm they have free access at all hours of
the day and night.
For this access to the African communities, especially the so-called
'Colonial Natives', the BSACo.officials were evidentlywary about the
activities of the Indian community in Bulawayofor tnstancejwhere it was
argued that because they were 'exceedingly keen traders', these Indians would
be consequently 'unable to resist the opportunity of indulgingin••• illicit
trade ••• ' with the Africans, more so that the CapeAfricans were, so it was
concluded, prepared to pay for the liquor 'at three or four times its proper
231value', and saw no reason why they should be forbidden to enjoy a privi-
232lege at the disposal of the African voters in the Cape Colony. But for the
BSACo.Administration, the activities of the Indians and the Cape Africans in
connection with liquor traffic could only lead to increasing drunkenness, crime
228C.O. 417/195: Petition of the 'Indian Congregation of Bulawayo' Enclosed
in Sir Hercules Robinson to C.O. : April 24, 1896.
229Tinker: OPe cit. pp. 53-4 and 60: The 'Untouchables' are said to have
formed one fifth of 'coolie' emigrants from Southern India.
230C•O. 417/197: Lord Grey to DeputyCommissioner, Sir R. Martin,
Bulawayo: July 15, 1896.
231.!2.!!!: Lord Grey to Sir Martin: July 15, 1896.
232Vide: The trial of Paul 'Magbato' andWilliam Mzinjana in Bulawayoin
in March 1898 for forging written authority to purchase liquor. Cape
Argus: March 3, 1898.
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and disturbances in the urban and mining districts,thus posing a source of
threat and insecurity to the white settlers which had to be prevented by
restricting the chances of collusioo. between the Indians and the Africans. 233
On the reverse side of the coin, the Indians were also regarded in 1896
as a positive asset andjtn those troubled times, as 'loyal and useful members
234of the community ••• '. Their value during the food shortage crisis in
1896Jfollowing the rinderpest epidemic and the blockade of Bulawayo by
Ndebele insurgents, was well underlined by their role as market gardeners
235supplying vegetables to the beleaguered white inhabitants. Thus by 1901,
these 'passenger' Indians or Asiatics in Southern Rhodesia amounted to the
236following figuresJas in Table m:
Table III:
Males Females Total
Mashonaland
Matabeleland
Totals
177
616
10
290
187
906
793 300 1,093
The predominance of the male element in the Asiatic population is a good
illustration of the indentured labour origins of the Indian population of South-
ern Rhodesia. As it was the male whose services were demanded by the
physical character of the employment for which 'coolies' were imported by
overseas employers, thus the proportion naturally tended to favour a
237
male dominance.
In any case,Asiatic presence in Southern Rhodesia remained minimal
up to 1900~ before the dominant Rhodesian economic stratum mounted its
efforts to resort to India and China for constant and regular labour supply.
As far as India was concerned, these attempts by Rhodesian employers were
233C. O. 417/197: Percy Inskipp, Secretary, Salisbury to BSACo., July 17,
1896.
234Ibid: Lord Grey to Sir Martin: July 15, 1896.
235Report by E. Ross Townshend, Civil Commissioner. Bulawayo, for the
Year ending September 16, 1896, Enclosed in BSACo. Reports ..__.,p 126.
236These figures are based on the census taken in March 1901: Vide
Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1902: P. 142B.
237Cf. From a total of about 50 to 60 Moslem Indians in the Victoria dist-
rict of Southern Rhodesia in 1905, only 3 were females hence the com-
plaints on 'bastards'. Vide: F. Dotsoo and L. O. Dotson: Ope cit. pp.
280-2.
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in harmony with the BSACo. conclusions that the Administration of Southern
Rhodesia could effect economies by resorting to the vast population of India
for its police recruits in the same way as Johnston had done in Nyasaland,238
and.tn so doingcut down the numbers of the more expensive white manpower
within the British South African Police.
The plan to substitute white police, who cost the Company about £200 per
head per annum in mamtenance.wtth Sikhs) at the lower cost of about 20 rupees
(c. £16) per month or £60 per annum, was sound economic planning, from the
. 239BSACo. point of View. But the size of the proposed reduction of about
two-thirds of the white manpower, literally leaving a small fraction of this
element for headquarters and other central post duties in the provinces) was
regarded as too drastic and likely to expose the white settlers in the country
to danger in case of insurgency. Accordingly, the scheme was unacceptable
240to the Imperial authorities. For the employers of Southern Rhodesia
however, the Sikh police scheme of 1898 helped to emphasize once more the
241
role of India not only as 'an English barrack in the Oriental seas', but
also as a source of labour supply to promote their economic interests in the
country. It was, therefore.India, alternating with China, which.henceforth,
provided the central point of controversy within the white public in Southern
Rhodesia up to 1904.
Other non-European and white sources were also considered,especially
regarding their merits and demerits,but with little success. The white labour
lobby for instance, suggested Italians, Maltese and other white communities
of Southern Europe to counter any moves to introduce Asiatic labour. A posi-
tive step in this direction actually came from one William Macnaughtaun of
of Glasgow in August 1900, whose company, the Mashonaland Agency, owned
mining properties in several parts of Southern Rhodesia1especially in the
242
Lomagundi district. In order to promote this introduction of Italian lab-
ourers into Southern Rhodesia, a labour purveyot; Alfred Edlmann,was
was despatched to Florence ,on behalf of the Mashonaland Agency, to assess
238Pachal: Malawi: The History of the Nation: pp. 247-8.
239C. O. 417/253: Jones, Secretary, BSACo. to C. O. : August 11, 1898.
240Ib1d: Chamberlain to Milner: August 19, 1898.-
241Robinson et al: Africa and the Victorians: p. 12.
242Vide Supra: pp. 149-50.
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the prospects of such a scheme.
From Eldmann's point of view, the advantages of Italian squatter-
labourers,working for private companies in return for promises on land-
holding rights to both cultivate and later buy pieces of land for their own use
as colmists in their own right, were manifold. In the first place, the rural
Italian labourer appeared to offer those allegedly positive labour qualities
which the Rhodesian colonist employers were looking for in their attempts
to import foreign labour. They could easily provide, so it was believed,
'thousands of steady, sober, hardworking emigrants ••• ' not only for working
in the mines,but, given sufficient guarantees of settlement in the country,
would possibly increase the number of '••• a steady, law-abiding, industrious,
white and Christian population, ••• undoubtedly ,more preferablej- to a
243yellow heathen rabble 'Asiatics~'. Secondly, because ofwhat was con-
sidered the exceptionally prolifiC regenerative propensities of Italian women,
well demonstrated in the case of Italian immigrants in the province of Sao
Paulo in Brazil where their population had increased to me millim In only
ten years towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Italian labour scheme
for Southern Rhodesfa.therefore, according to its promoters, merited the
sympathy of the Imperial authorities, simply on account of the hope it offered
to increase 'a large and friendly ,population~ to overwhelm and be pitted
244against the Boers. '
This Italian labour scheme had its supporters inside Southern Rhodesia,
notably ~h _ J. P, Finnie, a labour agent and contractor based in Gweloand
associated with the Matabeleland DevelopmentCo. Ltd. in these activites
since 1894. The successful utilization of Italian immigrant labour in Latin
America,especially in Brazil and Argentina was, from Finnie's point of view,
cogent vindication for simllar moves being adopted in connection with Southern
Rhodesia's labour problems. Unlike the Chinese labourer whose importation
would entail a legion of social problems, the Italian, it was argued, was, to all
appearances,a blessing to the country. For not onlywas he redeemed be-
;fore the white colonist public by his racial originjbut also because the Italian CBIIle
~ltoal":' 'a hardy race' used to working 'under a boiling sun' and was thus
243C•O. 417/311: Alfred Eldmann, Florence, to William C. Macnaughtan,
Glasgow: August 20, 1900.
24~id: Eldmann to Macnaughtan:August 20, 1900.-
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capable of adapting to the African environment more easily than any of his
white counterparts. Notwithstanding the fact that the Italian was a skilled
artisan representing a nation that producedsome of'the finest stone masons in
the world, , it was still hoped that he could be imported an indenture as
cheaply as the Chinese and subsequently be engaged at the rates ranging from
245'three to five shillings per day. '
In short, a very favourable picture was painted of the Italian labourer in
comparison with labourers of other races in Southern Rhodesia. He could do
the work of 'at least two average kaffirs ~Africansr' without incurring the
displeasure of the employers in the same way as skilled artisans of other
white races whose only claim for introduction into the country was, Finnie
argued, based on the assumption that Southem Rhodesia was:
••• the dumpingground for all the most unreliable white
labour from other parts of the ~wor1dr.
These 'unreliable' skilled white workmen, most of whomwere of British
stock coming and going into the country, did not enchant Finnie. In compari-
son with the Italians, they were too expensive to engage and did not remain
in the country permanently for its benefit. Thus Finnie said of these birds
of passage:
The unreliable ones ~white artisansr work for two or three
months, have earned enoughmoney, and then generally give
up permanent work themselves and take to employing kaffirs,
but they seldom stay long in the country, and very rarely
bring their families here. All that they want to do is to make
a few pounds in the cOUfW to go home ~to Europer and start
a small business with.
Itwas therefore with this multi-dimensional aim of replacing inefficient
African labourers and unreliable skilled white workers as well as forestall-
ing the social problems which Asiatic labour implied, that the scheme to
introduce Italian indentured labourers and their families was put forward,
In its entirety, the Italian labour scheme was not, in its own way, devoid
of those racial overtones commonly underlying composite colonial societies.
The very idea of introducing laboo.rers of a different nationality, though
European as in this case, In a subordinate position smacked of traces of un-
245Statement of J. P, Finnie, Gwelo, inThe Labour Problem: Opinion Survey
by the 'Bulawayo Chronicle': June, 1901: PP. 48-9.
246Statement by Finnie in The Labour Problem: loco cit.
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inhibited condescending attitudes. In this particular ease.It could easily be
concluded that this move reflected some of the peculiar Anglo-Saxon attitudes
towards the Latin races of Southern Europe; attitudes well demonstrated in
the relationship between the British colonists in Southern Rhodesia and the
Portuguese of neighbouring Mozambiqueat the early period of the twentieth
century. The Hyatt brothers, Stanley, Amyas and Malcom for instance, all
traders and labour agents in the Ndanga district of Southern Mashonaland
bordering on Mozambique, were so singularly disrespectful of the Portuguese
institutions and authorities that during the course of the Anglo-Boer war they
often.carried out their labour recruiting activities and other economic ven-
tures in the Portuguese terrltoriy without due authority. Indeed even the idea
of approaching the Portuguese authorities for permission was offensive to
these Rhodesian colonists and,for that reason,Stanley Hyatt concluded that it
was:
••• derogatory to a white man's dignity to ask permission of
a Portuguese or any other nasty Dago; but European nations
have, in their idiocy, recognised the Mozambique !territory
as PQ[~ese, and so decent people must make the best
of it.
Similarly, the Por-tuguese port of Beira, the gateway to Southern Rhodes-
ia, was described in the most unfavourable language as nothing but a place
of 'vice' where:
With the exception of the small British community, white clad
and unutterably weary, the white inhabitants form a perfect
collection of samples of polyglot rascality,. ••• East and West,
North and Southhave sent specimens of their very worst to 248
that sultry little Gehanna on the shores of the Indian Ocean••••
In this abysmally unfavourable situation in Beira depicted by these Rhodes-
ian colonists, poverty and squalor were so pervading that the only prosperous
man was the Anglican parson, who demanded '••• twoguineas, payable in
advance, for every funeral he conducted. '
The Hyatt brothers may have represented an extreme brand of British
chauvinism, but it is essentially through this type of attitudes towards the
Latin races that some Rhodesian colonist employers should have dared at all
to suggest the Italian labourer as eligible for importation in a gamut of for-
247S. P, Hyatt: The Diary of a Soldier of Fortune: T. Werner Laurie:
London: 1910: p. 154.
248Hyatt: The Diary of a Soldier of Fortune: p. 162.
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eign labour importation schemes dealing largely with non-European peoples.
However, the Italian labour scheme did not/in the end.sueeeed for
various reasons. The idea of introducing white menial1abour into a plural
colonial society, rife with race-consciousness, was altogether out of question.
It cut across the main themes of the sociology and ethics of labour utiliza-
tion,thus undermining the essential trends of the economic, social and psycho-
logical functions of colonization which emphasized the hierarchical rela-
tionship between the dominant and the subordinate social segments of one
colonial society; the master and the servant as well as the parent-and-child
paternalistic analogies on which colonialism derived its legitimacy and the
249
dominant groups their privileged position. For such reasons, in 1903
Milner, accordingly,informed those circles within the white colonist commu-
nities in Southem Africa opposed to the importation of Asiatic labour, pre-
ferring.as they did,the engagement of white labourers instead, that:
••• the wh\jg~ cannot, or ought not to, work with his
hands •.••
because:
The position of the whites among the vastly more numerous
black population requires that even their lowest ranks should
be able to maintain a standard of living far above that of th~51
poorest section of the population of a purely white country.
Rhodes too subscribed to MIlner's views and.In advising the Rhodesian
mining industry against Italian labour, cautioned that white labourers would
only end up 'bossing' the non-European labourers on the mines rather than
252working alongside them.
Other potent factors against the importation of Italian labourers or any
other form of white labour were considered in relation to their alleged
positive attributes to the Rhodesian colonist employers and ultimately the
disadvantages of white labour were regarded as just too great to run any risk
of its introduction. The question of these labourers' submission to the
249Vide: Cairns: op. cit. PP. 42~; and Memmi: oPe cit. PP. 48-55.
250Milner to Dr. J. E. Moffat: Private and Confidential: April I, 1903:
in C. Headlam (ed): The Milner Papers: South Africa 1899-1905:
Vol. II: Cassell & Co.: lDndon: 1931: P. 460.
251
Milner's address to the White League: June 2, 1903: in Headlam: opt cit.
P. 459.
252The Salisbury Chamber of Mines Report 1901: PP. 55~.
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nature of employer/employee relationship on a pattern in harmony with
their indenture status and in comparison with their non-European counterparts,
was obviously an important one here. For one thing, even the most ardent
supporters of the Italian immigrant as the ideal labourer for Rhodesian colo-
nist employers began to harbour some doubts on the disctplme and manage-
ability of the labour material whose country of origin had already produced
the 'Sooialists and Anarchists settled near NewYork' on the American con-
253tinent by 1900. Suchmisgivings as these obviously provided the opponents
of the Italian labour scheme with the ammunition they required, as they quest-
ioned the prospective employers whether
••• for every Italian employed, ~the companies)- w~g4
be prepared to engaged two policemen to watch him?
By and large, Rhodesian employers were no longer quite a s enthusiastic
about either Italian or other white labourers as they were on non-white sources
of labour supply. Their primary concern was cheap labour"which, to these
colonist employers, was naturally in accordance with the objective economic
255
realities of their situation in a generally non-profitable mining industry.
Even the more profitable Rand mines were, (Il this score, in accord with
their counterparts across the Limpopoin putting strong emphasis on cheap
non-white labour before everything else; a propensity they wouldnot conceal
to a party of visiting missionaries at the end of the Anglo-Boer war. Not even
machinizatian. could compensate for the advantages of this cheap non-white
256
labour, from the mining magnates' point of view.
Thus in their campaign to procure external labour from sources far and
wide, the employers in Southern Rhodesia wouldnot be persuaded to risk the
257
importation of white labour even on an experimental basis. After their
unsuccessful bid to import Abyssinians, Arabs and Somalis, the areas of
253C.o. 417/311: Eldmann to Macnaughtan:August 20, 1900.
254Statement by J. ShawHunt: in The Labour Problem: p. 45.
255C. van Onselen: 'The 1912Wankie Colliery Stroke': Journal of African
HiStory: XV, 2, 1974: pp. 275-6.
256For the visit of the missionaries to the Rand and arguments on cheap
labour and machinization: Vide: Evidence of the Rev. G.A. Wilder:
Salisbury: August 30, 1904: in S. African Native Affairs Commission
Report 1903-5: VoL IV: P. 15.
257Address by Col. Heman, President: RhodeSia Chamber of Mines: in
Rhodesia Chamber of MinesAnnual Report 1903: PP. 29-30.
259
operation now shifted to India and China and their strength of purpose in the
face of widespread hostility from the Rhodesian white public towards Asiatic
labour, only helped to widen the scope and depth of conflict between the
economically dominant mining industry and the less powerful but more
numerous secondary colonist clesa.composed of artisans, small-workers
and traders with the support of the missionaries. The fears of these econom-
ically impotent sections of the white colonist public of SouthernRhodestajo;
the importation of Asiatics, whether India or Chinese, were legion and were
largely based on the threats posed by possible economic and structural com-
petition as well as the quasi -mythical assumptions on the characteristic
insanitary and immoral habits of the ASiatics; assumptions derived essen-
tially from the social stereotypes and psychological persuasion of their
authors. Paradoxically, some of the characteristics of the Asians nowunder
attack in Southern Rhodesia in particular and Southern Africa in general,
concerningJespecially, the Asiatic labour attributes, had been for a long time
the very basis of traditional European Orientalism. 258
In the years following the construction of the railway Une connecting
Bulawayowith the South in 1897, the threat of increased economic compe-
titionJespecia1ly from 'passenger' Indians coming into the country from
SouthAfrica as British subjects, took on some new significance for the
Rhodesian white community. Hitherto they had put up with Indians merely as
m.arket-gardeners or ordinary labourers.such as the KonkaniMoslems em-
ployed at the Morven mine near Bulawayo,who had also come into Southern
259Rhodesia via SouthAfrica. But the prospects of further bouts of Indian
immigrants of the wealthier class,such as the Gujerati merchants in the years
1898 to 19041did not at all tantalize the secondary colonist segment of the
Rhodesian white society. Their anxieties in this regard, it may be pointed
out, were not unfounded. In Natal where Indian 'coolie' labour importation
had set the example for other sister colonies in Southern Africa for a fairly
long period, anti-Indian sentiment among the white colonists, dating back to
the period after the Wragg Commission between 1885 and 1887, was assuming
a distinctly virulent form towards the closing phases of the nineteenth century.
The main reasons for such increased anti-Indian sentiment were firstly.
~ j
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the increasing urbanization of the Indian immigrants, thus allowing their
movement from the backwoods on the sugar plantations to the urban areas,
the centres of white colonist agglomeration; secondly, the fectmdity of the
Indian immigrants and the rapid growth of the Indian population and finally,
the influx of the so-called 'Arab' (Gujerati) traders.waose presence.espect-
260ally in the retail trade.had begun to be felt by the 1890's. Moreover, as
far as Rhodesian colonists were concerned, there was no guarantee that the
commercial restrictions imposed on the Indian trading class in the Boer
republics in the South)especially in the 'I'ransvaaljprfor to and after the Anglo-
Boer war, would not lead to another source of Indian influx into the Company
territories on the basis of the universality of British citizenship then under-
lying British imperial philosophy. The 'Cape Boys' had,after all,used their
disabilities in the Transvaal as a pretext to join the campaign against the
1896 risings in the BSACo. territories and escape from the disadvantages
they shared with the Asiatics and other non-white British subjects in that
state.261
From the point of view of the white Rhodesian public of the period, Asi-
atic presence and its concomitant threats were.more or less",real rather
than fanciful What they wanted) therefore; were vigilante groups an the pattern
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of the European defence societies in Natal and later on the Rand, to
protect their interests rather than systematized importation of Asiatics even
as labourers, as the Rhodesian mining industry intended to do between 1898
and 1904. Indeed,settlers' reactions in form of structural antagonism towards
the Asiatic traders were beginning to manifest themselves in a violent
character as the Anti-Banyan society of Umtali demonstrated at the beginning
of 1899. Here the ingress of 'passenger' Indians into Southern Rhodesia
through the neighbouring Portuguese territory, then relatively lax in its legi-
263slation on Asiatic immigration, had become a controversial issue and a
cause of differences between the white trading community and the civil auth-
orities by mid-1898.
As early as April 1898, the granting of trading licences to Indian mer-
260R. A. Huttenback: Gandhi in Sout'&. Africa: British Imperialism and the
Indian Question: 1860-1914: Cornell University Press: Ithaca and Lon-
don: 1971: pp. 38-43.
261
Vide: Supra: pp. 117-8.
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chants, individually dripping into the country} had begun to cause some furore.
In spite of explanations from Cloete, the Acting Magistrate of Umtali, that
such actions were in accordance with official pollcy and the instructions of
the High Commissioner that no British subject with satisfactory credentials
could be denied such licences, the settlers of Umtali were apparently not
impressed. Thus at a subsequent meeting held on April18, 1898 under the
presidency of ane Mr. Lister, they protested against actions of such chara-
cter demanding the introduction of some form of legislation by th~ Executive
Oounctl in Salisbury to prohibit the issue of licences to Indians as well as:
to draw a defining line between Europeans and ~e~tics, and
place the latter on the same footing as natives.
To strengthen these demands, the Umtali white populace formed the Anti-
265
Banyan Society, with the sole purpose of 'boycotting the Indian and those
who assisted him. '
By the beginning of 1899, the protests of the Umtali white community had
obviously failed to influence the decisions of the BSACo. Administration,
hence they decided to adopt more vigorous measures} similar in character
to those of the Ku Klux Klan of American fame at the end of the nineteenth
century against the challenge of the competitive aspirations of the black com-
266
munities to the hitherto privileged position of the dominant white group.
Led by some of the prominent names in Rhodesian commercial circles like
267
John Meikle, A. W. Suter, JP; J. Corderoy, JP; A. H. Reynolds and
W. H. Marley, also a lieutenant in the Umtali Vobmteers Corps, the residents
of Umtali mounted physical attacks on Indian traders in January 1899J demand-
ing their immediate departure from the country. In the circumstances) the
municipal police and the British South Africa Police sent from Old Umtali to
263When the PEA authorities introduced their legislation restricting Asiatic
immigration in 1903, the British Imperial authorities were actually
anxious about its effect on Natal and S. Rhodesia especially: Vide:
C. O. 417/378: C. O. to F. O. : March 12, 1903.
264
Cape Argus: April 19, 1898.
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reinforce the former, were put in an awkward position. As Inspector Mac-
queen, the BSAPOfficer Commandingin the Umtali districtJconfessed, the
insurgents were not only members of the Umtali Chamber of Comm.ercebut
were also the bastion of the town's citizen militia, the Umtali Volunteers,
and with the small arms they had, were.tberetorejprepared to rout the police
force detailed to guard and protect the Indian traders and their property.
Only the sympathetic response to their petition by the Administrator in
268Salisbury helped to cool the tempers of these insurgent residents.
The Umtali fracas was perhaps an extreme manifestation of settler
opposition to Asiatic structural competition)especia11yby the secondary col-
onists who still felt that small-scale trade should remain in the hands of its
proper pliers, namely the lower segment of the white Rhodesian colonial
societyJdescribed by the Resident Commissioner in 1904Jin somewhat un-
palatable terms) as being composed mainly of Levantines, Russian Jews and
other non-descript entrepreneurs J classified generally as 'Dagos' and exer-
269cising 'no good influence upon the natives ••• ' in 'Kaffir truck'. This
lower social segment of the white society,with its precarious hold on the
country's economic spoilsJfelt threatened not only by the 'passenger'
Indian, the Gujerati merchant, but also by the proposed imported Asiatic
labourer whose rate of economic and social mobility they did not easily trust
and,therefore)concludedjaccordlnglY"that he also merited total exclusion from
the country.
SpecificallYJwhat the white traders, artisans and their colleagues dis-
liked about the introduction of Indians as labourers was diverse in character.
In a nutshell, these Rhodesian colonists were caught up In a morass of con-
flicting claims between British imperial philosophy and general European
Orientalism towards the British Indian subjects.
Brothers, headed by Tom Meikle and with trading outposts throughout
the country. Hewas also a brother-in-law to H.U. Moffat, Premier
of S. Rhodesia (l927-32),and was himself a member of the Leg/Co.
elected on the anti-Asiatic labour ticket in 1903. Vide: A 11/2/8/6:
H.M, HeYman,WillOughby'sConsolidated Co. Ltd" Bulawayo to
MIlton: Salisbury: November 10, 1903.
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While the 300, 000, 000 population of India promised to provide a per-
ennial and regular source of potential labour supply to Southern Rhodesia in
common with other overseas territories, the Rhodesian secondary colonists
felt that the mining industry whose intention to import Asiatic labour they
opposed, would not be able to comply with its promises to either repatriate
these Indians or restrict them in the nature of their economic activities) since
they were British subjects and as such restrictive measures were contrary
to British imperial policy. Moreover, India being nearer than either China
or Japan, some of the possible sources of importable Asiatic labour, it was
felt that the Indians would simply 'over-run' Southern Rhodesia like they were
270alleged to be doing in Natal. After all, the Rhodesian mining industry had
itself confessed its inability to institute a compound system comparable to
that at the Kimberley mines where the diamond mines were richer and con-
centrated in one area and quite dlsimilar to the scattered and relatively
271poorer gold mining industry in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed..,even some of
the more obdurate supporters of these Asiatic labour importation schemes
within the Rhodesian mining circles were quite prepared to express their mis-
givings on the issue of keeping Indian labourers off '••• the side walk, -(or}-
272
out of trade ••• ' because this ran contrary to British imperial pollcy.
These forebodings on the incapacity of both the Administration and the
Rhodesian mining industry to deal with the Indian labourer as they wished or
in such a manner as to minimize structural compettion between him and the
secondary colonist, were.undoubtedly.a bitter pill for the latter to swallow.
Perhaps the anxieties of the secondary colonists may have been well expres-
sed by John C. Collard, the editor of the Bulawayo Chronicle ~ho stated in
his commentary on the Asiatic labour issue that:
We could not compound them ~dian labourers}- or deport
them 00 the termination of their agreement, or restrict
their actions in any way; they would immediately their
contract was finished swarm over the country and mono-
polise many of the occupations now carried 00 by the whites,
270A 11/2/8/5: William J. Harvey to R. Wilson Fox, for BSACo. : London:
Private and Confidential: January 19, 1900; and also: SaUsbury Chamber
of MInes Annual Report 1901: pp. 24 and 39.
271Rhodesia Chamber of MInes Annual Report 1901: p, 53.
272Statement by Major Maurice Reany, Managing Director, Matabele Gold
Reefs and Estates Co., etc., in The Labour Problem.: P. 9.
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while during their term of service they would import their
fathers, sons, brothers, sisters and hundred other r~'ions.
In short, Rhodesia would become a coolie settlement.
Finally, it was also indicated by other antagonists of Indian 'coolie'
labourers that whilst it would be impossible to repatriate these labourers,
some of those who remained in Southern Rhodesia would be indulging in what
was described as a peculiar trait of the Indian labourer that:
••• he hoards his money, which eVH-.Fally goes out of
the country and reaches India •••
thus causing serious ti.oal drainage from Southern ~hodesia.
But it was in the opposition to Chinese and 'Asiatic' labour in broad
terms, that tempers rose and the respective lobbies on the importation of
this class of labour into Southern Rhodesia flayed one another in passionate
terms. Opposition to Chinese labour importation was based on three dimen-
sions. There were those who based their objections on Australian precedence,
whom we might call here the Australian lobby, represented especially by
Fred G. Shaw, a Mining Engineer with several mining claims of his own)in
addition to land assets, in the country. The second group of opponents of
Chinese labour had also some previous experience with this type of labour
in America, notably in California where Chinese labour had been introduced
some time after the American Civil War for mining and railway construction
work. The last class of anti-Chinese acttvtsts were mostly of the proto-
Rhodesian populist genre, who regarded the Chinese labour scheme as an
attempt by international finance represented by the Rhodesian mining industry
to thwart their economic existence. The OPPOSitionof the last-mentioned
lobby to the scheme actually reflected a mixture of British chauvinism and
Rhodesian colonist sentimentalism. The champion this last group of colonist
opponents was Leopold F. Moore, the chairman of the Anti-Chinese Immi-
gration Committee and a member of the Pharmaceutical Society of Great
Britain/who also owned several chemist shops throughout Southern Rhodesta,
The importation of Chinese labourers, as far as Fred Shaw and other
ex-Australian colonists were concerned, was a retrogressive step rather than
an advantage to the development of Southern Bhodesta, Without doubting the
273commentary by Editor (J. C. Collard), in The Labour Problem: PP. 1-2.
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positive qualities of the Chinese as a labourer, these ex-Australians, basing
their arguments on experiences of Chinese Immfgrattonjespecially in Queens-
land and Victoria where Chinese services were badly required in the sugar
plantations, mines and railways, still had their own anxieties on the feasi-
bility of putting this class of labourers under effective control. As John
Swift, then a builder and contractor in SouthernRhodesta.tndfcated, the
Chinese were '••• a stubborn, treacherous, -{and)-obstinate people••• ' with
a strong aversion 'to work for a white boss' and he was convinced that
should the Chinese labourer be confined 'to a compound as a hewer of wood
and drawer of water, ••• the experiment -{would)-turn out an expensive and
275dangerous failure. ' Such characteristic traits,on the part of the Chinese)
were, Shawalso argued, of course,excusahle in the light of human and general
historical development. The Chinese felt too superior to endure the rest-
rictive ccmditioos and other disabilities imposed on him as an unskilled men-
iallabourer either in Australia or in Southem Rhodesia, should the mining
industry proceed with its importaticm plans. In short, Shawsummarized the
positioo of the Chinese labourer in relation to his white boss as follows:
It must be remembered that from pride of the most ancient
history and descent from a Civilisation which existed and
founded its ethics hundreds of years before Moses wrote
the Ten Commandments, the Chinamanmay be forgiven
for remembering that centuries after Confuciousbequeathed
to him his lessons -{and)-his morals, our -{British)- ancestors
were the woad-stained roaming coracle-steering savages of
Britain, and therefore it must not be wondered at that he
-{the Chinese)- considers himself in every way equal, if not
superior, to a white man. Hewill not, unless compelled,
work alongside a negro, or take a nEffe's wages and it is
a mistake to imagine that he will;•••
For a white colonial community whose rationale for the utilisation and
importation of cheap and dependable labour and whose dominance in this
stratified plural society depended on alleged technological, cultural and racial
superiority, the possibility of egalitarian or competitive claims by any other
social segment was naturally a blow to the whole social, econom.icand
political structure of this SOCiety. The administrative problems of control-
ling such diverse social groups were obviously disenchanting. In Southern
275Statement by John Swift, in!!!!!: PP. 30-1.
276 Statement by Fred G. Shaw, in!!!!!: p. 15.
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Rhodesia, this was even more so especially that a small clique of the white
society representing international capitalism was responsible for institu-
ting this potentially problematic situation and was prepared to ride rough-
shod over the wishes of the white majority. In Shaw's opinion, the Rhodesian
labour problem reflected once more the peculiarities and deformities of a
situation dominated by a small faction of economic interests who acted not
only as hangers-on to Rhodes, the founder of the colony,but also aimed at
exploiting their dominant position to carry out their own designs and, in the
case of the Chinese labour scheme, influence the Administration to espouse
their cause. Given the problems involved in controlling and policing the
Chinese labour immigrants in accordance with requisite restrictive condi-
tions, what this economic class thus was driving at, so it was concluded, was
to increase the burdens of the Administration and consequently the taxation
of the ordinary white settler 'for the sake of a very few of the Mining Com-
277
panies who ~aver lost most of their capital and reputation. '
In one respect, what the Rhodesian mining companies were looldng for
as a solution to their labour problems was quite amiss ,as far as Chinese
labour was concerned. The ex-Australian colonists in Southern Rhodesia
and their supporters saw the Chinese labour movem.entas a clandestine
attempt by those more unpopular mining companies and properties, repres-
ented by the Bonsor mine)whose labour conditions and higb mortality and
accident rates had inexorably succeeded in scaring away African labourers
with dire consequences, but,at the same timeJcontrolled the voting power in
278the Chamber of Mines to their advantage. However)in spite of the power
of these mines and the absence of legal accountability for the management
over the accident and mortality rates in Southern Rhodesla,as .was then
obtaining in Australia, Shawwas doubtful whether' ••• the Chinkies ~Chineser
~werer likely to become more willing martyrs to the students in mine engin-
279eering than the Matabele or Mashonas?' What the mining companies ought
277MBs. Afr. S228/C 1: Fred G. Shaw to Rhodes: April 23, 1901.
278Shawwas here directing his attacks against,especially) the two largest
combines, Willoughby's Consolidated and its subsidiaries, and :Matabele
Gold Reefs and Estates Co, and Its ancillary syndicates too, whose
managing directors, Col, Heyman and Major Heany,respectively, were
among the strongest supporters of Chinese labour.
279Statement by Shaw: in The Labour Problem.: p, 17.
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to have been doing then was a reappraisal of the labour conditions on their
properties) instead of resorting to far-fetched soluttons.
Yet with thes state of affairs then prevailing in Southern Rhodesia bet-
ween 1898 and 1904, the stage when more realistic measures could be intro-
duced to solve the country's labour problem without resorting to the Chinese
or any other Asiatic source of labour and concentrating only on African and
white labour supply to meet the wishes of all sections of the white public,
was still far removed. For one reason, whilst white labour could be induced
to come into the country from other poaaeaatons.eapeofally Australia, under
promises of acquiring their own mining claims) which they could work on
alternate basis with their engagements to major mining companies and, in so
dofng,bring capital into the country and also replace 'some green niggers' or
confine them to surface work only, as Shaw claimed to have been doing in
280the Belingwe district, even such a system would)howeveljnot prevail on
account of the monopoly system which had grown over the years in Southern
Rhodesia. InMatabeleland only, this monopoly had led to the locldng up, by
the big mining companies, of about 55,000 mining claims by 1901, covering
an area of 1,600 miles of reefs and old workings to the exclusion of about
436,000 potential miners.281 Thus the stranglehold of the mining companies
on the country was so strong that it led the opposition camp to the conclusion
that in standing up against the Chinese labour issues, they were actually
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fighting against a plot aimed at driving them out of the colony.
Ex-American lobbyists, most of whom were employed in skilled jobs
as engineers by the Rhodesian mining companies, based their OPPOSitionto
Chinese labour purely on the possibility of structural antagonism likely to
ensure, in the event of large-scale importation. of these 'coolies I• The Cali-
fornian case whereby white workers and commercial classes mounted agita-
tion towards the close of the nineteenth century against Chinese immigrants,
previously brought into the country during the post-Civil War era for recon-
283struction purposes, served as a good example to Rhodesian colonlsts, In-
deed,lt was the Californian and the Queensland precedents which together
280Ibid: Shaw to Rhodes: April 23, 1901.
281Statement by Shaw: in!!W!: p. 16.
28212J.!!: Shaw to Rhodes: April 23, 1901.
283Statement by J.R. Farrell, Consulting Engineer for R. Williams & Co. :
Ibid: p. 32.-
268
provided the proto-Rhodesian populist movement with its characteristic
emotional dressing and ideological terminology; the hue and cry that the
Chinese labourer and his 'aptness, wonderful patience, untiring industry and
sobriety' would drive the white men into 'enforced idleness' and consequent
284
economic ruin. Leopold Moore and the anti-Chinese Committee
exploited this theme to a remarkable degree in Southern Rhodesia. These
age-old virtues of the Chines labourer were turned into vices and all the
positive attributes of this Oriental were thenceforth interpreted by the
proto-Rhodesian populists in terms of undisguised subterfuge against the wel-
fare of the secondary colontste, Consequently"the Chinese immigrant vir-
tually beeame.m the eyes of these colonfsta.a 'wily, persistent, cunning.••
unskilled labourer, .•• gradually -{working)-his way into every branch of
busmess••• 'because, as one Bulawayo artisan) T. H. Rickard, indicated:
What white man can compete with a Chinaman who~oBatisfled
with rice to eat and whose expenses are so small?
In the words of a restaurant keeper of pioneer fame, Thomas Constable, the
essence of the matter was that:
••• the white man has to live and keep up his dignity, demanded
by the society he Ilves in. The Chinaman has no dignity, and
no ane2~ts him to have any, hence he can live on sixpence
a day.
Thus itwas within the constraints of this ideological and economic
setting that the artisans, mechanics and general white labourers in Southern
Rhodesia carried out their campaign against the Importation of Asiatic lab-
our between 1898 and 1904. They wanted to be provided with adequate guaran-
tees from the pro-Asiatic lobby and the Administration on the need for total
Asiatic economic exclusion in terms of real estate ownership and acquisition,
commerce and skilled occupations in the mining industry and elsewhereJwhere
this lower social and economic segment of the white society held a precarious
foothold. To reinforce Its otherwise primarily economic cause, the Rhodestan
anti-Chinese movement intermingled its economic anxieties with apocalyptic
forebodings on the negative implications of Chinese labour Importation and
their possible effects on the moral and social life of the Rhodestan society as
284
For the Queensland anti-Chinese case: Vide: Statement by John Swift:
loco cit.
285Statement by T. H. Rickard, in!2!!!: p. 42.
286Statement by Thomas Constable, in!2l!!: p. 52.
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a whole.
The image of 'John Chinaman' painted by the opponents of Asiatic labour
was not at all attractive, to say the least. His capability to bring into the
country with him pestilence in form.of leprosy, cholera and other insanitary
diseases which were alleged to have ravaged 'the insanitary cities of China
287for 6,000 years', was not the only curse which Southern Rhodesia was
bound to inherit. The Chinese 'coolies' were, it was argued, 'wa11dngmasses
288of corruption', whose presence in the COlDltry could only be regarded as
a distinct drawback in terms of their proclivities for opium-smoking 'to a
289semi-stupefied state', gamblfng, immorality, thieving and a host of
other unspecified crimes with which they were likely to influence the indfgen-
290ous African population. MIssionaries too joined the anti-Chinese campaign
291on the grounds of moral and social complications likely to ensue, especi-
ally given the well publicised fact that no Chinese womenwould accompany
these prospective immigrants and that, in view of the Anti-Chinese Commi-
ttee, these Chinese labourers would1therefore)prey on 'native girls to be
292
drafted by thousands to the compounds of the Heathen Chinee••• "
consequently producing a bastardized race simllar in every respect to the
Mongolian/Aborigine offspring in Australia, considered by this lobby to be
293'the worst specimens of humanity in the world.'
In the final analysiS, the Chinese labour controversy created a rift and
some measure of distrust between the mining industry and the secondary
colonist segment in the Southern Rhodesian white society. In view of their
concem about Asiatic economic and structural competition expressed in
various assertions as we have already discussed above, the colonist artisans,
•
287Statement by L. F. Moore, in~: PP. 18-9; Vide also C.O. 417/283:
Moore, Secretary, Anti-Chinese Immigration Committee, Bulawayo, to
Milner: Telegram: July 23, 1900.
288Statement by J. B. Dark, in!M!!: p. 44.
289statement by John Switt, in!!!!!: p ".
290Statement by Thomas Read, in~: pp. 56-7.
291 .
Statement by BishopW1l1lamGaul, in!2!!!: p. 53-5.
292Statement by Moore: loc, cit.
293
Statement by John Swift: loc, cit,; These views on the soetal complications
of Chinese labour Importation were also advocated in SouthAfrica and
Britain. Vide: T. Naylor: Yellow Labour: The Truth About the Chinese
in the Transvaal: The Daily Chronicle Office: London: October, 1904:pp.6-7.
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mechanics, farmers and traders could hardly be persuaded against their
conclusions that international finance, represented by the mining industry
and the BSACo., was deliberately attempting to crucify the secondary colo-
nist sector on the question of Asiatic labour importation. In the circumstances,
they began to read in this movement, written in large letters, not only a
conspiracy by international capital but also unpatriotic designs destined to
undermine the fundamental principles under1yingBritish im,perialideals and
objectives. Indeed for the Rhodesian pioneers and settlers who had been
called to occupy and conquer the country under the banner of British patrio-
294tic pride and chauvinism in the manner Rhodes did, the Chinese labour
movement was decidedly an anti-climax in the overall progression of
Rhodesian history. Thus the proto-Rhodesian populist in his campaign against
Chinese importation began to question and reassess his contribution to the
country's colonisation processes and his subsequent betrayal by the Char-
tered Company and its capitalist associates in a way well demonstrated by
Rickard's rhetoric that:
Have the heroes of Matabeleland and Mashonalandwho have
lost their lives in the exploitation and pioneering of this
country, sacrificed their lives to fill the pockets of a few
money-grabblng capitalists and to pave the way for the
diabolical Chinee, the impersonification of ~in its
most hideous forms - the scum.of the earth?
Such concern by the anti-Asiatic lobby that the mining industry and
international finance or anybodyelse who advocated the importation of
296
Chinese labour was 'a traitor to the interests of the British race' was
enhanced by the apparent determination of the pro-Chinese faction to over-
ride the opposition and implement their scheme notwithstanding the wlner-
ability of the restrictive mechanisms which they intended to initiate to safe-
guard the welfare of their opponents. The assertions by some of the mine
bosses that there was no law in the COlDltry to prevent them from importing
Asiatic labour and that rigorous restrictions against 'cooUe' labourers would
4·
294For the role of Rhodes's jingoism and the birth of the Rhodes1as: Vide
Gross: Ope cit. pp. 160-82; and also Lockhouse and Woodhouse: OPt cit,
pp, 219-86.
295Statement by Rickard, in The Labour Problem: p, 42.
296Ibid.-
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be too expensive and costly for their companies, 297 were hardly encouraging.
Still from a legal point of view, the suspicions of the anti-Chinese lobby that
whilst Indian subjects were automatically not subject to restrictive legisla-
tion, the Chinese too might not be amenable to those proposed economic and
social disabilities due to Sino-British diplomatic and trade treaties, 298 could
only add to the anxieties of that section of the white colonist population of
Southem Rhodesia which felt threatened.
In a broader context, it should be remembered,1n this connection1tbat
the anti-Asiatic labour movement In Sou.thern Africa was specially strong
during this period. In the Cape where Asiatic labour had failed previously~99
the Rhodesian anti-Chinese lobby received support from commercial circles
In Kimberley, Cape Town and other centres as well as from Sir Gordon Spring,
300the Cape Prime Minister. With such backing, the differences between the
opposing sides on the Chinese labour issue in Southern Rhodesia could only
stiffen rather than recede. For Moore and the Anti-Chinese Committee,
their campaign assumed the aura of a caUsC:tcelebre and accordingly they were
prepared to sustain the momentum of their opposition to the scheme to the
bitter end, even if such an end meant an armed conflict with 'a few obdurate
speculators' determined to turn Southern Rhodesia into 'a plague spot on our
301-(British)- Empire. '
From these proceedings, it is evident that the decision by the Southem
Rhodesian mining industry to introduce Asiatic labour, in one form or another,
at the close of the nineteenth century to solve its chronic labour problems
had Significant results. The polarization between international capitalism)on
the one hand.and the white working class and national bourgeoisie ,on the other,
was dramatic. The conclusions of the latter classes that the Asiatic labour
movement was designed primarily for making 'the rich man richer, and the
poor man poorer,302 and also that the interests of the lower segments of the
297Statement by "I'elford Edwards, Consulting Engine6r: Rhodesia Explora-
tion and Development eo. ; etc. in l!W!: PP. 38-9.
298Speech by John Kerr, Bulawayo, March 17, 1901; in~: PP. 76-7.
299Statement by Shaw: loe.cit,
300Cape Times: May 23, 1901 and June 1, 1901.
301Statement by Moore: lococit.
302Speech by Dark at a meeting of artisans in Bulawayo: April15, 1900: in
Ibid: p, 70.-
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white Rhodesian society were being deliberately over-looked by what they
SOScalled a 'seven to four' form of government, quite naturally gave vent to
increased demands for a more representative form of political administra-
tion. In this movement was) thereforeJ-embedded the seeds of the anti-
Chartered Company movement whose main battle-cry for fair and equitable
economic and political deals in Southern RhodeSia gathered momentum
between 1904 and 1922. S04
The depth and strength of antl-Aslatic opposition within the discontented
circles of the Rhodesian colonist society did not however effectively impress
the mining industry in its determination to import Indian and Chinese labour.
Although Rhodes, as the godfather of the Rhodesian white populist movement,
may have found it necessary to reckon the trend of colonist public opinion
S05and thus trode m.ore cautiously on this Aslatic labour scheme, the rest of
the mining industry were less sensitive to the demands of the secondary
colonist element in the country. The line of action they adopted was that
whilst they would proceed forthwith with the importation of Aslatic labourers,
token restrictive measures would.nonetbelese, be introduced to minimize the
more obvious bounds of conflict with the white population opposed to this form
of labour.
The basic features of these restrictive measures on Asiatic indentured
labourers and immigrants were outlined at a meeting between the Chambenof
Mines and Commerce held in Bulawayo on Aprllll, 1900,where cotflpromises
were laboriously worked out between various and divergent economic inter-
S06ests. In essence.the Asiatic indentured immigrants were subjected to
S03The jibe was in reference to the 7 nominated members of the BSACo. as
agalnst the 4 elected ones in the Leg/Co.; Vide: Spgech by Swift at
Anti -Chinese Party Meeting, Bulawa,yo, March 17, 1901:1h!!!: P. 82.
S04Vide: Tawse Jollie: The Real Rhodesla: Hutchinson & ce., London: 1924:
Chapter In.
S05Rhodes, Bulawayo, to BSACo.; London: Cablegram: May'SO, 1901~in
Labour Supply and Regulation: P. 70: Vide also File C. O. 417/S1!o
P(R/O: London,
S06
It must be pointed out that the Chambers of Commerce and Mines were
diametrically opposed in their views on Aslatic im.mfgration. Thus dur-
ing the Umtali fracas supported by the town's Chamber of Commerce in
January 1899, the Umtali Chamber of Mines condemned the activities of
the white malcontents so Involved. Vide C. O. 879/57: J. S. Nicholoson,
Commandant General, BSAP, Salisbury to Milner: February 4, 1899.
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control on entry into the country, on their movements, nature of employment
and social and economic mobility. The rationale for these restrictions re-
flected not only the antipathy of the white secondary colonist segment, but also
the desire by the mining industry to utilise Asiatic labour more cheaply and
effectively without incurring some of the problems already occasioned with
regard- to African labour. Restrictive measures on the movement of the
Chinese or any other potential Asiatic labourers to an area,about 'two miles'
in perimeter. on the property so engaged and under pain of imprisonment for
307a term of up to 30 days.with or without hard labour for instance, was, in
this regard,therefore,not so much intended to exclude the Asiatic labourer
from visiting neighbouring independent shops,as W. Dempster of the Chamber
of Commerce feared, as it was primarily to facilitate the processes whereby
errant ASiatic labourers could be 'immediately nul in' and so prevent any
308possibilities of desertion.. Indeed the stiff penalties prescribed for deser-
tion, absence from work and wilful indolence, all classified as criminal
offences in the draft Immigration Ordinance of 1901, demonstrate, beyond any
doubt}the intentions of the mining industry to contain this form of labour and
maximise its utility within the five-year: 'maximum,period' of indenture so
309proposed
Similarly, the Chamber of Commerce and other more hostile sections of
the white community stood to benefit from a whole range of disabilities im-
posed on Asiatic immigrants and by which these people were excluded from
skilled occupations, granting of trading licences, acquisition of real estate
and citizenship rights or letters of naturalization. These restrictions, it
must be pointed out, were a compromise solution between the demands of
various colonist interests. Dempster, the Chairman of the Bulawayo Cham-
ber of Commerce and his colleagues, scared by the events in Umtali in
307Vide: Clause 59, ImmJgration Ordinance No. 18 of 1901: Enclosed in
Mllner to Chamberlaln, November 29, 1901: in Labour Regulation and
Supply: PP. 113-24.
308Speechby C.T. Holland, Chairman: Proceed1nJs at a Meeting held in
Bulawayo between the Chamber of Mine and Commerce re:- Restrictive
Legislation on Chinese Labour: April 11, 1900: in The Labour Problem:
PP. 62-3.
309
Absence, deserticms etc. carried penalties of 21 days imprisonment or
£2 ftne,first offence; £5 fine and two months imprisonment, for second
offence etc. ; Vide Immigration Ordinance No. 18 of 1901: Enclosed in
Milner to Chamberlaln: November 29, 1901: loc, cit,
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January 1899 and the presence of skilled Indian labourers at the Morven mine
near Bembesi in the Bubi district, 310 had two objectives in mind. They
wanted to achieve not only the total prohibition of either the 'Banyan'or the
'Chinaman' from coming into the country 'on his own hook', but also demanded
a heavy taxation on any potential free Asiatic immigrants, be they British
subjects or not; something akin to the £100 poll-tax of Australia. Of course,
total prohibition would have pleased such stalwarts.who argued,l1ke T. H.
Thomas, a member of the Executive Committee of the Bulawayo Chamber of
Oommeree, that:
You could never recognise a Chinaman again -(after a
twenty-mile journey ifF.Gwelo to Selukwewherej- he
would be a free man.
But total prohibition of Asiatic immJgratiOll as such, was,however, Unaccept-
able to the mining industry which actually viewed its relatively mild rest-
rictive measures as a favourable gesture towards the white public at a ttme
when there was
••• nothing to prevent any indivJfitl. •• from importing Chinaman
without restrictive safeguards.
Moreover, the mining industry managed quite well to stall behind
Imperial policy towards Asiatics from British possessions and on the fact
that Australian legislation having been passed by a self-governing dominion
was less dependent on the assent of the Colonial Office than that of Southern
Rhodesia. With such half-baked concessions to the antagonistic white public,
the Rhodesian mining industry thus placed its case for Asiatic labour importa-
tion on such a stroop; footing that only external intervention in form of action
by the Imperial government could effectively challenge and frustrate this
Asiatic labour importation programme.
The BSACo. Administration, a very willing partner in the Asiatic labour
movement, saw this as an advantage rather than a drawback. With its over-
all control over the importation, transport, hOUSing,feeding and other
313aspects of the Asiatic labour scheme, the Chartered Company as a pol1tico-
310Speech by C. T. Holland; at Anti-Chinese Party Meeting; BuIawayo:
March 17, 1901: in The labour Problem: PP. 80-1.
311
Speech by T. H. Thomas: Prooeed1Dgsat a meet1Dgheld in But awayo:
Aprll 11, 1900: in Ibid: p. 67.-312Speech by Holland: Prooeedings: April II, 1900;!l!!!!: p, 68.
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economic power in the country, with vested interests in the mining industry,
was well placed to play the tune in harmony with the interests of the other
mining concerns involved. The probabUity too of diverting some of this
imported Asiatic labour into alternative engagements like public works and
railway and road works, may have also tantalized the BSACo. Administration
314
to a reasonable extent. But it was particularly in connection with the
proposed creation of the post of Protector of Immigrants and his department,
corresponding to that on Native Affairs, that the Administration of Southern
Rhodesia came out into the open through its preparedness to take up cu~els
with the Colonial Office on behalf of'the mining industry.
In shaping this new office of the Protector of Immigrants, the BSACo.
legal advisers were quite anxious to exclude the influence of the Colonial
Office and thus leave enough Uving room to the mining companies, under the
aegis of the Southern Rhodesia Administration, to extract the maximum
reward from. the Asiatic labour scheme; their brain-child. Henry Wilson Fox,
one of the BSACo. legal brains, thus argued with the Londm Board in un-
equivocal terms on the need to keep the new official in charge of im.migrants
under BSACo. control as opposed to that of the Colonial Office in the follow-
ing manner:
The Imperial Government already have one Watch-dog -{Resident
Commissioner)- in Rhodesia. If they, want another, they should
appoint and pay him not ask us to adopt a course quite inconsistent
with the organisation of our Civil Service. If the whole Department
-(of Protector of ImmJgrants)- is to be independent of the Admini-
strator an imperium in imperio would be created and his posttton
would not be enviable.
Fox went on to elaborate the basis of his objections to the Protector of
Immigrants being made a protege of the Colonial Office:
••• it is derogatory to the position of the Company to take the
appointment of its officials out of its hands. It tends to give our
enemies a handle against us, as furnishing official proof that the
Government ~British)- still regards us with suspicion.
••• I think we should insist on the right of nomination. It is a mon-
313Sir M. F. Ommanney to Milner: June 14, 1901: In Labour Supply and
Regulation: p. 72.
314
A 11/2/8/5: Notes on the draft ImmJgraUon Ordinance by H. Wilson Fox
to B. F. Hawksley: June 29, 1900.
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straus pr~~ that we should have the paying and the C. O. the
patronage.
The resentful attitude towards Imperial control in labour affairs evinced
here by the BSACo., could only strengthen the positim of the colonist employ-
ers and,fn this case.concernmg Asiatic labour importation, the main bene-
factors were the Rhodesian mining companies.
Armed with this official backing and its own cmfidence to outplay in-
ternal opposition from within the Rhodesian white public, the position of the
Rhodesian mining industry on Asiatic labour importation, at least in Southern
Rhodesia itself, was unassailable. The opposition it faced between 1898 and
1901 could only be described as feebleJespecially in view of the economic
dominance of this single sector as it was then and the amount of influence
316which it wielded in the country. After the Anglo-Boer war, the movement
in favour of Asiatic labour was reinforced by increased labour demand to
meet the more intensified competition with the Rand.where massive quantities
of labour were required for reconstruction purposes. For one reason, the
Rhodesian mining industry could no longer prey on those sources of labour
formerly the preserves of the Rand.but abandoned in 1899 due to the outbreak
317of hostilities. Thus using this com,petitim as a worthy pretextJespeclally
in connection with Mozambique labour, the Rhodesian mining industry harped
over and over that its survival after May 1902, the projected end of the
Anglo-Boer War, could only lie in the introduction of Asiatic labour.
Indeed) with a corresponding movement gathering momentum at the Rand
between 1902 and 1904, the Rhodesian employers were just too pleased to
argue their cause in unison with the more genuine case of labour shortage
318across the Limpopo in the South. Finally, the conclusions of the Bloem-
319fontein conference in March 1903, and the Transvaal Labour Commission
315A 11/2/8/3: H. Wilson Fox, Portree, Isle of Skye, to J. F. Jmes:
September 1, 1901.
316For the predominance and priority of the gold minfng industry in Southern
.Rhodesia,especlally up to 1911: Vide: van Onselen: Chibaro: PP. 14-33.
317Vide: Supra: PP. 185-90.
318The formation of WNLA during the course of the War (in 1900) and Its
operatims vis-a-vis Rhodesian labour bodies after 1902 intensified
labour competition. Vide: Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report
1904: PP. 20-1.-319_
-Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Annual Report 1903: PP. 68-9: (Col. Heyman
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appointed in July 1903, 320 indicating that no amount of African labour, either
from the British colonies below and beyond the Zambesi, in East and West
Africa or in German and Portuguese Africa, could meet the insatiable hunger
of the labour-intensive mining industry in Southern Africa, greatly vindica-
ted the cause of the pro-ASiatic labour movement.
The period following the end of the Anglo-Boer war, therefore, added a new
zest to the pro-Asiatic labour campaign,either abandoned or taken half-
heartedly previously at the close of the nineteenth century. The Rhodesian
mining industry which had inherited the Abyssinian, Arab and Somali labour
321scheme from the Rand on account of the outbreak of hostilities in 1899,
had apparently not paid equal attention to similar arrangements on Asiatic
labour, especially those run by the London-based firm, the Harvey Brothers
specializing in Chinese, Japanese and Indian 'coolie' labour supply to the
West Indies, Hawaii and other countries in South America. As a matter of
fact, these purveyors of Asiatic labour had also been on the brink of estab-
lishing concrete arrangements with the Rand employers, when, like Kusel in
North-East Africa, the War caught them on the wrong foot and the study visit
to South Africa,for the purpoee.by William J. Harvey, one of the firm's
322managers, turned into a fiasco.
Thus what the Rhodesian mining industry could only do in the post-bellum
period, was to pick up the pieces of Asiatic labour arrangements hitherto
banished into oblivion. With regard to Indian labour supply for Southern
Rhodeata, earlier arrangements by private mining companies and individual
offers by specialist agents on Indian 'coolie' labour quite naturally formed
the basis of the post-1902 revitalised approach. Here for example, were con-
Sidered the offer~s previously made by a Glasgow firm~ William Ewing and
Company, in March 1900, to the BSACo. to supply 'coolie' labour to Southern
Rhodesia on the same terms as this firm had carried out, successfully, its
arrangements with employers of labour in the West Indies, Natal, Mauritius,
attended the Bloemfontein Conference in his capacity as President of the
320 Rhodesia Chamber of Mines).
Some of the regions proposed,unsuccessfully,as possible sources of labour
supply for one reason or another, included countries as diverse and far
apart as Zanzibar, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Cameroons, Congo Free
State etc. etc. Vide: Transvaal Labour Commission Report 1903: pp.1-12.
321
Vide Supra: PP. 191-3.
322A 11/2/8/5: William J. Harvey, to H. Wilson Fox, for BSACo. ; Private
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the Seychelles and even East Africa between 1894 and 1899. The main
sources of labour supply in India suggested in this instance, were the trad-
itionallabour reservoirs around Calcutta and the Tamil district in the Madras
Presidency" where, it was hoped, limitless suppUes could be procured from
the impoverished masses of these thickly populated regions. In other areas
of IndiaJsuch as the Bombay Presidency, the Punjab and the French settle-
ments at Pondicherry and Karikal, this firm of Ewing and Company was not
overly optimistic, as these areas seemed capable to offer employment loc-
ally}thus arresting overseas emigration. This was especially the case in the
Bombay Presidency. The Punjab.on the other hand/had already supplied
labourers for the UgandaRailway in 1898 and,for this reasan, private labour
agents could see no way out in a competition with the Imperial authorities
323for the same commodity.
These offers may not have effected immediate response from the relevant
official quarters at the time, but evidently generated sufficient enthusiasm
amongst private employers in Southern Rhodesia to sustain related movements
to import Indian labour for the mining industry. Notwithstanding the tremen-
dous opposition from the anti-Asiatic colonist circles in Southern Rhodesta,
324as we have already discussed, the feeling amongst the mining companies
that Indian 'coolie' labour could solve their labour shortage problems led to
the conclusions that perhaps India, as a source of labour supply, was worth
a trial after all. Thus at the height of the Asiatic labour controversy between
1900 and 1901, some of the mine managers and directors had begun to con-
clude, perhaps basing their theories on the offers already made, that provided
relevant working castes were recrutted,such as the Moplats of Mysore on the
325Malabar coast or the belligerent ethnic groups of the North-Western
326frontier of India bordering on the Afghanistan, the Indian labour scheme
might as well do. Accordingly, the first major initiative was launched in
and Confidential: January 19, 1900.
323!1?!!!: William Ewing, of W. Ewing & Co., Glasgow to BSACo.: March 23,
1900.
324Vide Supra: PP. 251-75.
325Statement by Holland: General Manager, Charterland Gold Fields, Little
Wanderer etc. etc. in The Labour Problem: P. 21.
326Statement by David Ferguson, Consulting Engineer to Colenbrander's Mata-
beleland Development Co" in!2!!!: P. 37.
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early 1901 by the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia, with the approval of
Rhodes and the BSACo. Administration, to send one Major Henderson, form-
erlyof the Indian Staff Corps and Assistant Labour Commissioner in Assam,
to India for the purpose of assessing the possibilities and implementing the
designs of the Rhodesian mining industry to procure labour from Mysore. 327
The scheme was,however,not successful, most likely on account of two
main reasons; firstly, the lack of unanimity between the Bulawayo and the
Salisbury branches of the Labour Board; the latter, in particular, expressing
its doubts over the value of Indian) as compared to Chinese labour material}
for mining work and hence this body's anxiety to avoid wmecessary additional
328expenditure on the part of the mining industry. Secondly, the Rhodesian
colonist employers were still involved with the promotion of Abyssinian,
Arab and Somali labour from North-East Africa and the Arabian peninsula
between 1900 and 1901 and some of them may have had good reasons to
329anticipate the success of these sources of foreign labour.
In any case, these initial moves to import labour from the Indian sub-
continent, however ill-conceived or fanCiful, provided the bri~e for more
vigorous action in the years after 1902. The faith of the Rhodesian colonist
employers that the Indian 'coolies', though less useful for m1n1ngpurposes than
their fellow Oreintals,the Chinese, were more used to less pleasant labour
conditions and lower wages in their own country than even those earned by
330African labourers in Southern Africa, must have, in the circumstances,
provided a veritable source of comfort to the champions of the Indian labour
scheme. For good measure, the activities of the Rhodesian Land and Mine
Owners' Association, that conglomerate body of Rhodesian financiers, based
in London,formed in 1902, and several purveyors and labour agents either
appointed and sent to India or originally working in that sub-continent but
associating themselves with the labour objectives of the Rhodesian employers,
tended by and large, to take cue after their sponsors. They interpreted in
the Indian labour scheme that such labour supply was by far the cheapest form
327Statement by David Ferguson Consulting Engineer to Colenbrander's
Matabeleland Development Co., in: !!2!S: p, 37.
328
B. T. Carson, Secretary, Labour Board, Salisbury to Labour Board,
Bulawayo Branch, March 27, 1901: in!!!!!!: PP. 97-8.
329
330Vide: Supra: pp. 193-248. .. .. ... .
Statement by Ferguson: in Labour Problem: loc, cit.
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of Asiatic labour material available and also took confidence in the precedence
that Indian overseas emigration then symbolized on a somewhat global scale.
Other methods adopted in implementing plans to extract Indian labour of
J
course) dealt with the alleged attributes of individual ethnic groups and their
merits as labourers; an arbitrary practice quite common in the Victorian
period regarding British and general European attitudes towards non-European
comm.unities in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. 331 As far as the post-1902
Rhodesian labour scheme relating to India is concerned, it is quite interesting
to observe that the areas of labour exploitation selected differed totally from
those proposed at an earlier period whenRhodesian employers were less
enthusiastic about Indian labour supply, namely those areas of traditional
supply of Indian 'coolie' labour around Calcutta and Madras,especially among
. 3i2the Telugu and Tamll ethnic groups. After the Anglo-Boer War, Rhodesian
hopes for Indian labour seem to have been pinned mainly in the Bombay Presi-
dency and the North-Western provinces) especially among the Moplas and the
Punjabis.
In its preference for Moplas, the Rhodesian Land and MIneOwners'
Association appears to have been influenced to a large measure by that pec-
uliarly inexplicable consideration in colonial Africa and Asla)that national
groups with recognisable historical military traits had more to offer to col-
onial bureaucratic infrastructures than the less militaristic ones, whether in
terms of labour utilisation, police and military services or even the recruit-
333ment of 'boss boys' and messengers. In this and many other respects,
the choice of the :Moplas, a formerly belligerent Moslem group on the Malabar
coast of India, by the Rhodesian consortium of employers and their henchmen,
may have been.Indeed.quite a deliberately well calculated move.
In its appeal for Mopla labour to the LondonBoard and the Colonial Office
in January 1903, the Rhodesian employers' association argued quite convin-
cingly in favour of the physical qualities of the Moplas,which, it was imagined,
were lacking amongst the Southern ethnic groups of India constituting the bulk
331
Vide Supra: PP. 248-9.
332Vide Supra: PP. 259-65.
333Van Onselen makes reference to the recruitment of African compound
police on the Rhodesian mines from Zulus, Ngoni, Ndebele and other
groups with reputable military background: van Omelen: Chibaro:
P. 139.
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of Natal's 'coolie' labour for the sugar plantations. The argument that the
Moplas were ; •• nothing more than a turbulent, fanatical and dangerous set
of ruffians .•• )' whose recruitment was likely to introduce a 'dangerous'
element into Southern Rhodesia, failed to impress the Rhodesian Land and
334Mine Owners' Association. On. the contrary, these employers of labour
pointed out that the frequent outbreaks of violence amongst this Moslem group
were largely due to 'an insufficient regard for their religious feelings' and
the 'overcrowded -{and)-distressed' conditions under which they lived, owing
perhaps to the faulty system of land tenure in the Mysore region which in-
exorably bred discontent. Indeed.not even the disapproval of local employers
in the Kolar district of India)where some of these Moplaswere engaged, could
perceptibly discourage the Rhodesian employers and their supporters. The
unfavourable attestations that Moplaswere 'peculiarly vulnerable to cholera'
335on account of 'the rotten fish onwhich they -{fed)-••• ' also appear to have
been, at least in the judgement of the Rhodesian employers, out-balanced by
the positive physical attributes of these people.qulte favourably compared with
their Hinducompatriots. Thus the Rhodesian Association concluded:
All ldnds of work requiring pluck, energy, and sustained
effort are done by Moplas, Moplashave done the heaviest work
and earned the reputation of being the best workmen; steady,
tractable and never troublesome while well treated in building
bridges over the big rivers of Madras; and in the gold mines of
-{Southem)-India, t!3G>estminers are the Moplas. They work
as Hindusnever do.
With this type of confidence in the MoplaIndian labourers, Rhodesian
colonist employers needed no further justification for importing Indian inden-
tured labour into the country,particul~ so that they had also promised to
introduce appropriate guarantees to appease the rival section of the Rhodesian
colonial society opposed to all forms of Asiatic labour. Suchguarantees were
obviously pertinent in view of the likely prospects of procuring even larger
supplies of Indian 'coolie' labour than the Rhodesian employers had at first
334C•O. 417/382: Memorandumby the Provisional Committee of the
Rhodesian Land and MineOwners' Association; January, 1903: Enclosed
in BSACo, to C.O, : January 6, 1903,
335A 11/2/8/8: R. Maguire, Agra, to Jones: January 14, 1903.
336!e!S: Memorandumby the Provisional Committee of the Rhodesian Land
and Owners' Association; January, 1903.
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anticipated, given under the circumstances, the promises on probable addi-
tional supply from the Punjabi, vouchedby George B. Allen, Rockfort Maguire
and J. H. Pollock of the SikhInfantry in the Punjab region: all associated,
albeit in different ways, with the Indian labour scheme for SouthernRhodes-
337Ia, Besides, one shipowner, Sir George Mackenzte,whose company ran
regular passages between Indian and African ports and whoalso boasted of
his contacts in Bombaylately involvedwith the Uganda.Railway contract
labourers, offered to deliver any amount of Indian indentured labourers bound
for Southern Rhodesia either at DelagoaBay or anywhere else at a reason-
338able price.
Against this background of a veritable avalanche of Indian indentured
labour and the inexorable conflict which this entailed with the anti-Asiatic
lobbywhose views were already knownthoughnot sufficiently heeded, the
sponsors of the scheme foundit necessary to assure those Rhodesian colonist
sections concerned about the advantages of this Indian labour importation
movement. For the commercial section of the Rhodesianwhite public, the
Moplas and other potential immigrants were described as more of 'cultivators'
than a trading class and.therefore, any fear of structural and other forms of
economic competition were underplayed. This was here also emphasized by
the fact that these indentured labourers, in the view of the Rhodesian em-
ployers, were after all intended to stay in the country only temporarily, or
for three years Et least and for that reason wouldnot bring their families
with them so as to avoid any propensities amongst them to develop some form
of attachment to the country.
From the moral and social point of view, one of the main theses put
339forward by Moore and his anti-Asiatic colleagues, this technique of dis-
couraging Indian permanent settlement in SouthernRhodesia by Introducing
only familyless labourers, vulnerable to social and moral pressures, however,
337A 11/2/8/8: T. Blair Reynolds, Chairman, The Rhodesian Land & :Mine
Owners' Association to H. Wilson Fox: January 9, 1903: Maguire to
Jones: January 14, 1903and J. H. Pollock, Kohat, Punjab to Col. Flint;
BSAP, Salisbury; Apri114, 1903.
338The cost of delivery from Bombayto Delagoa Baywas estimated at £11
per labourer. Vide: C.0, 417/382: Sir George Mackenzie to BSACo.:
March 10, 1903,
339Vide Supra: .p, 270.
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appeared to offer little comfort. It smacked too much of the old addage of
robbing Peter to pay Paul. But the Rhodes:ianemployers would not be caught
in a trap even on moral and social grounds. Consequently) they argued that
the type of Indian recruits they intended to bring were used to voluntary emi-
gration to other distant parts of India and to CeylonJin quest of employment
for long periods at a time, without falling victims to the social and moral con-
340sequences ascribed to emigration as a general phenomenon. In Southern
Rhodesia, the colonist employers hoped that such moral and social strength
evinced by these Indian emigrant 'coolies' would be obviously reinforced by
the scattered nature of the gold mining districts, thus minimizing any form of
Asiatic aggregation and association with the local African peoples, common
on the Rand.and.In this way, restricting the areas of contact and conflict
between the subject races.
To redeem the faith of the white settlers In the virtues and advantages
of a hierarchical colonial society; a conviction which may have been con-
siderably shaken by the growing political consciousness amongst the Natal
Indians in 1890's, 341 the sponsors of the Indian labour scheme for Southern
Rhodesia assured their constituents about the apolitical character of their
potential recruits by pointing out that these recruits, unlike the Natal Indt-
ans, were
••• not of the same race and they would not, therefore feel
injured by the consciousness of different treatment.
What these employers were more interested in, as far as the Indian
immigrants were concerned, were essentially sufficient labour supply,
efficiency, if any, and economy. The rights and welfare of the Indian rec-
ruits were simply peripheral and the very low wages provided for in the
contracts drawn by the Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners' Association Inex-
342
plicably emphasized these employers' objectives. On this occasion,
340Given the tendencies of Moslem Indians in East and Central Africa to
establish sexual liaisons with local African women, the Rhodesian Land
and Mine Owners' Association was naturally misleading its opponents.
Vide: F. Dotson and L. O. Dotson: oPe cit. PP. 280-5.
341Huttenback: op. cit. PP. 41-3.
342C. O. 417/382: Memorandum by the Provisional Committee January 1903
and A 11/2/8/8: T. Blair Reynolds: Chairman, The Rhodesian Land &
Mine OWners' Association to H. Wilson Fox: January 9, 1903. (The
wages designed for Indian labourers were as follows: Surface ••• 15/-
per month; underground. •• 20/- to 30/- and food, •• 15/- per month.)
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Rhodesian employers exploited the poor and congested state of affairs in
Indfa.arguing' that their labour importation scheme would, to all appearances,
provide India with the chance to solve her economic and demographic prob-
343lems and for this alleged advantage, they were in no position to offer
more concrete concessions in form of attractive labour conditions.
In these proceedings pertaining to the importation of Indian indentured
labour into Southern Rhodesia in those few years following the termination
of the Anglo-Boer War, the pattern adopted by the Rhodesian employers was
apparent. They were evidently more concerned with stabilizing their supply
of cheap labour than in introducing any kind of reforms to the prevailing
labour conditions in the mining industry itself, which inevitably led to an even
larger proportion of the local African labour supply proceeding to the South.
In consequence,Indian labour, like the North-East African and Arabian
labour schemes before it, was, therefore) to provide the external solution to
the employers' demand for a permanent and adequate labour supply; a
prospect regarded obviously as quite tantalizing in view of India's massive
manpower. But the potential Indian labourer was to act only as a cog in the
pattern of labour mobilisation rather than as a catalyst and medium for
reform. In this logic, lay, therefore, the roots of conflict between the India
Office, Imperial policy towards India and the pro-Indian lobby in Britain,
the so-called 'Indophiles',344 and the Indians in Southern Africa)rapidly
become conscious of their rights as British subjects since the arrival of the
345
famous lawyer and philosopher, M. K. Gandhi in 1893.
The demand for labour by Rhodesian employers, in association with their
colleagues across the Limpopo, was destined for a head-on collision with
some of the fundamental aspects of British imperial policy on India, evident
343C. O. 417/386: Milton to BSACo. August 5, 1903: Vide also File A 11/2/8/8:
R/N/A: Salisbury.
344The term 'Indophlles' was used rather abusely by frustrated employers
of labour: Vide: C. O. 417/382: Memorandum by Provisional Committee
••• January 1903.
345
It must be noted here that though Gandhi moved about advising Indians,
especially in Natal and the Transvaal, to organise to look after their own
welfare, his main contacts in his early years in South Africa were con-
fined mostly to the merchants and other upper classes rather than the
ordinary 'coolie'. Vide: C. F. Andrews (ed.): Mahatma Gandhi: His own
Story: G. Allen & Unwin: London: 1929: PP. 95-6, 112-3; and Tinker:
Ope cit. PP. 283-4.
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since the 1870's and championed especially by the Liberal Party. Essentially,
this policy embraced some traces of untversal justice, tolerance, personal
freedom and general Imperial trusteeship by which the people of India were
supposed to benefit largely from their British connection, whilst India
itself was expected to provide a set-book example in Imperial administra-
346
tion.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising and obviously predict-
able that the reactions of both the Government of India at Simla and the
India Office in london should have been less encouraging to the Rhodesian
employers in their requests for labour from India. The Government of India,
which,in fact,had already begun to question the wlnerability of the Colonial
Office to the influence of the West Indies 'Sugar lobby' over the emigration
347of 'coolie' labour since the close of the 1890's, could hardly be expected
to view kindly the role of India as a labour reservoir for overseas mining
industries.
Thus the question of Indian labour for the mines in Southern Rhodesia was
considered not only against this background of growing _epticism in Simla
on Indian indentured labour overseas, but also within the whole context of
official attitudes and policy in Simla towards the welfare of Indian labourers
employed in the mining industries in Southern Africa and elsewhere. As the
Secretary to the Government of India, J. O. Miller) observed in July 1903)
in the wake of the Rhodesian application, the Government of India had been,
from the start of boolte! recruitment inNatal in 1860, opposed to supplying
labour for mining purposes to Southern Africa, confining its permission to
348simple agricultural labour. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the Natal miners
who had set the example for their Rhodesian counterparts, had merely taken
advantage of the grey areas in the contracts of the Indian agricultural labour-
ers which did not totally exclude alternative engagements. Consequently) the
Indian 'coolies' were surreptitiously diverted from agricultural to mining
346Bolt: Ope cit. pp. 180-1.
347Tinker: Ope cit. pp. 286-7.
348Mss. Eur. F 111/25S/File 190: Memorandum by J. O. Miller, Secretary,
Government of India re: - Employment of Indenture Indians as miners in
South Africa: July 11, 1903: The Curzon Papers, European Manuscripts:
India Office Records: Foreign and Comanwealth Office Library, Black-
friars: london.
286
349work.albeit at increased rates of pay.
These clandestine activities amongNatal employers whereby Indian
agricultural labourers were thus expropriated by the coal miners, were, by
and large, successfully concealed from officials at Simla.whoappear to
have been rather surprised by the reports in 1899during the war, indicating
that some Indian labourers had been killed by the Boer commandos at Dundee
and other mining centres in Natal. Indeed,even the Protector of Immigrants
in Natal was reputed to have been opposed to these eranaacttcas, but may not
have sufficiently influenced individual employers on the matter, as the traffic
350increased gradually between 1896and 1902. In the final analysis, Simla
was presented with fait accompli las far as this diversion of Indian agricul-
tural labour for mining purposes in Natal was concerned. Consequently,when
Natal miners made their direct application for Indian mine labour from
Bengal at the close of the war in 1902, all that the Government of India could
do was to adopt a fatalistic. view and hope that the scheme might not after
all succeed, but possibly fail like an earlier move to recruit Indian labour.
351for the diamondmines at Kimberley.
If the Natal employers succeeded by 1902 to evade Simla'S restrictions on
the employment of Indian labour on the mines and, by such means, success-
fully deflected the official directives on Indian labour pollcy,with regard to
overseas emigration, their kinsmen in SouthernRhodesia were not as for-
tunate. Rhodesian colonist employers were apparently caught up in the
stirrups of a movementwithin the circles of the Government of India to tighten
up all the loopholes,in the India Emigration Act ,whichallowed the engagement
of Indian 'coolies' for miningwork overseas. This movementwhich had
349Indian agricultural 'coolies' diverted to Natal coal mines had their wage
rates increased to about 2/- extra per month for surface labourers and
5/- extra for underground work. The normal rate of wages was 20/-
per month. Vide: Mas. Eur. F. 11/258/16: Conditions of Coolie
service in Natal: Enclosed inRobert W,S, Mitchell, C,M,G, i Natal
Government Emigration Agent. to Lord Gurzon: February 7, 1902.
350The engagement of Indian 'coolies' for the mines in Natal started with
268 in 1896; 472 in 1897; 854 in 1898; 740 in 1899; 522 in 1900; and
1,200 in 1901: Vide: Mas, Eur. F. 111/258/190: Memorandumb~
Miller: July 11, 1903.
351Ibid,
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gained quite some influence in the corridors of power at Simla by mid-1902,
may have been aroused by the growing mortality rate amongst Indian overseas
labourers working in the mines and was,therefore, purportedly in favour of
some drastic action by the Govemment on the matter: action tantamount,in
some ways for instance}to the suspension of Indian labour recruitment for
the miners of Cayemme (French Guyana)and Surinam (DutchGuyana) in the
West Indies in 1899.352
But whilst it could be said,in one respect, that Southern Rhodesia's
Indian labour scheme was launched at an mauaplctoua period, attention
should also be drawn to the over-zealousness of private companies and indi-
viduals to push themselves into the limelight on questions where foreign
labour supply was coo.cemed. For a government like that at Simla, which had
grown increasingly sensitive on matters involving the welfare of its subjects,
the active part taken in the campaign to procure Indian labour by such com-
panies as the Globe and Phoenix, the Rhodesia Exploration and Development
Company and their allies aroused the suspicions and subsequent disapproval
of several of its ftmctionaries. Its objections to the Rhodesian colonist em-
ployers' request for labour, therefore,entailed some of those features hitherto
peculiar to the Rhodesian politico-economic system, notably the inordinate
influence wielded by international capital in both the intemal and external
affairs of the country.
With due concern, Simla questioned the bona fides of a labour scheme in
a country where the implementation of relevant sections of Indian labour legi-
slation,symbolized by the Emigration Act, was in the hands of private com-
panies and contractors and was,obviously,liable to influence by partisan
interests and,therefore, concluded that these were not the proper people to
trust. In the event, even the Rhodesian legislative mechanism, the Immigra-
tion Ordinance of 1901,adopted for the purpose of governing the working lives
of foreign labourers in SouthernRhodesta, did not meet with the requirements
of Simla as adequate machinery under which to entrust the welfare of its
353Indian subjects. Such conflict as emerged in the attitudes of the two gov-
ernments towards the treatment of labourers is more explicable in the light
352Mss. Eur. F 111/258/16: Minutes by Sir Denzil Ibbetson: April2, 1902
and R. E. V. Arbuthnot: July 21, 1902.
353
Ms~ Eur. F. 111/258/110: MInuteby Miller: December 15, 1902.
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of Hole's somewhat hostile reaction to the India Emigration Act and Its
application to Aden in 1901.354 Hole's concluston.on this earlier occaston,
that the Act was impossible to work under was the exact anti-thesis of the
official attitude at Simla towards the Rhodesian application for Indian labour
in 1903. The feeling that the anti-Indian lobby in Southern Rhodesia as in
Natal was bound to influence the restrictive conditions under which Indian
labourers were to live compelled some quarters in Simla to conclude that
only two courses of action were possible,in the circumstances; namely,
more positive demands for the implementation of the 'health and safety'
clauses of the India Emigration Act or the refusal to consider Southern Rhodes-
ia's application for Indian labour.355
In a nutshell, the odds against establishing a successful indenture labour
supply scheme in India for Southern Rhodesia were too great. The labour
supply.tn this instance,appeared to be somehowdependent on the orders and
whims of interested private companies in the destination territory and, from
the Government of India's point of view, was not likely to develop into a
large-scale and system.atic institution, stmflar, in some respects, to Indian
'coolie' emigration to other overseas posseastona, which, by the virtue of its
volume and the constant and unrestricted movement of labourers to and from
the areas of employment, in this manner,provided potential emigrants with
sufficient knowledgeon the labour conditions obtaining thither. Through this
type of unrestricted movement backwards and forwards, it was believed that
Indian labourers were well provided with an automatic safeguard against poor
conditions and ill-treatment in those territories where they were bound to
work, since potential labour supply naturally switched itself off should bad
reports on the labour market filter back to India through the industrial grape-
356vine. The system had obviouslyworked well with regards to the perfection
of legislation governing the conditions of Indian indentured labourers in Natal
357since the 1870's.
Indeed the state of affairsjeven in India itself,did not augur well from the
start, as far as the application for Indian labour by Southern Rhodesia was
354
Vide: Supra: PP. 22'-4.
355!2!!!: Minuteby Arbuthnot, January 24, 1903.
356C.O. 417/372: Lord Curzan of Kedleston, Calcutta to Milner: March 21,
357 1903.
Vide: Huttenback: OP. cit, PP. 8-11.
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concerned. The combination of private contractors and hostile public
colonist sentiment did not seem to match well with the desires of the Rhodes-
ian employers, at least from Simla's point of view, and were further compli-
cated by the general reluctance of Indian labourers at home to work under-
ground/which, in some cases, had led to labour shortages in the Indian mine~
notwithstanding the vast manpower available. In the case of Rhodesian
employers, the anxieties of the Indian Government officials were aroused by
what they considered the inadequate legislation to guarantee the safety of
labourers worldng underground and in neighbourhood of shafts and machinery,
not to mention Simla'S opposition to the compound system by which labourers,
as in the case of Africans, were confined to those enclosed quarters, with the
358
result that 'they -{could not)- leave without permission. ' The prospects
of Indian labourers being subjected to this system of labour control and their
inevitable exposure to all forms of disabilities 00. the mines in Southern
Rhodesia without 'fair remuneration for the more disagreeable & more dan-
359gerous nature of employment ••• " were not quite flattering even to the
more sympathetic officials in Simla.
In the final analysts, the Government of India could only follow the advice
of ane of its officials, Sir Denzil lbbetson, that the RhodeSian demand for
Indian labour merited negative response on the same lines as the fatal blow
which had brought down the meticulous arrangements of the German Admini-
stration in Tanganyika in their anticipation to avail themselves of indentured
Indian labour in 1902. 360 For Southern Rhodesfa, this blow by the Indian
Government was equally shattering and.tn its entirety, reflected not only the
growing resentment in Simla on the indifferent treatment meted onto Indian
labourers overseas, but also, in a more general way, manifested some of the
358C. O. 417/372: Lord Curzan to Milner: March 21, 1903: For an excellent
discussion on the compound system in Southern Rhodesia: Vide: van
Onselen: Chibaro: chapter 5.
359Mas. Eur. F 111/258/190: Minute by W. Lawrence to Miller: July 13, 1903.
360The German plans to import Indian labour followed in the wake of the Agha
Khan's friendly visit to Berlin in the 1890's whereupon negotiations were
entered into and finalized by 1902. For Tanganyika the arrangements to
receive Indian labour at specified depots like Dar-es-Salaam, Bagamoyo,
Tanga, Pang ani, Kbiva and Lindi were a climax of this understanding
which however failed to materialize: Vide: Mas. Eur, F 111/258/110:
Mlnutes by Sir Denzil lbbetson: February 3 and 13, 1903.
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fundamental aspects of traditional European Orientalism and British imperial
policy towards India and the Indian subjects.
Presented in form of a memorial to the India Office in March 1902,
these objections to Indian labour recruiting for Southern Rhodesia and else-
where in Africa read as follows:
The pioneers of colonial enterprise are naturally and
necessarily masterful men - not very squeamish or
tender hearted. It is probable that for the control of
Africans sterner measures than are needed for Indians
are absolutely necessary; and there is always the risk that
the distinction between the two races may not be recognfJIed
when both are labouring side by side, and that the simi-
larity of colour may be held to justify similarity of treat-
ment, and may obscure the fact that the native Indian
and the native African stand on entirely different levels.
In an undeveloped and unsettled colony, with a small and
scattered European population, the Administration of
government is not always sufficiently organized to ensure the
full observance of the law; and admirable provisions may be made
on paper for the protection of immigrants but the mac~1Y
and the opportunity for enforcing them may be lacking.
In this summary of the objections of the Indian government and the short-
comings of the Administration of Southern Rhodesia, Simla made its position
quite clear in connection with Indian labour supply to the latter and not even
the Colonia Office could sway it from this decision to have nothing to do with
362
the scheme. In the circumstances, the Rhodesian plans to import this
source of labour, like those of the Germans in Tanganyika, faced a natural
death.
From a wider perspective, the failure of Southem Rhodesia's Indian
labour importation scheme was perhaps inevitable and obvious. Evidently~
Rhodesian colonist employers had bitten off more than they could chew. The
strength of a parallel movement to better the conditions of the Indian commun-
ity in Southern Africa.especially in the Transvaal and Natal.between 1902 and
1904, was too strong for peripheral mining companies like the so-called 'few
361
C. O. 417/372: Petition of Lord Curzon; A. P. Palmer; T. Raleigh~ E. F. G.
Law; E. P, Elles; A. T. Arundel and Denzil Ibbetson (members of the
Indian Government) to Lord Hamilton, India Office: March 27, 1902.
Vide: also for the same document: File Mas. Eur. F. 111/258/110:
CUrzon Papers. India Offlce Records. London.
362
C. O. 417/372: Minutes by Graham: JWle 16, 1903 and Ommanney:
JWle 17, 1903.
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obdurate speculators', to borrow Moore's succmct phrase, in Southern
Rhodesia, to exert any meaningful pressure to thwart the momentum of this
campaign so efficiently monitored by the pro-Indian lobby in Londonand the
Government of India at Simla.. Even Lord MIlner and the British government
were themselves overwhelmed in the struggle for paramountcy,which followed
the Anglo-Boer War, between colonial and international capitalism,on the one
hand,as opposed to the fundamental political doctrines of British imperialism,
on the other.
This conflict of interests in the event was quite an interesting watershed ...
reflectlng,in the first place,orthodox imperialism, represented here perhaps
by Rhodes, Chamberlain,Milner and their associates) who viewed the British
imperial movement m terms of a series of exclusive white communities spread
all over the world and into which Indians and other non-Europeans could only
be admitted either as inferior workers or temporary sojourners, whose move-
ments were geared to the mterests of colonial and metropolitan capitalism.
The new school of thought, represented by the colonial Government of India,
symbolized a more liberal approach and, for them, the concept of British
citizenship and freedom of movement for the empire's subjects mattered much
more than the whims of interested financial groups.
In the case of Indian indentured labour for Southern Africa, Lord Curzon,
the Viceroy of India, was hardly impressed, for example,by the argument
pursued by Milner and the Imperial government that the need for 20,000
Indian labourers,for railway work and reconstruction purposes in SouthAfrica,
was a lynch-pin without which 'the whole situation in SouthAfrica will be
seriously affected' m terms of peace, mdustrialization, British immigration
363and the grant of self-government to the Boer republics. The gulf between
Curzon and Milner and their respective supporters was certainly too great on
the issue of Indian labour and the amelioration of the labourers' conditions and
treatment in Southern Africa. From all appearances, the Government of
Indian was quite prepared to slog the matter out with the Milner camp and,as
Curzon indicated, Simla's case was too apparent:
We are told that public opmton in SouthAfrica is the final
arbiter before we must all bow. Why should not public
363Mas. Eur. F 111/258/190: Lord Hamilton, Secretary of State for India to,
Lord Curzon: October 29, 1903.
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opmtrn m India be allowed some Uttle weight? It seems to
me much more important to conciliate the unanlmous senti-
ment of 300, 000, 000 of our subjects in Asia than to defer
to the prejudices of a small colony of white men in South
Africa, the more so as it is we who are asked to confer the
favour, not them ••• Our coolie labour is the one considera-
tion which we have to offer m exchange of treatment which
will never be conceded on unselfis9ffilrounds. Why should
we throw away our solitary pawn ?
In between this mter-govemmental confUct on Aslatic labour, the
problematic nature of the Indian labour scheme for post-1902 Southem Africa
365was further underlined by the struggle between Sir M. M. Bhownaggree,
one of the two Indian members of the House of Commons and Sir Arthur
366
Lawley, the Lieutenant-Govemor of the Transvaal; the former as the
champion of the pro-Indian lobby and the latter in favour of the anti-Asiatic
white settlers. This tug and tussle for either the removal or remforoement
of restrictive commercial and residential segregation; Indian poUtical and
civil disabilities and many other issues of racial character, only emphasized
the incompatibility between the political philosophy of the Government of
India and the Interests of colonial and metropolitan capitalism, supported by
an ingrained racial ideology serving as a protective membrane for the domi-
nant groups in this colonial setting. In the end, having failed to influence
either camp of combatants, even the Imperial Govemment could not proceed
367
with its own Indian labour plans.
The failure of the Indian labour importation plans in both Southem Rhodes-
ia and the Transvaal was a result of one common factor; the decisive influence
of the Jndian Government at Simla and its role in attempting to strike a
favourable balance between a dominant racial ideology and the concrete
economic facts insofar as they affected Indian subjects within a speclflc geo-
graphical and political sphere of the British empire, notwithstanding in this
case, the weight of private companies in Southem Rhodesia, the Randlords or
364__12!!!: Lord Curzon to Lord Hamilton: May 23, 1904.
365Ibid: M. M. Bhownaggree to Lyttleton: December 21, 1903. Sir Bhow-
-;;ggree and D. Naoroji, were the two Indian MPs in the House of Commons
by 1903. Vide: Huttenback: op, cit, pp, 169-70.
366!2!!!: Lawley to Milner: Apr1l13, 1904.
367
Ibid: Meeting between the C.O, and India Office re: Indians in the Trans-
!!!!!: June 29, 1904.
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the Crown Administration under Lord Milner in the Transvaal, which exer-
cised some considerable influence.in the process. But this does not.however,
signify any marked impotence amongst these employers to wield their power
to their advantage in the absence of rome wha t stubborn political authorities
and resilient political principles. The deploym.ent of such political and econ-
omlo power as they possessed by private employers to precipitate the importa-
tion of the next group of Asiatic labourers - the Chinese - between 1903 and
1904, was the next move adopted in both Southem Rhodesia and at the Rand to
compensate for the fiasco which indeed Indian labour importation had indeed
become.
Of course, the question of Chinese labour was not new either in Southern
Rhodesia or the Transvaal by 1903. In Southern Rhodesia, offers to introd-
uce into the country these Oriental labourers had been made at the close of
the nineteenth century, but were somehow delayed by several collateral foreign
labour schemes. The Harvey brothers,for instance,had offered their services
in this regard as early as 1898 after similar moves to the Rand in 1897 had
368met with Boer hostility and foundered, Arguing that the Chinese labourers
369would supplement the Fingo pilot scheme then in its first stages at the time,
the Harvey Brothers appeared more convtncmg than their counterparts, the
Bowden Brothers of Yokohama,who specialized in supplying Japanese labour
370for overseas services.
The Chinese labour scheme may have indeed strongly tempted employers
in Southern Rhodesia to argue for more positive action on the matter. Its
attractions to these employers, desperately scratching every part of the
African and Asian continents for cheap and stable labour supply, were appa-
rently decisive insofar as any concrete solutions to the so-called 'labour prob-
lem' were concerned, The advantages of the Chinese labourer, as the com-
mercially interested private purveyors of foreign labour supply to employers
in distant parts had it, were manifold. Among their fellow Orientals, the
Indians and the Japanese, the Chinese labourers were, as the patriotic Harvey
368A 11/2/8/5: W. J. Harvey to L. C. Phillips for the Globe & Phoenix Gold
MIning Co,' Ltd: October 13, 1899.
369~: Lawley, Bulawayo to Milton, Salisbury: Private and Confidential:
March 22, 1900.
370For the offer of Japanese labour by Bowden Brothers and Co. Ltd.,
Yokohama, in 1902: Vide: Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Report 1903: PP.
52-3.
294
Brothers put it:
.•• like the Scotch or Swiss -{and)-will work regardless
of fixe~*me if they see a prospect of making an extra
profit.
Compared with the African labourer, the Chinese was of immense
value to the employers of labour. Indee~this Oriental 'Scotsman' came out
quite favourably in juxtaposition to his potential African rfva],who, accord-
ing to the 'target worker' myth popularly adopted by employers on the Afri-
can continent to justify the utilization of cheap labour, 372 was largely dis-
373credited on such occasions when the economic situation so demanded. Thus
to strengthen their financial stake in the Chinese labour scheme so vehemently
opposed in some quarters of the white communities throughout Southern Africa,
the Harvey Brothers undermined the rationale for the deployment of African
labourIn the first place,by employers stating that:
When a native has accumulated say £50 which he can easily
do at the present high rate of wages - say in three years -
he returns to his kraal, buys th§,! or four wives, and lapses
into his old life and idle habits.
Given this 'uselessness' of the African labourer, the proximity of Indian
and the related difficulties of repatriating British Indian subjects as well as
the expenses involved in importing Japanese labourers from their more
distant part of the world, the pliers in Chinese labour carefully prepared their
ground for what seemed a promising trade in Southern Africa.
However, not even these purported advantages would subdue the anti-
Chinese sentiment within the secondary colonist segment as we have seen
375already, and.along with several intervening foreign labour schemes,
Chinese labour importation could only wait for the end of the Anglo-Boer war
to surface once more. The requests of the Rhodesian colonist employers on
371!2!!!: Harvey to Phillips: October 13, 1899.
372For the 'target worker' myth.00 African labour in Southern Rhodesia: Vide:
Harris: 'Ten Popular Myths Concerning the Employment of Labour in
Rhodesia': PP. 40-1; and van Onselen: 'Black Workers in Central African
Industry': PP. 237-9.
373For some tactics used by employers of African labour to ascribe different
labour values to their workers according to particular economic situations:
Vide: Cairns: ope cit. passim.
374__12!!!: Harvey to H. Wilson Fox: Private and Confidential: January 19, 1900.
375Vide: Supra: pp.265-72.
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the matter, especially after the failure of the Indian labour scheme in 1902-3,
indicate that these employers of labour were certainly quite convinced that
the Chinese labour question would pull through. Armed with an arsenal of
facts and figures on the alleged inherent inadequacies of local African labour;
the poor physical conditions of trans-Zambesian recruits; competition with
the Rand over labour from Mozambique,not to mention the hostility of Portu-
guese authorities towards Rhodesian employers; the conclusions of the majority
report of the Transvaal Labour Commission on the Inadequacy of the African
adult male population to meet the labour needs of the mining industries and
also the risk of the closure of such mines as the Geelong, the Globe & Phoe-
376 377nix, and the 'Red and White Rose'; the Rhodesian employers and finan-
cters, represented by the London-based Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners'
Association, a mouth-piece for 61,000 shareholders and representing a
working capital of £8,000,000 invested in Southern Rhodesta strove vigorously
to convince the Colonial Office and other authorities concerned about the
earnestness oftb:dr cause for Chinese labour importation.
On the strength of various pretexts, which in every sense resembled
extract pages from a Doomsday notebook, the Southern Rhodesian employers
and financiers emphasized that:
Unless the full number ~of labourers)- required can be constantly
maintained the rate of extraction ~of gold)- will invariably exceed
the rate of advance development and sooner or later production
must cease. With intermittent working, restriction due to the
burden of irreducible fixed charges, it is impossible ••. to
secure any return on the me capital required to open and
equip a quartz reef mine.
376The Hyatt brothers, labour agents in the Ndanga district during the Anglo-
Boer War, observed that the Geelong and the Globe & Phoenix mines
refused to have anything to do with local African labour except Shangaans
from PEA. Indeed, two weeks before the closure of the Geelong mine in
the Umzingwane district, this mine returned the labour recruits with a
'plethoric' note that the mine had 'more boys than it needed.' But when
it was closed down two weeks later, labour shortage was given in the
press as the cause of closure. Vide: Hyatt.:.. OP. cit. PP. 139-40.
377For the appalling labour conditioo.s and the high accident rates at the 'Red
and White Rose' mine: Vide: N B 1/1/10: H. A. Elliott, Assistant N/C
Umlugulu to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 22, 1900 and Archie A. Campbell,
N/C Insiza to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 1, 1900.
378C.O. 417/387: Memorandum by the Council of the Rhodesian Land and Mine
Owners' Association an Labour for Rhodesia. to C.O,: November 25, 1903.
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The commitment and conviction of these Rhodesian colonist employers and
financiers in the justice of the Chinese importation scheme was so strong that
they were even outrightly scornful of the anti-Chinese opposition which they
desired to be ignored. Accordingly, Milton the Administrator informed the
LondonBoard in November 1903 that the anti-Chinese lobby in Southern
Rhodesia
••• ma~.J?,entirely disregarded as uninstructed and of no
force.
The dichotomywithin the BSACo. directorate and the white colonist
population however, was too great for the ambitious plans of the Rhodesian
financiers and employers to come to fruition. The Colonial Office,at least,
could not allow this Chinese labour scheme with its divisive tendencies to go
ahead. As it was rumoured at the time, only Lord Grey amongst the BSACo.
380Directors had come out in favour of the Chinese labour scheme. Rhodes
was anxious to carry the wishes of the white population in Southern Rhodesia
before he died in 1902 and had,therefore toyed,with the idea of a unanimous
agreement within the leadership of the Rhodesian mining industry and public
endorsal of the scheme by the elective element within the Legislative Coun-
381cil, whilst Jameson and Sir Lewis Michell in the Capewere torn between
hostile white public opinion and the financial backing of the pro-Chinese Rand
382
mining magnates to the Progressive Party in the pending elections of 1904.
In the SouthernRhodesian elections towards the end of 1903, the views of the
white electorate were indeed emphatically opposed to Chinese labour. Out of
the four elected members of the Legislative Council, three came from the
anti-Chinese lobby and represented the views of the traders, farmers and
383white workers on the matter. Evenmore damaging for the Southern Rhodes-
ian pro-Chinese employers and financiers, were rumours circulated privately
379A 11/2/8/6: Minuteon the Importation of Labour from China by Milton to
H.Wilson Fox, Confidential: November 19, 1903.
380A 11/2/8/7: Just to H. Wilson Fox: December 4, 1904.
381A 11/2/8/5: Rhodes, Umtali, to Milton, Salisbury: Telegram: July 17,
1900.
382A 11/2/8/7: 'Cape Tim.es': December 12, 1903: Vide, also: Naylor:
Yellow Labour: PP. 28-9.
383Three of the elected members against Chinese labour were Wylie, Meikle
and Col Napier. The fourth, Haddon, promised to support the Chinese
labour scheme 'if necessary': Vide: A 11/2/8/6: Col Heyman to Milton:
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that the Chinese labour campaign was a subterfuge movement, designed by
the mining companies, primarily, to increase the value of their mining
shares on the Londonstock market and attract capital into the country.384
The failure of the Chinese labour scheme in Southern Rhodesia ,therefore,
was, in the circumstances, a result largely of those weaknesses endermic to
the Rhodesian politico-economic system. The mining companies were mis-
representing the facts to their ownadvantage,but,in so doing.were evidently
digging the grave for their Chinese labour designs. ConsequentlYjwhilst the
Rand was allowed by the Tory government in Britain to send its envoys to
Peking to lay downthe foundation for Chinese labour supply to the Rand mines
385in December 1903 and for a subsequent diplomatic understanding between
Londonand Peking)which put a seal to the Chinese labour scheme for the Rand
386in May1904, the Southern Rhodesian employers could only press the
LondonBoard of the BSACo. and the Imperial Authorities in vain.
iii: Conclusion
The various schemes the Southern Rhodesian colonist employers adopted,
between 1898 and 1904, to augment their labour supplies, through the intro-
duction of external labour groups from North-East Africa, the Arabia penin-
sula, India and China, failed dismally. The reasons for this failure are legion.
In the first place, the main purpose for introducing external contract labour
in a colonial frontier situation, as we have indicated before, was prompted not
only by overt designs to meet the necessary labour demands, but also by
November 10, 1903.
384C.O. 417/374: Minuteby Just: January 13, 1904.
385Vide: Speech by Sir George Farrar, DSOon the Motion for the introduction
of the Labour Importation Ordinance in the Legislative Council of the
Transvaal Colony: December 28, 1903: Transvaal Leader Office: Johan-
nesburg: 1904: passim.
386A 11/2/8/6: Ccnventionbetween the United Kingdomand China respecting
the Employment of Chinese labour in British Colonies and Protectorates,
Cmd 1956: May13, 1904. The ratification of the Sino-British agreement
mentioned above was followedby the formation in July 1904 of a recruit-
ing organisation known as the Chamber of Mines Labour Importation
Agency (CMLIA)amongst the Rand employers to handle Chinese labour
specifically. Vide: P, Richardson: 'The Recruiting of Chinese Indentured
Labour for the SouthAfrican Gold Mines, 1903-1908': Journal of African
HiStory: Vol. XVIII:No.l: 1977: PP. 86, 93-9.
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covert ones to readjust the labour control situation in favour of the employers
through reinforcing the dominance of the latter over foreign labour in a
strange environment. Alien labour was by nature more vulnerable to social
387and economic pressures than their local counterparts. In the case of
Abyssinians, Arabs and Somalis, even this mechanism of mobilising and
controlling cheap labour wouldnot work in Southern Rhodesia, coming as they
did from areas which did not have equivalent hierarchical colonial societies.
The Abyssinians from an independentAfrican state and the Arabs recruited
from Lahej and those areas outside the Aden Settlem.enthad.of course, little
reason to acquiesce in the situation prescribed by employment conditions in
Southern Rhodesia's racially stratified colonial society. The resistance of
these Abyssinian, Somali and Arab labourers to be treated in the same manner
as the local African labourers whohad suffered 'the traumatic effects of
388colonialism', to borrow van Onselen's phrase, was, therefore, in a large
measure, a rebuke to both the mechanics of labour extraction and restrictive
labour conditions obtaining in Southern Rhodesia between 1898 and 1904.
In essence, the indentured labourers brought downfrom the hom of
Africa and the adjacent Arabian peninsula exposed the drawbacks of the system
of labour mobilisation and utilization as well as the poor conditions under which
the labourers subsequently worked within the framework of a restrictive col-
onial economy such as that of Southern Rhodesia was. The recurrent griev-
ances of these foreign labourers on the conditions of service, food and accom-
odation at those particular mining properties whither they had been sent, in
a nutshell, reflected also the chronic plight of their local African colleagues
whose bargaining power, unlike that of these foreign labourers, was further
weakened by the llmitations prescribed under the Masters and Servants Iegt-
slation. Indeed in the final analysis, the North-East Africans and their
fellow recruits from Aden found themselves confronted by a situation in
Southern Rhodesia whereby colonist employers, with the support of the Com-
pany Administration, very often relied on regular exercise of raw coercive
measures to vitiate the bargaining position and rights of non-white workers.
Itwas, therefore,in their attempts to resist such a state of affairs, obviously
out of tune with conditions and experiences in their ownpart of the world, that
387Vide: Infra: Chapter 5.
388-VanOnselen: Chibaro: p, 83.
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the Abyssinians, Arabs and Somalis ultimately clashed with their patrons;
the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia. The net result was evident as J
in the process,these indentured lagourers consequently incurred the abject
odium of their colonist employers with the predictable outcome tbat all further
plans to procure labour from North-East Africa and Aden inevitably came to
a balt.389
As far as Indian indentured labour for Southern Rhodesia was concerned,
the designs of the territory's colonist employers to promote their own.section-
al interests, much in the same way as the Natal sugar planters along the coast
had been able to successfully ignore and over-ride the anti-Indian sentiment
of their colleagues.the up-country farmers and other colonists in the 1860's,
unwittingly exposed the unfavourable conditions under which Indian labourers
were also likely to be subjected,in an effort by the Rhodesian mining industry
to strike a compromise with its more fervent opponents. For the Government
of India, faced as it was by the increasing political consciousness amongst
390the indigenous people at home; a strong pro-Indian movement abroad as
well as the fundamental demands of a more credible Imperial policy on
British trusteeship and Indian rights as British subjects in India and else-
where in the empire, the application for Indian labour to meet the needs of
private interests in Southern Rhodesia under peculiarly restrictive condi-
tiona was.Indeed.out of the question. The chasm between the Indian govern-
ment of the early twentieth century, on the one hand.and Southern Rhodesia's
colonial society which required Indian Iabour; on the other, but was, at the same
time,none too repentent on the imposition of civil and commercial disabilities
against the Indian community already in the country, as the Dealers' Licence
391Ordinance of 1901 Signified., was clearly unbridgeable.
389!!lli!: PP. 82-3.
390Lord CUrzon was particularly more concerned about satisfying indigenous
Indian opinion and press on the better treatment of their brethren in
Southern Africa than with satisfying the demands of the mining interests
of the region. Vide: Mas, Eur. F 111/258/190: Lord Curzon to Lord
Hamntoo: Telegram: January 2, 1904.
391
Under this 19011egislation inspired by the various Chambers of Commerce,
Indian traders had no legal or administrative guarantees against system-
atic deprivation of trading licences by Town Councils. Vide: C, O. 417/
399: LIttleton to Lawley: Confidential: December 1903 and H. Betram Cox
to BSACo. : May 14, 1904.
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In the circumstances, any success on the part of the Indian labour scheme
for Southern Rhodesia would have been a miracle, more so that Simla did
not take kindly to the general run of the anti -Asiatic legislation in Southern
Africa as a whole. Indeed as Andrew Cohen, the Counsel for the Government
of India, observed on this kind of legislation, it was considered I••• a step
backward in the advance of civilization .•• , ' especially that Simla interpreted
the objective of this anti-Asiatic legislation as ostensibly designed:
••• to create a special class of persons, deprived of all
elementary rights of Citizenship, segregated from the re~2
of their kind, and unable in any way to improve their lot.
In the light of these divergent postures, the decision of the Government of
India not to extend labour recruiting facilities to Southern Rhodesia or even
the Transvaal afl;er 1902, was thus decisive and unequivocal, serving to
redefine once more the prtnctples set out by the architects of British imperial
policy towards India at the end of the nineteenth century.
The Chinese labour question was a different species altogether. The fact
that it failed to materialize in Southern Rhodesia whilst in the Transvaal it
met with some degree of success has little to do with the pros and cons of the
closed compound system and its efficacy and applicability to the mining indus-
393
tries of the two countrtes.as some scholars would have us imagine. Rather
the success or failure of the Chinese labour scheme was,more than anything
else.determined by the weight of the economic arguments and the amount of
leverage these two mining industries were able to exercise on the centres
of power in London and Southern Africa.
The Chinese labour importation movement did not.as a matter of fact,
mean the same thing to either the Rhodesian mining industry or the Rand.
Whilst the Rhodesian pro-Chinese labour movement was patronized mainly by
the mining houses to secretly enhance their mining shares on the stock market,
the Rand Chinese labour movement/in the post-war years of reconstruction)
392C. O. 879/92: Andrew Cohen, K. C., Counsel for the Government of
India: Quoted in Memorandum on Chinese Labour in the Transvaal b~
Major Seely: February 1901. For a milder view of the India Omce on
this subject, Vide: A 11/2/8/8: Horace Walpole to C. 0.: January 20,
1904.
393For the compound system as the cause of the failure of Chinese labour
importation into Southern Rhodesia, Vide: J. M. Mackenzie: 'Colonial
Labour Policy and Rhodesia': The Rhodesian Journal of Economics:
Vol 8, No. I: March, 1974: PP. 7-8.
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had wider economic and political implications. For example)whilst it might
be argued that the Rand mining magnates overtly exercised a dominant influ-
ence on the Crown ColonyAdministration of the Transvaal immediately after
the war, 394 vested economic interests associated with the British Treasury
under the Tory government should not,however,be ignored here. As the
Milner clique in the Transvaal pointed out, the damage sustained by British
economic interests on the Rand due to the Anglo-Boer war was obviously
global. In statistical terms, itwas estimated that out of total capital invest-
ments on the Rand,amounting to nearly £200,000,000 by December 1902,
British finance houses stood to lose about 25 per cent of their capital, due to
the 1903 economic depression caused by labour shortage, depreciation in the
market value of the mining shares and the drought and red-water disease
conditions. In addition, it was also feared that the British taxpayer was
likely to lose as much as £20,000,000 in war loans to Mining Houses in the
Transvaal. Thus in the circumstances, the Milner school of thought argued
that the question of Asiatic or Chinese labour was one synonymous to a con-
395flict between 'morality' and 'bankruptcy'.
On the local scene in the Transvaal itself, the gold mining industry after
the Anglo-Boer war,was indeed in a parlous state. Even before the war,
profit accumulatic:nby the Rand capitalists had been dependent on a plethora
of contingent factors. These.variables,which were geological and economic
in kind,included, among other things, the low-grade character of the Rand gold
ore; the fixed and stationary price of gold dependent,more or less, on over-
seas pundits rather than local market factors and finally, the inflationary
trends of development and overhead costs which deep-level gold mining at the
394The influence of the 'Randlords' was also enhanced by the rumours on their
consent to pay what was called the 'War tribute' to the Imperial govern-
ment amounting to £30,000,000 to meet war debts and expenses. Vide:
C.O, 879/82: Memorandumon the Proposal to Import Asiatic, more
particularly Chinese Labour for the Transvaal Mines, by H,W, Just:
Confidential: November 1903; and also, Denoon: '''Capitalist Influence"
and the Transvaal Government during the Crown Colony Period, 1900-
1906': PP. 313-4.
395C•O, 879/84: Memorandum onAsiatic Labour for the Transvaal, by G,V,
Fiddes: November 9, 1903,
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396Rand entailed. With the post-war crisis and general dislocation it en-
tailed, the position of the gold mining industry at the Rand did not at all
change for the better. Instead.the industry was further plagued by falling
levels of gold production either within the industry as a whole or on the basis
397
of individual companies. Yet.at the same time,costs in labour and mine
stores were patently rising; a situation induced as much by the diminution of
the size of the cheaper African labour force and the corresponding increase in
the ratio of the more expensive white manpower as it was precipitated by the
. 398decline in the price of gold ID relation to other commodities.
Itwas due to these factors, indicated above.that the Rand employers
decided to overhaul the whole cost structure in the gold mining industry by
resorting to specific imperatives which made profit accumulation more
promising and less elusive. These imperatives mcluded.m the main, mini-
misation of production costs and maximisation of gold output. In terms of cost
minimisation, labour costs easily became the readiest area in which to
achieve this desired goal,especially by maximising the supply of ultra-cheap
399non-white labour. Indeed.It was in regard to this objective that Chinese
labour for the Rand mines became a Significant factor in enabling the mining
industry 'to break wage inflation, restore and maximize output by the most
efficient deployment of labour, and thereby reduce working costs in order to
restore the level of profitability and encourage capital back into the -{gold
400mining)- industry. ' Moreover, Chinese labour was considered not only
capable of providing an infinite supply to the labour-hungry Rand employers,
but was also favourably viewed as 'sufficiently cheap and docile', whilst,at the
same time, it had 'the additional advantage of further fragmenting and dividing
401the working class in its struggle for higher wages. I
396Vide: F.A. Johnstone: Class, Race and Gold: A Study of Class Relations
and Racial Discrimination in South Africa: Routledge & Kegan Paul:
London: 1976: PP. 17-9.
397In 1898 gold production at the Rand totalled about 4,295,608 ounces but
in 1902 this amounted to 1,690,101 ounces only. Vide: Richardson: 'The
Recruiting of Chinese Indentured Labour for the South African Gold
Mines, 1903-1908': P. 87.
39~ichardson: loo, cit.
399Johnstone: Class, Race and Gold: PP. 19-20.
400Richardson: oPe cit. P. 88.
401~: P. 90.
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AlthoughImperial authorities were quite aware of the racial complica-
tions the Asiatic labour solution posed in Southern Africa, economic factors ~
especially in the 'I'ransvaal.appear to have shaped the outcome of their deci-
sions on the matter. Thus whilst the Coloo.ialOfficewas not prepared to allow
any undue disregard of white public opinion on the Asiatic labour issue in
Southern Rhodesia, as then expressed by the four elected members of the
Legislative Counotl and ipso facto by the colonist electorate in that country,
with the result that Number 12 DowningStreet would)therefore, not intervene
in favour of the mining companies, in the 'I'ransvaal, the case was quite dif-
ferent. The Imperial officials were anxious that such expression of white
public opinion in the former Boer republic might serve as a vehicle for Boer
resentment against British military victory and political control, consequently
ruining the chances for the recovery of the gold mining industry. Indeed}in
the Cape where such anti-Chinese sentiment was clearly dominant, the Afri-
kaner Bondwas suspected of fom.entingthe movement to undermine British
economic interests.
In simple terms, once the Chinese labour question in the Transvaal was
defined in terms of 'British interests and the British race' vis-a-vis the Boers,
as Sir George Fiddes, Milner's secretary in that recent1y acquired Crown
402Colonydid, the chances of success for the BritiBh-domJnatedRand Chinese
labour movement were much more enhanced than those of the free-booting
mJ.ningcompanies and individuals in Southern Rhodesia. The argument on
the compound system and how far tenable it was,could definitely not impress
any Imperial officials as far as Chinese labour for Southern Rhodesia was con-
cerned; not even for a mining centre like the Wankie Colliery on the fringes
of the territory and far away from areas of white colonist settlement as well
as African habitation. 403 Moreover, it is doubtfulwhether Southern Rhodes-
ian colonis t employers wouldhave been able to bear the cost of importing
404Chinese labour in the way the Randlords were able to do.
402C•O. 879/84: Memorandumon Asiatic Labour••• by Fiddes: November 9,
1903: (For similar sentiments amongst the'Randlords' and the Progressive
Party an Chinese labour: Vide: B.K. Lang: Drummond Chaplin: His Life
and Times in Africa: Oxford University Press: London:1941: passim.)
403
C.O. 417/401: D.E. Brodie, Ass. Secretary, BSACo. to C.O. : September
1, 1904.
40~t is estimated that the overall cost of importing Chinese labourers amount-
ed to about £32 10/- Odper recruit. Vide: Richardson: OP. cit, p. 93.
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In the final analysis, the Asiatic labour question was only another form
of exploiting ultra-cheap non-white labour by the colonist employers in
Southern Africa and,at the same time,consolidating the class structure in the
region by reinforcing the economic position of these white employers who
enjoyed the rights of private and exclusive ownership of the means of pro-
duction at the expense of the non-whites whowere destined to remain mere
workers on the property of these employers and owners. But Asiatic labour
for SouthernRhodesia, either in terms of Chinese, Indians, Japanese,
Javanese or Kanakas,as some of the bizarre importation schemes put forward
indicated, failed dismally. Perhaps this failure may have given the anti-
Asiatic lobby in the country, a chance to consolidate its position over the years,
as the exclusion of Asiatic immigrants into the country subsequently became
the primary concern of the BSACo.Administration's immigration policy
after 1904. By 1908 for instance, all forms of Asiatic immigration were
heavily circumscribed in SouthernRhodesia, 405with the result that even the
more bona-fide forms of entry into the country like the application of the
Indian 'dobbies' in the laundry business in Salisbury in 1912 to have their
kinsmen join them from the Indian sub-continent in order to reinforce their
406establishments, could hardly succeed. Similarly, the web of restrictions
surrounding the application of the Union:MiniereHaut Katanga for the
passage of its consignment of Chinese labour from Beira via Salisbury,
407Bulawayoand Broken Hill to Elizabethville in the Belgian Congoin 1913,
underscores once more the residlle of the anti-Asiatic sentiment of the
earlier period,which had such marked influence on the country's policies)
once the intervention of the Imperial authorities inRhodesian affairs had
proved effective.
In concfuston, it must be re-emphasized that the Abysstntan, Somali
and Arab external labour soluttons.resorted to by the Southern Rhodesian
colonist employers.fafled, between 1900 and 1901, because of the inherent
405C.O. 417/452: Milton to Lord Selbourne: October 6, 1905.
406c.O. 417/311: Petition ofRanchodNaron et al. to Burns-Begg: Res/Com.:
January 29, 1912.
407C.O. 417/543: R. M.C. Buxton, Johannesburg, to C. Corner, Acting
General Manager: The Beira-J.\fashonalandandRhodesia Railways:
June 25, 1913.
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wealmesses of the Rhodesian labour recruiting mechanisms, whilst these
foreign recruits, on their part, defied any attempts by their actual or pros-
pective employers to subdue them to chattel labour conditions and thus con-
sequently managing to upset ail the labour schem.es relating to that part
of the world. With regards to Asiatic labour importation, the sentimental
nat ure of the movement and the depth of divisions of opinionwithin the
various Interested sections of the white colonist population as well as the
weaker economic arguments of the pro-Chinese lobby In SouthernRhodesia,
Inadvertently blunted any schemes on this class of foreign labour. The
trans-Zambesian externallahour solution was,however,the more successful
amongst these multifarious devices through which a large foreign presence
was introduced into SouthernRhodesia. 408 It is, therefore, the trans-
Zambesian and other external solutions from nearby countries that we shall
examme m the succeeding chapters of this study.
408Vide: Infra: chapters 5 & 6.
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CHAPTER 4
The Origin of the Southern Rhodesian
MfeNffiCommunity and Other 'Black
Settlers' from the South. 1898-1905
Intraduction:
In the early stages of this study we have examined at length the role
played by the African auxiliaries from the South in the process of conquest
and "pacification" in the new colony of Southern Rhodesia in various capaci-
ties, to wit as military aides, evangelists and general menials to the white
forces of both secular and religious colonization. With the end of the initial
phases of conquest and "pactncatton'] especially after the 1896/7 risings, the
mood of the white colonist society of Southern Rhodesia began to change in
the context of their relationship with their former subordinates, whose ser-
vices were no longer relevant in the military context but in the field of labour)
to facilitate the effective exploitation of the resources of the new territory. 1
In this r'egard.what the former auxiliaries of the pre-1896 era were/therefore.
required to do was obviously to readjust the nature and quality of their asso-
ciation with the colonist society and proffer their services as labourers
rather than as military men or even mere evangelis ts, as had hitherto been
the case.
In the long run, when these auxiliaries in question had proved either un-
able or unsatisfactory in re-defining and adjusting their roles to meet the re-
quirements of both the B. S.A. Co Administration and the colonist employers
of Southern Rbodesfa, tentative efforts were naturally mounted to introduce
into the country, other specious foreign non-white groups to redeem the situ-
ation, given. especially, the evident mutual hostility and distrust between the
white colonizing group and the indigenous African societies of the territory. 2
In the event, whilst it proved both Impossible and impracticable to introduce
and sustain a permanent presence of Arab, Asiatic and AbYSSinian labouring
classes of people in Southern Rhodesia, trans-Zambesian immigration from
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, went a long way to meet
1
2Vide: Supra: Chapters 1 and 2.
Vide: Infra: Chapter 5.
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the needs of the colonist society of SouthernRhodesia; a role which was, in
more ways than one, largely reinforced by ancillary African groups from be-
low the Limpopoduring this period of our study.
ii: The drive to introduce Mfenguand other "Black Settler" Societies from
the Southby the B, S,A. Co. Administration and its supporters, 1898-
1902-
The introduction of the "black settler" communities from SouthAfrica
into Southern Rhodesia, namely the Mfengu, the Thembu and the Sotho, be-
tween 1898 and 1904 is as puzzling as it is bizarre, We have already seen
how after 1897, the alliance between the white colonists of early Southern
Rhodesia and their black aides from the Southhad begun to crack asunder as
a rift between the two or more groups began to surface and the feelings of
mutual antagonism became more evident, In view of these developments, one
would have naturally expected an unceremonious closure of all entry into
Southern Rhodesia .byone African group or another from below the Limpopo,
if not for all time at least in the interim, But as events will demonstrate in
the course of this chapter, this was however not the case,
Indeed,the ambiguous attitude within the administrative and colonist
circles in early Southern Rhodesia towards the pre-1896 "Black Pioneers"
from the South, on the one hand, and the later African immigrant groups, the
"Black Settlers, " on the other, certainly complicates any meaningful analysis
in relation to the motivation of the SouthernRhodesian Administration, in
particular, on these African immigrant ventures and with regard to one's
efforts to outline a general schema on the typologywithin which to fit in these
various related immigrant groups, seemingly subjected to differential treat-
ment, It might, however, be said here that, in a general way, in the post-
1896 period, the "Black Settlers" from SouthAfrica were expected, to some
extent, to assume in SouthernRhodesia those functions which their predeces-
sors, the "Black Pioneers'! had apparently failed to take up/once the Shona
and Ndebele risings were over and donewith, The agreement between "Mata-
bele" Thompson and the Mfenguin the Cape, the so-called "Fingo Agreement,"
inAprU 1898, for instance, sufficiently betrays these designs on the part of
Rhodes and the SouthernRhodesian Administration,
In his own way, "Matabele" Thompsonwas apparently best suited to ini-
tiate, Implement and impress onto the Mfengupotential migrants in the Cape
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the significance of their proposed transfer to Southern Rhodesia not only be-
cause of his earlier crucial role in the Rudd Concession and the founding of
3the colony of Southern Rhodesia, but also because of his experience inAfrican
affairs in the Cape and the trust and confidence Rhodes had in him. Thus when
Thompson had led a delegation of Mfengu notables to Southern Rhodesia to sur-
vey their future place of abode in that country in March 1898, Rhodes had in-
formed Sir Arthur Lawley, the Deputy Administrator (and also Administrator
of Matabeleland) that:
He E-Thomps~ comes with a proposition from here ~he Caper
Government will fully support to bring you up at least 1,000
Fingoes with their families who will agree to give you so much
labour per annum • • •• He is as you lmow well acquainted with
the native question and has been a successful administrator.
He is a member of the Cape Parliament •.• E-andrhas been as-
sociated with me for twenty ¥ears. He is obUging me in under=
taking this fFingo)- scheme.
It was.therefore.on the strength of this rapport between the chief actors in
the Mfengu immigration scheme from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia that it
was from the start expected to succeed
In essence, Mfengu migration to Southern Rhodesia, in the first half of
1898 as conceived by Thompson and his supporters, was governed by a variety
of promises and conditioo.s which the potential migrants were expected to ob-
serve.5 In the first place, the Mfengu gathering at Butterworth in the Tran-
skei was given to understand that three reserves had been chosen, set aside
and inspected by the Mfengu delegates to Southern Rhodesia the previous month,
and the reserves in question were located at Bembesi, Matopo and Nyaman-
dhlo:v.u,where the immigrants would be settled whilst their reserves were ac-
cordingly fenced off free of charge by the B. S. A. Co. Within the confines of
these reserves, each Mfengu man of over twenty-five years of age, whether
married or single, was entitled to a plot of 10 acres in size for ploughing; a
fifty-foot allotment on which to build a house and grazing rights for stock on
common land within the fence of the reserve.
34Vide: Supra: Chapter 1.
5Mss. Afr. S.227/A: Letter-Book 16: Rhodes to Lawley: March 8, 1898.
This proceeding analysis on the "Fingo Agreement" Is based on the following
material: C. O. 417/393: "Matabele" Thompson's address to the Mfengu
at Butterworth, Transkei, April (?), 1898: Enclosed in Clarke to MiJner
September 11, 1904 (also contained in File C. O. 417/512, PlRlo, toiiaon~
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Secondly, to secure one's title to this land, the 'Fingo Agreement'
6'
like the Glen Grey Act a few years before it, required each Mfengu land
holder to undertake wage labour for at least three (later changed to four)
months in the year, in the process of which they were to procure receipts
from either the mining companies, the wagon owners, shopkeepers, house-
holders or any other employer indicating that they had carried out their
stint. Failure to do this meant, to each Mfengu able-bodied man, a labour
tax payment of £ 3 per year, in addition to the annual hut-tax requirement
of 10/- then, generally, levied throughout Southern Rhodesfa, On the other
hand, any fulfilment of these labour requirements guaranteed to the potential
Mfengu landowner not only individual title to his plot during his life-time"but
also the fact that after his death the same plot would remain a family poss-
ession on a permanent basis, subject to inheritance first by the wife and
after her death by the eldest son. Only those Mfengu men who were below
25 years of age and had,therefore,no land allotments of their own and those
over 50 (and later 60) years were apparently exempted from what later
7
became popularly known as the 'Fingo Labour Clause'.
Thirdly. the BSACo. guaranteed to bear the transportation costs of all
Mfengu migrants and their property from the Cape to Matabeleland; men,
women and children being conveyed between these two points free of charge,
whilst the cost on the transportation of stock was liable to repayment to the
Company within the first five years of Mfengu settlement in Southern Rhodesia.
In "Matabele' Thompson's own words. 'the charge of the cattle -(remained)-
as a mortgage over their -(Mfengu)- plots. ,8 In fact,on this subject of Mfengu
transportation to Southern Rhodesia, the railway companies and authorities
involved in the process were apparently quite prepared to co-operate with
Rhodes and the BSACo. in order to make the whole programme a worthy ven-
ture j. to successfully re-stock the BSACo. poasesatons and,in this way, also
Written Evidence of Colonel Raleigh Grey, January 18, 1905,in South
African Native Affairs Commission Report 1903-5: VoL V, Annexure
No. 21; p, 39. Vide also Ranger: The African Voice in Southern
Rhodesia: PP. 45-6.
6
Vide: Infra: pp.349 -52
7The Helese Ginya affair at Bembesi between 1902 and 1905 must surely
have accounted for this change from 50 to 60 years. Vide: Infra: pp.365-85.
8C•O. 417/393: 'Matabele' Thompson's address to the Mfengu at Butterworth. .
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redress the harm inflicted by the 1896 rinderpest plague. 9 For this reason,
the Cape Government Railway Department was prepared to charge the BSACo.
a fairly cheap rate of about 'a farthing per head per mile' for the conveyance
of the Mfengubetween Queenstown and Vryburg.instead of the normal fare of
about 11/- 4d per head for the whole journey. The BechuanalandRailway
Company,responsible for the line between Vryburg and Southern Rhodesia,was,
on its part.even prepared to go further and grant concessions on the free trans-
10portation of these migrants altogether; a move evidently facilitated by the
fact that the BSACo. itself was a large shareholder in this particular railway
corporation.
The second group of promises and conditions}spelt out to the Mfenguat
Butterworth,dealt with, to a large extent, the organisation and character of
settlement in their future abode in Matabeleland as well as the governance of
what was later to become the Fingo Location at Bembesi in the Bubi district
of that province. Thus in relation to the bureaucratic machinery destined to
run the Fingo Location and look after Mfenguwelfare in general, 'Matabele'
Thompson promised these potential migrants that they would have 'an Officer
appointed over their -{affairs)- who -{would)-speak their language and under-
stand their customs', and whowould also respect their laws and customs 'so
long as they -{did)-not interfere too muchwith the European law, •••• ' The
official in question was to be assisted in his duties by about ten headmen}
appointed on the basis of the recommendation of the Chief Magistrate and his
assistants in the Cape, whilst these functionaries were, in their turn.expected
to constitute a council through the medium of which matters affecting the rank
and file residents either at Bembesi or elsewhere could be treated. In addi-
tion, it was these Mfenguheadmen whowere to take charge of the collection
of hut-tax from amongst their followers and compatriots. In return for such
services, they were to be rewarded by the BSACo.Administration in form of
monthly allowances, at the rate of £20 per annum for the senior headman and
11£12 for the nine others, and other specious fringe benefits like exemption
9NB1/1/4: Charter, Cape Town, to Acting Administrator, Salisbury: Tele-
gram: May31, 1898.
10NB1/1/9: Charter, Cape Town, to C/N/C, Bulawayo, Telegram: September
26, 1900.
11NB1/1/4: Charter to Acting Administrator: Telegram: May31, 1898.
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from the labour tax and landholdings 'double the size of that of the ordinary
12
subject' •
In terms of the social activities in the proposed area of Mfengusettle-
ment, rigorous control by the CompanyAdministration was made abundantly
there was a degree of collusion between polt-
tical and religious authorities to keep out of the future Fingo Location and
away from the Mfenguimmigrants all or most forms of diversionary
activities. Thus perhaps mindful of the opposition of the colonist traders in
the Transkei whowere said to be generally opposed to Mfenguemigration
to SouthernRhodesia, "Matabele!Thompson laid downa pollcy whereby this
class of people were to be excluded from the location. In ~Matabele' Thomp-
son's own colourful language, the influence of the trader amongst the Mfengu
immigrants was seen as a serious challenge to both official authority and
mtsstonary endeavour and.for this reason, Thompson,therefore) concluded:
I maintain that it is absolutely wrong to have a shop inside the
-iAfrican)- reserves, ••• The trader begins - -(a)- very good man,
builds a large shop. Havingbuilt it has a vested interest in the
reserve. • •• Anything he does depends upon his vested interest.
He may have -ia lot of money and)- the influence of the official is
lost when a prosperous trader takes the opposite -iside)-. That is
-(why)-one of the conditions -ilsr: that no shop or tr'i~
station shall be -iIocatedr in the -iMfengur reserve.
Rhodes himself stipulated this in an even more blunt manner,when he turned
downthe Mfengurequest for a trader's shop at Bembesi in September 1900
on the grounds that this couId easily lead to the sale of liquor throughout the
Fingo Location. In Rhodes's view)'These traders -iwould)-sell boots and
14blankets at the front door and Cape Smoke -il1quo~ at the backdoor. '
Whilst perhaps one couId here cavil at the manner inwhich the BSACo.
and its sympathizers overtly attempted to consolidate their hold and control
over the Mfenguimmigrants to SouthernRhodesia by pursuing, even at the
very initial stage of the Mfenguscheme, a deliberately exclustve policy, yet,
at the same time/it might be pointed out too that not very many Mfenguthem-
12C.O. 417/393: 'Matabele' Thompson's address •.••
13Ibid
14C.O. 417/311: Indaba held at the Bembesi Location by Rhodes with the
Ftngo leaders: September 6, 1900.
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selves would have supported the idea of liquor being made avallable in the
location. Indeed, for the Mfengu who, under missionary patronage, were
nurtured in rigid Victorian orthodox Christian teachings on abstinence and
moral rectitude; a factor which had naturally compelled them to petition the
Cape authorities to abolishJin Fmgoland.such traditional customs and prac-
tices as those relating to abakweta (circumcision for male adolescents)
ceremonies, the intonjane (female initiation) dances and the imgidi (the large
African beer-drinking) sessions which accompanied these institutions in the
15later phase of the nineteenth century, it is not surprising to find that they
had changed little by the beginning of the twentieth century. As Captain
Veldtman Bikitsha, the leading Mfengu headman and spokesman to the
South African Native Affairs Commission indicated in March 1904, the Mfengu
were evidently still determined to stick to their prohibitionist ideas and con-
sequently pleaded with the commtsstoners and other officials concerned that
'~these)- gentlemen now before us, who we feel sure entertain sympathy with
our feelings, -(would)- do all in their power to continue to prevent the liquor
coming into this Territory ~the Transkei)-'. 16
From the proceeding argument, it would, therefore, appear that the
requirement of the 'Fingo Agreement' on the restriction of liquor traffic in
the proposed Fingo Location was by no means a disadvantage to the Mfengu
immigrants who were themselves aympathettc, in every way, to this particular
stipulation. Thus if the restrictive part of the 'Fingo Agreement' on liquor
achieved anything at all, it was also largely for the benefit of the missionaries
and the BSACo. officials involved with the Mfengu scheme, who naturally took
the liberty to entrench their hold on the new arrivals in Southern Rhodesia.
In the final analysfs, the significance of the 'Fingo Agreement' lay not so much
in the stipulations that it provided for on liquor traffic or on how and at what
cost Mfengu were to be transported to Southern Rhodesia, but on the promise
the new scheme offered in solving the labour and defence problems of the new
colony. For one thing, it may be pertinent to observe here that Southern
Rhodesia was, at this stage and for a long time to come, a politically and
culturally plural society in a conflict situation, in the true Furnivall and Smith
15 .
Vide: Suprai Chapter I: pp.IS-8
16Evidence of Captain Vedtman Bikitsha, Cape Colony, March 15,
South African Native Affairs Commission Report 1903-5: Vol.
1904: in
II: p, 943.
313
traditions whereby a dominant white colonist minority wielded power over a
variety of subject national and ethnic groups with sheer force majeure and a
host of economic, political, and social factors as the main determinants in
relation to the imposition of a reasonable degree of inter-group consensus,
involuntary integration and co-existence and some form of common weal or
values for the sake of making the hierarchical colonial structure and the
whole syndrome of colonial domination and subordination more meaningful17
Thus in this kind of aggregate society, both plural and inequitable in
nature. as that of Southem Rhodesia symbolized in 1898 and after, the emphasis
on politico-economic motivation in form of labour extraction from the subject
colonial groups and the defence of the privileged position of the dominant
minority by military means as well as the maintenance of all forms of ineq-
uality in the name of law, order and stability, was a singularly important
theme. 'Matabele' Thompson did not apparently forget these characteristics
of the society he represented in the course of biLsMfengu scheme for Southern
Rhodesia and.accordingly, pointed out to the Mfengu gathering at Butterworth,
in early 1898)that:
Now, do not misunderstand me. I am not going to take the
Fingoes up there ~to Southern Rhodesia)- to look at. I want
two things from them. I want labour and I want defence. That's
all I want from them. Understand that clearly. We do igt love
one another so much as to give land without any return,
From the preceding evidence, it is) therefore, cone lusive that the institu-
tional aspect of the plural colonial society in Southern Rhodesia, like anywhere
else where the colonial regimen was then prevalent, was quite a primary
factor underlying the Mfengu migrant scheme. Besides the labour and defence
features of the Mfengu arrangement indicated above, there was also a number
of other causes which contributed to make the process of Mfengu transfer to
Southem Rhodesia from the Cape, a more plausible affair and these causes
are best gleaned from the whole range of apologia and pretexts proffered by
various administrative officials, colonist classes and individuals on the matter.
In the Cape colony itseU,for example, administrative officials and influential
17
For an analysis of these features of plural colonial societies in theoretical
perspective: Cf. Kuper: 'Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems'
in Kuper and Smith (eds.): Pluralism in Africa: PP. 10-3; and also Smith:
'Institutional and Political Conditic:m.sof Pluralism' in !!lli!: PP. 28-33.
18C. O. 417/393: 'Matabele' Thompson's address ••••
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individuals were, perhaps, inordinately swayed by issues of economic nature.
The gradual degeneration of the productive potential of the African agricul-
tural sector in the Cape,noticeable in the later 1880's and the 1890's especi-
ally in the Ciskei, Fingoland and the Transkei in general, was quite a potent
factor in relation to Mfengu emigration from that country. The fact that this
progressive economic decline in these African areas was largely a product
of such divers forces as the extensive land expropriation by the white
colonists and its resultant land shortage amongst the African peasants;
physical and natural disasters like drought and stock diseases; the growing
labour demand in the recently emergent mining industry and its reliance on
African migrant labour largely facilitated by legislative mechanisms like the
Glen Grey Act.which)through its ethos and principle of 'one man one lot~
aimed deliberately at creating a discernible African landless class and, there-
fore) a sizeable 'migrant African proletariat' as well as the overt acts of
economic discrimination against the African areas by the white bureaucracies
. 19in terms of market structure and general mvestment policy, was not
altogether convtnctng in the eyes of the white officials and colonists in the Cape.
They looked for other factors to explain away these developments in the Afri-
can areas.
One factor which the officials and rank and file white colonists in the
Cape, of course.held responsible for the acute land shortage and the generally
parlous economic conditions of the colony's African areas centred on popu-
lation growth, over-grazing and African economic conservatism in those areas
concemed; views here widely held even by some of the so-called liberal-
20
minded supporters of the African cause at the time. It was obviously against
this background that the famous Cape politician and parliamentarian, J~W.
Sauer, for instance}justified the removal of the Mfengu to Southern Rhodesfa,
when he indicated in May 1898 that:
I think this step would be in the interest of the Fingoes if
they can find suitable land fin Southem Rhodesia~ because that
part of the Transkei occupied by them is almost over-populated,
very thickly populated, indeed, and with the natural increase
of population amongst them - and there being no more vacant
19
C. Bundy: 'The Response of African Peasants in the Cape to Economic
Changes, 1870-1910: A Study in Growth and Decay' in Institute of Common-
wealth Studies (University of London) Seminar Papers: Vol. 3: No. 16:
October 1971-June 1972: pp. 29-32.
20Vide: Written Evidence of R. W. Rose-Innes, King William's Town, n. d. :
315
land in the Transkei in that part occupied by natives -
there would soon be an overspill of population there. 21
This idea of viewing Mfengu migration as a means of decongesting the
Transkei and related African areas in the Cape,which certainly enjoyed a
lot of support in white circles both below and across the Limpopo,22 may
have apparently gained some credence amongst the Mfengu themselves and
other African groups of the colony who had begun to regard the deteriorating
land allocation conditions at the close of the nineteenth century with equan-
imity. In the 1860's,land allocation amongst the Mfengu and other African
loyalist groups of the Cape had been made on the basis of 40 to 80 acres per
head; by 1882 this amounted to about 2 to 30 acres (1 to 15 morgen) per man,
whilst with the promulgation of the Glen Grey Act in 1894 these holdings were
further reduced to 8 acres (4 morgen).23 Under these circumstances, it was
just as well that leaders of l\ffengu opinion like Captain Bikitsha, whose son,
Charles Bikitsha,was inCidentally a member of the Mfengu delegation that
accompanied 'Matabele' Thompson to Matabeleland in March 1898 to assess
24the land promised them and their people, were themselves becoming in-
creasingly aware at the time of the implications of the land shortage problem
amongst the African societies and the futUity of appealing for further allo-
cation of this commodity by the Cape authorities.
From this point of view, it becomes clearer why the Mfengu should have
been by 1904 so insistent on their land in the Transkei being surveyed and
individual titles granted to landholders as a sign of security of tenure. Their
anxieties on this score were perhaps aptly summarized by Captain Bikitsha's
statement in reference to the Ciskei that: 'We know there are places where
25
there is no grazing ground even for a beast - the beast has to be tied up, '
But even these survival techniques, which the Mfengu had apparently applied
since the fOlmdingof Fingoland in the Transkei in 1870 to safeguard their
landholding rights, were rapidly becoming Irrelevant by the close of the nine-
in South African Native Affairs Commission Report 1903-5: Vol. TI: PP.
tx, xtv-xv,
21Cape Argus: May 4, 1898.
22Vide: The Diamcnd Fields Advertiser: Apri119, 1898 and Bulawayo Chron-
!2!!: April 20, 1898.
23Bundy: ope cit. P. 31.
24Bulawayo Chronicle: April 20, 1898.
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teenth and the beginning of the twentieth century as the land policy of the Cape
began to undergo rapid transformation to catch up with those of the other
SouthAfrican territories) especially the Boer republics where the African's
access to land tenure and acquisition was heavily circumscribed. In the final
analysis, it was.therefore.not only Southem Rhodesia and the HighCommis-
sion territories, to some extent, which came to serve as safety-valves to the
artificial conditions of eongesuen and over-crowding created in the African
areas of the Cape due to the land-hunger of the colonist population there, but
the newly acquired domain of Pondoland also provided some necessary
lebensraum to the Mfenguand other African landless groups from the Trans-
kei and the old colony,right from the 1890's to the early decades of the
26twentieth century.
For the sake of clarity however, it should be pointed out here too that;
in a general way,the white colonial govemments of the four territories of
SouthAfrica tended, as a matter of policy, to treat the newer territories of
Southem Africa, particularly Southem Rhodesia and the HighCommission
territories, as sources of relief to their longstanding problems of black/
white conflict and friction so characteristic of plural or composite colonial
societies. In this regard it is)therefore, hardly surprising that after the Lange-
berg Rebellion in the northem Cape, there were hints on the possible removal.
in 1898,of the former Tswana insurgents, whose lands around Taungs had been
expropriated by white farmers, to Southem Rhodesia; a movewhich conse-
quently elicited the comment from their Catholic missionary patron,
Father Porte, that 'The -(the insurgent Tswana)- do not care to go to -(South-
27
ern)- Rhodesia, because they hate the :Matabele,••• '
Similarly, when the Rolong succession dispute erupted between the two
sons of the late Chief Moroka, the Anglican-backed Samuel Moroka and the
MethodIst-supported Tshipinare Moroka, the president of the Boer republic
of the Orange Free state, J. H. Brand, took the opportunity to expel the for-
mer from the territory in the late 1890's because of this claimant's English
28
education and.therefore.hts 'English feelings', to which the Boer leader took
25Evidence of Captain Veldtman Bikitsha: March 15, 1904; le!!!: p, 951.
26Vide: Hunter: Reaction to Conquest: passim.
27Cape Argus: Apr1l23, 1898.
28Samuel Moroka had been educated in England at St. Augustine's College,
Canterbury.
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great exception. In the long run.Samuel Morokawas banished to the Ramak-
webana area of Bechuanaland Portectorate bordering on Southern Rhodesia. 29
A fewyears later, plans were afoot also to settle the Tlokwa and Hurutshe
communtttes of the Orange Free state In the Protectorate.30
The total effect of these official moves, at one time or another, to
transfer African communities from the older territories of white settlement
In Southern Africa to the newer ones, apparently to the advantage of the col-
onists of those older white states, was obviously an important factor In In-
31fluencing African societies and individuals themselves as well as commer-
Cially-motivated syndicates 32 to regard, in a rather bizarre manner, that
the problems of land shortage and general African displacement in South
Africa proper could best be solved by systematic transfer of the Afrlcan
communities so affected to the neighbouring colonies, especially Southern
Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. It Is, therefore, within this
wider context that Mfengutransfer from the Cape to SouthernRhodesia)at
the close of the nineteenth century, must also be generally considered.
But whUst the African land shortage problem in SouthAfrica in general
and in the Transkei in particular may have acted as a cognisable motivating
factor in Mfengumigration to Southern Rhodesia, it was,however)by no means
the only cause of this process of population transfer. There was certainly a
number of other causes which variously contributed to the origins and
implementation of the Mfengumigrant scheme. One such important factor
may be apparently ascribed to the Mfenguhistorical background and modem
33tradition as what Moyer terms 'the great collaborators' of the Eastern Cape.
29vide: C.O. 417/452: Petition of Samuel Moroka to Acting Lieutenant-
Governor, H. F. Wilson, Orange River Colony; February, 6, 1904 and to
Lord Selborne: April 26, 1908.
30Vide: C.O. 417/437: Lord Selborne to Lord Elgin: August 26, 1907.
31Note the application of M.H. Madapuna, an African farmer of the
Matatiele district of East Griqualand in 1913 for land in the Ghanzi div-
ision of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. C.O. 417/523: M.H. Madaplma,
Matatiele, East Griqualand, to Government Secretary, Mafeking:March
26, and April 9, 1913.
32Cf. The application by a Johannesburg syndicate, DouglasWilson and Rusk,
to the BSACo. in 1906 to purchase land in Southern Rhodesia for the
settlement of African landless groups from the Transvaal. C.O. 417/444:
Douglas Wilsm & Rusk, Johannesburg, to BSACo., Cape Town, November
8, 1906.
33Moyer: OP. cit. P. 144.
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This Mfengu collaboration with the white colonists and their own self-image
as allies of British colonial agencies and power in Southern Africa were
obviously developments which became so indelibly imbedded in :Mfengupsy-
chology and orientation that nothing could be said to have changed, as far as
this African group of people was concerned, by the close of the nineteenth
century. If anything,the Mfengu themselves, both below and across the Lim-
popo, were quite outspoken and sentimental on what they outrightly regarded
as their special relationship with the British forces of colonization in the
sub-continent, especiaUy in the Cape. 34 For this reason, one Mfengu clerk,
William 1\1. Mzinjana, on trial in BuIawayo for forging a pass authorizing
himself to purchase liquor in March 1898 could boast, with some justifica-
tion, that:
I am not a native of Matabeleland, but am a colonial native.
I can boast of being a British subject before I was born
-{April 1859)-; in fact all and every one of the nation commonly
called the Fingoes took the British yoke upon their necks at
the first possible opportunity, and have ever since been ~al
under the British rule; -{they)- never rebelled whatever.
Similar assertions of Mfengu loyalty to the British authorities were
also expressed in 1904 by Captain Bikitsha in relation to how his people came
to acquire Fingoland in 1870,on which he stated that:
The ~Cape)- Governm.ent gave us this country - made us a
present of it - because we were obedient servants; the
Government, recognising us as obedient servants, gave
us this CO\Dltry. We, especially we Fingoes, w:fif8 given
it because of our obedience to the Government.
Moreover, as a demonstration of their loyalty, the :Mfenguin Fingoland had
even gone to the extent of requesting the Molteno administration at the Cape to
impose taxation over them because, as they asserted I••• We -(were)- child-
ren of the Government and we -(wish)- the Government to understand that we
37
did not wish to break our connection with them, ••• I
From the context of colonial societies as plural societies in a conflict
situation~whereby the dominant ruling classes could only maintain their
position and privileges through wholesale deployment of coercive powers;
34Vide: SUpra: PP.
35Cape Al'J{U!:March 16, 1898.
36Evidence of Captain Veldtman Bikitsha: loc. cit.
37 I!2ll!: p, 952.
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monopoly over poUtical, social and judicial resources as well as immobiliza-
tion of the subject peoples by suppressive or proscriptive acts of one kind or
38another, these assertions of loyalty and obedience by the Mfenguwere.m
every way.an immense boon. The notion of using a loyalist group of people,
as typified by the Mfengu, in a colonial setting was certainly appealing and
feasible. In both Southern Rhodesia and the Cape colony much play was made
on this factor. Thus in May 1898, Sauer had commented on this aspect of
Mfengumigration from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia emphasizing not simply
the loyalist sentiment of the Mfengu)butalso other positive ascriptive qualities
which. , he judged, were bound to benefit the white colonial society of
Southern Rhodesia in the long run. In a nutshell, Sauer indicated:
••• if suitable land can be got for them it would help
materially towards the development of the gold mines
in -{Southem)-Rhodesia, as the Fingoes are very
intelligent, and amongst the most industrious of our
-{Caper native races, with a Scotsman's capacity for
making money. They have always been loyal, and are most
reliable people. In intelligence and education, of course, they
are far in advance of the natives of -{Southern)-Rhodesia, and
they could be relied upon, should unhappily any fresh diffi-
cultiesggrise in -{Southern)-Rhodesia, to support law and
order.
It was this line of argument,portrayed above,which officials and other
supporters of the Mfenguscheme in Southern Rhodesia,at first,also tended to
pursue. From the point of view of the Chief Native Commissioner for Mata-
beleland, Mfengu historical background tended to suffiCiently guarantee their
positive contl'ibution to the processes of development in Southern Rhodesta,
because these people '-(had)- been brought up in civilization for 200 years,40
and were,therefore.lexpected, by virtue of this upbringing, to '••• act as a
wholesome example for their fellow natives', especially as they were 'in a more
41advanced state of civilization than the indigenous inhabitants of the country'.
Oneway through which these 'advanced' Mfengu were to demonstrate their
38Vide: Smith: op. cit. PP. 55-6.
39Cape Argus: May4, 1898.
40C•O. 417/276: Report on an Indaba held by the C/N/C CMatabelelangj'with
the Fingoes at the Fingo Location on Thursday. September 21. 1899.
41 /C. O. 879 84: 'Short History of the Native Tribes of the Province of Mata-
beleland' by C/N/C Taylor: January 11, 1904; Enclosed in Taylor to
BSACo. January 16, 1904.
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positive cultivation was in the field of labour demand in which they were
naturally expected ", •• ttor take to mining work and thus serve as an object
lesson for the inducement of the natives of the country to do likewise, •••• ",
On this score, B. S.A. Co. officials appear to have elicited the support of the
42Colonial Official on the Mfengu scheme, though at first the labour clause
in the "Fingo Agreement" had been dismissed in Number 12 Downing Street as
lacking in legal authority since it could not be enforced in law against the
Mfengu immigrants. 43 As far as Rhodes was concerned however, Mfengu im-
migration into Southern Rhodesia also served another useful purpose. The
scheme was, from his point of view, a plausible move worth exploiting as a
public stunt to validate the B. S. A. Co. policy towards the African subject soci-
eties of the country, as Rhodes readily reminded the B. S.A. Co. shareholders'
44meeting in London in May 1898.
Of course,not everybody was as enthusiastic over the Mfengu scheme as
officials in both Southern Rhodesia and the Cape evidently were. Rank and file
white colonists as well as those African societies likely to be affected in any
adverse manner by tm scheme were certainly not pleased in the least. In the
Cape colooy,white traders were obviously not pleased by the threat which the
scheme posed to them as a class, especially in terms of the consequent loss of
custom which the whole plan implied. But the opposition of this secondary
colonist segment was curtly dismissed as being "actuated by self interest" and
their warning to the Mfengu,as liable to have their labour explotted in Southern
45Rhodesia for no returns} also decried as baseless. In away, all t hat this
traders' opposition may have.therefore.acbteved.m due ccurse.was the manner
in which tm Mfengu became wary and sensitive to all traces of deception by the
B. S.A. Co., especially with regard to land allocation in Matabeleland; a devel-
opment in which Mfengu notables at the Cape also played quite a Significant
46part.
4243C. O. 417/401: Minute by Grindle to Just: July 28, 1904.
44C. O. 417/393: Minute by Grindle to Just: November 8, 1904.
Cape Argus: May 18, 1898.
45C• O. 417/393: 'Matabele' Thompson's address •••
46
Note here the advice of Jabavu and his paper..!!:!!!2 to potential Mfengu
migrants to Southern Rhodesia in 1898 to make sure that they had all the
land allocated to them by the BSACo. properly surveyed for security.
Vide: Jabavu: John Te pgo Jabaw: loco cit.
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In Southern Rhodesia,on the other hand, colonist opposition to the Mfengu
immigration scheme was tied to two main issues; firstly, the demand for an
active role on the part of the BSACo. Administration to procure forced labour
from the local African societies and secondly, the issue of generous land
grants the Company had already made to various individuals and syndicates
in the country. Concerning the first issue which constituted the gravemen
of white colonist opposition to the Mfengu scheme and its co-relationship with
forced labour demand, Southern Rhodesian white colonists were apparently
disappointed by what they regarded as the duplicity of the BSACo. Admini-
stration, along with the interference of Exeter Hall in Southern Rhodesian
affairs, in renouncing forced labour as an aspect of its administrative policy
and)by the same breath,designating labour mobilisation an essentially private
enterprise, yet,on the other hand, '-(stultifying)- itself by arranging to locate
47several thousands of Fingoes in the country. ' To these colonists, the ques-
tion of labour demand was so paramount and forefront in the territory's
affairs that it could hardly be solved by half-hearted measures such as the
planting of 'native colonies' in the country, as the Mfengu. scheme denoted.
Accordingly, they condemned the scheme, indicating) in the process, that:
It seems to us bad policy to start at the top of the tree,
and this is what the Chartered Company appears to be
doing in bringing colonies of Fingoes into this territory
-(Southern Rhodesia)-. But the Administration is prone to these
things, and instead of formulating a far-reaching and def-
inite native policy they tinker at the question. The Fingoes
are no doubt a good race of natives as natives go, but we do
not think they are much more inclined to underground
mining than the Matabele, and4\t is labour for the mines
that the country is crying for.
The main reason for colonist attack here, therefore ,was necessitated by
what they viewed as a bankruptcy of policy on the part of the Southern
Rhodesian Administration on local African labour supply. But.at the same
time, it should also be noted that these colonists had other ideas in mind In
this connectlon,they opposed the Mfengu settlement scheme because they were
convinced that it was less feasible than the alternative ones they desired.
relating to the 'Zambesis' (Tonga), residing on both sides of the Zambesi
river, and the Shangaans from the Portuguese territory. In the perspective of
47Bulawayo Chronicle: August 16, 1898.
48Bulawayo Chronicle: March 29, 1898.
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these colonists, the advantages in establishing 'Zambesi' and Shangaan
'colonies' in the heart of Matabeleland,for the sake of labour supply.did not
lie so much in the presumption that they were 'the best mining boys we
-(SouthernRhodesian employers)- can get, -{indeed)-far better than the
Fingoes, , but also in the fact that, it was considered easier and cheaper to
secure 'two or three colonies' of these peoples,since the 'Zambesis' had, in
the first place, no paramount chief to hinder their transfer of abode, whilst
the Portuguese, under whose control the Shangaans lived, were expected to
offer little resistance to the move; an assumption which was here as erroneous
49as it was optimistic.
In essence, the alternative schemes on 'Zambesis' and Shangaansettle-
ments in Matabeleland, like that on the Mfengu, were expected to achieve one
thing; to act as a kind of catalyst among the Ndebele on positive labour res-
ponse and,by force of example,induce the latter to undertake work on the mines)
since, it was presumed, 'when the Matabele saw these men -{Zambesis and
Shangaans)- decking themselves out in gay blankets or Piccadily suits they
would hanker after these fleshpots, and would see that the means to obtain
50them was by labour. ' Paradoxically, however anxious colonist employers
might have been over their proposed schemes on 'Zambesi' and Shangaan
client communities to serve as labour reservoirs, they were, at the same time,
quite aware that the success of these plans was heavily circumscribed. In this
regard, the second issue of white colonist opposition to Mfenguimmigration
into Southern Rhodesia was largely responsible for frustrating these foreign
migrant designs.
The large-scale alienation of land in the country to private individuals
and conaortta.Ieadfng to a situation whereby a greater proportion of the land was
locked in the hands of speculators) was certainly viewed by white colonists as
a sour aspect of the BSACo.'s economic policy. The grant of land by the
Company to some of its supporters and favourites, like the one made to
Captain Arthur Lawley;for example,in the Mazoe district of Mashonaland in
51February 1898 to the tune of '75 square miles, for services rendered', and
was,in this particular instance,criticized by both the Rhodesia Chamber of
49Cf. The failure of Southern Rhodesian authorities to procure Shangaan
labour from Mozambiqueduring and after the Anglo-Boer war. Vide:
Supra: PP.184-S
50 .BulawayoChronicle: March 29, 1898.
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Mines and the white colonists, did not certainly augur well for the Mfengu
scheme which followedtwo or so months later. White colonists, in general,
could only conclude that the purchase. in April 1898,of the Battlefield block at
Bembesi from Asshur by the BSACo.Administration for £7,00052 as
well as the £1,500 deal with a Mr. Pennant over his two farms in the Nyam-
andhlow area in November 1898; an arrangement over which the owner in
question was quite insistent to see completed as quickly as possible,whilst
Rhodes personally thought the farms were quite suitable for Mfengusettle-
53ment, symbolized yet another move by the Companyto playa generous host
to its clients, be they black or white. From this point of view, the Mfengu
immigration scheme and the attendant land offers it dangled to these 'black
settlers', therefore, inexorably attracted considerable criticism from the
white colonists. These critics deplored what they saw as a state of affairs
whereby the locking up of the most fertile and desirable land in Matabeleland
by syndicates and absentee landlords had created a situation in which this
asset could only be purchased at prohibitive prices, whilst, at the same time,
'only black men -(could)-obtain land for settlement, the whites being com-
54pletely ignored. '
In another respect, it was also felt that the move to attract Mfenguimmi-
grants, though as potential labourers, could only create an erroneous imp-
ression,with these 'black settlers' consequently over-estimating their worth
in the eyes of Southem Rhodesia's colonist society. The Acting Native Com-
missioner of the Bubi district in which the Mfengumigrants were to be settled,
P,A. Stuart, may have best summarized this colonist viewwhen he stated in
October 1898:
Whyshould we have to import Fingoes -(into Southem
Rhodesia)- - give them good fertile land to live on, and
in other words, bribe them to come and live here?
They are goodworkers I am told, but won't they be a
great nutsance, knowing as 5~ey must do, howhighly their
labour will be valued here?
Beside white colonist opposition to Mfenguimmigration in Southem
51Cape Argus: February 2, 1898.
52Cape Argus: April 2, 1898.
53Mas. Afr. S. 227/A: Letter-Book 22: Rhodes to Lawley: November 6, 1898.
54Cape Argus: March 30, 1898.
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Rhodesia, the indigenous Ndebele society too was by no means tantalized by
the developments, Indeed,it has already been demonstrated.tn the earlier
part of this study, how in the post-1896 era relations between the Ndebele and
the African communities from the South living in Bulawayo were so strained
56
that they often resorted to violent confrontation. This uneasy truce between
these two campsjwhieh was obviously responsible for such overt expressions
of Ndebele antagonism as Induna Sikombo's famous description of the 'Col-
onial boys' as 'monsters' before Captain Lawley in June 1900, 57 may have
also largely conditioned the attitudes of the Ndebele host society to the Mfengu
arrivals.
In fact, it is pertinent to observe here that one of the major issues dis-
cusssed by the Ndebele leaders at Umjaan's place on Rhodes's Sauerdale farm
in the Bulawayo district in November 1898; a meeting which consequently led
to the deposition of Umjaan as a Government-subsidized induna, 58 was that
59
'the Matabele country was to be handed over to the Fingoes ..•• ' In spite of
official assurances to the contrary, Ndebele anxieties were certainly deeply
embedded, especially in view of the original BSACo. plan to systematically
locate the Mfengu at various places 'in the heart of the Matabele fastnesses
••• ' which. it was hoped,'~ouldr- tend considerably to the maintenance of the
. 60present peaceful state of affairs -(in Matabelelandj-, ' Ndebele anxieties over
Mfengu settlement in Matabeleland were here aptly captured by one of their
indunas, Chief Mazwi of the Malema district of that province,who informed
Captain Lawley in December 1898:
We don't know how we shall get on with them -(the Mfengur.
They might go over &'feir boundaries and encroach -(on
Ndebele territoryr.
In the final analysis, it was not.however, the opposition of either the white
55NB 1/1/6: Stuart, Acting N/C, Bubi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: October 22, 1898.
56
Vide: Supra: Pp. 163- 4
57C. O. 417/311: Report of an Indaba held at Bulawayo by Captain Lawley with
the leaders of Matabeleland on June 21, 1900.
58
Vide: Supra: pp.170-2
59C. O. 879/57: Memorandum of proceedings at an Indaba held at Government
House, Bulawayo, <Xl the 12th December, 1898.
60Bulawayo Chronicle: May 20, 1898.
61
Ibid: Memorandum of proceedings at an Indaba held at Government House.
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colonists or the Ndebele society to Mfenguimmigration which carried the day.
What actually appears to have been more important on this score was the
reaction of the Southern Rhodesian employers,particularly, the mining industry
which was apparently much more concerned with the labour aspect of the
Mfenguscheme. Indeed,the enthusiasm of the Southern Rhodesian mining in-
dustry over Mfenguimmigration was, from the sponsors' point of view, quite
encouraging)right from the start. For the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines,for
instance, which had already placed an order with 'Matabele' Thompson for
700 MfenguIabourers, by May1898)to arrive by the end of that month in Bulaw-
ayo, what this association of employers was more worried about.however;was
that the Mfenguin question might not arrive in Matabeleland in time in order
to allow particular employers to sort out their priorities as to the engagement
of either this form of labour or local supply.
Moreover, the mining companies were also concerned, to some extent, by
the nature of the employment conditions under which they had arranged with
'Matabele' Thompson to engage Mfengulabourers. Thus whilst the 35/-
monthly wage tariff per labourer, promised the Mfengu,wasnot subject to
review, the mining companies were.however, not at all happy over the privi-
leges conceded in the process) especially in terms of food and other social
amenities. In this regard, it was concluded that 'Matabele' Thompson should
drop his stipulations on the provtston of 'meat, Boer meal, coffee and
sugar' to Mfengulabourers by employers and substitute these with alternative
rations in form of com meal and a cash allowance of 2/- per week in place of
meat, coffee and sugar. The mining companies as potential employers of
Mfengu labour actually feared that by conceding too many privileges to Mfengu
labourers, a situation might arise whereby 'other native labour would have to
62~e)- treated in the same way."
It was,therefore,agatnst this background of considerable support from
the BSACo. officials and the mining industry, onthe one band.and rank and file
colonist and Ndebele opposition,<Xlthe other, that Mfenguimmigration into
Southern Rhodesia came to fruition by the close of 1898. Their transportation
between Queenstown and Bulawayomay not have been the best, characterized
as itwas,particularly, by loss of property and stock en route,notably at such
connecting points along the railway line as Kimberley, Vryburg, Mafekingand
62Bulawayo Chronicle: May28, 1898.
326
and Plumtree,where the Mfengu migrants were often required to change trains
and thus being inevitably separated from their stock and property with dis-
astrous consequences. Indeed/even the need to detrain the stock.espectally
for pasturage.for one or two days was just as fraught with problems. 63 But
in the long run, what mattered is that by November 1898 the Mfengu had
arrived at Bembesi and a nucleus of the future Fingo Location began.hence-
forth) to take shape.
Although Mfengu political and social organisation was later to assume a
certain definitive structure which largely corresponded to these people's
pattern of settlement at Bembesi, with Chief Kona at the head of the Amazizi
people formerly of the Ketani district in the Transkei; Chief Garner Sojinl as
the leader of a ffiubi group from Gquba in the Ciskei; Chief Mdani of the
Amabhele from Nqamakwe (Transkei); .Chief Mtyaldsane also leading another
Hlubi group from Willowvale (Transkei) and Chief Nqakala also of another
Amabhele group from the Nqamakwe district in the Transkei,64 these various
Mfengu groups did not,however,arrive at Bembesi at the same time. The first
Mfengu arrivals in Southern Rhodesia in November 1898 were the three chiefs,
namely Kona, Mtyakisane and Nqakala,with only a handful of their followers
consisting of merely sixteen families;65 a situation which had hardly improved
by August 1899 when the first computation of the Mfengu population at Bembesi
recorded an overall figure of 280 men, women and children, of whom 69
were placed under Mtyakisane; 27 under Nqakala; 164 under Kona and the
remaining 20 being under another new arrival Headman Mbulawa, the father
of Nzimende Mbulawa Ndondo, destined to playa significant role in the genests
66of Mfengu history in Southern Rhodesia.
63Vide: NB 1/1/6: Statements of Ngamala. Ngyenti et al, , before W.M. Bar-
nard, Acting Superintendent, Fingo Location: February 4-6, 1902.
64This information is based on Interviews with Chief Morosi NyUika and Mr.
Meckson Mpengesi (a former member of the Fingo Council), Fingo
Location, Bembesi, November 17 and 18, 1975 (respectively) and also on
Written Evidence of Rev, Sojini to author: December 11, 1975,
65NB 1/1/6: R. Tanning, N/C, Bulawayo at Shiloh -(.£nyati)-, to C/N/C, Bula-
wayo; November 19, 1898. Amongst the first family heads to arrive at
Bembesi were Jim, Siko, Gatju, Popi, Mhlolo, Freddie Kona, Ipsuku,
Mhlahlo, John Blanni, Fani, Dukuduku, Sllwanyawa and Baleklsa, (These
names are retained here as recorded by N/C, Lanning.)
66
Ibid: H. F. Griffith, Superintendent, Fingo Location, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
August 31, 1899.
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AppcndixW THE FIRST MFENGU SETTLEMENT AT
BEMBESI November 1898
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Under these circumstances, it was obvious,therefore,that the number of
Mfenguimmigrants was far below the expectations of the BSACo. officials
whohad instructed the Native Department in Matabeleland in June 1898to
67survey about 800plots of 10 acres each at Bembesi for the purpose. In the
event, the pattern of Mfengusettlement and administration at Bembesi was.at
first, both random and carefree because of this short-fall in the expected
number of Mfenguarrivals; a point which may have vindicated the BSACo.
Administration's action in suspending its land-surveying activities in June
1898 on the grounds of uncertainty as to the number of Mfenguimmigrants
bound to tum up.68 In any case, the first arrivals, unlike those immigrants
who later followed, were allowed to settle in one compact community,regard-
less of their group differences and political allegiance, with the only major
division represented here by the distinction between their agricultural plots
69and the area set apart for grazing lands. This compact pattern of settle-
ment was seen as the best way in which these immigrants, whohad after all
arrived in the middle of the planting season, could be concentrated along the
banks of the Bembesi river in order to be better able 'to break up ground
with hoes on the river bank so as to get crops quickly and get a return of
70
grain for sowing purposes for -(ther next season. '
Even after the appointment and arrival of the first Superintendent of the
Fingo Location, HughFerrier Griffith, the former Native Commissioner of
the Tuli district in Matabeleland, at the end of November that year, this
initial pattern of Mfengu settlement was allowed to persist,as it provided the
best way in which these Mfengu arrivals could, as a community, cope with the
problems of maximumutilization of the team of six oxen and one plough, in-
stead of the three spans (18oxen) and three ploughs previously promised by
71'Matabele'Thompson, supplied them on loan by the BSACo;the sharing of
67NB1/1/4: TanDing, N/C Bulawayo~at Inyati)- to C/N/C, Bulawayo; June 21,
1898 and C.L. Carbutt, Acting N/C, Bubi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 24,
1898.
68lbid: Chief Secretary, Salisbury, to C/N/C, Bulawayo, Telegram: June 30,
1898.
69 -Vide: Appendix~ (map) 'The First Mfengu Settlement at Bembesij November.
1898'.
70NB 1/1/6: Lanning, N/C, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:November 19,
1898.
71NB1/1/6: Griffith, Superintendent, Fingo Location, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
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the three rifles placed in the trust of the then three Mfenguheadmen at the
location for the protection of the Mfenguimmigrants and their stock against
predators 72 and to facilitate the distribution of medicines, especially quinine
and chlorochyme, also provided by the Companyas a preventive measure
against fever, lest the Mfenguimmigrants died in sizeable numbers in the first
year of their stay in Southern Rhodesia with the resultant 'bad effect on the
73number who ,intendedr coming up ,from the Caper next year ,1899r.'
Other Mfenguleaders of consequence, who made their appearance at
Bembesl in 1899with their people, were Chiefs Garner Sojini, John Hlazo and
Mbulawa. But these leaders, however, do not seem to have commanded the
same measure of respect from the BSACo.Administration, which their
forerunners enjoyed, for a number and variety of reasons. In the first place,
the followers of this second category of Mfenguleaders were too few and fell
far short of Rhodes's requirement of a following of '100 families' for each
Mfenguheadman or chief to qualify for the £1 monthly subsidy from the gov-
ernment.74 Indeed,Rhodes's jibe at the Mfenguleaders at Bembesi in
September 1900 that 'Some of you only have 12 people under you -{andr you
75cannot call that being a Headman••• " was particularly relevant to the
cases of Mbulawa, Hlazo and Sojini at the initial stages of Mfengusettlement
at Bembesf,
Moreover, the manner inwhich this second category of Mfenguleaders
rose to positions of leadership was not at all credible in the eyes of the
officials of the BSACo.Administration. Mbulawa1forexample,was in every
way overshadowed by his ultra-loyalist son, Nzimende, who had not only
accompanied the Mfengudelegates to Southern Rhodesia earlier on to size up
76the land reserved for Mfengusettlement thither, but was also largely res-
ponsible for effecting the necessary arrangements with the BSACo. officials
72 November 25, 1898.
ll!!!!: C.B. Cooke, for C/N/C, Bulawayo, to BSACo.: November 25, 1898.
73~: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo, December 19, 1898.
74By June 1903 Mbulawahad under him only 20 men: 80jini about 19 men and
Hlazo as little as 13. Vide: NB 1/1/19: J. H. MacDonald, Clerk-in-
Charge, Fingo Locatim, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 10, 1903.
75C.O. 417/311: Jndaba held at Bembesi by Rhodes••• September 6, 1900.
76
NB 1/1/7: Ndzimende Mbulawa, Nqamakwe, Transkei, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
December 16, 1898.
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for his father to come over and, in Nzimende's own words, '•• , look -{after)-
that place you -{C/N/C Matabeleland)-promised me before at the time I was
77there -{inSouthernRhodesia)-., ., ' In essence, old Mbulawawas/therefore,
his son's surrogate.
With regard. to the other two Mfenguheadmen, Sojini and Hlazo, the
similarity of their lot to Mbulawa's appears to have been evokedparticularly
by the bizarre circumstances under which they came to SouthernRhodesia
and the motley of souls constituting their entourages, In Hlazo's case, having
come into SouthernRhodesia before 1896 and after participating in the terri-
78tory's wars of conquest and 'participation', his rights and position as a
member of the 'black pioneers' were unquestionable, What apparently seems
to have both complicated and.subsequently, strained his relationship with the
BSACo. officials was his appearance at Bembesi in August 1899 at the height
of the Mfengusettlement scheme and,by so doing,occupyingland on conditions
simulating those laid downby the 'Fingo Agreement,.79 Sf.mfiarly.Sojini's
point of entry into the mainstream of Mfengumigration to SouthernRhodesia,
in the later half of 1899, seems to have cast a lot of doubt onhis bona fides as
a party to the 'Fingo Agreement' as outlined by 'Matabele' Thompson at
Butterworth a year before.
Sojini's claims to have been stranded at Lobatse in the Bechuanaland
Porteotorate.en route to SouthernRhodesia,as his father'S envoy and a rep-
80resentative of 'three hundred families' in the Cape, were not at all convin-
cing,as far as the BSACo.Administration was concerned. This became even
more apparent with the discovery by the officials concerned that what later
came to be termed the 'Soj:l.nitrek' at first consisted of only 1 man, 3 women
81and 6 children and 30 goats, Under these circumstances, the BSACo.con-
fessed,as Hole the Company's Secretary did, that such small parttes.as the
'Sojlni trek' symbolizedJwere a drawback.sfnce it was 'impossible for us
-{theBSACo.)-••• to take advantage of the special terms allowed by the Cape &
77~: Nzimende -{Ndzimende)-Mbulawa, Nqamakwe, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
June 1899.
78vide: .u,fra ~Chapter 7.
79 . I INB 1/1/6: Griffith, Bembesi, to C N C, Bulawayo:August 14, 1899.
80Thid: Garner Sojini, Lobatse, to C/N/c, Bulawayo:December 22, 1898.
81.!E!2:Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, BSACo.: December 27,
1898.
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Bechuanaland Railways for ~the)- conveyance of the Fingoes. ,82
Under the terms agreed to by these railway corporations with regard to
Mfengu transportation, the fare per family was 5/- between Queenstown and
Vryburg, provided these Mfengu families were conveyed in full loads and by
special trains, whilst over Bechuanaland railway lines transport for people
was altogether free, Cattle and other types of stock were to be carried at the
'lowest obtainable rate' and paid for by the BSACo. which expected some refund
from the Mfengu migrants within five years of Mfengu arrival in Southern
Rhodesia.83 It was essentially for these reasons.tberefore.that railway offi-
cials at Lobatse had adamantly refused to allow the passage of the Sojini party
to Southern Rhodesia until definite assurances were provided by the Chief
Native Commissioner for Matabeleland on the co-operation of the BSACo. to
meet the transportation costs. 84
Perhaps what may have ultimately persuaded the BSACo. Administration
to accept overall responsibility over the 'Sojini trek' in 1899 may have been
the public avowal by Sojini himself to observe the labour clauses of the 'Fingo
Agreement' when he indicated '~ am)- one of the Fingoes ~whom)- the
Government so liberally conveyed up to this country ~Southern Rhodesia)- for
the purpose of labour in the ~Southernr Rhodesia mines - ~and)- I have joined
the Fingoes under the same conditions. ,85 In the final analysis, it could be
said that it was most porbably this commitment,on the part of Garner Sojini I
to provide what the BSACo. Administration valued most highly - labour supply
- that this Mfengu leader may have succeeded in Ingratiating himself with the
officials of Southern Rhodesia. otherwise the origins of his followers and
their connection with the major Mfengu migrant groups were certainly not
credible.
In addition, the manner in which Sojini subsequently proceeded in gathering
people around himself, once he had arrived at Bembesi, was just as equally
dubious. Various claimants of Mfengu and other African origin in the South
appealed to the Administration of Southern Rhodesia between 1899 and 1902,for
instance, pleading indigence and,at the same time,claimlng for assistance for
themselves and their families then striving to join their leader Sojini at Bern-
8283!!ilit Hole, Secretary, BSAC?, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: January 4, 1899.
!M!t 'Conveyance of Fingoes': Enclosed in Hole to C/N/C, BUlawayoj January
84 4, 1899; Vide also: Supra: ppJIO-I.
!2!2: C/N/C, Bulawayo, toStation Master, Lobatse: Telegrams; September 4
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besi, but were allegedly stranded at various points along the railway line
between Bulawayoand Kimberley. The Dingiswayobrothers, Paul, Jeremiah
and Simon,for example,do offer a good illustration here. Paul and Jeremiah
Dingiswayowere, by December 1899,whenthey applied to join Sojini and
other Mfenguat Bembesi, actually employed in Bulawayo;where Paul was
engaged as a 'telegraph messenger' and Jeremiah as a messenger in the
Resident Magistrate's Office. Whilst these two brothers both pleaded with
the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland for assistance to go downto
Mafeldngand bring up their families and property to Southern Rhodesia, the
reasons they gave in order to explain the conditions Inwhich they found
themselves were, howeverJdifferent.
In Paul Dingiswayo's explanation, he had just recently left the Ciskei
with the intention of coming to settle in Southern Rhodesia,but his private means
could only enable him to proceed as far as Mafeldngwhere he had consequently
left his people.86 In Jeremiah Dingiswayo's case, it is evident that the Dlngis-
wayo brothers were not part of the Mfengumigrants persuaded by "Matabele!
Thompson In the Ciskei and the Transkei to migrate to Southern Rhodesia In
early 1898. Rather, they were Mfenguof diaspora who had long before left
either the Transkei or the Ciskei to reside elsewhere. Thus Jeremiah con-
fesses as much in his letter to the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabele-
land inwhich he states:
Having -{been)-drawn to the fact that the Fingoes are allowed
to come & reside in -{Southern)-Rhodesia I therefore beg to
apply for the same permission to be granted to me. •• I am a Fin-
goe residing at Mafeldngat present & subject of Garner Sojini's
father.
I agree with the Rules & Regulations made for the Fingoes -(sic)-.
I also wish to -{ask)-the Government -{ofSouthernRhodesia)- to
assist me in bringing up my famlly & I also wish that Iwouldbe
supplied -{witha>SfWketfree of charge to go to Mafekingto
fetch my family.
The third amongst the Dingiswayobrothers, SimonDingiswayo, was
still based in Mafeldngfrom where he engaged in. correspondence with the
BSACo. Administration for land between March and July 1899. Whllst,at first,
85!!:!!!!: Sojini, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:December 22, 1898.
86Th!!!:Paul Dingiswayo, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo; December 27, 1899.
87.!2!!!: Jeremiah Dingiswayo, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo, Bulawayo:
December 29, 1899.
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the Southern Rhodesian officials had reacted positively to these requests;
reactions which had naturally induced Simon Dingiswayo to make all sorts of
88promises 'to bring up a good lot of young men to••• labour', and to under-
take arrangements to forward about twenty families from two points, Taungs
near Kimberley and MaIeking, ready to proceed north and occupy the land
promised them by the second half of 1899.1inreadiness for the ploughing
season, 89 the BSACo•.1however} suspended temporarily all forms of Mfengu
90immigration into the country during the latter part of 1899.
Taken together, the example of the Dingiswayo brothers demonstrates
that once the Mfengu scheme was initiated in 1898, shrewd land-hungry Mfengu
in other parts of South African also took the opportunity to exploit the situation
and proceed to Southern Rhodesia under one Mfengu leader or another. Garner
Sojini, in particular, seems to have greatly benefitted from such developments,
whereupon he took the opportunity to augment his following in the process. In
fact, the presence of a sizeable Mfengu community in locations on the out-
skirts of Mafeking, quite well-established by the close of the nineteenth century
and including within its ranks such famous and commonplace Mfengu families
91as the Mfazis and the Ngonos, was just too tempting for those Mfengu
leaders passing through Mafeking to Southern Rhodesia. Whilst the going
between the BSACo. and the immigrant Mfengu community in Southem Rhodes-
ia was still good, there was apparently no harm in these Mfengu of diaspora
joining their kinsmen en route to Southern Rhodesia. It was after the honey-
moon period of Mfengu/BSACo. relations had ended that individuals like
Garner Sojini were picked upon by the BSACo. Administration, as stowaways
from Bechuanaland, who did not deserve to enjoy the privileges originally
92intended for the Mfengu migrants from the Transkei and the Ciskei proper.
In any case, whilst the phase between 1898 and 1899 may be described as
having been a hectic one in the genesis of Mfengu Immigration into Southem
Rbodeata, that between 1899 and 1902 which followed, indicates a noticeable
88NB 1/1/7: Simon DiDgiswayo, Mafeking, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: Apri112, 1899.
89!2!!!: Simon Dingiswayo, Mafeking, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 8, 1899.
90Ibid: Hole, Secretary, BSACo., to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 11, 1899.
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Entries for January 6 and 7, 1900; in J. L. Comaroff (ed.): The Boer War
Diary of Sol, T, Plaatje: An African at MaIelffi!i.: Macmillan: Londoo:
1973: pp. 70-1.
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Vide: N3/10/5: Taylor, C/N/C, Salisbury, to Leo Schreiner, Cape Town: April
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decline in official efforts and enthusiasm on the matter. The causes of this
decline were legion. In the first place, the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war
in 1899presented a real obstacle to the flowof traffic between the Cape and
Southern Rhodesia, particularly so that the military authorities required the
railway corporations to provide all the available rolling stock for the purpose
of transporting troops and stores to the war zones where these were require<l3
On another level, given the customary Mfengufanatical loyalty to the British
cause, the movement of these immigrants along SouthAfrican railway lines
during the course of hostilities was quite likely to expose them to Boer attacks,
especially as some of their people were actively involved in the war on the
British side. 94
Seconci1y,there was some trace of anxiety within the BSACo. official
circles that the Mfengumigration scheme was being exploited and abused by
private individuals to their own advantage. The example of the Dingiswayo
brothers, on the African side of the matter, which has already been examined
95somewhere else, is a case in point here. On the white colonist Side, the
Halse Brothers, a firm of contractors hailing from Sterkstroom in the Cape
colony, present another good illustration. These contractors whohad been
engaged by Rhodes inApri11899 to construct a dam on his farm, Sauerdale ,
in the Bulawayodistrict, seized the opportunity to import what they termed
'a better class of labourer ~from the Cape)-, known up here ~in Southern
Rhodesia)- as the "Cape boy", ' and, in this manner, initiate a process whereby
'a useful and reliable class of labour ~would)-be introduced' in form of
96
Mfenguand Thembu labour migrants.
Under this seemingly altruistic pretext, Messrs Halse Brothers,there-
fore,wanted to involve the BSACo.Administration in bringing up their Mfengu
and Thembu labourers into Matabeleland at minimal cost in transportation and
with promises of possible land grants as inducements in very much the same
way the 'Fingo Agreement' portended. However, the BSACo.Administration
16, 1919.
93C•O. 417/311: Jndabaheld at Bembesl by Rhodes••• September 6, 1900.
94Vide: Entry for October 29, 1899: in Comaroff (ed): The Boer War Diary of
Sol T. Plaatie: PP. 2-3.
95Vide: Supra: pp.332-3.
96NB1/1/7: The Halse Bros, c/O Palace Hotel, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bula-
wayo: April 5, 1899.
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would not swallow the bait, arguing as it did that:
We cannot be too careful in the selection of Natives who
intend to remain up here -(in Southern Rhodesla)-, as at
present there are a great many Colonial Natives in this
Province -(Ma.tabeL;'and)-,themajority of whom are not
desirable objects.
On the other hand,the Administration of Southern Rhodesia was prepared to
sanction the plan of Messrs Halse Brothers on condition that Rhodes himself
agreed to offer the Thembu and Mfengu labourers in question land on his own
98farm.
A third factor, which may have had considerable influence on the lapse
of BSACo. effort and interest in Mfengu immigration between 1899 and 1902,
could be ascribed to a combination of two issues; namely, the cost of the
scheme to the Company and the changing attitude of the BSACo. officials them-
selves towards the Mfengusettlers already in the country, Indeed, from the
cost-benefit point of view, the report of the Native Commissimer for the
Bulawayo district, D.H. Moodie, on the Mfenguscheme and the Fingo Location
in May 1900was by no means enchanting. Up to this date, the BSACo. had
spent about £10,943 3s 7d on the Mfengu immigration scheme, of which
£8, 346 19s 3d went into land purchase and survey whilst the other £1,370
11s 6d was spent on.transportation. and food expenses for the Mfenguon their
way from the South; not to mention the ploughing paraphernalia (six oxen and
a plough) as well as the tents supplied to the new arrivals to the value of
£105 14s sd, In fact, what actually may have demoralized the BSACo. over
its budget on the Mfengu immigration scheme was that the Mfengu themselves
were required to pay back only £1,370 11s 6d out of a total sum of £8,346
19s 3d. Even then,by May 1900,all what these immigrants had managed to pay
back was £9116s 3d,whilst their annual tax contribution amounted to a paltry
£100; hardly enough to maintain the Native Department outpost at Bembesi which
99
cost an annual outlay of at least £600 to £700.
In addition, Mfengu response to colonist labour demands was not at all
wholesome, from the BSACo. point of view. Though these immigrants were
97!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator:
April 8, 1899.
98Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to the Halse Bros., c/o Palace Hotel,
Bulawayo: Apri117, 1899.
99NB 1/1/9: D.B. Moodie, N/C, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: May 8,1900.
335
generally regarded as industrious, in terms of their own agricultural work at
Bembesi, and though a very high percentage or almost all the adult male
population (about 144 men), with the exception of headmen or chiefs, were
reported to have gone out to work, between December 1898 and August 1899,
at the mines and other places of employment, notably an railway construction
work between Bulawayoand Gwelo, the Southern Rhodesian officials were,
however, still not satisfied with them on the labour question. In this particular
instance, Mfengupreference for wagon-driving, a class of work for which
they often earned as much as £5 a month compared to the lower monthly
tariff of 35/- which they generally received for actual mining work itself, 100
obviously did not commend these clients to their patrons.
Itwas, therefore, against this background that a frigid attitude began to
surface amongst the BSACo. officials, noticeably towards the end of 1899,
with regard to the continuance of Mfenguimportation into SouthernRhodesta,
Individual applicants like the Dingiswayobrothers were. in the process. the
first to suffer the after-effects of this reversal of BSACo. policy. In the
Ciskei and the Transkei,whence a greater bulk of the Mfenguimmigrants came,
this news on the Company's change of attitude, which had obviously arrived
there through the grapevine and may have been largely distorted in the pro-
cess, caused a lot of confusion and consternation. Fred Kona, one of the
101
first Mfengusettlers to arrive at Bembesi at the end of 1898, was actually
in the Transkei collecting followers with whom to accompany him back to
Matabeleland, when this stunning news reached him there. In his coo.fusion,
Fred Konawrote the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland in May1900:
••• I want to knowabout this, when I came downhere ~ to the
Capej- to fetch the people I heard a word that all the natives
are no longer wanted. Nowthe land ~in Southern Rhodesia}-
is belonging to the whites. Youmust tell me whether I can simply
~o)- up alone or with some persons. I ~ve}- got some many
people here about more than 100. Youmust answer me soon and
explain ~to}-me that we will ta~E()Zhesame road. •. going up
~to Southern Rhodesia}- or not.
It was not only Individual potential Mfengu migrants whowere thus con-
fused by the sudden volte-face in BSACo.policy, but even officials at the Cape
100Ibid: Report on the Fingo Location by Griffith, Superintendent: August 31,
1900.
101Vide: Supra: ,:p.317.
102!E!!!: Fred Kana, J'ujura School, Transkei, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:May 29, 1900.
336
were themselves thrown off balance by thls turn of events. ColonelWalter
Stanford, the Secretary for Native Affairs in the Cape colony,was himself
compelled to demand for an explanation on the stance of the Southern Rhodes-
ian Administration on the question of further Mfengu emigration from the
103Cape in the light of rumours to the contrary. In the end, the upshot of
these inquiries and demands from the Capewas an arrangement arrived at
in Southern Rhodesia whereby a final assault had to be made on the issue of
Mfengu immigration from the Cape once and for all time.
In this new arrangement proposed in September 1900, the main features
were the appointment of an accredited official agent in the person of C.G.
Fynn, a member of a family with longstanding historical connections with
104SouthAfrica and,therefore,well acquainted with the sub-continent himself,
to proceed to the Cape to effect Mfengu emigration from that territory to
Southern Rhodesia; the role of the five Mfengu leaders then at Bembestjnamely
Chiefs Kona, MbuIawa, Mtyakisana, Nqakala and Garner Sojini.whowere to
accompany Fynn to the Cape and endeavour to induce their kinsmen to come to
Southern Rhodesia by spreading favourable accounts on the country throughout
the Ciskei and the Transkei; the need for urgent and water-tight arrangements
with the railway and military authorities in the Southover the provision of
necessary transport facilities in order to convey the Mfengu immigrants,
their stock and foodstuffs to Southern Rhodesia as conveniently as possible and
finally, the need to statim an official of the Native Department of Southern
Rhodesia (a duty later assigned to Griffith, the Superintendent of the Fingo
Location) at Mafeldngto supervise the break in the journey at this j1.mctureJ
for the benfit of both the Mfengumigrants themselves and their stock as well
as to check whether these migrants had brought along with them any 'inferior
105stock, worthless farm implements or unnecessary impedimenta. ••• '.
Another important aspect of the new arrangement m further Mfenguimmi-
103Ibid: W. Stanford, Secretary, Native Affairs Department, Cape Town to
C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 25, 1900.
104George Fynn was a descendant of the famous Fynns of pioneer fame in
Natal and an expert in African languages below the Limpopo: Interview
with Mr. Paul ffiazo: November 18, 1975. For the activities of the Fynns
in pre-ooloatal Zululand, Vide: Omer-Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath:
Chap. 2.
105
~: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, BSACo., Bulawayo: Septem-
337
gration was promptness, in order to enable the immigrants in question to
arrive at Bembesi, where a place was already reserved for a further 1,500
settlers, during the ploughing season. Not surprisingly, Fynn was given an
allowance of £250 by the BSACo. for travel expenses in the Cape, especially
the purchase of a Cape cart and a horse for traversing the African areas in
which he was to operate.
The Fynn mission, it might be noted, was bom under the inauspiCious
circumstances of the Anglo-Boer war and was naturally doomed to fail due to
factors beyond the control of either its sponsors, participants or well-
wishers. Thus in spite of the impressive and detailed initial reports by Fynn
on his activities (and those of John H. MacDonald, a cousin of his he had
appointed downthere as an assistant) in the Transkei and Ciskel areas of the
Cape colony between October 1900 and February 1901, all the migrants and
their property Fynn forwarded to Southern Rhodesia amounted to only 795 men,
women and children, 205 head of cattle, 1,609 sheep and goats, 28 horses,
22 pigs; a few dogs and fowls, one wagon and several truck loads of personal
effects.
According to the report of this envoy, the minimal character of his succ-
ess was a result of a number of factors which generally militated against the
Mfengu immigration scheme. Firstly, the drought which ma.rked the close of
1900 in the Cape colony had such adverse consequences on the African comm-
unities there that few people had any food supply at all. Most people, so it
would appear, were compelled either to purchase their food or secure the same
on credit from local traders at very high prices with the result that these
traders would consequently not allow their clients to leave the country for
106Southern Rhodesia before their debts were settled. Of course, given the
negative reaction of the colonist trading class in the Cape colony to Mfengu
107emigration right from the start of the project in 1898, it is evident here
that this form of debt-peonage they so successfully brought into play by 1900/1
was a calculated device not only to influence the decisions of potential emi-
grants, but also to pin downtheir constituents to the Cape.
ber 19, 1900.
106
NB 1/1/11: Report of C.G. Fynn, Bolotwa, Transkei, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
February 1, 1901.
107Vide: SUpra:pp.321.
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Secondly, most of the chiefs and headmen in the Transkei and the Ciskei,
who had stood security for the food requirements of their followers in rela-
tion to these credits from the traders, wouldnot allow their people to emigrate
to Southern Rhodesia and leave them to bear the burdens. Thirdly, because of
the drought conditions, African stock in most districts of the Ciskei and the
Transkei was by 1901 in a generally poor condition and could.therefore.not be
moved over long distances from the remote districts to places like the Imvani
108and Kei Road stations for entrainment to SouthernRhodesia. But it was.how-
ever, the final factor, that is the communication and transportation problem
in the broader context of the Anglo-Boer war then going on, which had the most
decisive impact on the Fynn mission to the Cape. The BSACo. officials them-
selves, both in Cape Townand Southern Rhodesia, foundit so difficult to cope
with the stream of potential Mfenguand other migrants that they had to advise
pattence.on the part of their envoy,due to the shortage of adequate transporta-
109tion facilities.
From the preceding evidence, it is apparent that whilst the BSACo.Admim-
istration was anxious by 1900-1 to undertake one massive and final Mfengu
immigration programme into Southern Rhodesia, the movewas not altogether
well timed and the subsequent postponement of the whole programme by mid-
1901was, therefore, a logical sequel to a scheme whichwas largely governed
by the dictates of the military conditions of the period. Thus whilst Fynn, the
purveyor of Mfengumigration in the Cape may have felt disappointed to have
to traverse the Transkel and Ciskei areaa onee morelexplaining to potential
migrants and generally dismantling the work he himself had previously set
110up; and whilst Mfengu chiefs from Bembesi who had accompanied him to
the Cape may have also fretted and fumed, as Chief Garner Sojini did,that
'these people -(potential MfengumJgrants)- -(were)- unwilling to stay here
-(in the Cape)- any longer' and that 'they -(were)- now ready to start -(for
Southern Rhodesla)- because they have no place to lo~e in••• ' since 'they
-(bad)- sold their kraals to others who -(couldnoQ-give back their kraals ••• pt
all these please wouldnot impress the authorities, both beyond and below the
108!2!!!: Report of Fynn ••• February 1, 1901.
109!2!!!: Fynn, Imvanl, Transkel, to CIN/C, Bulawayo:Telegram: November
9, 1900 and Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Fynn, Imvani, November 6,
1900.
110NB1/1/17: Fynn, Fingo Location, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: September 20,1902.
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Limpopo,to allow the Mfengu immigration scheme to go ahead In 1901. It was,
allegedly) to wait for another time.
On the other band, what Fynn may have succeeded in bringing into the
picture during his 1900-1 mission to the Cape was,in fact,the introduction,
though at first quite unintentionally, of another dimension of general African
migration from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia. This was in the form of
Thembu and Pondo migrants who were to supplement the hitherto Mfengu-
dominated African immigration from the South Into Southern Rhodesia. From
Fynn's own correspondence with his superiors, the Administration of Southern
Rhodesia, it is evident that these plans to include both Thembu and Pondo
groups into the purview of the Mfengu immigration programme of the BSACo.
were an impromptu affair rather than a preconceived one. Perhapa.It might
not even be out of place to credit here the Chief :Magistrate of Tembuland in
the Ciskei, Sir Henry Elliott, for stimulating Fynn's interest on the need to
Include the Thembu in his plans as an agent of the BSACo. Administration on
Mfengu emigration from the Cape colony. Indeed.thts conclusion is quite
tempting and also fitting, especially in view of the fact that it was adopted after
Fynn's two meetings with the Thembu followers of Chief Siyabalaba, firstly,
In the Hoita Valley In the Kentani district and secondly, at SoutheyviUe near
the Glen Grey district. 112
On the other band, though the Thembu may not have been as loyal to the
British cause and as proud and exhibitionist on the matter as the Mfengu were,
they were.however, associated, whether by accident or design, in many ways
with the latter I especially on matters of black/white contact influences and
general African integration into the continuum of colonist economy and thought.
This was particularly true of Emigrant Thembuland where the pace of social
and economic changeJfor tnstance.waa by the late nineteenth century quite
113
favourably compared with that in Fingoland itself. Besides, it should be
borne in mind too that when that firm of private contractors, l\.f.essrs Halse
Brothers from the Cape engaged by Rhodes for dam construction on his farm
in Matabeleland, suggested importing Mfengu and Thembu labourers into
Southern Rhodesia with government assistance inApril 1899, the idea did not
111!2!2: Chief Garner Sojini, Butterworth, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: August 26, 1902.
112NB 1/1/11: Report of Fynn••• February 1, 1901.
113Bundy: OPe cit. PP. 27-8.
340
seem altogether odious from the BSACo.'spoint of view, except of course in
terms of expenses. In actual fact.the Thembuwere highly recommended in
some BSACo. official quarters where it was concluded, as the Chief Native
Commissioner for Matabeleland did, that these people were 'good mining boys
and in this respect -{were}-superior to the Fingoes. ,114
In any case, whatever factors Fynn may have played upon to positively
influence the Administration of SouthernRhodesia on Thembu immigration into
that country, they seem to have produced the desired effect. Indeed, before
February 1901was ended, four Thembudelegates, namely Tyesi, Sihuhu,
April and Nyanga, were already in Matabeleland to survey the land promised
them, whilst the BSACo.Administration on its part was making frantic efforts
to settle them on one or the other of the farms bought back by the Companyin
115the Nyamandhlovuarea in 1899. Here the Thembu immigrants were to be
settled in a location designed on similar lines and under similar conditions of
tenure to those appertaining to the Fingo Location already in existence by then
at Bembesi. The separation of the two immigrant communities, the Mfengu
116
and the Thembu, was here considered quite vital in official opinic:n.
These preparatory arrangements in connectionwith Thembu settlement
in the Nyamandhlovuarea of Matabeleland also included, in the main, a land
grant of about 20, 000 acres to accommodate about 1, 000 families, made on
condition that at least five hundred of these Thembu families wouldhave to
arrive in the country before the end of 1901. In fact,as ChiefNative Com-
missioner Taylor once more indicated, the BSACo.Administration by stipu-
lating this condition naturally wanted to avoid a repetition of the problems
caused earlier on by the Mfenguimmigrants who had come in driblets and
'thus unnecessarily -{putting}-the -{SouthernRhodesian}-Government to con-
siderable trouble and expense. ,117 For the administration and supervision
of these Thembu immigrants in the Nyamandhlovuarea, Mr. Parry,
highly esteemed by the head of the Native Department in Matabeleland for 'his
114NB1/1/7: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, Department of
Administrator: April 8, 1899.
115NB1/1/12: Hole, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, February 4,
1901.
116!2!!!: Hole, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:February 13, 1901.
117!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, BSACo., Bulawayo:
February 26, 1901.
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~Parry's)- intimate knowledgeof the country", was chosen for the task.
Judging from the reports of the Chief Native Commissioner for Mata-
beleland, it is obvious that there was much optimism within the BSACo.
official circles in SouthernRhodesia with regard: to the positive outcome of
the Thembu immigration plan adopted at the beginning of 1901. Indeed,in
anticipation of the arrival of these 'black settlers' from the Cape, the Ndebele
communities which had hitherto lived on the farms chosen by the Thembu
delegation and described as 'amongst the finest -(land)- in the country -1and)-
eminently suited for an agricultural population, ' were hurriedly moved out
to make room for these potential settlers. This same streak of enthusfaam
was also demonstrated by Fynn in September 1902when he accompanied
another delegation of Thembu envoys to Matabeleland to assess the quality and
extent of another land offer promised to Thembu potentlalimmJgrants in the
Bulalima district by the BSACo.118 With regard:~ to Pondo immigration also
proposed by Fynn in 1901 alongside their Mfengu and Thembu compatriots
from the Cape, the case was quite different. No amount of persuasion could
arouse official interest in Southern Rhodesia on the issue.
However, in the end, all these specious schemes indicated above, whether
on further Mfengu immigration or belated fresh Thembu and Pondan settlers
from the South, came to naught by 1902. As a sign of the times, the military
situation and the problems of transportation constituted the most formidable
determinant to the success or otherwise of these migrant schemes. For the
potential Thembu migrants to Southern Rhodesia,for example, it could be said
that their fate in 1902 on transportation difficulties may have been sufficiently
portended by similar but unwelcome developments which befell some of their
delegates to Southern Rhodesia a year before, when they and a number of the
African commuters from the Southwere stranded for about six weeks in Bula-
119wayo between February and March 1901, because the railway lines to the
Southhad been closed to passenger traffic by the higher military authorities,
leaving the local base commandants at various points in the sub-continent with
120no room to alter circumstances. During the second half of 1902, a similar
118NB 1/1/17: Fynn, Fingo Location, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: October 11 1902, .
119NB 1/1/12: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Base Commandant, Bulawayo:
February 27, 1901; Taylor, cIN/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, BSACo.,
Bulawayo: March 28 and April1, 1901 and Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C
Bulawayo: March 1901.
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situation had developedwith serious implications for any of the migrant
schemes the BSACo.Administration in SouthernRhodesia then had in the
pipeline.
With the end of the Anglo-Boer war in mid-1902, the mllitary and
railway authorities once more interposed to procure all the rolling stock
available for the return of troops from the military zones to the coastal towns)
with the result that the railway corporations could, therefore, not undertake,
as the Charter office in Cape Townwas informed in July of that year, 'the
removal of any large number of natives and their stock to Bulawayo.•• ' until
conditions had changed.121 Besides, by the time when conditions were ex-
pected to be changing for the better in the field of transportation, an outbreak
of cattle disease was reported in September 1902. In the Circumstances, the
BSACo.would, therefore, not accept what it called 'the unnecessary expense
.•. entailed in first bringing up the Fingoes and their families, and then later
on sending them back to fetch their stock. ,122 Together these two factors
indicated above could thus be said to have drastically affected the course and
character of further immigration of 'black settlers' into SouthernRhodesia at
the end of the Anglo-Boer war.
Of course, the obstacles to Mfengu and Thembumigration from the Cape to
Southern Rhodesia at the close of 1902may be said to have been real and con-
Siderable, though short-lived as they might have appeared. But the same
could not be alluded in relation to the failure of the Pondo immigration scheme.
Whilst it is safe to assume that in connectionwith Mfenguand Thembu impor-
tation in SouthernRhodesia, the BSACo.Administration was being unwittingly
influencedby both ascriptive and achievement criteria with which these two
African groups from the Southwere, rightly or irrationally, associated from
anhistorical perspective, the case is certainly different on the question of
potential Pondo settlers.
As a matter of fact, it might be noted that the whole rationale for the
proposal to undertake this scheme was altogether shady and flimsy. For
example, the main reasons given by Fynn in June 1901to justify Pondo impor-
120Ibid: Base Commandant, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:March 1 1901- , .
121NB1/1/17: J. A. Stevens, Secretary, Charter, Cape Town, to C/N/C,
Bulawayo;August 26, 1902.
122Th!!!:C. L. Carbutt for C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Griffith, Bembesi, July 28,
1902.
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tation into Southern Rhodesian centred on the coincidental factor that when
the Pondo faction of Mhlangaso Faku, whom Fynn thus recommended for
importation, was banished from Pondoland to East Grtqualand.during the
annexation of this chiefdom in 1894 at the Instigation of the Pondo Paramount
Chief Sigcau and with the connivance of the government of the Cape colony,
Rhodes was then the Cape Prfme Minister and Milton, the then Adm:inistrator
of Southern Rhodesia by 1901, his Secretary. The assumption here
was that these two figures who, by 1901~headed and controlled the affairs of
Southern Rhodesia, Including the 'black settler' importation schemes, would
obviously be well acquainted with the Pondo :internecine problems prior to
1894 and also eventually show some degree of empathy on the matter.
On the basis of this historical background to the potential Pondo migrants
of :MhlangasoFaku, Fynn obviously wanted his first reason to justify the
second one, connected,:inthis case,with assumed positive qualities of the Pondo,
whowere :inthis regard very well spoken of. Thus whilst Mhlangasohimself
was referred to as 'an Intelligent and enlightened native••. ~who could)-
certa:inly exercise a good deal of influence over his people and the establish-
ment of a large Pondo Location :in~Southern)- Rhodesia ~consequently)-
accomplished with comparatively small cost, ' his followers were equally
praised as 'a lot of hardy natives and Uving as they ~did)- In a semi-tropical
country ~Pondoland)-~It was hoped that 'they would be well suited and practi-
cally acclimatized to -{Southern)-Rhodesia. ,123
Yet In spite of Fynn's recommendation, the Pondo immigration scheme
was viewed as unnecessary and inadvisable by the BSACo.Administration in
124Southern Rhodesia, specifically by Miltonhimself. In the end, itwas
those more determined individual immigrants and their families whowere
allowed to come into the country. The case of Joel Sishuba, for instance, the
leader of a group of 9 Thembu families from Kamastone near Queenstownwith
125their property In form of 10 cattle, 4 horses, 120 sheep and 2 dogs, is
particularly interesting on this score. Havingbeen assured by Fynn, the
123NB1/1/13: Fynn, Imvani, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 14, 1901.
12~id: Andrew B. Rankine, Chief Secretary, Salisbury to C/N/C, Bulawayo,
to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 2, 1901.
125NB 1/1/15: Joel Sishuba, Bulhoek, Kamastone, to Fynn: December 16,
1901.
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BSACo. agent to the Cape, in the earlier part of 1901Jon the favourable pros-
pects of Thembu immigration to Southern Rhodesia, Sishuba's party left
Queenstown in December 1901, only to be stranded for a full year at Mafe-
king. Even when the necessary permission and financial aid were finally
granted to this party of resolute Thembu immigrants in December 1902, this
was only because Sishuba had contacted John Hlazo at Bembesi, 126 who,in
turn.managed to establish personal rapport with MacDonald, the clerk-m-
charge of the Fingo Location, and the latter's cousin,Fynn, by the end of
1902 then Native Commissioner for the Gwelo district. In providing succour
to Sishuba and his followers, the BSACo. Administration did so only on the
grounds that the party in question had left Queenstown for Matabeleland
either in complete ignorance of the changed attitude of the Administration
towards further African immigration from the Cape or simply that theirs
was an extreme case of enthusiasm to emigrate to Southern Rhodesia just
as many of their compatriots had done before them. On this basis, the as-
sistance thus proffered by the BSACo. to the Sishuba party was consequently
127regarded as purely exceptional.
iii: The End of the Honeymoon Period of Relations between the "Black
Settlers" and the BSACo. Administration, 1902-1905
In fact,when all the aspects and issues connected with the immigration
of "black settlers" from South Africa into Southern Rhodesia are considered
more thoroughly and systematically" especially during the period 1898 to
1902, it becomes evident that two main factors were,in the process, either
over-emphasised or simply allowed to run amock in exercising the outcome
of decisions relating to the immigration of these "black settlers". In a nut-
shell, the two factors whose influence was decisive on African immigration
from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia between 1898 and 1902 were,firstly, the
role of Rhodes in exercising both his personal and official influence on the
subject of "black settlers" for Southern Rhodesia and secondly, the exagger-
ated emphasis by officials concerned; both below and beyond the Limpopo, on
the ascriptive and achievement criteria of the potential African migrants from
126NB1/1/15: Joel Sishuba, Mafeking, to Hlazo, Bembesi: October 16,1902.
127...!E!!!: J. H. MacDonald, Clerk-in-Charge, Bembesi, to Fynn, N/C, Gwelo:
October 21, 1902; and Fynn, N/C, Gwelo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: Decem-
ber 8, 1902.
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the Cape, especially the Mfengu and, to some extent, the Thembu as well.
Given the fact that the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia had tried to in-
troduce African labour from the Transkei on the basis of similar assumptions
as to the value and potential of the Cape African groups,between May 1900 and
February 1901,with disastrous consequences, 128 it is, therefore, not even
necessary here to pinpoint the misguided nature of most of the perceptions
and conceptions governing the immigration of "black settlers" into Southern
Rhodesia before 1902. It was obviously the dawning of the realities of the
situation and the gradual dissipation of those far-fetched misconceptions the
BSACo. officials and other white colonists had harboured on their ideal Afri-
cans from the South that was to dominate relations in Southern Rhodesia be-
tween the BSACo. Administration and the white colonists,on the one hand.and
the "black settlers" from the South.on the other, during the period after 1902.
With regard to Rhodes and his personal influence on the matter of es-
tablishing "colonies" of African immigrants from the South, this may best be
demonstrated by examining his relationship with the Mfengu community in the
sub-continent. Perhaps because Rhodes so forcefully symbolized British
colonial power and presence in Southern Africa at the close of the nineteenth
and the beginning of the twentieth century, he came to be regarded both as a
personal frieni29 as well as a benefactor and godfather of the Mfengu people.
especially insofar as the Mfengu migrants to Southern Rhodesia were and still
are concerned today. 130 The importation of the Mfengu settlers into Southern
Rhodesia and the subsequent grant of Iand to these immigrants in that country
were viewed as special favours granted to them through the bounty and good-
will of Rhodes. Conversely. whenever these Mfengu immigrants were acting in
a refractory manner before 1902, they were quickly reminded by the Native
Department officials in Southern Rhodesia, rather like small children that
Rhodes, their godfather and benefactor, would not be pleased with their be-
128Vide: Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Report 1901: pp.63-5.
129During the course of fieldwork research in November 1975, whether at
Bembesi or anywhere else inRhodesia, the author was repeatedly told by
individual Mfengu informants of "the land given us by Rhodes ": meaning
the Fingo Iooation.
130Note the Mfengu demonstrations in December 1972 against the Fingo Loc-
ation Bill (1972/3) which sought to transform the land title system over
the location. Vide: D. K. Davies: Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey
for 1972-73: Rex Collins: London: 1975: PP. 289-90.
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h. 131aviour.
To a large extent, this avuncular aspect of Rhodes's relationship with the
"black settlers" from the South was,of course, greatly enhanced by the defer-
ence and regard the Mfengu themselves, for example ..reserved for this political
figure. Their reverent attitude is certainly quite evident in the tone of a let-
ter written by the famous Mfengu leader in the Cape colony, Captain Bikitsha,
in May 1897Jwelcoming Rhodes from a trip overseas. Captain Bikitsha in-
dicated:
I am glad to hear. •• that you ~hodes, have returned from
Europe. My son also has written to tell me about your arrival.
I am glad indeed.
The great thing I wish to put before you is the survey of Fingo-
land. We Fingoes of Butterworth are one in wishing the survey
to take place. I mow that you are the Greatest friend and father
of the Fingoes to help them on this survey question.
We Fingoes are in one feeling with -(the Cape, Government to
have • •. Fingoland surveyed. . •• The survey will enable the
Fingoes to build the fence, cultivate their lots in full trust that
-(they, belong -(entirely, to them; •.• But we would beg your
kindness to see Sir Gordon -(Sprigg, the Prime Minister, and
help him. Because he -(Sprigg, told us that it was your -(Rhodes's,
thought and wish to make this good thing -(land surveys-) for
Native nations •
.........................................................
You will perhaps have heard that several deputations have been
sent -(to Cape Town, in the name of all Fingoes. It is not so.
They are a few red heathen Headmen wishing for their old CUB-
toms of their several wives and concubines. 132
In a way, the Mfengu view of Rhodes as their guardian and patron to
whom they could always look for help,when the need arose, was obviously
strengthened by Rhodes's political gimmickry in establishing reasonable
rapprochement between himself and leading Africans of the Cape colony, some of
133
whom, were of Mfengu origin,Uke Tengo Jabavu. Moreover, the deli-
berately misleading assertions by "Matabele" Thompson, Rhodes's right-
hand man in the Mfengu immigration scheme.for example, that their trans-
131Vide: C. O. 417/276: Report on an Indaba held by the C/N/c -(Matabele-
land, with the Fingoes .•• on Thursday, September 21, 1899.
132Mas. Afr. S. 18/c: Captain Bikitsha to Rhodes: May 3, 1897.
133Note for example Rhodes's invitation to Tengo Jabavu to accompany the
first train to enter Bulawayo in 1897. Vide: Jabavu: Drawn in Colours:
loco cit.
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fer from the Cape was a move undertaken as "absolutely a work of love"
for the Mfengu, 134 did not help matters either. From this point of view,
it might be argued with some force that the Mfengu of Southern Rhodesia
may bave been justified to regard their ill-usage at the hands of the BSACo.
officials in Southern Rhodesia,after 1902J as arising essentially because of
the death of their benefactor, Rhodes, and the appearance of new men OIl
the stage who bad, in every manner, an obsessive hatred of the Mfengu as
135a people.
Of course,the dichotomy between the Mfengu and their official hosts,
the BSACo. Administration of Southern Rhodesia, did not appear on the
scene abruptly and abrasively. It evolved gradually and.In the process,
systematically phased out the honeymoon period of Mfengu relations with
the BSACo. The nature of this progressive rupture was, in fact,connected
with the fact that once the Mfengu arrived in Southern Rhodesta, their de-
mands and grievances concerning their new locale and pattern of adminis-
tration were.to a large extent.both minimal and trivial. The Mfengu griev-
ances, at first, cceatsted.In the mainJof such issues as the shortage of food
and medicines amongst the new arrivals; the need for Mfengu leaders and
family heads to bring up their followers and households from the Cape to
join them at Bembesi,particularly so that it was the task of the women in
Mfengu society to carry out the thatching of dwellings) or permission to
carry guns, especially with regard to those amongst them who had held gun
permits in the Cape colony. 136 On an even more absurd level, these Mfengu
grievances also included such issues as the establishment of shops in the
Fingo Location to enable the immigrants to buy packing cases for making cof-
final because, as Chief Garner Sojini indicated, "The Fingoes ~were, used to
being buried in coffins and ~d, not like being buried in blankets like other
ti ,,137na ves.
134C. O. 417/393: "Matahele" Thompson's address ••••
135The Mfengu in Southern Rhodesia blamed C/N/C Taylor of Matabeleland
for their post-1902 problems due to what they regard as his racist views
and obsessive hatred of the Mfengu in general. Vide: Written Evidence
of Rev. Sojini to the author ••• December 11, 1975.
136C~U."417/276: Report on an Indaba held by the C/N/C iMatabeleland-)
with the Fingoes ••• on .•• September 21, 1899.
137C. O. 417/311: Indaba held at Bembesi by Rhodes •.•• September 6, 1900.
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From the foregoing, it could thus be argued that whilst the grievances
of the Mfengu remained confined to an amateurish and less coherent level,
the relationship of these "black settlers" with the BSACo. Administration
in Southern Rhodesia in tum remained good. But once the Mfengu began to
challenge the fundamental aspects of the scheme under which they were
brought into the country as well as the entrails of power the BSACo. wielded
over them, the tone of relations between them and their patrons evidently
changed and consequently became strident. In the first place, it may be
observed here that there was a faction within the BSACo. official circles
in Southern Rhodesia which was.Irom the start6generally opposed to Mfengu
and other forms of African immigration from the South into the country.
Such opponents of these schemes on ''black settlers" included people like
Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland.where thesepeople
were to be settled; Hole, the local Secretary of the BSACo. and C. H.' Tred-
gold, the Attorney-General. Since these officials were) from the beginning,
overshadowed by the opposing camp which favoured the immigration of
"black settlers" and, fortunately, included Rhodes himself, they. however)
could only, at first,content themselves with wholesome quantittes of pessim-
ism and unsavoury forebodings on the matter. Itwas not until the Mfengu
immigrants had begun to direct their feet astray, so to speak, that these
forebodings actually began to assume a more meaningful shape.
Between 1899 and 1905, three main issues dominated and affected
Mfengu/BSACo. relations. These concerned Mfengu response to colonist
labour demands as required under the "Fingo Agreement'; governing their
introduction into the country; the repayment of the advances made to the
Mfengu immigrants by the BSACo. during the course of their migration from
the Cape and. finally, the question of Mfengu attitudes towards their BSACo.
officials once they arrived in Southern Rhodesia. With regard to labour
demands ,the feeling in some BSACo. official quarters was definitely that the
Mfengu were not responding as positively" on the matter of labour supply, as
had been expected. Thus in May 1899, about six months after the arrival of
the first batch of Mfengu settlers at Bembesi, the request by Chief Kona that
the portion of the Fingo Location occupied by his people should be provided
with facilities for adequate water supply, whilst favourably considered,was/at
the same timeJaccompanied by the petulant remark that the Mfengu them-
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selves had to provide the labour for sinking the required wells since they
138"1had~ not done a stitch of work up till now, ••. "
Similarly, the request by the Superintendent of the Fingo Location.in
August 1899,for a number of bags of grain to be supplied to his wards, who,
apparently, had not had the chance as yet to grow enough of their own food
since their arrival, was.at firstJvery contemptuouslytreated by those "
BSACo. officials who felt that the Mfengushould then be selling their labour
in return for food. Hole, the BSACo. Secretary~for instance/once more com-
mented:
• •• the Administrator does not see his way to allowing these
stores 19rain~ to be issued to the Fingoes: they have had
ample opportunity of earning money and should now be in a
position to pay for their own food: the arrangement with the
Fingoes was not meant to afford them the means of becoming
the pensioners of the Company for all time ••••• 139
In the final analysis, it was only on the grounds of destitution as well as the
desire to show some measure of consideration to the first Mfengu arrivals,
in order to avoid alienating those whowere still to come up.that the request
to provide the Mfengu settlers at Bembesi with food towards the end of 1899
140was granted.
What really seems to have irked some BSACo. officials on Mfengulabour
responses may have been the pretexts and strong-headedness of the Mfengu
immigrants over the word and letter of the so-called "Fingo Labour Clause. "
The common excuse most of these immigrants tended to proffer on being
confronted with the demand for their labour was that they could not leave
their families in the location lest they starved, whilst if they took them along
to the mine centres,in particular) their womenwere likely to fall victims to
141the amorous advances of other non-Mfengu labourers. To a large extent,
the arbitrary alteration in 1900, by the authorities concerned, of the "Fingo
Labour Clause" from three to four months as the minimum period each in-
138 .
• NB 1/1/8: Hole, Secretary, BSACo., Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
June 15, 1899.
139~ Hole, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:August, 30, 1899.
140!2!!!:. Griffith, Bembesl, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: October 11, 1899.
141C.O. 417/276: Report m an Jndabaheld by C/N/C ~Matabeleland1 with
the Flngoes ••• on ••• September 21, 1899.
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dividual immigrant was required to work in a year, may be regarded too as
having been the main cause for Mfengu dissatisfaction on the question of
labour. Indeed.a s the Superintendent of the Fingo Location aptly observed
in February 1901, the Mfengu immigrants were, rightly) "very excited" on
being informed of this alteration from three to four months of labour per
annum, arguiIg,as they did,that "they are told one thing in the ~Cape1 colony
before leaving and then told something quite different when they arrive here
142~at Bembest-s",
Moreover; these Mfengu immigrants may have been equally upset by the
other change in the labour tax/which/as from 1900Jrequired all Mfengu men
of between 16 and 60 years to either work for the prescribed four months
a year or pay a sum of £3 in lieu of labour. Before leaving the Cape, the
Mfengu immigrants had been assured that all men over 40 years of age would
be exempted. As a matter of fact, it was not only the sudden and unwarranted
changes in the 'Fingo Labour Clause' so much resented by the immigrant
Mfengu community which adversely affected relations between the 'black
settlers' and the BSACo. Administration. The differences of opinion between
John Hlazo and his followers, on the one hand, who argued that they occupied
land at Bembesi on a different footing from the other Mfengu immigrants and,
143
therefore/naturally refused to abide by the requirements of the labour tax,
whilst the Company Administration insisted, on the contrary, that this group
of immigrants was subject to the same conditions as the rest of the Mfengu
144community, certainly constitute another aspect of those issues which in-
exorably complicated Mfengu/BSACo. relations on the question of Mfengu
labour supply.
The second issue which characterized Mfengu/BSACo. relations between
1899 and 1905was, in a way, very much coonected with the first one. This
second issue dealt with Mfengu debts to the Company. Once the Mfengu had
arrived at Bembesi, the BSACo. Administration felt that it could not afford to
wait for the five-year period of grace provided by the 'Fingo Agreement' as
the limit within which these immigrants were expected to repay the advances
142NB 1/1/12: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: February 26, 1901.
143NB 1/1/14: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: September 1, 1901.
144-1!!!,!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Superintendent, Fingo Location:
October 1, 1901.
351
made to them for their food and transportation costs from the Cape to South-
ern Rhodesia. Just like the labour question, there was a feeling in some
BSACo. official circles that the obstacle to collecting the debts owed by
these 'black settlers' to the Company was the pensioners' mentality ascribed
to the Mfengu; a mentality whereby the Mfengu expected the government to do
everything for them, whilst they did nothing to help themselves. To Griffith. ,
the Superintendent of the Fingo Location at Bembesi for whom the collection
of Company debts from the Mfengu was his main duty, the whole question of
these. debts was literally a taxing one. As this official was compelled to
confess in January 1900, the Mfengu immigrants were, from his point of
view, essentially lethargic and nonchalant about the matter, professing, at
the same time, either the excuse that 'Matabele' Thompson had assured them
at Butterworth that they had five years within which to payoff their debts or
that 'they had no money but hoped to pay some of it -(the debt)- off after they
145
had reaped their crops. '
In the long nul, the question of BSACo. debts and how quickly the Mfengu
were expected and were trying to discharge them became the sole issue
around which the regulation of Mfengu affairs at Bembesi revolved. Thus in
November 1899 when the Mfengu, like the other African societies of Mata-
beleland, applied to purchase about 51 head of cattle from the total stock
captured in the Anglo-Boer war and subsequently advertised by the Native
Department for sale throughout the province, their application was curtly re-
jected on the grounds that these 'black settlers' should payoff their debts to
the BSACo. first.146 SimilarlY,an application by one Mfengu individual,in
February 1900,to purchase the Government span (six oxen), hitherto used by
these immigrants in the Fingo Location on a loan basis, at about £14-10-0d
per beast, was equally turned down on account of the fact that the applicant in
147
question owed the Company some money.
On a more insidious level, the Company debt became a useful weapon to
the Native Department in monitoring the movements of the Mfengu immigrants
either Inside the country or to the South. The Mfengu were totally forbidden
145NB 1/1/9: Griffith, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: January 19, 1900.
146NB 1/1/11: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: November 1 1899, .
147NB 1/1/9: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: February 10, 1900.
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to travel, especially to the Cape, without first checking with the SUperintendent
of the Fingo Location who ascertained whether the traveller in ques tion had
paid off his debt to the Company. Itwas, therefore, on this score that one
Mfengu named Mlandleni was arrested and detained at the railway station in
Bulawayo, in January 19001 for attempting to board a train for the Cape without
paying off the £1 14s Odhe owed the BSACo. for the food and transportation of
148his horse from Imvani (Transkei) to Bulawayo a year before.
The same obsession with the Company debt could be said of the hue and
cry which followed the discovery, a few months earlier, that three of Chief
Kona's men, to wit Alfred Gaju, Ndzanza Klaas and Kelem Zetu, had used
the passes they had previously procured from the Superintendent of the Ffngo
Location, allegedly to seek work inside Southern Rhodesia, for travelling to
149
the Cape instead. What appears to have bothered the BSACo. Administra-
tion in this desertim by some of Kona's people at Bembesi was the fact that
these men owed the Company some money. Kelemu Zetu and Ndzanza Klass,
both formerly of the Engcobo district in Thembuland, for instance,owed the
BSACo. some cash to the amount of £6 18s 9id and 9/-9id respectively,
whilst Alfred Gaju, formerly from the Willowvale district, was expected by
150
the same Company to pay back the debt of a deceased friend of his.
From the facts indicated above, it is apparent that the BSACo. Admini-
stration was bent on exploiting the debts owed by the Mfengu immigrants to
the Company not simply as a way of establishing a bond between itself and
these immigrants, but also as a means of reinforcing its own peculiar brand of
psychological, economic and political domination over these 'black settlers'.
In a way. the BSACo. was trying, in a subtle manner, to institute some form of
debt-peonage relationship with the Mfengu immigrants, leaving them in a
position whereby they were to become hopelesaly dependent on the Company as
their benefactor. From another angle, the Mfengu debts to the BSACo. became
a very useful weapon with which to pursue a patently vindictive policy against
these 'black settlers' and.m this way,effecttvely bring them to book. The
manner in which the BSACo. pursued the Mfengu debtors was both relentless
148!2!!!: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: January 28, 1900.
149
NB 1/1/8: Griffith, Bembesl, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 19, 1899.
150!!lli!: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: August 4, 1899.
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and remorseful, rendering somewhat ridiculous the initial posture by this
corporation and its functionaries that the Mfenguimmigration scheme from
the Cape to Southern Rhodesia was simply a charitable exercise. 151
Indeed, the manner in which those Mfenguwho fell foul of the BSACo.
Administration over the Companydebts were treated clearly demonstrates
the sinister designs underlying the Companymotives in introducing the Mfengu
settlers,in the first place. In July 1899 for instance, one Mfengulabourer,
Balekisa, fell sick at Selukwe.whereupon he was sent to Gwelo for treatment,
but subsequently died in the process, leaving behind a £3 6s 8d debt to the
Company. Since Balekisa's family was still in the Cape colony waiting to
join him at Bembesi later, it was to Balekisa's friend, Alfred Gaju, formerly
working near Bulawayo, that BSACo. officials looked for the payment of the
152deceased's debt. Itwas for this reason,therefore}that the BSACo. officials
resented the surreptitious departure of Alfred Gaju for the Cape,a month or
two later.
Related to the case of Balekisa, was that of David Joseph Magunyaat the
end of 1901. Magunyahad been working in the Selukwedistrict as an evangelist
for the Methodist church when he fell 'dangerously ill', towards the close of
1901Jdue to an attack of acute melancholia. Magunya's l1lness and its link with
the debt he owed the BSACo. were aptly portrayed by J.W. Reid, the Clerk-
in-Charge in the Native Commissioner's office at Selukwe,who indicated:
He ~Magunya)-has a delusion that he cannot afford to eat,
and nourishment has to be forcibly administered. This is
being attended by Doctor Mantell, who informs me the disease
may possible have been brought on by the debt which Magunya
owes to the Government ~BSACo.)- - and which he has been
earnestly endeavouring to payoff - preying on his mind. If the
Government would remit the small balance of this which still
remains owing, Doctor M-tell thinks it might assist his
~Magunya's)- recovery.
What the Clerk-in-Charge at Selukwehoped to do to help Magunyawas
obviously to effect the cancellation of the remaining £3 12s 4d,which the sick
man owed the Company,out of an orfginal total of £15 12s 9d of which the rest
154had been paid off. In fact, so confident was the Selukwe district official
over his demand that he went on to quote the good qualities of Magunyato
151
152Vide: Supra: PP.346-8.
153Ibid: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 8, 1899.
NB1/1/15: J.W. Reid, Clerk, Selukwe, to N/C, Gwelo: December 13, 1901.
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support his argument, pointing outJInparticular) that the sick man In question
had, during his stay in the Selukwedistrict, 'conducted himself In an irrep-
roachable manner, and gained the respect of all persons with whomhe -(badr
been in contact' and that 'his example and teaching -(could notj- faH to have a
good effect on the Natives if he -(werer spared to carry on his goodwork. ,155
NotwithstandingReid's testimonial on Magunya's behalf, the BSACo. debt was
not cancelled. Instead,the task fell onto Magunya's wife to fetch her ailing
husband from Selukweby ox-wagon as well as payoff the Companydebt using
156some funds procured from friends, especially John Makunga.
The Balekisa and Magunyacases demonstrate the ruthlessness with which
the BSACo. pursued its Mfengu debtors either as a deliberate measure to bring
the Mfengu immigrants to book or to generally in keep with its outlook and
motives as a private"corporation bent on getting some profit rather than a
charitable organisation engaged on a spending spree. But in pursuing these
Mfengu debtors with utmost vigour and zeal, including even.those beyond the
grave, the strain in the relations between the BSACo. as a patron and the
Mfengu as wards, became more pronounced. These signs of strain became
noticeable not only in the economic field, but in the political sphere as well
Even.before Rhodes's death in 1902, the dichotomybetween the Mfengu
and the white colonist society in Southem Rhodesia had begun to show in a
number of ways. On the official level, it could be argued, in terms of Mfengu-
BSACo. relations between 1899 and 1905, that whilst the Companyas an econ-
omic consortium demanded to see its economic designs met over Mfengu immi-
gration Into Southem Rhodesia, the administrative officials on the other hand
also desired to see their position of dominance over the Mfenguimmigrants
preserved and respected. They were certainly loath to see this position
challenged by people whom they expected to be more dependable and malleable
not only because of their historical background as congenital loyalists and
collaborators to the white colonist cause, but also because they were foreigners
in Southem Rhodesia where they were expected to be more vulnerable to num-
erous political and economic forms of pressure.
154-
~: Fynn, N/C, Gwelo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:November 11, 1901.
155Ibid: Reid, Selukwe, to N/C, Gwelo:December 13, 1901.-156
Ibid: M.W. Barnard, Acting Superintendent, Flngo Location, Bembesl, to
C/N/C, Bulawayo: January 3, 1902.
355
The Mfenguheadmen or chiefs were, from the official point of view, just
as blame-worthy as their followers over the question of 'proper relations'
with their superiors in the country's BSACo.Administration and were, there-
fore , often subject to official reprimand or overt punitive measures for in-
fringements, allegedly, interfering with the prescribed regimen of hierarchical
relations and colonial class structure in Southern Rhodesia's composite
colonial society. Chief Kona, for instance, was amongst the first of the Mfen.gu
leaders at Bembesi to fall foul of the BSACo.Administration's requirements
and expectations from the newly arrived Mfengucommunity. His crime deri-
ved from his demands for more land for his followers and alleged disrespect
for his immediate authority. Chief Kona's problem actually arose from the
misconception or false impression he had harboured that the Bembesi location
would be set apart solely for his followers, the Amazizi, whilst the other
Mfengugroups would,accordingly.be sent to their respective locations in the
Nyamandhlovuand Matoporegions.
A basic aspect of Chief Kona's misconceptions here was apparently this
Mfenguleader'S assumption that since he had taken the most active part in
prodding both the Cape and Southern Rhodesian governments to implement
the Mfengu immigration scheme, once the scheme had been disclosed by' Mata-
bele' Thompson in early 1898, he was, therefore, 'the prime mover in the
present -(1.899)-migration of the Fingoes from the -(Cape)-Colony to Mata-
beleland' and ipso facto was thus entitled 'to have the first choice of ground
157-(in Matabeleland)-•••• ' In addition, Chief Konabacked his claim for the
reservation of the Bembesi location solely for his Amazizi people on the
grmmds that not only did he expect to have the largest number of followers
(between 600 and 700people),most of whomwere still expected by mid-1899
to come up from the Cape, but also because of his anxiety to prevent struct-
ural rivalry amongst the various Mfenguethnic segments. For this reason,
Griffith, the SUperintendentof the Fingo Location at Bembesf,mdtoated.tn May
1899)that 'Kona states that••. the greater part of his people are still in the
-(Cape)- Colonyand that if they hear that they are to be located -(in Matabele-
land)- in the same Location as the other classes (Amahlubi & Amabele) they
being Amazizi, they will not come up, and that he -(Kona)-mows that the
157NB 1/1/8: W.E. Thomas, Acting C/N/C, to Hole: June 3, 1899.
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other -(Mfengu)- classes will feel the same way in this matter. ,158
Of course,some of Chief Kona's grievances over land allocated to him at
Bembesi were genuine and, therefore, likely to be accepted by the BSACo.
Administration. The demand to separate the various Mfengu social and poli-
tical segments in Matabeleland1for fnstance,was not a strange one at all, In
fact, the BSACo. Administration itself aclmowledged it In principle, especially
with regard to the application by Rev. Pambani J. Mzimba towards the end
of 1902, on behalf of the Mfengu chiefs and their followers from Alice near
Lovedale, to be granted land in Matabeleland The idea of settling the Mfengu
immigrants from the Cape colony proper, as Rev. Mzimba's clients obviously
were, together with their kinsmen from the Transkei and other places, did not
just appeal to the BSACo. Administration. Indeed,as Fynn, then the Super-
intendent of the Fingo Location, commented, he thought'it would not be wise to
locate -(the Mfengu immigrants from Alice)- on the Flngo Location, -(because)-
firstly there would be endless trouble, -(and)- secondly, -(because)- .•• they
would not agree ••• ', Instead,Fynn went on to suggest that these immigrants
from Alice 'be located elsewhere with surplus Fingoes ••• who -(could not)- be
159found ground on this -(Bembesi)- location. '
But whilst the Administration of Southem Rhodesia, as Indicated above,
recognized the principle of spatial segregation for different social and poli-
tical Mfengu segmental groups coming into the country, it would,however, not
accept its corollary advocated by Chief Kona on the probability of land shortage,
should all the Mfengu immigrants be settled in the Fingo Location at Bembesi
permanently. It was, to a large extent, quite prepared to aclmowledge the
inconvenience caused to Chief Kona's people due to lack of adequate water
supply on the location, with the result that his epople bad to travel a distance
160
of from It to 3 mtles in question of water during the dry season.
Thus whilst the BSACo. Administration was prepared to grant Chief Kona's
people and other Mfengu settlers facilities for permanent water supply in the
161Fingo Location, it would not, however, accede to the request to reserve the
158Ibid: Griffith, Bembesi, to Thomas, Acting C/N/C, Bulawayo: May 18, 1899.
159NB 1/1/18: Fynn, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: December 18, 1902.
160NB 1/1/12: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: May 7, 1901.
161nw!: Report of Visit of Inspection by C/N/C -(Matabeleland)- to the Fingo
Location, Bembesi: January 28, 1901.
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Bembesi location solely for the settlement of Chief Kona's Amazizi branch of
the Mfengu. Besides, it was considered absurd and ridiculous by the Company
Administration for Chief Kona to ever suggest 'to have the whole -(Bembesi)-
location to himself' for the sake of 'only six or seven hundred people -(expect-
162ed to he)- under him.... '; a claim which was,in this respect, further weak-
ened by the fact that even up to the death of this Mfenguleader in mid-1903, all
the followers he had at his command amounted to barely 40 able-bodied men,
163excluding their families (womenand children). In the long run, what Chief
Kona's demand for more land for his people only managed to earn him, were
crude reprimands from the authorities that he and his people could go back to
the Cape colony, if they were not satisfied with both the amount of land allo-
cated them as well as the pattern of settlement prescribed in the Bembesi
164location, and also his temporary deposition from the posttlon of leadership,
within the Mfengusociety, which was immediately effected by July 1899.165
If Chief Kona incurred the displeasure of the Southern Rhodesian Admini-
stration simply by his demands for the provision of more land to safeguard the
security and welfare of his people, Chief Garner's ~ini's crime waa In com-
parison,quite a serious one. He was accused of both insubordination and gen-
eral disrespect of his imm.ediate superiors within the Native Department of
Matabeleland. In September 1901, Griffith, the Superintendent of the Fingo
Locatton.eomplamed about Chief Sojini's behaviour, especially the latter's
frequent refusals to appear at the Bembesi administrative office,when so
requested,as well as his tendency to visit Bulawayowithout the prior consul-
tation and permission of the Superintendent at Bembesi. In his plea to the
Chief Native Commissioner for Matabelelandto 'take serious notice' of
Sojini's behaviour and punish him 'in some way as an example', Griffith also
commented in the followingvein on the character of this Mfengu ruler, that:
This man -(Chief Sojini)- has a very hlgh opinion of his own
importance and I consider his action -(in going to Bulawayo
with<iWrrmission)- an open defiance of my authority over
him.
162NB1/1/8: Thomas, Acting C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Hole: June 3, 1899.
163NB1/1/19: MacDonald, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 10, 1903.
164NB1/1/8: Thomas, Acting C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Hole: June 3, 1899.
165C.O. 417/276: Report an an Jndaba held by the C/N/C -(Mataheleland)-
with the Fingoes••• September 21, 1899.
166NB1/1/14: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: September 13, 1901.
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But unfortunately for the SUperintendent of the Fingo Location, the exemplary
punishment he had prayed for from his superiors in the Native Department of
Matabeleland over 80jini did not materialize forthWith. All that 80jini appears
to have received,at first,was a 'severe reprimand' and a warning that he
would be expelled from the Fingo Location 'on the slightest future provoca-
ti ,167on.
As far as Chief 80jini himself was concerned, the reprimand and threat
of expulsion from the location by the Chief Native Commissioner for Mata-
beleland.In September 1901, do not seem to have effectively cowed him. By
the beginning of 1902,immediately after the departure of Griffith from Bem-
besi, Chief Sojini once more features amongst the Mfengu who attempted to
take advantage of the arrival of a new official at Bembesi, W. M.. Barnard,
the Acting Superintendent for the location, by exploiting this official's ignor-
ance and demanding more land for their settlement. This ruse was.however,
frustrated by the Mfengu messengers at the Bembesi office who briefed the
new official on the ruling of the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland,
on previous ocoasfonsjm connection with the issue of more land for the Mfengu
settlers.
In the event, the antagonism generated.In the process, between the Mfengu
messengers and the followers of 80jini was such that it not only sparked off
meetings of protests, but also aroused anxieties at Bembesi on the safety of
these messengers, whom 8ojini's followers had apparently threatened to
attack, with the result that the Acting SUperintendent had to apply for reinfor-
168cements from the headquarters in Bulawayo. In the end, the promised
attack from Sojini's people against the Mfengu messengers in question did not
materialize. But all the same, official measures were taken to make matters
more difficult for Chief Sojini who, under these circumstances, was assured
that he would neither be allowed to bring into Southern Rhodesia any more of
169his followers nor get any additional land grants in the future.
On the lighter side of the Sojini/BSACo. Administration saga between
1901 and 1902, is the contemptuous manner in which this Mfengu chief regard-
167
Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo to Griffith, Bembesi: September 25- ,
1901.
168
NB 1/1/16: W. M. Barnard, Acting Superintendent, Bembesi, to C/N/C,
Bulawayo: February 5, 1902.
169Ibid: Barnard, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: February 8, 1902.
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ed the official buildings at Bembesi. Itwas alleged that 80jini had sworn to
other Mfengu that he wouldnot take orders emanating from the poor 'Kaffir
huts', 170 which then.constituted the offices of the Superintendent of the Fingo
Location at Bembesi up to 1902. Indeed,as if to support 8ojini's misgivings
on the efficacy of BSACo. authority at Bembesi, Fynn, the former promoter
of the Mfenguimmigration. schemes from the Cape to Southern Rhodesia,
himself burst into apoplectic rage, on his transfer from Gwelo to Bembesi in
February 1902, with regard. to the scene which met his sight at his new
administrative base. The residential quarters for the Superintendent at
Bembesi, as seen by Fynn in February 1902, were 'absolutely unfit for
human habitation, built of green bricks in 1894••• ' and were by 1902 'in a
condition of disgraceful dilapidation.' The administrative quarters too were
in an equally poor state and were best portrayed in Fynn's description that:
The office here -(at Bembesi)- is an ordinary Kaffir hut
about 10 feet in diameter and 12 feet high. Such a building
is quite unfit for the transaction of official business and
cannot but have a bad effect on natives accustomed %1
respectable Government offices in the Cape colony.
In a way, Fynn, therefore, paradoxically vindicated Chief Sojini's contumacy
and insubordination in the Fingo Location.
The changing character of Mfengu/BSACo.relations between 1899 and
1902, thoughminimal and less significant than at any other subsequent period
of MfenguhiStory in SouthernRhodesta, was,of course, in harmony with the
mood then prevailing within the white colonist circles in the country. The
attitudes of both the rank and file colonists and the BSACo.Administration
itself were, to a large extent}hardening towards not only the Mfengu, but also
towards the black emigres from the Southin a broader sense. Indeed}it might
be recollected here that this somewhat hostile attitude within the colonist
society had been. evident since the en.dof the Shonaand Ndebele
172risings in 1896/7, but had been temporarily smothered and overridden by
the wishes of the SouthernRhodesian mining industry and the personal in-
volvement of Rhodes in the matter of Mfenguand other African importation
programmes from the Southbetween 1898 and 1902. Yet in spite of the initial
170NB 1/1/14: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: September 13, 1901.
171NB 1/1/16: Fynn, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: February 18, 1902.
172Vide: Supra: pp.160-80
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success of the supporters of the 'black settler' schemes in the country,as a
solution to the territory's economic and political ills, this success in no way
obliterated all forms of opposition to these initiatives. Perhaps, it could be
reasonably argued that opposition to the establishment of 'colonies' of 'black
settlers' from the South, was just driven behind the scenes in 1898, only to
re-emerge gradually between 1899 and 1902 and progressively gathering
potency and momentum after the death of Rhodes in 1902.
Colmist hostility towards the Mfengu and other 'black settlers' from the
South during 1899-1902was manifested inanumber of ways. There was,for
instance, the case of Mrs. J. M. Engelbrecht, a Boer widowand tenant on the
farm of Messrs Fletcher & Espin, Civil and Mining Engineers and Government
Surveyors, in the Bulalima-Mangwe district of Matabeleland,whoresented the
presence of black emigres from the Southon the neighbouring property. In
August 1901,she appealed to her landlords indicating that she could 'stick it
no longer on account of a lot of Xosas if they do not leave this -(neighbour-
173hoodj-": a plea which,instantlY,solicited the support of her landlords who.in
turn,protested to the Native Department over what they called 'the tone these
semi-civilized Kaffirs from the -(Caper Colmy use towards Europeans who
are helpless to defend themselves -(andr which tone the natives of this country
174
-(SouthernRhodesia wouldj- not be slow to imitate unless checked I
The subsequent prosecution of the black emigres from the South, residing
on a Mr. Heiman's farm in the Bulalima-Mangwe district,under the Colonial
175Natives Prohibition Act (1898)for trespassing, was the upshot of Mrs.
Engelbrecht's appeal. But most signUlcantly, her feelings were shared by a
wide range of sympathizers within the Southern Rhodesian white colonist
society. This is particularly true with regard. to the case of Ludwig
Papenfus, a farmer in the Bembesi area and,therefore)a neighbour to the
newly arrived Mfengu community as well as a pioneer and leading participant
in the wars of conquest in early Southem Rhodesia, not to mention his out-
spoken racist views,brought almg in undiluted form from the Boer republic of
176
the Orange Free state.
173NB1/1/14: J. M. Engelbrecht (Mrs.), MatopoSiding, to Fletcher (Trans-
lated from Dutch):August 25, 1901.
174_12!!!': Messrs Fletcher & Espin, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: Septem-
1
ber 2, 1901.75 ..!!2!2: W.E. Thomas, N/C, BulaUma-M"angwe,to C/N/C, Bulawayo: Septem-
176 Vide: Supra~p.54
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Papenfus was totally opposed to the settlement and presence of the Mfengu
immigrants at Bembest.argutng, in July 1902Jthat since he had been 'a farmer
for many years in other parts of SouthAfrica I knowthat farming alongside a
native location is very difficult on account of stock thieving•. -(and)- trespass
which -1cauld)-in the near future probably cause me serious loss and. •. a
sense of insecurity which renders farming impossible•.•• ,177 For checking,
especially Mfengutrespass,and 'its accompanyingevils' against his extensive
farm, Papenfus requested the BSACo.Administration to speedily fence off
the 3} miles boundary his property shared with the Fingo Location; a request
supported by other white farmers in the neighbourhoodsuch as the Rademeyer
Brothers, wholin the course of time,even offered their services to carry out
the fencing themselves, as long as the govemment provided the necessary
178material. In the end, the BSACo.Administration had to face the music and
soothe the anxieties of the colonist farmers of the Bembesi region by provtd-
179
ing £2,200 worth of fencing material to fence off the Fingo Location.
Within the BSACo. administrative Circles, opposition to Mfenguand
other 'black settlers' from the Southwas particularly noticeable amongst the
junior officials, though the senior ones were themselves no exception to the
rule. Amongst the Native Department officials in Matabeleland,for instance,
Archie A. Campbell.the Native Commissioner for the Insiza district, and P.A.
Stuart of the Bulawayodistrict were both quite voluble on this issue concern-
ing the presence of 'black settlers' from SouthAfrica in the province between
1899 and 1902. As far as Campbell was concerned, his views on the subject
of the Mfengusettlers were occasioned by the transfer of abodeby one Mfengu,
Nkohla, and his family from Bembesi to the Insiza district where he had been
engaged by a 'Dutch' farmer named W.H. Dowell, 'to plow and look after -(the)-
cattle' on the latter's Bathcline farm, whilst the owner himself lived in Bula-
180wayo, What naturally aroused Campbell's Indignationwas the fact that
whilst the Superintendent of the Fingo Location had considered the arrangement
a temporary form of employment and allowed it to go through on that basts, 181
177NB1/1/15: L.M. Papenfus, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: July 26, 1902.
1781bid:The Rademeyer Bros, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:September 30,
1902.
179!2!!!: H.B. Dough, Inspector of Public Works, Bulawayo, to C/N/C, Bula-
wayo: January 19, 1903.
1801bid:W.H. Dowell, Bathcline Farm, to N/C, Insiza: November 4, 1901.
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Nkohlahimself, on the other hand, viewed the matter from a different angle
altogether.
As Nkohla, this Mfenguimmigrant himself admitted in October 1901, he
had come to regard himself as 'a Nyizane (Insiza) man' rather than a Bembesl
one.although he still paid his tax at Bembesi where he retained his plot of
land in the location.182 To Campbell, the idea of the Mfengu immigrants
being allowed to move about and settle at random in areas as far as '30 miles I
away from the Fingo Location, as the Insiza district obviouslywas in the
case of Nkohla, was just inacceptable. Thus the Native Commissioner of
Insiza protested:
I was not aware that Fingoes brought up by the Govt. (sic)
& located on a defined Locationwere allowed to remove
their whole kraals in this way, & I regret that it is so, as they
~the Mfengu)-are trmost undesirable people to be mixed
with the Matabele.
Campbell's opposition to the Mfengusettlers may be excused on account
of the administrative inconvenience which unauthortsed transfers of abode by
Mfenguindividuals entailed on the district level. That of Stuart, the Assist-
ant Native Commissioner of the Bulawayodistrict, against the Africans from
the south.m general.then resident in the town of Bulawayowas, it might be
said, in every way.embossed with hard-line racist views and a somewhat
callous attitude towards the black subject peoples over which this over-
zealous and extremely negrophobic young official from Natal, was particularly
noted. 184
In his contribution to the 1899-1902debate on the advantages and dis-
advantages of the presence in Southern Rhodesia of the Mfenguand other
'black settlers' from the South in August 1902, Stuart took the opportunity to
give the 'Cape Boys' resident in the Bulawayolocation a pretty hard bashing.
In the first place, Stuart was very much displeased by the £66 lOs Odhut tax
money collected by his office for the year 1901. From his owncomputation,
he estimated that out of a population of about 350 people and 250 huts in the
181!!ili!:Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:October 24, 1901.
182Ibid: Statement of Nkohlabefore A.A. Campbell, N/C, Insiza: October 14- ,
1901.
183Ibid: Campbell, N/C, Insiza, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:November 5, 1901.
18~Vide: Supra:p.324_
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Bulawayolocation, the Bulawayodistrict office should have collected,at least,
some £150 in 1901,instead of a paltry £66 lOs Od. For this discrepancy, the
'Cape Boys' were held responsible and a new modus operandi,with regard to
the collection of hut tax in the Bulawayolocation,was,consequently,suggested
not only for the sake of augmenting government revenue, but also as a punitive
measure against the 'Cape Boys' restding in the location whowere to be
pr evented,by all means.from evading the payment of hut tax. Accordingly,
Stuart had concluded that:
•.• the drastic effects of allowing Colonial Natives of the
worst type (whichthese undoubtedlyare) to live in an
insolent and immoral state (let alone their total dis-
regard of the Hut Tax Ordinance) will go from bad to
worse and that their far-reaching influence will be
greater and take firmer root amongst the at present
peaceably dispose«\~tives of this country, than can
be eas ily foretold.
Secondly, Stuart assumed that there was necessarily a co-relationship
between the problems of the Native Department in collecting tax from the
'Cape Boys' of the Bulawayolocation and the character of these alien
Africans. From Stuart's point of view,therefore, the problems of the Native
Department officials in Bulawayo in collecting tax were overtly frustrated by
'these Natives -1CapeBoys)-who -(were)- noted for their cunning and deceit
and who -(had)-no difficulty whatever in using these vices to their advantage. '
In a sense, the 'Cape Boys' in the Bulawayolocation were said to have succeed-
ed in carrying out their nefarious activities on the tax issue in league with the
'Zambesi boys] who had no huts of their own in the location but were kept as
lodgers by the crafty 'Cape Boys'. But all in all, it was primarily the question
of what Stuart considered the 'proper relationship' between the 'Cape Boys', as
a subordinate community within a colonial setting, and the BSACo. offiCials,
as representing the dominant segment of the composite colonial society of
Southern Rhodesia, which worried this official.
Besides, Stuart feared and warned,once more.agamst what he saw as the
pernicious influence of these 'Cape Boys' on the indigenous African peoples.
With this anxiety in mind, the Bulawayodistrict official thus indicated:
It is not merely the loss of £100 annually (from the Bula-
wayo Location alone) which requires consideration - that
185NB 1/1/18: P. A. Stuart, Assistant N/C, BulawayoDistrict, to C/N/C,
Bulawayo:August 28, 1902.
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is perhaps the least serious view to be taken of the matter -
but it is the bad influence which this notoriously insolent and
semi-educated race is exercising on the natives of the country.
Let that influence but once take firm hold of our native -
(who, if a savage, has at least respect for & pays his tax
readily to the whiteman) and it will be goodbye to all respect
and no mconstderable revenue, and after that m1fR& easily
follow riots, strikes and even another rebellion.
Hitherto we have, in our study, examined the changing nature of the
relationship between the BSACo. and the Mfenguas well as other related
'black settlers' from the Southduring the period 1899 and 1902. After 1902,
the honeymoonperiod of amicable relations between the two sides in question
effectively died a natural death. Relations between the BSACo. and the Mfengu
settlers in particular progressively deteriorated and the case of Helese Ginya,
between 1902and 1905,certainly demonstrates, beyonddoubt}this trend of
developments more clearly than any other example. Helese Ginya's problems
with the BSACo.Administration of SouthernRhodesia had their roots in the
domestic and marital difficulties of Chief Zita or Zizi Kona, a kinsman of his
and under whom he lived at Bembesi. The decision of Chief Kona to marry; in
his old age.Elsie NoveyUeKona, the youngest of his three wives, by Christian
rites and,therefore, on monagamous lines in SouthernRhodesia in 1901, had
profound repercussions not only for this Mfenguleader himself but also for
his immediate relatives and associates.
One such adverse result of Chief Kona's move was the quarrel over
succession and inheritance which immediately ensued between the old chief
and MbangaKona,his eldest son by the chief wife. MbangaKona sued for the
possession of all his father'S cattle in accordance with Mfengulaws and
customs, which required a man's cattle, in polygamous households, 'to run at
the Chief Kraal' where the chief wife lived; ;187 whichwas apparently quite
justified in this respect,since Mbangalived at Bembesi with his mother,
Nokasi Kona. Besides, Mbangaalso demanded all the cattle of the other wife,
Novili Kona of the 'Right-hand House'"who had remained with her children in
186!!ll!!-
187Cf. The origins and significance of the 'Chief Wife' and the 'Senior Wife' as
well as the 'Left-hand House' and the 'Right-hand House' each.reapecttvely,
gave birth to in terms of succession and inheritance in Nguni societies,
In: Wilson and Thompson (eds.): Oxford HiStory of SouthAfrica: Vol. I:
Chapter III: PP. 16-30.
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the Cape colony, as well as the privilege to have all the cases) handled by his
father as chief in the Fingo Location, to be held at his own homestead,which
was, as we have already indicated, the Chief Kraal of Zita Kona under Mfengu
1 188aw,
As far as Griffith, the Superintendent of the Fingo Location, was concerned,
Mbanga's demands were not at all out of harmony with Mfengu traditions and,
thus, after prior consultation with other Mfengu leaders at Bembesi, this
official ruled in favour of the plaintiff and.In the process) authorized Mbanga
to expropriate most of his father's of cattle, with the exception of eight
189
or so beasts left at the disposal of chief and his Christian wife, Elsie. The
Griffith judgement in favour of Mbanga was, however, inacceptable to the
other Mfengu parties involved, notably MbaYbe Kona,the son of Chief Kona's
'Right-hand House', who had remained in the Transkei, and those Mfengu
supporters of the old chief &garnst Mbanga at Bembesi, who happened to include
Helese Glnya,
Top-level officials, both at the Cape and in Southern Rhodesia, were also
dissat1sifed with the Griffith judgement,since it was assumed that the Common
Law of the Cape should have carried more weight in the matter. The Chief
Native Commissioner for Matabeleland, for example, indicated in November
1901 that:
All cattle -(in the Kona dispute)-. •• remain with -(Chief)- Kona
- Kana having married -(the third)- wife by Christian rites, this
wife is the only me that can be recognized. Mbanga's mother
can mly now be considered as one of Kona's concubines &
unless Kona OIl his death leaves Mbanga or his mother any
cattle or other property by will - the question of Inheritance
can only be settled by the Common Law of the Cape colony
- which naturally only provides for legitimate descendants.
This law Is applicable in this country -(Southern Rhodesia)- 190
where natives are married in accordance with Christian rites.
Taylor's view was, of courseJin tune with that of the Resident Magistrate of the
Willowvale district in the Transkel,whence the Konas at Bembesi came and
where the others still lived. 191
188NB 1/1/15: Statement of Mbanga Kona: Enclosed in Griffith, Bembesi, to
C/N/C, Bulawayo: December 17, 1901.
189.!!ll!!: Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: October 22, 1901.
190!!tl!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Superintendent, Bembesi: November 22,
1901.
191!!l!2: Resident Magistrate, W111owvale, Transkei, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
November 12, 1901.
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Itwas over this judgement that Helese Ginya and other supporters of
Chief Kona, against his eldest son, were to suffer at the hands of the BSACo.
Administration, particularly after the death of this seventy-five year old
Mfengu leader on a trip to the Transkei, in June 1903. 192 As far as Ginya's
case was concemed, his problem was greatly complicated by the fact that the
administrative officials at Bembesi, tended to support :MbangaKona's cause,
insofar as the Kona family's succession dispute was concerned. For this
reason, Helese Ginya and Sifuba Magadlela, the more outspoken opponents of
Mbanga, were, naturally, marked men at Bembesf, Indeed, Sifuba had
earlier on been severely beaten, to the extent that he lost consctousness, by
the supporters of Mbanga Kona, when, at a beer drink in the Fingo Location
before the death of Chief Kona, he had, in a careless way, swom that Mbanga
. 193
did not deserve to inherit a position of authority after his father, whilst
Ginya's opposition had, in tum, aroused the passionate disfavour of Fynn, the
successor of Griffith at the Bembesi office.
Thus in May 1902, Fynn had appealed to his superiors in Bulawayo for
some punitive action, including expulsion from the Location, to be taken
against Ginya on the grounds of non-payment of the £28 7s 9d debt to the
BSACo. and lack of respect for administrative authorities in the Loeatton, In
short, Fynn regarded Ginya as a man '••• whose behaviour and general
attitude towards the -{Southern Rhodesian)- Government officials past and
present has been and -{was)- still most unbearable.' Fynn conttnued.mdtcat-
ing that Ginya 'absolutely -{fgnored)- this office -{Bembesi)- ••• -{and)- that
this Native -(was)- a very bad character and was tumed out of WUlowvale
District in the Transkei for similar behaviour to the officials of that Dist-
i t ,194rc.
This uneasy relatimship between Ginya and his administrative supremo
at Bembesi did not improve for the better with the passage of timeJbut worsened
in every way. The death of Chief Kona in mid-1903 and the subsequent suc-
cession of Mbanga Kana to the leadership of the Amazizi group of Mfengu
immigrants at Bembesi later that year, contrary to the Chief Native Commis-
192
NB 1/1/9: MacDonald, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 10, 1903.
193
NB 1/1/14: Statement of Sifuba: Enclosed in Griffith, Bembesi, to C/N/C,
Bulawayo: September 24, 1901.
194
A 3/18/24: Report of N. C., Fingo Location: May 26, 1902.
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sioner's 1901 ruling, which had, as we have already seen, debarred Mbanga
and disqualified all his claims to succession and inheritance of his father'S
property and position of authority, were bound to bring in another round of
clashes between Ginya and Fynn.
Thus by December 1903, Fynn complained that Ginya's 'behaviour to his
Headman ~Mbanga Kana)- and his people generally ~was)- unbearable •••• ;195
A month later, in January 1904, it was further reported that Ginya had 'not
yet given his chief and chief's people peace.' He was accused of bringing
before the Bembesi office 'endless land disputes' and of having been the prim-
ary mover in the dispute between the late Chief Zizi Kona and his san and
successor, Mbanga Kona, as well as of instJgating Elsie Kana, the chief's
widow, to bring her complaints over Chief Kona's cattle, taken over by Mban-
ga, before the Chief Native Commissioner himself in Bulawayo and,in the
process} by-passing the Bembesi office which exercised immediate control
over the Mfengu community. Moreover; it was also mdtoated.as part of
Ginya's allegedly incorrlgible character, that he was 'the only man at the
meeting called to inform the people who the late Chief Kana's successor was,
who did not thank the Government, and ended up making insulting remarks about
196the Chief ~Mbanga Kona)-. ' To add to Ginya's tale of woe, the Native Dep-
artment authorities at Bembesi were not1in the Ieast, pleased with the slovenly
manner in which he was endeavouring to payoff the BSACo. debt. The fact
that since May 1902, he had, by December 1903, paid only £3 out of a total
197
sum of £28 7s 9d,wh11st disputing the basis of the other £16 7s 9d, was
another cogent reason in favour of Fynn' s demand for the expulsion of this
Mfengu man from the Ffngo Location.
Up to the beginning of 1904, Fynn's superiors in Bulawayo had not been
sufficiently convinced that there was anything, in this junior official's charges
against Ginya, which warranted the drastic actions the former called for
against the latter. In fact, Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner for Mata-
beleland, had made it quite clear that he could not take any step to invoke the
punitive measures demanded by Fynn simply an the basis of 'the bald and
wholly inadequate statements that these men (Ginya and Sifuba) ~d)- been
195!!llS: Report of N.'C., Fingo Location: December 30, 1903.
196!!llS: Report of N. C.", Fingo Location: January 6, 1904.
197!!tl!!: Report of N. C., Fingo Location: December 30, 1903.
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misbehaving themselves in relation to the Government. ' The Chief Native
Commissioner had required more turgid facts on the misdemeanours of Ginya
and men of his persuasion to proceed against them; a request which, it would
appear, could hardly be met even by Fynn's appeal to the Cape authorities,
formerly acquainted with the Mfengu immigrants, to provide helpful material
Indeed, as far as M. Leifeldt, the Resident Magistrate of the Wi1lowvale
district, was, for tnstance.concerned, Ginya,in particular; had not been the
bad apple that the BSACo. Administration in Southern Rhodesia portrayed him
to be. If anything, Lelfeldt had seen Ginya, before emigrating from the Cape,
merely as 'a great nuisance', liable to be 'everlastingly having land disputes
with his neighbours' but without committing any serious crime warranting
conviction. For these incessant land disputes involving Ginya and his neigh-
bours, Leifeldt was.bowever, very glad when he learnt;in 1898;that this man
had joined the 'Kana trek' of emigrants to Southern Rhodesia. 199
For all the official attempts to bring Ginya to book, allegedly for acts of
insubordination but in reality for differences of opinion between him and Fynn,
the Native Commissioner of the Fingo Location, 200 nothing was more effect-
ive than the petition of those Mfengu at Bembesi who were dissatisfied by the
succession of Mbanga Kona to the leadership of the Amazizi. This petition,
sent in April 1904 to Leifeldt, the Resident :M:ag1strate of Willowvale, and
which included Helese Gtlya amongst its signatories, was, in essence, a final
attempt by the anti-Mbanga faction to reverse the decision, whereby the
Bembesi authorities had arbitrarily overridden the wishes of some of the
Amazizi Mfengu of the location, by imposing on them a candidate, whom they
regarded as 'an illegitimate son' of the late Chief Kona on the basis of the 1901
ruling, but was strongly backed by the Native Commissioner at Bembest, Thus
in the appeal to their former Cape authorities, the Mfengu petitioners, led by
Ginya, indicated that 'Mr. Fynn appointed Mbanga heir apparent & that was
against our views, ~and)- when we objected to him -(Fynn)-, he said he
198!!ll!!: Taylor, cIN/C, to N/C, FIngo Location: April6, 1904.
199J!ll2: M. LeUeldt, Resident Magistrate, Willowvale, to N/C, Fingo Loca-
tion: May 14, 1904.
200The title of the Superintendent of the Fingo Location was changed to that of
the Native Commissioner with the arrival of Fynn at Bembesi in February
1902. Vide: NB 1/1/16: Fynn, Bembesi to CIN/C, Bulawayo: February
18, 1902.
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201-{Mbanga was)- selected by the Government •••• ' Moreover, these aggri-
eved Mfengu were further enraged by Mbanga's activities, on ascension to
the Amazizi chieftainship, in expropriating all the stock left by his father for
the benefit of his step-mother, Elsie Kona.
The results the petition to the Cape gave rise to were certainly not what
those aggrieved Mfengu at Bembesi had bargained for. For Helese Ginya in
particular, the consequences of this petition to Leifeldt were more profound
and evidently far-reaching than he had ever expected. The Native Department
officials in Matabeleland took the opportunity to nail Ginya on the charge of
202forging the names of other petitioners in the appeal to the Cape colony. This
charge, so propounded by the officials of the Native Department, was, to say
the least, as unrealistic as it was indefensible. The names which the offi-
cials m Matabeleland alleged to have been forged by Ginya were.as a matter of
fact,those of people who were either his kinsmen or supporters and were.m
every way,openly hostile to the idea of Mbanga being imposed onto them~with
a position of authority over them and their famllies.
A quick glance at these names/for fnatance.shows that some of the peti-
tioners in question included men Uke Fayo Mnild, a brother-m-law to Helese
Ginya and a man who had acted as Headman of the Amazizi branch of the
Mfengu at Bembesi, since Chief Kona's departure from Bembesi in 1902 till
his subsequent death in the Cape colony during the course of his visit there in
mid-1903 and also up to the appointment of Mbanga Kona.las successor,shortly
203after. The commendation by MacDonald, the clerk-in-charge at Bembesi
in June 1903,for instance, that Fayo Mnild, the acting Headman, was fa man
much after ,Chief)- Kona's stamp', 204 is obviously indicative that Mbanga and
Mniki were just poles apart in their views; a fact which quite logically may
have placed Mniki on a collision course with the Native Department of Mata-
beleland. Indeed.as has already been pointed out, Sifllba Magadlela, whose
name was also included amongst the petitioners, was by no means a fan of
201A 3/18/24: Petition of Helese Ginya, Samuel Kma, Fayo Mnild et at. to
Mr. Leifeldt, RMO, Willowvale, Transkei: April 9, 1904.
202!E!,g: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary, Salisbury, July 18,1904.
203Interview with Mr. Kenneth Kona (grandson of Elsie Kona), Fingo Location,
Bembesi, November 18, 1975.
204__
~B 1/1/19: MacDonal, Bembesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: June 10, 1903.
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Mbanga's, especially in view of the brutal beating the former had earlier on
205received at the hands of the latter's followers in September 1901, which
quite evidently testifies to this effect.
The relationship and connections of other Mfengu petitioners with Helese
Ginya are just too clear to make the charge of forgery against this Mfengu
dissident altogether ridiculous. Jamane Ginya, one of the petitioners was a
brother to Helese; Samuel Konawas a young son of Chief Kona'a.who.together
with Helese Ginya, Mntld and others, had quite strongly urged and supported
the late Chief Kona, prior to leaving the Cape colony and in 1901, to marry
206his youngest wife Elsie according to Christian rites. For Samuel Kona,
who was, as a matter of fact, a full-time evangelist of the Methodist Church
in the Bulawayo circuit between 1901 and 1904,before he moved to the Selukwe
207district in 1905, the temptation to persuade his parents to re-marry
according to Christian requirements was just too compelling.
In short, the charge raised by the Native Department of Matabeleland
against Helese Ginya was clearly a trumped up one, brought to the fore by
desperate officials whowere apparently unsuccessful in other respects to bring
Ginya to book. Other offences credited to Ginya like the £25 7s 9d Company
debt and his conduct, constdered, from the official point of view, as 'habit-
ually and perSistently truculanc and mischievous ••• " 208 may have carried
more weight,had it not been for the fact that these offences were by themselves,
primarily, ancillary to the major charge of forgery Ginya was thus being
accused of by the Native Department.
But in the process of carrying out the alleged charges against Ginya, the
developments which transpired indicate that, to a large extent, both these
charges and measures taken by the BSACo. Administration against this Mfengu
man were by no means credible. Indeed,they appear to have been.at least}
actions largely prompted by sheer pique and extreme vindictiveness on the
part of the Native Department officials who considered it their primary function
to preserve the 'proper order' of hierarchical relations in the composite
205Vide: SUpra:p. 367.
206NB 1/1/18: Griffith, Bembest, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: October 22, 1901.
207Based on notes supplied to author by Miss E, Buckley. Salisbuq:
October, 1975.
208A 3/18/24: MacDonald, Beniliesi, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: March 28, 1903.
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colanial society of Southern Rhodesia onwhich the success of the whole syn-
drome of superordination and subordination depended,especially so, in the
words of Cairns, for 'the District Officer whose qualifications were related
less to high academic attafnm.ents than to the intangibles of character. ,209 To
an extent, it could be said that the forgery charge and the ancillary offences
brought forward against Ginyawere a mere charade in which the actual mis-
demeanours of this MJengu individual were greatly exaggerated to cover the
misadventures of the officials themselves involved in the matter.
As became apparent later in the appeals of Ginya and Elsie Kona to the
Resident Commissioner in Salisbury in October 1904, the Native Dpeartment
officials at Bembesi and in Bulawayowere not the innocent souls, they pro-
claimed themselves to be, pitted against a stubborn-headed man perststently
encouraging the late Chief Kona's widow to engage in a series of conflicts with
the authorities. In fact, these officials of the Native Department,in trying to
establish those norms of domination which characterized plural societies
where the minority group governed the subject peoples by coercion. and rep-
ression, resorted quite openly to some very crude methods of doing so. In the
case of Elsie Kona, the enthusiasm of the Native Department officials in their
support of :MbangaKona, as the successor of his late father, Chief Zizi Kona,
verged on the fanatical and,for this reason,they gave unwarranted support to
wanton acts of brfgandry and callousness committed by the young chief-elect
against his step-mother. The seizure of Elsie Kona's cattle by Mbanga, which
she had previously refused to loan, is patently demonstrative of this fact. As
Elsie Kona informed Sir Marshall Clarke, the Resident Commissioner, in
Salisbury, the alliance of Interests between Fynn, the Native Commissioner
at Bembesi, and :Mbangawas both evident and too strong for her:
A messenger -(of the Native Department)- arrived from Mr.
Fynn instructing me to hand over my cattle to Mbanga. I
refused to. On. my refusing ••• the messenger returned to the
office -(Bembesi)- and came back immediately afterwards
and drove off the cattle. I proceeded to try to stop them,
I cried and shouted and others -(Mfengupeople)- came and
called me away. The cattle wife driven off. Iwent and
reported the matter to Ginya.
209Cairns: Ope cft. p. 93.
210
A 3/18/24: Statement made to His Honour Sir Marshall Clarke KCMG,Resi-
dant Commissioner. Southern Rhodesia, by Elsie Kona, a Fingo woman
and widowof Kona Zit!, deceased; Salisbury: October 9, 1904.
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For his part in this seizure of Elsie Kona's cattle, Fynn was by no means
apologetic or evasive on the matter. In spite of an earlier ruling to the con-
211trary, Fynn was curt and dismissive to the pleas of Elsie Kona, indicating
in no uncertain terms that 'you -(Elsie Kona)-may go where you like, the
cattle belong to Mbanga, Mbangahaving been appointed successor to Kona. '
Indeed,even when this widow implored the Bembesi Native Com.missioner for
perm.1ssion,in form of a pass, to go to Bulawayoand see the head of the Native
Department in Matabeleland <n this question of her stock, Fynn was even
obstructive; a tactic, of course,also conveniently adopted by Fynn's superior,
Chief Native Commissioner Taylor in Bulawayo.
With Taylor's refusal to attend to Elsie Kona, the position of this widow
had become virtually desperate due to the concerted acts of the Native Dep-
artment officials to frustrate all her moves. Thus she had queried the Chief
Native Commissioner: 'What can I do? Mr Fynn has Ul-treated me, and upon
my applying to him for a letter to his superior officer - you ,c/N/C Taylor~ -
he refused to give me a letter and nowyou won't hear me without first bringing
a letter, the position is impossible.' In Bulawayo, Elsie Kona's last resort
was to appeal to the magistrate.who could only consider her case provided she
had the services of an attoroey; a privilege which this widowcould hardly afford)
as the attoroey in question required the payment of a deposit of £20 which
Elsie could not afford. In the final analysts, it was to the Resident Commiss-
ioner in Salisbury that this widowappealed to over her plight. In her own
words, this decision was arrived at under the following circumstances:
..•I took a train -(from Bembesi)- to Salisbury to find out
from those in AuthOrity the reason for my being so badly
treated. I am starving and my children are starving and
instead of being able to plough my land this year -(1904)-I
can do nothing as my cattle have been taken away from me;
nor does my sm -(Pupan1 Kona)- receive the £1 allowance
due to him as heir to -(Chie~~ona. That amount is now being
paid to Mbangaby Mr. Fynn.
If the treatment of Elsie Konaby the Native Department of Matabeleland in
1904, represents the high-handed manner inwhich these officials dealt with
those subject people who differed with their dectstoas, that of Helese Ginya,
211Vide: Supra: pp.365-6
212!2!!!: Statement made to••• Sir Marshall Clarke, ••• by Elsie Kona. •• Salis-
bury: October 9, 1904.
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her guardian, demonstrates" to some extent,how the BSACo. Administration
of Southern Rhodesia ruthlessly crushed those individuals who stood ft1 its
way. The support Ginya proffered to Chief Kona's widow,during her difficult
times against MbangaKona and the Matabeleland Native Department"was to
prove Ginya's ownundoing. As has already been hitherto profusely indicated
earlier in this chapter, the Native Department. officials, both at Bembesi and
213Bulawayo,had no love for Ginya and once he actively assumed his guardian-
ship role over Chief Kona's widow, these officials in turn intensified their
efforts to crucify this Mfengu individual and,by so dolng,set an example to any
of his fellow men who dared.m the future}over-step his or her mark in matters
concerning BSACo./Mfengu relations. Indeed,by October 1904, the officials
of the Matabeleland Native Department had gone a long way to stress this
aspect of their administrative philosophy and attitudes in their dealings with
Ginya as one of the subject Mfengusettlers within the Southern Rhodesian
colonial setting.
Firstly, as Ginya stated before Sir Marshall Clarke in SaliBbury in October
1904, when Elsie Kona complained to Native Commissioner Fynn over the
seizure of her cattle, Ginyawas accused of instigating her and,for tbis reason,
his home was burnt down,whilst he himself was turned off the Fingo Location.
Secondly, a certificate of loyalty previously granted to Ginya,like other Mfengu
in the Cape, 'to separate us ~the Mfengu)-from the Xosa, who had fought
against the ~Cape)- government'. as Ginya himself testified, was arbitrarily
cancelled by Fynn at Bembesl. Thirdly, drastic measures were taken against
Ginya over the debt which he owed thelBSACo. In spite of this Mfengu's pro-
testation that '1intend, as others ~Mfengu)- in a similar position, to refund
this ~debt)- a little every year, £1 or £2 or £3', and that,in some years,he
had not been able 'to pay much owing to the drought••• and the cattle dying',
these excuses could hardly impress the BSACo.Administration. InGinya's
own words, he was literally 'picked out to pay the whole amount -{ofdebt he
owed the Companywhilst)- others ~Mfengu were)- not', and,by October,was
sued at the Magistrate's court in Bulawayoover the debt in question.
In fact, in pleading, as thiBMfengu did, in the Bulawayo court that he had
no lmowledge of the other £16 7s 9d claimed from him by the Company and thus
accepting the payment of only that amount relating to the expenses incurred in..
213Vide: Supra: pp.367-71.
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bringing up, from the Cape in 1898, his cow and pig as well as the cost of food
en route and at Bembesi, Ginya apparently was quite ignorant as to the limit
to which the BSACo. Administration was prepared to go, in order to recover
its funds. He was to discover this in a hard way, as he was later to admit:
-{When)-I returned to the Bembesi -(from the Magistrate's
court in Bulawayo two days later I)- found Mr. Fynn had
confiscated one cow, two pigs, two goats and seven fowls.
The door of my hut was also broken open. I heard -(that)-
night my grain was going to be confiscated next morning and
I immediately took -(the)- train to SaItsbury -(to appeal to
the Resident Commissioner)-.... Even if lowe this money
I do not see why the grain with which I feed my children
should be confiscated. The amount of goods taken from me is
more than the amount owed -(the BSACo. )- by me. The
amount which Iowe, ••• , is £9 17s.... -(This)- treatment
is unfair, for why shoul~l,fe treated in this manner and not
others in a like position.
Ginya's conclusion that he had not been fairly dealt with at Bembesi was
shared by a number of top-level officials in Salisbury. In. Bulawayo, the
Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland was.however, quite unrepentant
over the whole affair and even went to the extent of rubbing salt into Ginya's
wounds,when he gave.as his reason for the cancellation of this Mfengu's loyalty
or Citizenship certificate from the Capel that the measure 'precluded -(Ginya)-
from posing further before his -(Mfengu)- fellows (as he had done in the past)
215as being especially privileged to defy authority. '
Unfortunately however, Taylor's superiors did not show any enthusiasm
over his dismissive and callous disregard in this Ginya affair. The Resident
Commissioner. Sir Marshall Clarke; the BSACo. Treasuryl F. J. Newton
(later Sir Newton); the Attorney-General)C. H. Tredgold,and,to some extent;
the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, Milton (also later Sir Milton), all
disapproved of the actions of Fynn and Chief Native Commissioner Taylor and
the manner in which these two officials of the Native Department had handled
the Ginya/Elsie Kona affair.
Various points of criticism were, in the process, privately raised within
the top-level administrative circles in Salisbury on the Ginya/Elsie Kona case.
21~id: Statement made to His Honour Sli4 Marshall Clarke, KCMG. Resident
Commfssioner, Southern Rhodesia. by Helese Ginra. a Fingo: Salisbury;
October 9, 1904.
215!!!!!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary; SaUsbury: October
26, 1904.
375
Firstly, itwas admitted that both Fynn and Taylor had over-played the charge
of forgery against Ginyawith regard to the Mfengu petition of April 1904 to
the Cape in which his name apparently headed the list of the signatories. Thus
whilst it was observed within the top-level official circles in Salisbury that
the forgery charge against Ginyawas overtly made both 'the cause and occas-
216ion of his removal ~from the Fingo Location)-', it was,on the other hand,
freely accepted that, as the Attomey-General indicated, even if Ginyahad
attached the names of other dissident Mfengu to the petition sent down to the
Cape, this could simply be treated as an act of 'misconduct' and was defini-
217tely 'not such a forgery as is cognisable by Courts of Law. ' Moreovert top
officials in Salisbury felt that the charge of forgery against Ginyawas too
ill-founded to sound realistic,as it was based simply on loose and unsatis-
factory statements by Fynn and Taylor; statements which, it was concluded,
218could hardly stand any judicial investigation.
Secondly, there was the question of the arbitrary cancellation of Ginya's
loyalty or citizenship certificate, granted to him by virtue of the Cape Act 22
of 1867 andwhich had effectively exempted Ginya from pass laws or other
civil disabilities in the colony. In the view of the superior officials in Salis-
bury, this action by the Native Department of Matabelelandwas certainly
ultra vires and unjustifiable and had given Ginya a very strong sense of
219
grievance which he exploited with dexterity and to his advantage. As these
top-level officials concluded, it wouldhave been enoughfor the Native Dep-
artment of Matabeleland to retain Ginya's certificate in question until such a
time when it was required by the owner for use outside the territory of
220Southern Rhodesia, where such certificates were anywayirrelevant.
In the whole debate on the rights andwrongs of the Ginya/EIsie Konacase
in 1904, what the top brass officials in Salisbury were mostly paranoid about
were twomain issues; firstly, the level of awareness amongst the Mfengu
immigrants and the extent to which these 'black settlers' were prepared to
explore all the possible official and legal channels to arrest all forms of in-
216Ibid: Minuteby F. J. Newton, Treasurer, BSACo., to Milton.:December 8,
217 1904.!2!!!: Minuteby C.H. Tredgold, Attorney-General, to Milton: December 9,
218 1904.
219Ibid: Sir M. Clarke to Milton: November 11, 1904.
220Ibid: Minuteby Newtonto Milton:December 8, 1904.
!2!!!: Minuteby Tredgold to Milton: December 9, 1904.
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justice carried out against them, as demonstrated in this particular instance
by Ginya's appeal to a firm of lawyers, Messrs Cecil Roberts and Letts of
221Bulawayo, and to the Imperial official in Salisbury, Sir Marshall Clarke,
against the Matabeleland Native Department. Secondly, there was a feeling
of uncertainty in Salisbury as to the reactions of the Colonial Office over the
Ginya/Elsie Konaaffair once the news reached London.
Starting with the second aspect of official anxiety in Southern Rhodesta, it
was felt that the junior officials in the Native Department had acted in an un-
worthy manner in the Ginya/Elsie Kona affair. The treatment of Ginya over
the BSACo. debt whereby on this Mfengu's return from the court trial over the
issue, he foundhis homestead in shambles and his property seized, on Native
Commissioner Fynn's orders,as compensation for the debt in question, was
viewed by the top brass officials in Salisbury as 'prima facie evidence of
severe treatment, deserving further enquiry. ,222 The same critical viewwas
adopted with regard, to the obstructive actions of both Native Commissioner
Fynn at Bembesi and Chief Native Commissioner Taylor in Bulawayoagainst
Elsie Kona, once her cattle had been seized and she wanted to complain over
the matter. In the opinion of H. H. Casterns, the Chief Secretary, the obstru-
ctive behaviour of these two Native Department officials was out of tune with
their primary duty as patrons of their African wards. In Casterns's ownwords,
'In such cases ~as that of Elsie Konaj- the Native Commissioner and the Chief
Native Commissioner should assist rather than to throw obstacles in the way
of complaints especially when their own actions are the subject of complaint~23
Whilst the refractory actions of the Chief Native Commissioner for Mata-
beleland and the Native Commissioner of the Fingo Location were thus con-
sidered serious dereliction of duty, the top-level officials in Salisbury were in
a dilemma as to what line of action they had to take over the two Native Dep-
artment officials in question without,at the same timeJcourting the disapproval
of the Colonial Office in Londonon this Ginya/Elsie Kona affair. Thus while
it was freely admitted that Native Commissioner Fynn,especially,deserved
221Ibid: C. L. Carbutt for C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Messrs Cecil Roberts and
Letts, Bulawayo:May 18, 1904.
222!!ili!: MInuteby Newtonto Milton: December 9, 1904.
223!!ili!: H.H. Casterns, Chief Secretary, Salisbury, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
November 17, 1904.
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some censure for his part in the Ginya!Elsie Kona case, and that, with regard
to both Native Department officials, 'one does not like not to support one's
own men', as the BSACo. Treasurer stated, it was still felt amongst the
BSACo. officials in Salisbury, that this support could not be given easily with-
out some cost to the credibility of the BSACo. Administration in Southern
Rhodesia. The Imperial authorities were, especially, the cause for anxiety as
far as Newton was concerned, pointing out as he did, that the Administration
could not count on the approval of Number 12 DOwning Street on the matter.
Accordingly, the BSACo. cautioned that 'Sir .,Marshall Clarke, the Resident
Commissioner)- may accept the protests .,and)- declarations .,of the Southern
Rhodesian Administrationt- - but if he does not, I think the Secretary of State
would take an unfavourable view of the .,Native Commissioner's and the Chief
Native Commissioner's)- actions in the matter .,the Ginya/Elsie Kona affair~~4
On the question of the level of awareness amongst the Mfengu immigrants/
particularly on those matters concerning their rights, however limited, and
the appropriate legal procedure to follow in pursuing these rights, it could be
said that the BSACo. Administration in Southern Rhodesia was here being
hoisted by its petard. The exaggerated emphasis the Company and the
supporters of the Mfengu and other African immigration schemes from the
South had placed en these immigrants' achievement criteria was beginning to
tell,with rather unpalatable results for all concerned.
225
As has already been demonstrated elsewhere in this study, the BSACo.
Administration in Southern Rhodesia was very much opposed to a state of
affairs whereby Africans in the country were granted,with ease, access to the
Courts of law to challenge the actions and decisions of either the Administra-
tion itself or those of its officials. For this reason,when Karl Khumalo, that
enterprising black emigre from South Africa, initiated the Ndebele leaders to
the functioning and purposes of the law courts and/in the process.tntroduced
some white colonist lawyers to handle the grievances of the Ndebele people
towards the close of 1898, Sir Arthur Lawley~the Administrator of Matabele-
Iand.burst into a fit of apoplectic rage over these developments. In the end,
the consequences for all those involved were not in the least favourable. The
two white colonist lawyers involved, Elliott St. M. Hutchinson, a Bulawayo
22L1!!!!!: Minute by Newton to Milton: December 8, 1904.
225Vide: Supra: Chapter II: PP.170-2
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attorney, and Dyason, also an attorney and a partner in the Bulawayo-
based legal firm of Messrs Coghlan and Dyason, were ordered, in no un-
certain terms, to keep off their noses from the administration of African
affairs at all times. 226 Those Ndebele leaders like Umjaan, whowere asso-
ciated with this initiative, were deposed from chieftaincy and Karl Khumalo
ran the risk of being deported from the country, only to be detained for poli-
tical reasons a year later. In Lawley's own words, the Native Commissioners'
offices in the districts were the appropriate institutions to which the African
subject peoples were expected to direct their appeals and not the law courts.
But whilst the BSACo.Administration could thus effectively hoodwinkthe
indigenous African societies in the manner demonstrated by Sir Lawley in
1898 and,by so dOing.allowitself room to carry out some of its bizarre and
generally underhand activities in the territory, it could not successfully
employ similar tricks against the Mfengusettlers. These new arrivals had
been exposed to a long tradition of open judicial procedure in the Cape colony
where their access to law courts had never been questioned. Indeed, as some
BSACo. officials in Southern Rhodesia were later compelled to admit, this
longstanding exposure and access to the law courts amongst the Mfengu had
227turned them into 'clever natural lawyers' as a group.
Itwas, therefore,against this background that top-level BSACo. officials
in Salisbury cautioned the Native Department in Matabeleland over the manner
in which it handled the Mfengu settlers. In Helese Ginya's case,who had by
the close of 1904 already appealed to the Imperial official in Salisbury and
drawn the attention of his lawyers to the injustice perpetrated against him by
the Native Department officials, itwas clearly pointed out, as a precautionary
measure, that this man was 'a troublesome kind of Educated Kaffir' and that
228'all the more care ~was)- necessary in dealing with his case. '
Tredgold, the Attorney-General, evenwent further than the Company
Treasurer in admonishing the Matabeleland Native Department over the same
subject when he indicated:
••. that all persons concerned in dealing with this Fingo Loca-
226NB1/1/6: Arthur Lawley, DeputyAdministrator, Bulawayo, to Messrs
Coghlan & Dyasm, Bulawayo, November 18, 1898.
227N 3/10/5: C.T. Stuart, N/C, Selukwe, to s/o/», Gwelo: November 9,
1912.
228A 3/18/24: Minuteby Newtonto Milton: December 8, 1904.
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tion should be advised that they cannot be too careful in
dealing with the persons living there. My experience at
Bulawayo has proved that these Fingoes are as a whole a
source of great danger. They are at the bottom of all sorts
of practices, generally egging on others to commit an offence
while clever enough to themselves escape the meshes of the
law. Making Kaffir Beer flavoured with stronger elements
is quite a trade with them. The sale of this has most dele-
terious effects. Their defiance of authority is almost
proverbial, -(and)- as a class they are inveterate liars
-(and)- quite unreliable. I can thus sympathize with
Messrs Taylor -(the Chief Native Commissioner)- & Fynn
-(Native Commissiooer, Bembesi~, and advise the most
careful dealing with any complaint however trivial. When-
ever possible these Fingm should be removed to the
place whence they came.
Judging from Tredgold's strong language against the Mfengu settlers as
a community, it is apparent that the feeling in some quarters of the BSACo.
Administration in Southern Rhodesia was running quite high by 1904. The
reasons for this state of affairs are legion. Although up to 1904, very few
Mfengu had committed any serious crime meriting this form of approbium and
reprimand quoted above, it should be observed that they had by this period
become victims of the situation inexorably created in the wake of the growing
chasm between themselves and the BSACo. government. Thus whilst it could
be frankly admitted that the involvement of some Mfengu individuals like John
Petani in beer-brewing or what the British South Africa Police called the
maintenance of 'native brothels' and harbouring prostitues and bad characters
along the Wankie Railway Extension, 230 which in this case subsequently led to
the burnilg up of Petani's camp and property at the Lukasi railway station in
231September 1903, may have by itself given the BSACo. Administration in
Southern Rhodesia cause for concern over the refractory proclivities of these
settlers, the same could,however,not be said of the whole range of accusations
arrayed by the officials against these immigrants.
All the accusatioos hitherto brought forward by the BSACo. officials and,
to some extent, by the rank and file white colonists, against the Mfengu were
largely based on insubstantial stereotypes, born of the disillUSionment of the
white front over the dependability of these immigrants as a subject community
in a strange environment. Once this disillusionment amongst the BSACo. offi-
229
230Ibid: Minute by Tredgold to Milton: December 9, 1904.
NB 1/1/20: Sergeant W. H. Geoffrey, BSAP Wankie, to Acting N/C, Wankie:
23L September 18, 1903.
12!!!: Taylor, C/N/C, to Acting N/C, Wankie: September 14, 1903.
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cials and the white colonists began to take root, references to Mfengu.and
other 'black settlers" insubordination and unreliability became more frequent
and the tendency to decry the so-called 'bad qualities' of the Cape Africans
(the 'Colonial Natives') became more fashionable, especially as the relations
between these 'black settlers' and their white hosts rapidly deteriorated.
Adverting once more to the Ginya/Elsie Konacase as a tangible example
of the increasingly poor relations between the BSACo. and its Mfenguclients
in the period 1902 to 1905, it is quite interesting to note that in spite of the
board-room arguments and disapproval by the top BSACo. officialsl with re-
gard. to the activities of Native Commissioner Fynn and Chief Native Com-
missioner Taylor in this particular case, in the long run, these two officials
of the Native Department were not,after all, let down. Ginyawas not only
expelled from the Fingo Location,but was also imprisoned for some months,
On his release from jail in January 1905, he managed to procure some land
whereupon he could settle temporarily as a squatter, before gathering his
family and property to retum to the Cape colony. The private land in question
offered to Ginyawas within the precincts of the Empandeni Missiro farm,
where Father A. Leboeuf, the head of this Catholic institution was apparently
231aquite ready to provide the succour Ginya required.
In his letter to the Resident Commissioner after his release from jail and
inwhich he claimed for compensation from the BSACo.Administration, Ginya
was obviously quite bitter and unrepentant over the way he had been treated in
Southern Rhodesia during the six years he had hitherto lived there. He thus
informed the Resident Commissioner:
I have been unable to write to you all this time as I have
been wandering about looking for a place to put my children
to live; because I was turned off o1theBembesi Ioeatlonj-,
A European has given me a place to squat on at Plumtree.
I went there after I was discharged from gaol,
I have now retumed to Bulawayoand wish to -(demand)-
compensation -(from the BSACo.Admfnistratlon)-in order
that I may proceed with my children back to the -(Cape)-
colony as I don't knowwhy I was dismissed from -(the Fingo
Location)-.
I also want you kindly to make my certificate right that was
cancelled in Bulawayo. The character given me by -(the
231aA 3/18/24: Rev. Father A. Leboeuf, S. J., Empandeni MisSion, to C/N/C,
Bulawayo:April 23, 1905.
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Caper Government -iisr that I was a loyal subject to Her
Majesty the Queen for fifty years -iup to 1898r.
...Iwant you please Sir, to reply this -iIetterr H/oon
as you get it as I have no place to rest my head.
Faced with these demands by Ginya with regard to his certificate,
arbitrarily cancelled by the Native Department officials in 1903, and also on
compensation over his property either destroyed or confiscated by the same
officials, not to mention this Mfengu's imminent exit from Southern Rhodesia,
the BSACo' Administration found itself in a rather uncomfortable position. Of
course,on the demand for compensation,estimated by Ginya himself at about
£27 (£12 for the cost of materials and labour for building his huts and £15 for
the trenching of his plot at Bembesi), the Southern Rhodesia Administration
would not concede even a dime. On the contrary, it was felt that this Mfengu
had 'sustained no direct pecuniary loss by his expulsion from the Ffngo Loca-
tion' as the only property of his worth mentioning had been disposed off by the
owner himself. This property included standing crops, said to have been sold
for £2 17s Od,and his doors and windows, valued at 20/- each, removed from
233his huts by himself; leaving behind valueless structures.
Even more paradoxically, itwas alleged by the Administration of Southern
Rhodesia that Ginya still owed the BSACo. some money to the tune of £19 19s
3d. Obviously Ginya's remaining debt arose from the £25 7s 9d1which he had
previously disputed as a fictitious figure,and an additional £8 6s 3d in costal
also arising from the Company's court action against him in October 1904. All
his property (one cow, two pigs, two goats, and seven fowls) previously con-
fiscated by Native Commissioner Fynn to forcibly meet this Mfengu's debt to
234the BSACo. was alleged to have realized a paltry sum of only £13 14s 9d,
thus leaving a balance which Ginya had to settle even after his imprisonment
235and expulsion from Bembesi.
From the foregoing, it Is evident that the BSACo. Administration found it
relatively easy to dismiss Ginya's claims over compensation arising out of
disabilities connected with his fracas with the Matabeleland Native Department.
232!bid: Helese Ginya, Bulawayo, to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury!
January 26, 1905.
233!!ili!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo: to Chief Secretary, Salisbury: January 31,
1905.
234Vide: Supra: PP.
235!bld: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to A. H. Holland, Administrator's Private
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But on the questtoa of Ginya's imminent departure from Southern Rhodesia,
things did not augur so well for the Companyauthorities. Certainly the soul-
searching debates amongst these officials behind closed doors, as to the
rights and wrongs of administrative measures taken in the Ginya/Elsie Kona
affair, were beginning to bear results. The sense of fear and guilt amongst
the Southern Rhodesian officials that once Ginya returned to the Cape, leaving
Southern Rhodesia permanently, the state of affairs in the country might be
exposed to the public eye was beginning to take root in Salisbury and Bulawayo.
A.H. Holland, the Private Secretary to the Administrator in Sallsbury,
aptly expressed this concern in a confidential telegram to the (bief Native
Commissioner for Matabeleland in March 1905. InHolland's view, one,of
cours e,shared by Milton himself, it was a matter of paramount importance
that Ginya should be provided with alternative land for settlement in some other
part of Matabeleland rather than be allowed to quit the country since '••• this
would be much better than his ~Ginya's)-leaving -(the)- country ~and)- telling
236lots of lies. ' Bestdes, if such land were to be provided, it was significant
that this had to be outside the Fingo Location as the Administration would lose
face before the other Mfengu settlers by conceding victory to Ginya. InChief
Native Commissiroer Taylor's own words, Ginyahad to be settled 'in some
locality away from the FiDgolocation as his return wouldbadly influence
237
natives who ~ow the)- circumstances ~of his removal)-•••• ' The need to
keep up appearances on white infallibility, onwhich the doctrine of white sup-
remacy heavily relied upon.to secure the co-operation of the African subject
peoples and.in this way.more effectively promote the objectives of colonialism,
was.tn this particular caseJjust as important as the BSACo. desire to avoid
unnecessary publicity as to the inner detail on the activities of its officials.
Under these circumstances, arrangements were,therefore,made in April
1905 to provide Helese Ginyawith a place to settle in the Bulalima district of
Matabeleland The plot so granted was to consist of 'a piece of arable land,
ten acres in extent, with sufficient grazing land for ten head of cattle and
thirty head of small stock, and a building lot fifty feet square on one of the
Secretary, Salisbury: Telegram: March 6, 1905.
236~: A.H. Holland, Private Secretary to the Admfnistrator, Salisbury, to
C/N/C, Bulawayo: Confidential Telegram: March 18, 1905.
237Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayo, to Holland: Confidential Telegram: March
20, 1905.
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Government Farms (unoccupied)••• ' in the Bulalima district. These conditions
were,in every waYJsimilar to those under which the Mfengu settlers were also
granted land at Bembesi, but,at the same time. the Administration cautioned,
Thomas, the Native Commissioner at Tegwanl, that in the selection of the land
in question for Ginya, '••• care must be taken that its position lies in one
corner or on the boundary of the Government Farm in order that the value of
the Farm may not be unduly depreciated by the alienation of Ginya's portion
238
thereof. '
This change of heart thus manifested by the SouthernRhodesian Admini-
stration towards Ginya in the early part of 1905, did not,however,impress
Ginya himself and Father Leboeuf of Empandeni Mission, whohad been obvi-
ously converted to Ginya's cause. Ginya had actually suffered too much at the
hands of the BSACo.Administration and by 1905 the wounds inflicted on him
as a result of the CompanyAdministration's vindictive pcltctes were still too
fresh and his bitterness still unmitigated, Indeed.at the very time the letter on
the government offer of land in the Bulalima district reached Empandeni from
239the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland in April 1905, Ginya's
world had literally gone topsy-turvy. One of his sons was by then 'dangerously
ill' at Bembesi,whilst his wife was equally poorly in Bulawayo. In the event,
Ginyawas compelled to commute between these two places. leaving the rest of
his family at Empandeni under the care of his missionary sympathizers.
For the reasons given above, even Father Lebouefwouldnot allow this
tried Mfengu to entrust himself and his welfare once more into the patronage
of the BSACo., however, well-intentioned. Itwas naturally felt that Ginya and
his family would be safer if they either remained as squatters on the Empan-
deni Mission farm or accepted an offer of land on a government farm adjoining
240the mission in question rather than anywhere else. In the final analysis,
Ginya,therefore,did not accept the land offered him by the BSACo.Administra-
tion in the Bulalima district in 1905 and the authorities were quite prepared to
241leave the matter at that. When, after seven years, he tried to revive his
238!!ll!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo: to Thomas, N/C, Bulalima District:
April 14, 1905.
239!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Ginya: April 13, 1905.
240!E!!!: Rev. Father A. Leboeuf, S. J., Empandeni Mission, to C/N/C, Bula-
wayo: April 23, 1905.241 .,!!ll!!: Taylor, C/N/Ct Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary, Salisbury: June 1t 1905.
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claim over this Bulalima district land offer in December 1911, the situation
had changed and his value as a publicity asset against the BSACo. Administra-
tion had considerably deteriorated In the end, the Administration concluded
that their 1905 offer to Ginya had lapsed and could not be renewed except under
242different considerations altogether.
In assessing the significance of the Ginya/Elsie Kona affair, it may be
appropriate to state that this case easily became the most celebrated index
reference to the progressive deterioration of relations between 1902 and 1905.
The identity of interests between the Mfengusettlers, in particular, and the
BSACo'jas a representative agency of British imperialism in SouthernRhodes-
ia,was falling into some measure of disarray once the special association
which the Mfenguas a community had for generations shared with British
interests began to loosen at the seams, especially after the death of Rhodes.
Perhaps as an indication of this gradual and steadfast departure in the rela-
tionship between the BSACo. and the Mfengusettlers up to 1905, it may be
pertinent to point at the manner in which some alternative schemes on other
'black settlers' from the Southwere put forward for consideration by the
Southerv.Rhodesian Administration as worthy substitutes to the Mfengu. The
plan to settle Sotho farmers in Southern Rhodesia between 1901 and 1904 is just
what we have here in mind.
Indeed Ithe idea of Sotho settlers in Southern Rhodesia, seriously consid-
ered from 1901 onwards, was not a new one as such. The northern Sotho of
the Transvaal had, for instance, been introduced into Southern Mashonaland
by various mlssicma.rybodies from that Boer republic across the Limpopo in
the pre-1890 era; giving rise. in the process, to the nucleus of the Sothocom-
243m\Ulityof the Victoria district. Towards the close of 1898, there was a
m.ovementafoot in Southern Rhodesia to introduce a contingent of Sotho settlers,
to the amount of about eight hundred families. These Sotho settlers were, like
other alien groups from the South, to be located In specified areas of :Mata-
belelandjbut they were1howeveljnot particularly enchanted by the places set
apart for their habitation. In the Matobo-:Mawabenidistrict for instance, D. H.
Moodie, the Native CommisSioner of the area, observed this trend of dis-
242Ibid: 'Th.ylor,C/N/C, Bulawayo, to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator- ,
Salisbury: December 9, 1911; and Hole, Secretary, Dept. of Administra-
tor, Salisbury, to C/N/C, Bulawayo: December 12, 1911.
243Vide: Supra: Chapter I: PP.
385
satisfaction amongst the Sothodelegates and prayed his superiors in Bulawayo
to allow the immigrants in question to settle where they preferred, especially
244in the Tuli district. In the Manzamnyamasub-district, the authorities
there were apparently quite prepared to accommodate these immjgrantsJpar-
ticularly along the banks of the Tull river where fertile land was said to be
abundant. In offering to accommodate these Sothoimmjgrants as they did, the
authorities of the Manzamnyamasub-district were also anxious to solve, in
one way or another, the country's labour problem,even if this meant an open
resort to a beggar-my-neighbour pollcy like this one, as Pleter Nielsen,the
245
Assistant Native Commissioner at Manzamnyamaindicated.
In any case, this 1898plan to settle the SothoChief 'Maffatoon' and his
followers in Matabeleland does not seem to have come to anything, as the
BSACo.Administration became too involvedwith the importation of the Mfengu
and other related settlers from the Southduring this period For this reason,
any other moves on Sothosettlers had to wait till the end of 1901when the
Southern Rhodesian Administration was becoming disillusioned,in every way,by
the various aspects of the Mfengusettlement scheme at Bembesi. Thus in
this regard, the application of a group Sotho farmers.tn the Matatiele dis-
trict of East Griqualand in the Cape colcny.Ied by Jass Kortjass in January
1901, to acquire land in Southern Rhodesia, was, to some extent, quite timely.
These Sotho farmers of East Griqualand were apparently motivated not
only by the desire 'to trek if we can get land from ~the Southem Rhodesian)-
246Government cheap' as they indicated, but also by the overcrowded con-
247ditions of the African areas in that part of the Cape. Yet at the same time,
it could not be easily denied that the waves of African emigration from the
Cape colony to SouthernRhodesia, whether officially spoosored or on individ-
ual basis, so actively pursued since 1898, did not have their impressicn
throughout the length and breadth of that colony. These precedents en Mfengu
24~B 1/1/5: D. H. Moodie, N/C, Matobo-Mawaben1,to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
Telegram: October (?), 1898.
245!2!!!: P. Nielsen, Assistant N/C, Manzamnyama, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
October 6, 1898.
246 L 2/2/8: Jass Kortjaas, Matatiele, East Griqualand, to C/N/C, Bulawayo:
January 8, 1901.
247Ibid: Surveyor-General, Salisbury, to Chief Secretary, Salisbury: December
21, 1901.
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and Thembu emigration to SouthernRhodesia, for instance, appear to have
effectively influenced other African groups in the Cape colony, the Sotho
farmers of East Griqualand not excepted, on the advantages of transfer of
residence.
In Southern Rhodesia itself, official reactim to the application of the
Sotho farmers of East Griqualand was both varied and interes tIng. High
premium was, it would appear, placed on these foreign farmera.who were,
according to some official quarters in Salisbury, quite desirable. The
Surveyor-General's office, for example.summartzed this view in a general way,
when it indicated:
The location of some Basutos on Government land in the same
way as the Fingoes would.•• be useful. They would form a new
element and. •• a loyal one; aiding in the civilisation of the
natives here ~in swtern Rhodesia)- and rendering any
rising less likely.
This positive attitude of the Surveyor-General's office in Salisbury, on the
potential value of Sotho immigrant farmers, was largely given a boost by W.
Bellairs, the Resident Magistrate at Matatiele in East Griqualand, on Jass
Kortjass and his colleagues. Bellairs' s report that Kortjass and other appli-
cants in question were 'Basuto and ~were)- therefore the best class among the
native tribes as agriculturalists and stock-breeders and ~were)- of a very
progressive tendency••. , ,249was quite a credit to these potential migrants
and their supporters in Salisbury.
However, whilst the progressive character of these Sotho farmers of
Matatiele was thus well appreciated, at the same time, it also served as a
source of threat to the white colmists of SouthernRhodesia, The very fact
that these Sotho farmers were reported to be creditable landowners, having In
their possession in East Griqualand, farms varying in size 'from 500 to 1,500
m,organ' and purchased by them from. the Cape government on 'conditions
250similar to farms held by Europeans••• , ' did not,in any manner)please some
colonist quarters in Southern Rhodesia. As Milton, the Administrator himself
248!!!!!!: F.W. Inskipp, Survey-General's Secretary, to Chief Secretary,
Salisbury: February 4, 1901.
249!!!!!!: W. Bellairs, Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, East Griqualand, to
Chief Magistrate, Kokstad: March 14, 1901.
250Ibid: Bellairs, Resident Magistrate, Matatiele, to Chief Magistrate,
Kokstad: March 14, 1901.
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confessed, there were severa.l objections emanating from within the South-
ern Rhodesian colonist society which pointed out that whilst 'the Basutos and
Thambookies -(rhembus)- and other colonial native farmers -{were)- intel-
ligent and progressive ••• ' and,therefore,quite valuable for Southern Rhodesia,
there was .however, the danger that 'the establishment of a class of natives
who would be qualified for registration as voters' would appear in every way
ominous to the white voters of the territory.251
Such anxieties and objections on the part of the Southern Rhodesian
colonist society, with regard'; to the accommodation of Sotho farmers in the
country by the close of 1901, may have shaken the confidence of only a few
Salisbury officials as to the justification of pursuing the scheme in question
to its logical conclusion. But in the end, it would appear that the confidence
of those weak-meed officials, like Milton, was somewhat compensated by the
ebullience of those of their colleagues whose faith in these Sotho farmers
never even wavered for a moment. J. G. Kotze, the Acting Attorney-
Generaljfor instance, was one such supporter of this Sotho settlement scheme
whose views on the matter largely helped to both prop the confidence of his
half-hearted colleagues and rescue the scheme when it should have foundered.
InKotze's opinion, the significance of a sizeable Sotho presence in Southern
Rhodesia could never be over-emphasized in the sense that:
These natives -(the Sotho)- have reached a stage consider-
ably in advance to the native living here -(in Southern
Rhodesia)-, and their example may prove of benefit to
the latter. The Mashona lead an absolutely idle life to
the detriment of the progress of the Territory and of
themselves. Any movement which may help directly or
indirectly and in however small degree2s'f an improvement
in this respect ought to be encouraged.
To some extent, the Attorn~General 's views on the alleged value and
importance of Sotho farmers as settlers in Southern Rhodesia were quite :In
harmony with those of the Surveyor-General"who also believed in this myth on
the worth of the Sotho immigrant. Moreover, the Surveyor-General was even
prepared to see these Sotho applicants settled not only on the basis of land
acquired by themselves through purchase in Southern Rhodesta, but also on a
251!h!2: Milton to Attorney-General: November 25, 1901.
252~: Memorandum for His Honour the Administrator re:- Grants of Land
to Colonial Native Farmers by Attorney-General, J. G. Kotze, Novem-
ber 5, 1901.
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pattern of settlement similar to that initiated in connection with the Mfengu
settlers at Bembesi and their Thembu counterparts in the Nyamandhlow
district, where these immigrants were simply allocated locations en block but
without any proprietory rights.
According to the BSACo.'s Surveyor-General in Salisbury, who constdered
both the Mfenguand the Thembuquite inferior in value and potential. for the
SouthernRhodesian Administration, in comparison with the Sothoimmigrants,
there was indeed all the justification to allow these Sothoapplicants to come
into the country and settle them en a location of their ownbecause' .•• the
Basutos wouldbe at least as valuable as either of these tribes -{theMfengu
and the Thembu)- and .• more so.' Moreover, this official argued, 'a var-
iety of elements in the population -{ofSouthernRhodesia was)- of strategic
value and that Basutos wouldyield more servants - male and female - than the
other tribes mentioned.' In conclusion, the Surveyor-General observed:
I wish we had a good location of them -{theSotho)-near
Salisbury; they would lead the way in supplying domestics and
other servants.253question whether the Fingoes have done
much that way.
To minimize the economic and political threat which, it was feared, the
Sotho immigrant farmers posed for the SouthernRhodesian colonists, both
the Attorney-General and the Surveyor-General had water-tight solutions to
the situation in their sleeves. In a nut-shell, it was felt that the potence of
these Sotho immigrants could be easily dissipated, firstly, by limiting the size
of the landholdings each of these immigrant farmers could acquire in Southern
Rhodesia, say, for instance,by an elaborate administrative policy whereby
efforts wouldbe made to avoid granting farms to the tune of 1, 500 morgen
(about3, 000acres) to a single Sothofarmer and his family alone.
Secondly, very few of these Sothofarmers were to be introduced,at first)
as an experiment and these only after the SouthernRhodesian Administration
had been satisfied on such issues as character, means and suitability before
their arrival in the country. The idea here was to effectively discourage what
the Salisbury officials regarded as 'undesirable elements' from entering the
country and.tn this way,unnecessarily reinforcing the ranks of the territory's
black voters. Thirdly and still connectedwith the question of the black vote,
it was also felt that the fears of the colonist society on the enjoyment of fran-
253!£!!!: Surveyor-General to Chief Secretary, Salisbury: December 21, 1901.
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chise rights by these foreign Africans could be overcome 'by scattering these
~Sotho)- native farmers, and not having too many of them living in one loca-
lity. ,254
Finally, it would appear that the Salisbury officials were,to some extent,
quite confident on the adequacy of Southern Rhodesia's franchise legislation
to contain the sttuatton.once the Sotho immigrant farmers were settled in the
country, The colonist fear, that these Sotho farmers would take advantage of
the 'blank vote' of those poor African tenants liVing on their property to en-
hance their voting strength, was the main bone of contention. But the Salis-
bury officials ,however, were evidently contented that this situation could easily
be dealt with by official emphasis or even manipulation of the requisite fran-
chise qualifications for the African voter. For example, it was pointed out
that whilst the Sotho landlords built their houses 'like Europeans', their Afri-
can tenants,on the other hand,would obviously 'live like ordinary natives in
huts. '
Besides, it was also assumed that even the potential Sotho immigrant
farmers themselves could be effectively screened by 'fixing a pretty high
price ~of land)- per morgen' whteh.together with the stipulation under the
franchise law that a voter was required to build a house to the value of at
least £75, would naturally exclude a sizeable number of potential voters among
255these people. Thus by manipulating the economic factor in the Southern
Rhodesian franchise law, some Salisbury officials concluded that the BSACo.
Administration could,in a way, kill two birds with one stone; carry out the plan
to accomodate Sotho immigrant farmers in the cotmtry.butjat the same time,
emasculate them economically to prevent a situation whereby they could pose
a serious challenge to the white colonist voter. The Sotho farmers were, in
this respect, to take their place in the heterogeneous colonial society of
Southern Rhodesia where African immigrant groups~from either below the Lim-
popo or across the Zambesi,jostled and interacted in various ways with both
the white colonist society and the indigenous African communities of the terri-
tory.
25L12!!!: Memorandum to His Honour the Administrator ••• by Attorney-General,
Kotze: November 5, 1901.
255!E!!!: Surveyor-General to Chief Secretary, Salisbury: December 21, 1901.
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Conclusion
In assessing the points of import in the origins and fruition of Mfenguand
other 'black settler' schemes in SouthernRhodesia between 1899and 1905,
it may be argued that these schemes did not sufficiently meet the expectations
and requirements of the BSACo.Administration for a variety of reasons. Too
much emphasis was, at the initial stage of these schemes, placed on the as-
criptive and achievement criteria of these African foreign groups from the
South,whilBtlittle consideration was reserved for the knitty-gritty side of the
economic and political issues of the composite colonial society in Southern
Rhodesia as in other parts of the world. The white colonist segment in South-
ern Rhodesia which required politically docile and economically vulnerable
foreign African communities in the territory to mediate between itself and the
indigenous subject but unco-operative African peoples, had gambled, at least
as far as the Mfenguimmigrants were concerned, on factors of historical
bearing to elicit those requisite qualities amongst the Mfengu, as collabora-
tors of colonial enterprise, to payoff large dividends on the question of Afri-
can immigration. Arguing from a particularistic point of view, it was felt,
amongst the BSACo.officials in SouthernRhodesia, that because of their prior
contact with European or colonist influences in the Cape, which obviouslygave
them pronounced advantages in their dealings with both the white colonist and
indigenous African societies of SouthernRhodesia, the Mfenguand other black
satellite communities from the Southwouldevidently fit in with those precon-
ceived colonist ideas on the 'ideal society' and 'proper' black/white dependence,
whether economic or political, which the dominantwhite ruling group intended
to establish and maintain.
For their part as a privileged medial element within this plural society of
Southern Rhodesia, the African immigrant groups from the Southwere expect-
ed to strive to maintain the status quo and.m the process, develop some form
of stake in the peculiar colonial setting into which they were thus introduced.
As far as the Mfenguin particular were concerned, their suitability in the
scheme was hitherto never questioned,due to this African group's tendency to,
like the Creoles of Sierra Leone, idealize their special association with
256
Britain and British colon1alagencies. Mfenguproclivity to identify with the
256For the Creole case of nineteenth century ultra-loyalty to Britain, Vide:
Spitzer: OPr cit. PP. 100-4.
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aims of British imperialism in the African sub-continent and their concom-
mitant habits of rationalizing such empathywith British interests in terms of
gratitude to what the British had done for their Mfecane-riven ancestora.at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, or simply to maintain the peculiar
perception which missionaries and philanthropists had concerved.tn connection
with these people.as an important arm of British colonial expansion in South-
ern Africa as well as living examples of the success of British 'civilizing'
endeavours in Africa at a later stage, were, it would appear, sufficient
guarantees for the SouthernRhodesian Administration to count on the feasi-
bility of introducing such people into the country.
The nature of BSACo./Mfengurelattons, therefore, suffered due to the
miscooceptions and erroneous assumptions onwhich they were founded.
Gradually, and especially after 1902, these BSACo./Mfengurelatioos inex-
orably deteriorated as the authors of the misconceptions failed to adjust to
the realities of the SouthernRhodesian colonial situation with the result that
the Mfengufell out of grace with the BSACo. officials in Salisbury and Bula-
wayo as 'the favoured Africans' in that British possession. In the long run,
a number of other African foreign groups came into the limelight as substi-
tutes to these fallen Mfengu;the Sothobeing the best example. The Sotho
immigration scheme, taken up rather seriously in 1901, had its chances of
success. As has been pointed out elsewhere in this study, Rhodes was him-
self an astitute opponent to the introduction of the Sothopeople in Southern
Rhodesta, ostensibly on the grounds that the Sothohaving never been subjected
to direct colonial rule, were, therefore, spoilt by missionary or other phllan-
257thropic patronage.
Thus after Rhodes's death in 1902, more forthright measures were adopted
by the Southern Rhodesian Administration between 1903 and 1904 to introduce
more Sotho elements into Southern Rhodesia. It was,therefore,in accordance
with this view to maximize a loyalist foreign African element that the plan to
settle the Phuthi leader, Chief MochekoLethuka, the grandson of Chief Mor-
oosi, and his people in Matabeleland in 1903must be examined. The BSACo.
Administration and the Imperial authorities in Southern Africa obviously wanted
to exploit the differences between Lerotholi, the Paramount Chief of Basuto-
257Vide: Mas. Afr. S. 211/3: Lagden to Clarke: Private: December 28,
1898.
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Iand.and Mocheko and further the BSACo. 's grand design of establishing a
safety belt against future African insurrection in Southern Rhodesia,
, "
I. , , .
; :': ' .., but the design was unfortunately frustrated by Mocheko's
258reluctance to accept the offer. Similarly, the attempt to introduce Sotho
259police levies for Southern Rhodesia in 1904, should be looked at in the
same light. After 1902, the Sotho had virtually replaced the Mfengu as the
BSACo. 's 'favourite Africans' and were frantically sought after in consequence
but with little success. As far as the Mfengu were concerned, their popu-
larity in the eyes of the officials of the Southern Rhodesian Administration
could only deteriorate rather than improve after 1902.
258Vlde: C. O. 417/394: Petition of Mocheko Lethuka to Milner: March 22,
1904, and H. C. 8101ey, Resident Commissioner, Maseru, to Milner:
December 31, 1903.
259Vide: C. O. 417/393: Milton to Milner: August 5 and 9, 1904.
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CHAPTER5
The Immigration of Trans-Zambesians into Southern
Rhodesia up to 1930: A Durable Labour Solution:
(i) Labour migrants from Northern Rhodesia and
administrative collusion at work, 1903-1923.
Introduction
The labour question in Southern Rhodesia is one aspect of African col-
onial history which has recently been subjected to severe analysis,with dif-
ferent conclusions to suit various ideological persuasions and academic
disciplines. Charles van Onselen, whohas emerged as the most prolific
writer and analyst of the African labour question in the Southern Rhodesian
mining industry between 1900-1933, has concluded, in various articles and
publications, that the dominant feature of this industry, during the period in
question, was its profitability constraints. This consequently rendered the
industry less attractive and competitive in comparison with the giant mines
of the Transvaal. To accord with this rather unfortunate course of events,
the Southern Rhodesian mining employers, therefore .consequently came to rely
beavily on cheap African labour supply, notwithstanding the obvious adverse
consequences arising therefrom. 1 The same argument has been pursued by
Arrighi who also indicates that cheap labour was an underlying aspect of the
proletarianization of the African peasantry in the political economy of early
2Southern Rhodesia..
1C. van Onselen: 'Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia,
1900-1920': Journal of African History: XIV, 2, 1973: PP. 239-40; 'The
1912Wankie Colliery Strike': Journal of African History: XV, 2, 1974:
PP. 275-6, 286-8; 'Black Workers in Central African Industry': Journal
of Southern African studies: Vol. I: No.2: April 1975: PP. 240-1. This
last article also forms an introduction to van Onselen's research:
African MJneLabour in Southern Rhodesia; 1900-1933: D. Phil. (unpub-
lisbed) thesis: St. Anthony's College, Oxford: November, 1974. (This
thesis has since been published under a similar title. )
2G. Arrighi: The Political Economy of Rhodesia: Mouton& Co. Publishers:
The Hague: 1967: PP. 24-5, 29, and 'Labour Supplies in Historical Per-
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Mackenzie, somewhat more sympathetic to white settler ideology and
official opinion in SouthernRhodesia, has also singled out the role of cheap
labour as a corollary to the spatial segregation movement, symbolized in this
3instance by the country's land tenure system. Throughout this study, it will
be argued that the labour problem and the processes adopted to procure labour
supply were a development of calculated eclectic policies very much chara-
cteristic and consonant with the functions and designs of composite colonial
societies. Itwill also be demonstrated that the 'labour problem' was essen-
tially an artificial phenomenoncreated by the superordinate stratum of the
SouthernRhodesian colonial society to undermine the subordinate strata and,
consequently.flood the country with cheap labour in the form of more malleable
external accretions - the 'migrant' factor.4 Finally, this study contends and
will endeavour to demonstrate the fallacy of the 'labour problem' issue and
the incipient selective policies of the employers and their preference for
workers of specifiC ethnic groups, especially foreign ones, allegedly well
endowedwith peculiar working skills, hence distorting the labour supply
question. In the final analysis, it was apparently these befoggedarguments
and practices which determined the successof trans-Zambesian labour immi-
gration into the country.
Colmial society has been described as a plural society in a conflict situ-
ation' a vestige of the earlier frontier conditions whereby power resources
and differentials determined the character of dominance and subordination and,
obviously,excluded equality and mobility between the subordinate and super-
ordinate interacting groups. The inequitable distribution of power between
spective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in
Rhodesia:' Journal of DevelopmentStudies: Vol. 6, No.3: 1970:pp.197-234.
3J. M. Mackenzie: 'African Labour in the Chartered CompanyPeriod':
Rhodesian History: Vol. I: 1970: PP. 34-6, 48-50; 'The Chartered Afro-
cams: Colmlal Office, Settlers and BSACo., Rhodesia, 1890-1923':
Institute of Commonwealth'''Studies(University of London)Seminar
Papers: Vol. 4: 1972: PP. 79-80, 83: 'Colonial Labour Policy and Rhod-
esia': The Rhodesian Journal of Economics: Vol. 8, No. I: March, 1974:
pp. 12-3. This author does not in anyway agree with most of Mac-
kenzie's conclusions which only differ in degree with those of the Native
Department.
4For my theory on race relations and general group Interaction, I have used
these works: Rex: Race Relations in Sociological Theory: andWilson:
Power. Racism and Priv112fie:Race Relations in Theoretical and Socio-
historical Perspectives.
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these two or more groups, it is argued, influenced the manner of not only the
social and political stratification in this composite society, but also the
pattern of economic exploitation of the resources of the given colony. Given
such power differentials, competition between these groups was undoubtedly
out of the question and, instead, the general pattern of inter-group relation-
ship in the economic sphere was onewhereby the dominantgroup sought to
exploit the labour of the subordinate segments, often unsuccessfully, with
coercive colonial institutions like forced labour, taxation and related labour-
inducing devices being liberally applied. In cases of failure, it is further
argued in relation to composite colonial societies, the subordinate social
groups were invariably the scapegoats andwere consequently subjected to
punitive policies, whose frequency and severity usually reflected the gravity
or regularity of the economic crises facing the dominant political, social and
economic segments.
In a situation where these scapegoat groups were racially and physically
distinguishable, the punitive policies were often incorporated as well into the
value system and culture of the dominantgroups. Under these circumstances,
the subsequent abuses, psychological stereotypes and other disparaging views
were,therefore, not roly symbolic of the existing intergroup conflict and
strained relations, but also represented verbalised' ••• forms of aggression
resulting from frustration in the objective situation. •• '. 5 These attitudes
were naturally a residue of earlier military conflicts, themselves a form of
competition for political and economic dominance. From another angle,
verbal abuse and racial hostility towards subordinate groups ,in a given racial-
ly composite colonial society ,may be regarded as a prelude to the outright
institutionalization of racially stratified social systems and exploitative econ-
omlc patterns) especially when the interests of the dominantgroups may seem to have
been threa.tE:lBCi by opposition, canpetition, military revolts or other obstacles.
The gravity of these obstacles,in tum/tended to determine the virulence of
6abuse and the depth of intergroup hostility.
These simple socio-historical theoretical approaches to social and racial
stratification indicated above, are peculiarly pertinent to colonial societies in
general and to the post-1896 SouthernRhodesian SOCietyin particular. Using
5Rex: Opecit.: PP. 29-30, 36, 121-8.
6Wilson: op. cit.: PP. 43, 77-80.
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such conceptual tools, it will be demonstrated that labour shortage in early
Southern Rhodesia, however loud the hue and cry, was over-dramatized by
deliberately introducing non-economic factors into the process of labour
supply and demand and thus creating a paradoxical situation whereby the same
labour demand was, in the first place, responsible for the ingress into the
country of large hordes of external supply, especially from the trans-
Zambesian territories, whilst,at the same time/local African labour was
emigrating from Southern Rhodesia to SouthAfrica. To come to grips with
such inconsistencies, we have to examine both the restrictive political system
and the etlmic factor as tmderlying features of the labour problem and also,
to a large measure, as a background to the character and quality of early
African political response to colonialism in the two provinces, Mashonaland
and Matabeleland, in Southern Rhodesia. It is interesting to observe that van
Onselen, hitherto the most ebullient writer on African labour in the country,
has over-emphasized the process of African working-class formation at the
7expense of other issues, especially the ethnic factor, while other labour
historians have argued in terms not dtsimilar to those espoused by the South-
8ern Rhodesian Native Department. The attitudes held in relation to various
ethnic groups by colonist employers of labour are of special interest in this
study.
We have previously discussed the manner in which early missionary
contacts influenced the pattern of attitudes adopted by different later-day
colonial governments, especially in South Central Africa, towards various
ethnic groups. 9 Official and general white settlers' attitudes towards partl-
cular African national groups also inexorably affected the manner in which
colonist employers reacted to labour supply, police recruitment and other
matters, at least as far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned. These attitudes,
especially towards African labourers, were. of course,an extra dimension to the
whole character of race relations and social stratification and greatly affected,
in the long run, the volume of labour supply as well as labour conditlons at
various centres of employment particularly in early Southern Rhodesia. The
7Van Onselen: 'Worker Consciousness in Black Miners': PP. 251-2, and
'Black labour in Central African Industry': P. 246.
8Mackenzie: 'African Labour in Chartered Company Period': PP. 52-3, 55-8.
9 .
Vide: SUpra: PP.43-6
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case of the Selukwe mines, their labour shortage problem and the attitudes of
mine managers to Shona labourers, in a district right in the heart of the Shona
country but,at the same time,adminlstered as part of Matabeleland, is a very
revealing study on the functioning of psychological attitudes and their immedi-
10ate bearing on labour supply in a colonial setting.
Although racial hostility after 1896 reached such a pitch in Southern
Rhodesia that even the Boer republics across the Limpopo in the South appear-
11ed extraordinarily 'liberal' in comparison, the attitudes of the Southern
Rhodesian white settlers towards Shona societies. in general and.conaequenfly,
Shona labour supply in particular, assumed a peculiar brand of their own from
the very beginning. These views were commonly shared within the white col-
onist communlty, ranging from adventures, clertes, officials to employers of
labour. As early as November 1890, 'Matahele' Wilson, a believer in the
concept of the superiority of 'Zulu blood' stated:
The world would not have lost much if the whole of the12
Mashona were gone to make room for a better people.
Such opinions were obviously in keeping with the thinking of other colonis ts
like the Rev. Hartman, the Catholic priest, who had accompanied the Pioneer
Column as a chaplain in 1890. As the reverend missionary viewed things, the
Shona as a labourer was not a prospect he and his colleagues would have wished
to cherish. Accordingly, he had this to say of the physique of this class of
labourer:
Has the Mashona a flne physique? By no means. Occasion-
ally one may meet a robust woman or girl, but men and boys
are in this respect a disgrace. Exceptions are so rare,
that they only serve to bring out more closely what a
wretched framework their soul is cased in. Their shoulders
are often drawn up in such a way as to give the whole figure
a deformed and ugly aspect. By a sort of paradox when a
Mashona wants to express the idea that he is not strong, he
says andinamapfupa. 'I have no banes'; whilst in fact he is
nothing but bone_rsand skin - and the skin is not much to
boast of either.
10This has been fully dealt with in: Makambe: 'Colonialism and Racism and
their Bearing on the Shma societies in colonial Zimbabwe, c.1888-1930.'
11Evidence of John Mackendree Springer; Salisbury, September 2, 1904: in
South Africa Native Affairs Commission Repot-t 1903-5: Vol. IV: p, 136.
12 'Matabele' Wilson's Diary, November 27, 1890: Quoted in Cairns: oPe cit.
13__ p. 125.
L{ev. A. M. Hartman: 'The Mashona: By One Who Knows Them': South Afri-
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From Father Hartman's standpoint, this lack of physique on the part of
the Shonapeoples must have also accounted for their 'laziness', which he
regarded as a national trait and described in no less disparaging terms as
follows:
Is the Mashona industrious? Far from it. . .• Their
natural laziness which makes them idle awaynine months
out of twelve is helped on in many cases by a most ingenious
superstition, which makes many of them believe that they
are possessed by a spirit of laziness: this is an incubus,
preventing them from even making an effort to work. Their
wltchdoctor is the ~~lyman whohas the power to drive
this devil of sloth. .
Yet these obviously undesirable characteristics were allegedly not the
only ones that plagued the Shonapeoples.from Father Hartman's point of
view. The Shonawere also portrayed as 'hypocritical', 'selfish', 'liars' and
'thieves', whowouldnot understand even the simple doctrines of Christianity
and 'civilization' and.therefore.requtred 'humanisation' firstJbefore anything
could be done with them. Thus Rev. Hartman concluded,accordingly:
We are to humanise them -(the Sbonaj-first, I, e., to
accustom them to order, of which they have no idea; to
labour, which they1~not like, etc. Primum sit homo,
deinde Christianus.
Not all missimaries shared these despondent views about the Shonasoc-
ieties Jof course, especially those ones whowere opposed/in one way or another..
to the general assumptions characterizing white settler ideology and subse-
quent bitterness over labour shortage. The Rev. Arthur Sharley Cripps,
newly arrived in Mashonaland to work for the Anglican Church in 1901, was
not so sure about the reports he had previously read on these ShonapeoplesJ
16especially on their physique, industry and agriculture. The same applied
to the Natal-born Rev. George Albert Wilder of the j\merican Board of
Colonial and Foreign Missions. based at MountSelinda in the Melsetter dist-
rict since 1892, who, for a difference, considered the Shona 'more industri-
ous than the Zulu' basing his conclustons,specifically. on Shonapre-occupation
with agriculture and on the absence in Shonasocieties of the dtvtston of labour
can Catholic Magazine: Vol. 3, 1893: PP. 478-9. Vide: Plate Yif1:White
Settlers' Viewof African Labour Value and Physique.
14Hartman: 'The Mashona:by OneWhoKnowsThem': loco cit.
151bid.
16Steere:God's Irrsular: Arthur Shearly Cripps: ARhodesian Epic: pp.41-2 .:
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between men and womenas commonlypractised within the Nguni societies ..
17especially in the South.
Whatever the pros and cons of the arguments of various clerics regarding
Shonasocieties, it was these attitudes which, in the final analysis, greatly
influenced the employers of labour at the various centres of employment through-
out Southern Rhodesia. Indeed,it was this kind of psychological disposition
towards the colony's majority indigenous African social segment that made the
'labour problem' in early Southern Rhodesia appear far more worse than it
actually was. Thus whilst by 1904, Shonalabourers were no longer wanted
18even by the colonist farmers of Mashonaland, the rank and file white colonist
employer in the territory apparently had no regrets at all over this kind of
development. On the contrary, the colonist employer exploited this negative
attitude towards local labour as an appropriate justification for bringing into
the country requisite foreign labour supply. With the failure of some of the
foreign labour schemes on Abyssinians, Somalis, Arabs, Indians and Chinese
labour as has already been amply dem.anstrated,19 it,therefore,became quite
popular within the white colonist circles in SouthernRhodesia to decry in-
digenous African labour in favour of trans-Zambesian immigrant supply. For
this reason, 'Curio' Brown, an Ohio-born colonist farmer-cum-mineowner
and later the populist mayor of Salisbury, justified this general colonist pre-
ference for trans-Zambesian labour supply an the grounds the Shonalabour-
ers on his farm, for example,worked for only' one or two months' and were
generally 'a very queer people too, -{whogotr offendedat some small thing
and -{wentr and -{1eftr you -{theemployerj- without any Natives to do your
k. ,20wor .•.
In one respect, the more positive approach adoptedby the Southern
Rhodesian colonist employers towards trans-Zambesian labour supply after
1903, had its advantages. In addition to the geographical proximity of North-
Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to SouthernRhodesia in
comparison to Abyssinia, Aden, India or China, the SouthernRhodesian col-
onist employers felt confident that the trans-Zambesian labourer was some-
17Evidence of Rev. G.A. Wilder: Salisbury: August 30, 1904, SouthAfrican
Native Affairs Com.missianReport 1903-5: Vol. IV: PP. 3-4.
18Vide: Evidence of Rev. JohnWhIte; Salisbury: September 1, 1904; in South
African Native Affairs CommissionReport, 1903-5: Vol IV: PP. 8~
19Vide: Supra: Chapter 3.
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how more manageable and less independent on the Southern Rhodesian labour
market than his local counterpart. 21 In fact, so strong was this belief amongst
the Southern Rhodesian colonist employers that even some of the early Afri-
can landowners in the territory had become) inevitablYJinfected by this col-
onist bug, vouchsaftng.as they did,that this class of foreign labour was not
22only more reliable, but also cheaper, an the whole, than local supply.
Bestdes, like the American colonists or the Spaniards in Latin America
in their relations with the indigenous Indian population, the Southern Rhod-
esian settler had by 1898 undoubtedly neutralized the resistance of the Afri-
can indigenous peoples and grievously undermined and disrupted their social,
economic and political institutions as well as their cultural organization. Yet
at the same time, the former could not, however, achieve the degree of
dependent relationship which guaranteed constant and spontaneous flow of
labour for specified economic ventures throughout the length and breadth of
the country, The Southern Rhodesian colonist employer could not rely on the
labour of the indigenous peoples whom he could not effectively control at will
in their homeland and, therefore, like the American planter, once more,
resorted to an external solution for the purpose. This trend of developments
in early Southern Rhodesia is, therefore, comparable to the precedent in the
American colonies whereby it became necessary to import African slaves
rather than depend on the indigenous Ameri-Indians, as the American planter
would have wished. The main reason for this action apparently was:
••• not only because the native population was numerically
insufficient, but more often, ••• because it was difficult or
even impossible to obtain a satisfactory degree of control
over people who were at home in the local environment. The
familyless man or woman recruited in some place and trans-
ported to a plantation region where he found himself in
strange surroundings and among strange ~ple was more
easily made dependent upon an employer.
20Evidence of William Harvey Brown: Salisbury: September, 1904: in Ibid:
pp. 112-3. For 'Curia' Brown as mayor of Salisbury by 1909, V~
C, 0, 417/491: FIR/a: London.
21Vide: Evidence of Col. Raleigh Grey, CMG, Salisbury: August 31, 1904: in
Ibid: pp. 62-5.-22Indigenous African employers' views on trans-Zambesian immigrant labour
were expressed by Maya and Gwabu. two Rozvi landowners at Riverside
(6 mUes from Bulawayo) in Matabeleland, who were by 1925 longstanding
members of the RNLB, Vide: S. 96/1: Evidence of Maya and Gwabu.
Bulawayo: March 25 and April 1, 1925; in the Morris Carter Land Com-
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Only such an explanation, as this given above, to colonization as a pro-
cess of population transfer with labour exploitation as a primary objective,
can simplify some of the non-economic aspects of the Southern Rhodesian
'labour problem', especially the strange paradox of labour emigration to
24SouthAfrica in the face of labour shortage on the local market. The more
the Southern Rhodesian colonist employer resorted to administrative pressure
and coercion to procure labour from local sources, the more he alienated
25local manpower with uncalled for results in consequence. Thus the 'alien
factor', more vulnerable to control and other restrictive conditions imposed
by the employer at his own will, became a major feature of Southern Rhodesia's
economic, social and political history.
To a large extent, it has to be noted that trans-Zambesian labour supply
seemed to fit in with the economic strategy of the BSACo;the overall politico-
economic body in charge of the destinies of Southern Rhodesia and its sister
states beyond the Zambesi. With the main aim of developing an export-
import orientated capitalist economyunder its own monopolyin Southern
Rhodesta, the BSACo. and its functionaries literally reduced the northern
territories across the Zambesi to the role of mere labour reserves or peri-
26
pheries of the centre of development capital in the South. This state of
affairs was of course justified by the fact that the BSACo. had been denied the
privilege of assuming total control of either North-Western Rhodesia, where
27
it shared power with the Lozi aristocracy and the Colonial Office, or that
of North-Eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where this Companypaid part of
the administrative expenses whilst the Foreign Office in Landoncalled the
28tune. In this way, the consequent inequitable economic development in
Southern Rhodesia and the trans-Zambesian territories could oo.lyresult in
the gradual dessication of the economies of the latter to the advantage of the
mission 1925 (Oral Evidence).(Hereafter the Land Commission. )
23Quoted in Wilsoo: op, cit. pp, 75-6.
24Vide: Infra: Chapter 8: PP.951-9
25The questioIl' of 'forced labour' up to the more recent times of Southern
Rhodesia hiStory and its effects h~been fully dealt with in, Makambe:
'Colonialism and Racism and their Bearing.••• '
26 .~
S, Amin: 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Origins and
Contemporary Forms': The Journal of Modern African Studies: Vol, 10:
·No. 4, 1972: pp, 518-9.
27Vide: BSACo. Directors' Report and Accounts for the Years Ended March
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former. Since little effort was made to arrest this state of affairs, at least
till the 1920's, the trans-Zambesian territories1therefore,virtually became,
in Caplan's phrase, 'living museums,29, largely dependent on labour exporta-
tion for economic viability.
The marginalist economic theory was here conveniently brought into play
to justify the trend of economic developm.entwhereby the mobility of labour,
rather than that of capital, from one region to another was viewed solely in
terms of favourable geographical distribution and the inexorable aggregation, in
one region, of the factors of production - namely capital, labour, natural
resources and land;30 a state of affairs which incidentally was also given in-
ordinate consideration in the Company territories before anything else. From
the BSACo.'s point of view, this marginalist economic theory obviously fitted
into the general pattern of its politico-economic strategy, as far as the econ-
omic development of Southern Rhodesia and the trans-Zambesian territories
was concerned. For one thing, rather than the Companyallowing the transfer
of capital, if it had any, to those territories across the Zambesi and inevi-
tably fostering equitable development and economic self-sufficiency on both
sides of the river, it encouraged a situation to emerge whereby labour migra-
tion from the trans-Zambesian territories came to serve as an ointment to the
wheels of the export-import orientated economy of Southern Rhodesia. In
this manner, the BSACo.was, to some extent, thus able to meet the admini-
strative expenses of running its vast territories as cheaply as posstble, on
the one hand, and,at the same ttme, paying sufficient heed to the increasingly
31strident call for profit among its own shareholders. For the colonist em-
ployers of Southem Rhodesta, the politico-economic strategy of the BSACo.
in its territories was quite welcome insofar as it allowed them chance to
31st. 1899 and March SIst, 1900: pp. 5-6 and also: G. L. Caplan: 1!!!
Elite of Barotseland 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia's We!tern
Province: Hurst: London: 1970: PP. 81-2, 88-90.
28An agreement was signed between Rhodes and Sir Percy Anderson at the
Foreign Office in 1894.for example,whereby an arrangement was made
for the BSACo. to provide a sum of £ 750,000 in administrative expenses
incurred by the F. O. over British Central Africa (Nyasaland) and North-
Eastern Rhodesia. Vide: BSACo. Directors' Report and Accounts:
l\Iarch 31, 1894; PP. 28, 36-7.
29Caplan: The Elite of Barotseland 1878-1969: P. 138. The same notion is ex-
pressed by Amin in S. Amin: 'Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black
Africa': PP. 520-1.
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import foreign labour more amenable to control and vulnerable to those num-
erous forces which, in various ways, influenced the labour market in the
country,
It ts.therefore.agatnat this background that labour migration from the
trans-Zambesian territories into Southem Rhodesia must be viewed up to the
end of BSACo. rule and beyond. There was apparent, in every sense, a
degree of total commitment by the Companytowards the economic develop-
ment of Southern Rhodesia, albeit at the expense of its sister territories in
the north, and,by virtue of this commitment, the Administrations of the nor-
thern territories, especially those of the former North-Westem and North-
Eastern Rhodesia constituting modern Zambia, came to serve primarily as
32
surrogates of their more dominant partner in the South.
i: The RNLB and'the Consolidation of its monopoly in the BSACo. terri-
tories across the Zambesi. 1903-1914:
In analysing the phenomenonof labour migration from Northern to
Southern Rhodesia up to the end of BSACo. rule in 1923, three distinct phases
are worth taking note of. These are: firstly, the period between 1898 and 1903,
when the territories of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia were still
less organized in terms of their administrative infrastructure and.therefore,
provided a haven to freelance labour recruiters. The second phase begins in
1903 ending perhaps with the termination of World War I in 1918. This sec-
ond period (1903-1918)is of course associated with the birth and ultimate
triumph of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB), a semi-official organ-
ization set up to deal with matters of labour mobilisation and supply, on both
sides of the Zambesi, for the benefit of the colonist employers of Southern
30S. Amtn (ed.): Modern MIgrations in West Africa: Studies Presented at the
Eleventh International African Seminar, April. 1972: Oxford University
Press: London:1974: pp. 35-8.
31The demand for profit by BSACo. share-holders reached hysterical prop-
ortions in 1910when the shareholders questioned LondonWall over the
retention of the northern territories (North-Western and North-Eastern
Rhodesia) which appeared more of an administrative burden to the Com-
pany than anything else. Vide: BSACo,Report on the Fifteenth Ordinarx
General'Meeting held at CannonStreet Hotel iLondont on February 28th•
.!!!!Q.: pp. 17-9.
32The issue of the primacy of Southern Rhodesian interests over labour supply
from northern territories has been well argued by Henderson. Vide:
I. Henderson: Labout-and Politics in Northern Rhodesia 1900-1953: A
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Rhodesia mainly and, at a later phase, those of Northern Rhodesia as well.
The third and final stage, covering the years 1919 to 1923 and beyond, may -
be termed, in every sense of the word, the years of decline in the volume of
labour migration; a process engendered, in this respect, not only by the
growing irrelevance of the RNLBas African peoples, throughout South Central
Africa, were gradually integrated into the economic system of the white col-
onist societies, but one also worsened by the rising importance of the copper
mining industry of Northern Rhodesia by the 1920's, with the result that a
greater portion of trans-Zambesian labour migrants, hitherto available to
the SouthernRhodesian colonist employers, was tied downin their own regi-
on. For the purpose of this study, more emphasis will be placed on the last
two phases of the periodisation indicated above, thati\.the years 1903 to 1918
and 1918 to 1923 and beyond. The limitations of this research not mmaturally
dictates those priorities we have to focus our attention on.
Whilst labour mjgration from the twoRhodesias across the Zambesi to
Southern Rhodesia certainly became more systematized with the establishment
of the RNLB in 1903, this does not,however,imply that the movement only
began to take root at this particular time. Indeed.long before the RNLBcame
into existence, trans-Zambesian labour migration into SouthernRhodesia had
become an established phenomenonin its own right. A variety of factors were
responsible for this development. Firstly, the general streak of optimism,
which characterized the colonization of SouthernRhodesia by the BSACo., with
regard to the economic potential of the new territorial possessions also
embraced the trans-Zambesian region, particularly in connectionwith pros-
pects for labour supply to colonist enterprise below the Zambesi. For this
reason, it is scarcely surprising that, at a very stage, the Companywas
already despatching envoys to the trans-Zambesian region to examine the
economic potential of that part of the world, even before it had secured effect-
ive control over the area.
One such envoywas Commander Keane, whose surveys between 1889 and
1892, raised a lot of hope in the official circles concerned, in connectionwith
labour and the general economic prospects of the territory which later became
North-Eastern Rhodesia. The Ngoniof Mpesen! and the Chewaof Mwase
Political Study In the limits of Colonial Power. PhD (tmpublished)
thesis, University of Edinburgh: 1972:PP. 24, 27-8.
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Kasungu, residing in the belt around the Luangwa river and was later to
become the East Luangwa district of North-Eastern Rhodesia, were the' main
cause of Keane's excitement in relation to this area's labour supply pros-
33pects. A similar report was made over North-Eastern Rhodesia too in
1900 by Lionel Decile ,an official of the Tanganyika Company, inwhich the
BSACo. itself was a majority shareholder. Indeed,so extravagant was Decle's
eulogy on the labour supply prospects and the economic potential of North-
Eastern Rhodesia in general, that this avid BSACo. supporter may, perhaps,
be excused for his avowed intention to write seven articles to one of the Lon-
don papers, The DallyTelegram, in order to publicize the attractions of
34what he termed 'one of our ,BSACo. '8)- most valuable assets. '
North-Western Rhodesia, just like its counterpart. North-Eastern Rhod-
esia, also played a major role in influencing official attitudes towards its
economic potential. Just as in the case of North-Eastern Rhodesia, a whole
assortment of private, official and semi-official connoisseurs on labour and
related economic matters, played a prominent part in pre-determining the
character of official poltctes and attitudes towards this territory. One self-
appointed purveyor of labour, named Frank Smithman, played an important
role, towards the end of 1898, in contributing to the generally optimistic
sentiments shared by the BSACo. officials and the colonist employers of
Southern Rhodesia over prospects of trans-Zambeslan labour supply. During
the course of his travels, in December 1898, from British Central Africa
(Nyasaland) to lake Bangweulu; then from the Tanganyika plateau and the
Luapula Valley through the Kafue region to the Gwembe Valley along the Zam-
35besl, Smlthman was able. to sort out, though in a rather arbitrary manner,
the various ethnic groups of these territories, in terms of their labour value
and potential for the labour market in Southern Rhodesia. The African groups
in question included such diverse peoples as the Bemba, Bisa and Ushi in the
north; the Lenje, Luano, and Lamba in the central region and,finally, the
Ha (Mashukulumbwe), Totela, Taka, Tonga, Leya and the Lozi towards the
36Zambesi Valley.
33BSACo. Directors' Report on the Company's Proceedfugs and the Conditions
of the Territories within the Sphere of its Operations. 1889-1892:pp.36-7.
34C•O. 417/309: Lionel Dede to Rhodes: Telegram: March 21, 1900.
35
Vide: Appendix VII(Map): Smithman's Labour SurveyS and Route to Bula-
wayo: December. 1898.
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On the whole, it could be argued that the main positive contribution of
Smithman's labour surveys, across the Zambesi in 1898, lies in the manner
in which he was able to outline the general framework of the whole tecbnology
of labour importation from these trans-Zambesian territories for the sake of
the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia. In a nutshell, Smithman was able
to outline quite clearly the procedure on labour recruitment from these dom-
ains, cautioning his colleagues, at the same time, on the need for considerate
treatment of the first batches of labour recruits in order to create a good
impression on these and other potential recruits. He also pointed out the im-
portance of setting up the labour collector's camp in the source areas to avoid
inconveniencing the labour recruits by compelling them to travel up and down,
unnecessarily, before setting for the journey to the South. In this instance,
Smtthman.aeeordlngly, recommended locating the labour recruiter's camp at
a place 'about two days journey to the North of Chepepos'; a defunct settlement
somewhere on the eastern bank of the Kafue river in an area where the habitats
of the Kaonde, the Lenje and the Twa met.
In the period following the Smithman survey, a number of individuals and
duly accredited officials to the trans-Zambesian territories were to validate
his conclusions on the prospects of labour supply in the region, in one form
or another. Major Colin Harding, the BSACo. official associated with the
37
creation of the police force in North-Western Rhodesia between 1899 and 1903,
was one of those accredited officials whose reports and analysis of the labour
supply situation in that region, greatly relieved the anxieties of employers
below the Zambesi. By the end of 1899, when Major Harding made an official
tour of Barotseland in connection with labour supply, voluntary labour migra-
tion to the South had already gone a long way to become an established indus-
try. Indeed, amongst those ethnic groups, on both sides of the Zambesi up to
the Mazabuka plateau} like the Tonga, the Ila, the Leya and the Subiya, working
in Bulawayo or Matabeleland in general is said to have been popularized since
38
the fall of the Ndebele State in 1893. In fact, it was primarily because of the
discovery, by these groups, of the relatively remunerative nature of employ-
36
Mss. Afr. S. 228/C.1: Frank Smithman's Report to the BSACo. ; December
7, 1898: Enclosed in Lawley to Rhodes: December 7, 1898.
37 Harding: Far Bugles: :- .. , ,_.. , .L. _'!" Chaps. XXV+XXVI.
38Vide: E. Colson: Social OrganiSation of the Gwembe Tonga: Manchester Uni-
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ment in Matabeleland in the South, that they shunned all attempts by private
individuals and officials to subdue them to the rigours of the extremely un-
popular porterage industry at the close of the 1890's. 39
Thus the arrival of Major Harding and other BSACo. officials in North-
Western Rhodesia in 1898/9 did not seem, in any way, to materially affect
the attitude of those groups in the Southern portion of the territory, by then
quite used to working in the South. As :Major Harding himself indicated, the
main problem to potential voluntary labour mJgrants from North-Western
Rhodesia by 1899 was, in fact, the increasing number of unscrupulous private
recruiters, who had added a rather unpleasant commercial dimension to the
whole phenomenon. It was obviously for this reason that the various African
peoples of North-Western Rhodesia were said to be generally opposed '••• to
being driven down -(to the Southr in a mob like sheep', in the course of which
some of them died en route, leading to large-scale desertions amongst their
. . tri ts 40remammg compa 0 •
Whilst the optimistic reports of these numerous connoisseurs and accred-
ited officials to the trans-Zambeslan region, in the early period of coloniza-
tion, were appreciated by prospective employers below the Zambesi, overt
efforts, within the official and colonist circles, to harness the potential of
the said source areas of labour supply did not pick up as quickly as might have
been expected. A number of factors may have been responsible for this lack
of positive response in the Southern Rhodesian quarters concerned before 1903.
Firstly, it has to be noted that in the period between 1898 and 1903, Southern
Rhodesian colonist employers were too pre-occupied with the question of
Importing foreign labour from the far-flung corners of Africa and Asia to pay
any attention to the positive aspects of trans-Zambesian immigrant labour.
41Indeed, if anything, they had a passionate dislike of this class of labour.
Secondly, the political conditions of the trans-Zambesian region were
still too fluid, especially in earlier part of the 1898-1903 period. In the terri-
tory which later became North-Eastern Rhodesia, it has to be borne in mind
versity Press: Manchester: 1967 (reprint): PP. 8, 27-9.
39Vide: J. R. P, Wallis (ed.): The Barotseland Journal of James Stevenson-
Hamilton 1898-1899: Chatto & Windus: London: 1953: passtm,
40C• O. 879/68: Report of Major Harding in Barotseland to BSACo. Secretary,
Bulawayo: December 22, 1899, and also C. O. 417/309: Report of Major
Harding to the Chief Secretary, Salisbury: December 22, 1899.
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that it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that most of the
powerful African states of the region had been sufficiently subdued to col-
onial control. For example, the Bemba kingdomof ChUinukulu fell only
42between 1896 and 1899. The Landa empire of Kazembe, which persistently
resisted British domination in the 1890's, could only be conquered in 1900,43
whilst itwas at the beginning of 1898 that the Ngoni of Mpeseni were also
brought into the colonial fold. 44 In the circumstances, it was, therefore,
only at the beginning of the twentieth century, whenAfrican opposition across
the Zambesi had been successfully contained, that reasonable administrative
structures could be established at all, to the advantage of either the mission-
ary' the trader, the labour recruiter or the colonist employer.
In addition to the fluid political conditions across the Zambesi, at the
beginning of the present century, a third factor, very closely related to the
second one, may be said to have completed the list of those variables which
governed the course of labour migration and recruitment in the trans-Zam-
besian region for the Southern Rhodesian labour market. This was the trans-
portation issue. The immensity of the problems of communication between the
BSACo. territories on both sides of the Zambesi river, at this early period,
was such that it required a lot of mettle and daring on the part of both the
labourers and labour agents who ventured between these source areas in the
North and the labour market in the South. Indeed,the argument that African
labourers responded massively to labour migration from the trans-Zambesian
territories to labour markets in the South, at the beginning of the colonial era,
either out of gratitude to the white man for the benefits of Pax:Britannica,
which had put an end to slave trade and internecine African wars, or because
of an inexplicable wanderlust, which had somehowbred a characteristic racial
45mania for travel in the African mind, is, in(f8ct, a very Simplistic approach
46to a phenomenon of great and complex dimensions. Trans-Zambeslan
.',
41Vide: Supra: pp.I85..91
42For the subjugation of the Bemba in the late 19th century, Vide: A. D.
Roberts: A History of the Bemba.:PoHtidal growth and change innorth-
eastern Zambia before 1900: Longman: London:1973: PP. 269-92.
43I. G. Cunnison: The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhod!lsia: Customs and
History in TribaI Politics: Manchester University Press: Manchester:
1959: PP. 28-9.
44J.A. Barnes: Politics In A CharigingSociety: A POlitical History of the Fort
Jameson Ngoni: Manchester University Press: Manchester: 1967:PP. 87-8.
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Africans may have worked in employment centres in the South.such as Kim-
berley and the Rand as well as Bulawayo before 1890 and immediately after
1893,47 but this was on an individual basis and not on the scale demanded of
them under the aegis of systematized recruitment as occurred after 1898.
The vastly increased labour demand and the equally more intensified efforts
to quarry labour supply from the trans-Zambesian regions greatly magnified
the immensity of those problems faced by early labour recruits.
Before North-Western and Southern Rhodesia were linked together by a
railway connection from Wankle to Livingstone in 1904, the problems of
travel between these two territories were, indeed,untold. Traders, transport
riders, postmen, labour recruiters and other travellers all had to use ox
wagon transport and horse and mule carts for overland journeys, whilst rivers
and sizeable streams, that could not be forded, had to be crossed by barges
and canoes. 48 As far as the link between North-Eastern and Southem Rhod-
esia was concerned, the matter was even more complicated in the early period.
Actually the transportation system of North-Eastern Rhodesia was, before
1904, wholly orientated towards British Central Africa (Nyasaland) and then
the Indian Ocean through Portuguese East Africa. It was only after 1904 that
the llnk between Fort Jameson and Salisbury via Tete began to come into
49prominent use. In the Circumstances, the difficulties faced by migrant
labourers from North-Eastern Rhodesia, like those of the Nyasaland labour
50'ulendos ' to the South, during this period, were immense.
Yet even after completion of the railway connections between the trans-
Zambesian territories and Southern Rhodesia by June 1906, when the railway
line from Wankie and Livingstone reached Broken Hill (Kabwe), there was
45For these simplistic overviews on trans-Zambesian labour migration, Vide:
Gelfand's writings Northern Rhodesia In me Days of the Charter: PP. 94,
106; and 'MIgration of African Labourers in Rhodesia and Nyasaland
(1890-1914)': The Central African Journal of Medicine: Vol. 7: No.8:
August, 1961: pp. 293-5; and Gannts works: A History of Northern Rhod-
esia: PP. 101-3; The Birth of a Plural Socie!;y:PP. 76-91; and A Histo!Z
of Southern Rhodesia: PP. 176-7.
46The complex nature of labour mJgTation and its causes form the basis of
Mitchell's article: J. C. Mitchell: 'The Causes of Labour Migration':
Bulletin of t!e Inter-African Labour Institute: Vol. VI: No.1: 1959:
PP. 12-47.
47R. Philpott: 'The :Millobezi-MonguLabour Route': RhodeS-Livingstone
Journal: No.3, 1945: P. 50 and Colson: Social Organisation of the Gwembe
Tonga: loc.cit.
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Mode of travel across the Zambesi before 1906
Barges
(b) Clarke's Drift, Zambesi (Livingstone) (Plate X), c. 1905
Ifand. Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter:
• Extracts from M. JGe d S~cial Studi. 1898-1924: (Baail Blaokwell: Oxford:1961).A Med1Q&_ aD_ --
\
still no immediate relief for the potent1allabour migrants to the South. The
railway system, which served as one of the most effective inter-territorial
links, was planned on the basis of general speculation, to benefit the share-
holders in the railway companies involved, rather than to alleviate the every-
body's transport problems. In short, the railway system was built primarily
to connect areas of industrial development and white colonist settlement and
not to serve the African hinterland which remained totally isolated For this
reason, the 1906 railway line to Broken Hill was naturally intended to connect
the Copperbelt to Bulawayoand Capetownin the South, whilst Barotseland and
other predominantly African-occupied areas were neglected Under these
circumstances, the African labourer and traveller had to wait till the arrival
of motor transport on the scene, after World War I, when the African tack-
51woods were consequently connected to the railway belts by dry-weather roads;
In most parts of the trans-Zambesian region, even this motor transport did
not materially affect the African migrant labourers' mode of travel. In fact,
such people had to await the arrival of the bicycle in the later phases of the
52twentieth century.
Because of this plethora of difficulties related to the absence of a credible
communtcatlons infrastructure between the northern and southern regions of
48In connection with transportation problems in early Northern and Southern
Rhodesia, Vide: Gelfand: Northern Rhodesia in the DaySof the Charter:
Chapter VIll. For the crossing of the Zambei and the mode of travel be-
fore the advent of railway transport across the big river, Vide: PlateU(:
Barges and'Paddles Crossing at the OldDrift; and Plate 'X .; Clarke'S
Drift. Zambesi (Livingstone): c. 1905.
49C.O. 417/373: Lyttleton to Milner: July 22, 1904 and also Gelfand: Ope cit.:
PP. 109-10, 113.
50Vide: Infra: Chapter 6:
SIn. Niddrie: 'The Road to Work: A Survey of the Influence of Transport on
Migrant Labour in Central Africa': Rhodes-Livingstone Journal: No. 15,
1954: PP. 37-9. Vide: AppendixVIll(M:a.p):General Labour Routes from
the North to SouthernRhodesia in Later Times.
52For the use of bicycles by labour migrants from North-Eastern Rhodesia to
facilitate their travel to and from SouthernRhodesta in the 1940's and
1950's, Vide: M.G. Marwick: 'Some Labour Histories': AppendixB. in H.
Heisler: Utbanizatian and the Government of Migration: The Inter-relation
of Urban andRural Life in Zambia: Hurst & Company: London: 1974:
PP. 144-50. Note also: Plate XI: A Lozi Mjgrant Labourer RetumityI
from the Gold Mines of SouthernRhodesia in the 1930's.
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Zambesi, most positive moves to procure trans-Zambesian labour in a more
systematized manner were, therefore, doomed to fall before 1903. In addition,
even those few attempts by the Southern Rhodesian officials and colonists, to
introduce semi-officia1labour organisations to deal with the question of labour
recruitment in the trans-Zambesian region, failed between 1898 and 1903,
as occurred in the cases of the Matabeleland and Mashonaland labour boards
53
or the more widely embracing Southern Rhodesian Labour Board. The di-
chotomy between the colonists of Matabeleland and those of Mashanaland was
evidently responsible for this state of affairs. 54 On another level, the 1901-2
inter-governmental agreement between Southern and North-Western Rhodesia
on how best to co-ordinate and make more effective, the frantic efforts of the
colonist employees of Southern Rhodesia to obtain labour supply from North-
Western Rhodesia, was a veritable non-starter. In this instance, the involve-
ment of top-level administrative officials like Taylor, the Chief Native Com-
missioner for Matabeleland, and Coryndon, the Administrator of North-West
Rhodesia, in the process of labour recruitment for colonist employers, did
not certainly please the Colonial Office, which had, a year before, passed a
ruling against all such forms of official involvement. 55 In the event, the field
of trans-Zambesian labour recruitment was, therefore, left open to all and
sundry.
An interesting side-effect of this pre-1903 state of affairs, is the manner
in which the magnitude of those transportation and administrative difficulties
of the period weeded out of the field of labour recruiters, all the feeble-
hearted ones, leaving as it were, a class of tough-minded and hardy frontiers-
men at best described as '••• completely unscrupulous and wholly undesirable
56parasites ••• ' if not 'a public danger ••• ' under normal politically stable
conditions. For the African recruits, their position was worsened by the fact
that these freelance recruiters were also convinced that they were ' ••• dealing
with ignorant and gullible natives ••• ' and 'so tricks and deceptions of all kinds
53For a history of these successive labour boards in Southern Rhodesia bet-
ween 1898 and 1901, Vide: Report of the Native Affairs Committee of
Enquiry 1910-1911: p. 28.
54Vide: van Onselen: Chibaro: pp. 79-80. This rivalry between the white col-
onis ts of Matabeleland and Mashonaland was even recurrent. Vide:
'Declaration of Policy by the Visiting Commissioner made in Bulawayo
on 19th October 1907' in BSACo. Directors' Report and Accounts, March
31st. 1908: pp. 27-31.
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were possible. ,57 Itwas under these circumstances, therefore, that indi-
vidual labour agents mounted their campaign to quarry labour supply from the
trans-Zambesian territories, to meet the requirements of the Southern
Rhodesian labour market,without any control whatsoever from the governments
of the territories concerned.
Firstly, there was the case of G. Farquharson and a Mr. Culverwell,
two labour agents based in Matabeleland but operating in North-Western
Rhodesia in 1900. Although the activities of these two agents, dealing mainly
with the interception of those trans-Zambeslan labour migrants entering Mata-
beleland independently and subsequently forwarding them to the centres of
employment in the destination territory as recruits, essentially, brought down
58under these agents' charge and expense, might not have produced those
far-reaching adverse consequences which the officials feared, the methods of
operating adopted by these same agents, however, left much to be desired.
The idea of sending out African touts, dressed in uniforms similar to those
used by messengers of the Native Department, was considered too sinister, by
the BSACo. officials, to be allowed to persist. Thus Farquharson and Culver-
well, who were also known by their respective Ndebele niclmames, Mfulasebisi
59
and Tababengwa, were severely reprimanded on the matter.
Secondly, there was the case of John Harrison Clarke alias Chauga-
Changa, whose chequered but interesting career and.espectally, his activities
in South-Central Africa between 1887 and 1902, represent a very fascmattng
episode in the history of this part of the world. Clarke (or Clark) was the son
of a hardware merchant in the Cape colony, whence he had fled from the long
arms of the law, after 'accidentally shooting dead an African there. Since
1887, Clarke lived in what later became known as North-Eastern Rhodesia, on
the banks of the Luangwa and the Kafue rivers, where he competed with the
Portuguese muzungos (prazo-holders) to control and dominate an area largely
occupied by Chikunda or former Portuguese slave settlements. Here his
55C. O. 417/338: Milton to BSACo.: Telegram: October 10, 1901 and BSACo.
to Milton: Telegram: October 11, 1901.
56Orde Browne: oPe cit: PP. 50, 53.
57Ibid.
58NB 1/1/10: C. B. Cooke for C/N/C, Bulawayo, to N/C, Bulawayo: May 9,
1900.59 .!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayo, to G. Farquharson, Bulawayo: June 2, 1900.
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activities appear to have been very low-key before 1891, if only because at
this particular time, the partition of the Zambesi Valley between Britain and
Portugal __e". left a large number of Chikundacommunities within the British
sphere of influence and}therefore, outside the reach and control of powerful
Portuguese muzungos like Kanyemba and Matekenya, with whom Clarke had
previously contested for the overlords hip, if not general devastation, of these
. 60
Chikunda settlements on the Kafue/Luangwa reaches.
During the decade between 1891 and 1902, when the BSACo. establlshed
its ~ at Feira, the absence of effective control, by either the British or
the Portuguese, created an environment just suitable for Clarke's designs.
Constituting himself the sovereign power in the region and backed by armed
bands of Ila and Senga followers to execute his authority, Clarke began to
collect, for himself, hut and poll tax in kind; seized women and stock of all
kinds from the Chikunda 'communities as well as raising labour for the col-
onist employers of Southern Rhodesta, The offer to supply labour to the
colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia had been made by Clarke in October
1897, along with assurances that he could immediately raise about '500 boys
for work in the Mines and Railway formation', to be subsequently supplemented
by several batches of about 1,000 recruits at a time, supplied at inter-
vals. In his own confident words, Clarke had concluded:
I feel confident that, with judicious handling, the much talked
of labour question wouldbe a ~ of the past, at least as
regards -(Soutbern)-Rhodesia.
However attractive Clarke's offer might have been, from the Southern
Rhodesian colonist employers' point of view, the manner inwhich the offer in
question was to be met could only embarrass the Salisbury officials. This
self-appointed 'king' and representative of 'the Great Chief of the English in
Salisbury', as he began to call himself at the time, went about his business
in that part of the trans-Zambesian region, inwhich he was based, with the
characteristic lack of savoir-faire and ruthlessness common among private
labour agents as a class. Because of his nefarious activities an the Kafue/
Luangwa reaches, to try and meet both the labour requirements of the col-
onist employers below the Zambesi as well as to liberally line his ownpockets,
Clarke ultimately managed only to alienate those Chikundacommunities
6061Newitt: Portug1J.eseSettlement on the Zambesi: PP. 308-11.
C.O. 417/276: J.H. Clarke, Tete, to Administrator, Salisbury: October 141~~ ,
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amongst whom he operated. Thus with obvious frustration and resentment,
one Chikunda chief, Caetano Francisco Lubrinho alias Chimtanda, whose
wives and stock had also been appropriated by Clarke, confessed before the
Salisbury authorities in Apri, 1899 that:
Whenever Clarke sees a girl he fancies, he takes her as his
mistress for a few days and when tired of her he sends her
home. The fathers and husbands of these girls are cons tantly
complaining to me about Clarke's actions, but I can do nothing
as Clarke is a white man and professf()~ to be representing the
Government -(of Southern Rhodesia)-.
Clarke's activities may be excused on the grounds that he was a man who
had, for a greater part of his life, lived on the fringes of the law and was thus
trying to introduce those characteristics of a ragged and carefree frontiers-
man into a colonial setting. Our third case study of the pre-1903 era, is a some-
what different fry altogether. This was John Hayes, a former member of the
British South Africa Police in the North Mazoe (later Mount Darwin) district
of Mashonaland, Because of his former official position and location on the
north-eastern approaches from the trans-Zambesian region into Southern
Rhodesia, Hayes is a very good example of a man, who had had the opportunity
to witness the origins and progress of trans-Zambesian labour migration to
the labour markets of the South andwas determined, for economic reasons, to
exploit the situation.
In essence, Hayes's labour recruiting activities in North-Eastern
Rhodesia, between 1902 and 1903, provide a very interesting case of a pri-
vate agent who was prepared to take advantage of the crying labour demand
amongst the colonist employers and the absence of credible administrative
control to feather his own nest. With regard to the £686 lOs Odprofit,
which Hayes made out of the 391 Ngoni labour recruits distributed to the
Public Works Department in Salisbury and the Globe and Phoenix Mine at Que
63 .
Que, under dubious promises and with consequently rueful results, It may
be argued here that this was a typical case of a private labour agent 'dealing
with ignorant and gullible natives, and possibly -(unsuspecting)- employers
••• ' with the result that he ended up leaving everybody, except himself, in a
62!!ll.2: Complaint made by Caetano Chimtanda and sworn before Taberer,
C/N/C, Salisbury: April 25, 1899.
63C. O. 417/373: Clarke to Milner: July 25, 1903 and Lyttleton to Milner:
July 22, 1904.
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lurch. Indeed,the assertion by Milton that the Hayes affair was,essentially,
'a private venture••• in which the speculator took his goods to the best
65
market. •• " is quite fitting, in the circumstances.
Apparently, a very interesting by-product of the Hayes activities, as
representing the nature of trans-Zambesian labour recruitment for Southern
Rhodesia in the pre-1903 era, is the manner in which a commercially-
motivated private labour agent was able to create a noticeable degree of mis-
understanding between two sister governments on either side of the Zambes1.
As far as the government of North-Eastern Rhodesia was concerned, the
shambles, which the Hayes affair then represented, were altogether a sad
reflection on the unco-operative and negligent attitude of the Salisbury author-
ities on the question of immigrant labour supply, to which North-Eastern
Rhodesia itself was 80 committed. Given the fact that the Fort Jameson
officials had initially contacted their Salisbury counterparts for some of
guarantees on the 'fair and considerate treatment' of the Ngoni labourers
recruited by Hayes,in order 'to encourage them to seek such -ithe Southern
Rhodesia}- a market for their labour for future years ••• " Robert Codrington
and his colleagues could naturally not help feeling 'very disappointed' by the
66actions of the Administration in Salisbury.
Itwas certainly a sore point for Codrington that, in spite of profuse
assurances on these labourers, whohad been recruited for a term. of only six
months, starting in March 1902, nothing had . even been heard of them by
December of the same year, when Fort Jamesm mounted an enquiry into the
matter. Even in the face of this enquiry, the 'vague and general' explanations
from Salisbury did not satisfy Codrington. Nor wouldhe understand why, by
March 1903, only 149, out of the original official total of 323 recruits, had
returned to Fort Jameson, whilst the remainder, the 22 dead excepted, were
unaccounted for. BeSides, it appeared that very little effort had been made in
Salisbury, either to intimate the authorities in Fort Jameson on these 22
labourers whohad died or to forward the wages and estates of these deceased
to their relations in North-Eastern Rhodesia.
Ii
64Orde Browne: loe, cit,
65Ibid: Milton to Clarke: July 22, 1903.-66C.O. 417/384: Robert Codrington, Fort Jameson, to Milton: Salisbury:
March 4, 1903.
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Taking into consideration that this was the same attitude the Administra-
tion of Southern Rhodesia had also shown towards the repatriation of Ngoni
police recruits in the 'Black Watch' or the Mashonaland Native Police, bet-
ween 1898 and 1903,67 Codrington was, perhaps quite justifiably, frustrated
by the condescension of the senior partners in Salisbury towards their junior
colleagues in Fort Jameson. To rectify this state of affairs and consequently
restore the balance in the relationship of the two governments, Codrington,
accordingly, decided to play the only trump card he had, which was to switch
off the supply of labour from North-Eastern to Southern Rhodesta. With this
view in mind, the Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia, therefore, in-
dicated that:
••. until more efficient arrangements are made in Southern
Rhodesia for the reception of labourers and until some real
guarantee is given that ordinary conditions of service -{once
agreed to)- will not afterwards be neglected or ignored, it
will be impossible for the Administration of North-Eastern
Rhodesia W8encourage natives to seek work in Southern
Rhodesia.
The course Codrington had here proposed to resort to, in order to secure better
treatment for labourers recruited from North-Eastern Rhodesia, whether by
private agents or officially accredited workers, was certainly drastic. But
this did not, in any"'ay, unduly worry the Salisbury officials, who were
apparently well acquainted, at the time, with the increasing volume of labour
migration from the trans-Zambesian territories, altogether, to the labour
markets of the South. Thus Codrington's threat could only be treated as an
empty gesture, whilst the Salisbury officials proceeded to exonerate them-..
selves from all accusations over the Hayes affair.
From another perspective, it may be argued that whilst in South Central
Africa itself, officials like Codrington were asserting, in the wake of the
Hayes affair, that 'The Angoni of Mpeseni -{would)-not go down -{to the South)-.
again for years to come ••• ' and that in this way ' ••• a useful source of
labour -{was)- dried up•.. ~9toP-level opinion in London was beginning to dev-
67C.O. 417/385: Memorandum on the Repatriation of Angoni in the Mashona-
land Native Police by R. Codrington to BSACo., Aprill, 1903. Vide also:
Plate m: The Angoni Police and Messengers, Mrewa: 1898-1904.
68C• O. 417/384: Codrington to Milton: March 4, 1903.
69JE!2: Codrington to BSACo.: March 11, 1903.
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elop in other directions, on the question trans-Zambesian labour recruitment
for Southern Rhodesia. In the Colonial Office in particular, whilst one
faction or another could glibly dismiss Hayes either as 'an irresponsible
70 71agent', or 'a notoriously bad character', there was, however, a general
consensus that time had come for the establishment of an 'unofficial organi-
sation' on the pattern of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
(WNLA), for the purpose of taking over all the functions of recruiting and
distributing labour to respective employers throughout Southern Rhodesia. 72
The idea was not a new one, having been previously raised in connection with
the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia in 1900, when it was argued that an
employers' organisation of this ldnd, would be expected to, of course, cush-
ion the Administration from any political embarrassment arising from labour
73 .abuses. The failure of thts Labour Board, for a number of reasons in-
ternal to the Southern Rhodesian colonist society, was, in the event, directly
responsible for the vacuum which the private labour recruiter had tried to
fill up to 1903.
In the final analysis, it might also be said that the private labour agent
was a very important factor in influencing the course of labour importation
from the trans-Zambesian territories whether for the better or for worse.
After all, the main idea for introducing foreign labour within the context of a
colonial economy and a hierarchically stratified colonial society was to make
the most out of the labourer Without,at the same time,incurring any responsi-
bility over the labourer's welfare. Indeed,in the case of alien labourers, on
account of their wlnerabiUty to social and economic pressures in a strange
environment, more was expected of them by their employers in terms of
dependability and generally sound employer-employee relations. For a maj-
ority of these recruits, who were essentially simple country-folk who had
never ventured beyond their villages or chiefdoms before they were press-
ganged into dubious contracts by commercially motivated recruiters, they had
no preconceptions of any kind about the journey they were to undertake to the
South and the world in which they were to work.
70C•O. 417/373: Minute by Ommanney: July 25, 1903.
71!!ili!,: Memorandum on the Hayes affair by Grindle: n, d.
72Ibid: Minute by H.W. Just: September 21, 1903.
73C. O. 417/320: Minute by Ommanney: July 16, 1900.
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Thus the whole process of the transfer of trans-Zambesian recruits from
their own environment to a strange labour market could frequently result in
shock and alienation of one type or another, especially if, as often happened,
there recruits were distributed to the more unpopular mining properties.
Left in the hands of strange white men and their black messengers. either on
their journey to the Southor at the centres of employment, the sense of
alienation amongst these recruits was certainly aggravated by their mode of
interaction with these strange white men and their aides whohad neither
scruples nor respect for the traditional etiquette of the African societies from
which particular labourers came. Consequently,these alien labourers either
resigned themselves to their fate and,therefore) became more dependent on
their employers or resisted the new dispensation to which they were thus being
introduced by deserting.
From this point of view, it might be said, therefore, that the role of the
pre-1903 era was a crucial one, as far as the introduction of trans-Zambesian
immigrants into SouthernRhodesia was concerned. Given.the half-hearted
and, apparently, languid efforts of the various labour organisations of the
period, the private labour agent came to feel the vacuumwhich characterized
the history of trans-Zambesian labour migration to the Southbetween 1898and
1903. Indeed,so effective was the private labour agent on this score that
occasionally he even wonofficial recognition either as an alternative to or a
substitute for some semi-official labour organisation, formed primarily for
the purpose of recruiting and distributing labour. For this reason, a firm of
private labour recruiters, like that of Messrs Acutt and Crewe of Bulawayo,
was given official recognition by the Administration of SouthernRhodesia to
operate as an auxiliary factor in the recruitment of labour in North-Western
Rhodesia in 1901on the recommendation of the Chief Native Commissioner
for Matabeleland.
Messrs Acutt and Crewe impressed Taylor in three fields. Firstly, they
were prepared to meet the initial capital outlay in the venture to establish a
reasonable infrastructure for labour recruiting purposes by establishing food
depots along specified labour routes from North-Western Rhodesfa, Secondly,
they were also prepared to appointwhat was known, in official Circles, as 'a
sufficient number of qualified agents', whowere expected to meet with the
approval of Caryndon, the Administrator of North-Western RhodeSia, before
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resuming their duties in that territory. Finally, the record of this firm's
activities, especially between March andAugust 1901, was not a bad one, at
least as far as the Administration of SouthernRhodesia was concerned. Dur-
ing this period in question, for instance, Messrs Accutt and Crewe had re-
cruited and distributed over 1,600 labourers to various employers in the
followingbatches as indicated in Table IV below:
Table IV:
March
April
May
June
July
August
96 recruits
73 recruits
335 recruits
247 recruits
378 recruits 74
284 recruits
On the basis of this record and the evident willingness of this particular
firm to commit its resources into labour recruiting, Messrs Acutt and
Crewe,therefore, came to enjoy a large amount of favours from the Salisbury
Adminjstration and, in this respect, played an important role as a handmaid
to the mining industry of early SouthernRhodesia. In fact, this firm of
labour agents was so confident and set in its operations that, whenDe Beers
appeared on the North-Western Rhodesian scene in early 1902)torecruit
labour for the Kimberley mines at the higher wage rate of £4 per month as
compared to the SouthernRhodesian rate of only £2, they naturally expected
the Administration of SouthernRhodesia to safeguard their monopolyby pre-
venting any form of 'authorized competition' in the territory of North-Western
Rhodesia. 75
Other private recruiters also managed to secure official recognition on
the same lines as the firm of Messrs Acutt and Crewe did and were thus simi-
larly integrated into the overaI11abour recruiting machinery of the Rhodesias.
F. J. Clarke, of the Clarke's Drift fame on the Zambesi, was one such pri-
vate recruiter. By 1900, 'Mopane' Clarke had struck some close relationship
with the mining industry of Matabelelandand, for this reason, was backed by
this industry, financially, to upgrade his labour-recruiting infrastructure, by
establishing a number of rest-houses and fooddepots, along the labour routes
74NBI/1/14: Taylor C/N/C Bulawayoto Chief Secretary: Salisbury: Septem-
ber 26, 1901.
75C.O. 417/373: P, Crewe, for Messrs Acutt and Crewe to C/N/C Bulawayo:
January 29, 1902;and Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayoto Chief Secretary,
Salisbury: January 30, 1902.
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in the region between Bulawayo and the Zambesi. Using a camp, situated at
about 30 miles outside Bulawayo, as his receiving and distribution depot for
labour supply secured from the Zambesi Valley and the Batoka plateau, Clarke
succeeded, to a large measure, to ingratiate himself to the mineowners of the
76
province of Matabeleland.
But unlike either 'Mopane' Clarke or Messrs Acutt and Crewe, another
private agent, by the.name of Pretorious, betrayed the official trust, he had
initially won, by carrying out a veritable reign of terror across the Zambesi
in the name of labour recruiting. This agent, attached to the Mashonaland
Labour Board and based on the Kafue river by mid-1901, was apparently in
the habit of flogging his potential recruits and their traditional leaders in and
around the Feira district. One such case of flogging was that against a Chief
Chikobongo on the banks of the Kafue, in the Ambo/Nsenga country, after
which Pretorius and his messengers narrowly escaped assassination from
Chikobongo's people, who were naturally infuriated by the naked humiliation
of their ruler. Btt a far more serious affair was the murder of another
African chief called Chiawa, in the same region, by Pretorius' messengers,
who had been denied their dubious privilege of procuring sexual favours from
77this chief's daughters.
The repercussions, arising from this agent's activities, were certainly
profound Officials, either in London or South ,Central Africa, were generally
in accord that no individual, even in the name of a semi-official organisation
as Pretorius operated, had the authority to unlawfully issue firearms to his
labour touts and, in addition, to license a chaotic situation under the guise of
labour recruitment. 78 But what also worried these officials in the Pretorius
affair more than anything else, even after Pretorius had been dismissed from
the service of the Mashonaland Labour Board, was the proverbial 'unsettling
effects' such events were likely to produce within the subject African soc-
ieties of the colonial set-up. This idea was well demonstrated by the Colonial
Office's analysis of the Pretorius case, especially in the light of Southern
Rhodesia's mabillty to take any legal proceedings an offences committed
76Rhodesia Chamber of Mines Report 1901: loco cit.
77C. O. 417/321: H. M.. Taberer, C/N/C Mashanaland, at Musengezi Village,
Lomagundo, to N/C, Feira: July 19, 1901.
78Ibid: M1ltm to Clarke: September 6, 1901.-
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across the Zambesi, when it was indicated that:
The natives will not grasp the subtleties of our oo(British)-
jurisdiction - what they will see is that chiefs may be
murdered with impunitJffB the white men don't '1sic)-
punish the murderers.
In a nutshell, Pretorius was, more or less, in the same class of freelance
touts with Clarke and Hayes, whomwe have already discussed, in spite of
his connections with the Labour Board, and his activities had the unexpectedly
mixed blessings that they, willy-nilly, awoke the officials of the trans-
Zambeslan territories, especially, to their duties.
As a summation of the genesis of labour recruitment from the trans-
Zambesian territories for services in Southern Rhodesia between 1898 and
1903, it is argued here that whilst the amorphous semi-official labour rec-
ruiting organisations set up during this period were definitely ineffectual and
consequently short-lived in most cases, their place was inevitably taken up by
the private labour agents. Because the private labour agent was governed by
personal motives of commercial nature in this business of trans-Zambesian
labour recruitment, the results of his activities often hada tincture of mixed
blessings. In one respect, some private labour agents, like Messrs Acutt
and Crewe of Bulawayoas well as 'Mopane' Clarke,engaged in the service of
the employers of Matabeleland, were quite successful in their profession and,
for that reason, their services were sought for by officials, to lend a hand in
the process of labour importation into SouthernRhodesia. In this way, the
more successful private recruiters were. therefore, incorporated into the
semi-official labour organisation in which they continued to promote the
labour importation movement, for the sake of the colonist employers of
labour, whilst their financial basis was guaranteed within the umbrella of
these semi-official bodies.
Thus it could be said that the combined efforts of these private labour
agents and the .amorphous semi -official labour bodies of the period between
1898 and 1903, were a positive development in the promotion of organised
labour recruitment in the trans-Zambesian territories. That these attempts
failed to survive beyond 1903was, more or less, a factor beyond the control
of these agents, responsible for serving as pioneers to the trans-Zambesian
labour importation movement. If the causes of the fallure of these pre-1903
,.
79!!!!!!: Minuteby Grindle to Ommanney:November 1, 1901.
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attempts should be sought anywhere, it must be amongst the colonist employ-
ers of labour, whose divided attention, during this period, was evidently a
drawback to the initiatives mountedby those individuals interested in the
trans-Zambesian labour schemes,
In the first place, the Southern Rhodesian colonist employers were more
interested in securing government help to extort compulsory labour from the
indigenous subject African communities than in anything else and even London
Wall itself was well aware of this fact. Secondly, most employers were still
engrossed with other labour importation schemes, such as those on Abyssin-
ians, Arabs and Asiatics, which occupied a greater part of the period 1898
and 1904. Because of such expectations amongst a majority of the Southern
Rhodesian colonist employers, however misplaced these expectations turned
out to be in the end, they had little confidence at the time in the trans-
Zambesian labour plans. Indeed, at those centres of employment, where some
of the early trans-Zambesian recruits had resisted the employment conditions
under which they were expected to serve, the 'Barotse and the Angonis', as
they were Inehzsfvely termed, became an anathema to the mineowners and
managers.
Even those private labour recruiters of the pre-1903 era like Clarke and
Hayes, whose activities were classified as patently negative and detrimental
to the cause of labour migration from the trans-Zambesian territories into
Southern Rhodesia, may here be regarded as having played a significant part
in laying downa sound foundation for the future of this phenomenonof labour
migration. For one thing, a significant aspect of the activities of all these
private labour agents, across the Zambesi is that they precipitated a situ-
ation whereby a feedback process of communication was effectively established
between the source areas of labour supply and the destinations in which the
extra-territorial recruits were bound to work. Because of the fact th~ the
awareness of the peoples in the source areas was beginning to emerge, in
terms of the process of labour migration and its Impltcattons, and because of the
state of affairs, in the early phases of migration, whereby real knowledge, on
what this labour migration actually entailed, was still mixed with myths and
other mysterious stories evidently harmful to any permanent system of
labour exploitation in the trans -Zambesian region, the largely negative effects
arising out of the activities of unscrupulous agents, certainly, galvanized the
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officials into action to arrest the situation.
It became apparent, within the official circles concerned, that should the
proportion of trans-Zambesians labourers, returning to their homes with
stories of woe on their experiences to and in SouthernRhodesfa, exceed those
with good ones, the long-term prospects on labour supply from the region
would be harmed irreparably. To counteract this, a programme of action had
to be devised whereby the whole technology of labour recruitment had to be
reappraised. In the circumstances, the situation called for an intermediate
or semi-official labour organisation with an adequate financial base not only
for laying downa credible machinery for labour recruiting purposes, but one
also capable of running on its ownas a self-sufficient department, separate
from those of either territory's administration and,at the same time,willing
to engage men of sound reputation,with the acumen to get onwell with African
peoples as recruiters. 80 In essence, the situation by 1903was ripe for the
creation of a new and more meaningful labour organisation to carry out the
recruitment of labour on both sides of the Zambesi. This situation was
caused as much by the absence of such a bodybefore 1903as it was by the
blunders and chaos emanating from the activities of private labour agents.
From the proceeding arugment, it is evident that, by 1903, the climate
was quite favourable for the birth of the Rhodesia Native Labour Board
(RNLB). Of course, a number of contingent factors were also responsible for
'this favourable climate, into which the RNLBwas born, and may have, in the
final analysis, undoubtedlypredetermined the success of this labour body,
during the next two or three decades. In the years after 1903, the BSACo.
had begun to acknowledgewhat it had hitherto tried to cover, that is, the
poverty of the gold mining industry of SouthernRhodesia. For the colontst
employers of labour, this aclmowledgementby the Companynot only heralded
the liberalization of the Company's fiscal policies and the general reduction in
costs, like the high railway tariffs, they had always complained about, 81 but
also established, in their minds, a significant raison d'etre for the formation
of the RNLBas an instrument for the collection and distribution of cheap
labour to employers whowere just beginningto feel the pinches of the 1903-6
80For an analysis 00 various types of labour bodies and their functions: Vide:
Orde Browne: Ope cit. pp. 50-6.
81
C.O. 417/373: C. F. Massy-SWynnerton,Hon. Secretary, Gazaland Farmers'
Association, Melsetter, to Clarke: Salisbury: August 4, 1903.
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economic recession. 82 The psychological impact of these factors to impov-
erished capitalists, on the verge of ruination, was naturally inestimable and
very well timed
Another, no less Significant, factor whichworked to the advantage of the
newly formed RNLB, in relation to the importation of cheaper immigrant
labour, was the gradual crystallization of the BSACo. administrative struct-
ures, then recently laid downacross the Zambesi, in the northern territories.
The trans-Zambesian region, as it might be pointed out here, was one of the
five districts designated by the new labour body for its recruiting activities,
since its formation in August 1903. The other four included the Victoria
Circle, Southern andWestern Matabeleland, UmtaUand the Eastern districts
of Mashonaland and,ftnally, the Lomagundiand the road from North-Eastern
83Rhodesia. The success of Nielson, the Bureau's agent across the Zambesi,
operating initially on the Batoka plateau, was heavily dependent on the stable
conditions obtaining there and and the goodwill of the northern governments
towards the new labour agents.
Of course, the two trans-Zambesian territories, directly under the con-
trol of the BSACo., were, naturally, expected to co-operate with the RNLB
in very much the same manner as they had lent a hand to the amorphous
organisations and private labour agents operating within that region for the
benefit of colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia, in the pre-1903 years.
Yet the determining factor, in realizing the ideals of the RNLB to recruit
trans-Zambesian labour, was not so much the paramountcy of Southern
Rhodesian interests as the positive measures, the administrations of those two
northern territories, adopted in order to meet the Bureau's demands. In
this regard, one mlght,therefore,be tempted to examine the degree to which
the northern territories were able to go in applying taxation or fiscal pressure
as a weapon for extracting labour supply for the sake of the Bureau. The im-
position of the hut-tax in North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, which
only began to materialize after 1903, was a boon for the Bureau in its
labour-recruiting activities.
As early as 1901, the two administrations in question had made tentative
efforts to deploy this subtle form of administrative coercion, but with mixed
82Van Onselen: Chibaro: pp. 25-6.
83C•O. 417/386: Milton to BSACo.September 14, 1903.
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results. In North-East Rhodesia, the fall of the more powerful African
states, such as those of the Lunda in the Luapula Valley, the Eemba on the
Tanganyika plateau and the Ngoni of Mpeseni in the Fort Jameson region, at
the close of the nineteenth century, had been followedby a flurry of demands
for labour by administrative officials and private employers. This labour
could, of course, be easily procured through the imposition of an impost as
occurred in 1901. Yet even under these circumstances, whereby only mini-
mal labour supply was demanded, the reactions of African societies in those
districts singled out for taxation, six months after the declaration, were
quite Interesting.
In spite of the fact that tax was collected in kind, only a few areas, like
those pockets of Bembaland stradd.l1ngthe Tanganyika, the East and North
Luangwadtstrtets, were commended for their positive response to taxation
in form of labour. Reports from other districts, which did not seem to have
been suffiCiently influenced by the pre-colonial tribute labour institution, were
not encouraging in the least. By September 1901 for instance, most African
communities confronted by the tax demands in North-Eastern Rhodesia had
either removed their villages sited near the bomas and transferred them to
'bush country', not easily accessible to offiCials, or they, simply, did not
have the resources, like grain or other agricultural produce, with which to
84meet administrative reqUirements on this impost.
This situation did not, in any way, change materially by mid-1902, when
a completely tangled state of affairs was observed by the territory's Admini-
stratioo. An interesting development, at this stage, which certainly frustrated
the attempts of the government of North-Eastern Rhodesia to collect labour
and hut-tax, was the presence of an indigenous economy In form of rubber.
This economy Significantly influenced the Bemba, Unga and Eisa communities
of the Awembadistrict; the Lamba, the Seba and the Lima of the Kafue dist-
rict and the Ngumboand other ethnic groups of the Fort Rosebery division of the
Luapula district.
By resorting to this rubber economy, these African communities, named
above, could only assert their economic independence, much to the mortifica-
tion of the North-Eastern Rhodesian Administration, which stressed and ex-
8~4-------------------------------------------------C.O. 417/363: Report of the Acting Administrator (C.p. Chesnaye), N/E/
Rhodesia on the operations of the Hut Tax for the Half-Year Ending,
September 30, 1901.
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pected the payment of its hut tax impost both in kind and in form of labour,
at the time. For this reason, administrative officials could not avoid, in
their frustration, to deride those peoples residing in these rubber-producing
districts as 'troublesome', 'indolent', or 'timid to go on long journeys -(as
carriers)-. ,85 Those African communities, inhabiting the Sakontwior Upper
Luapula division of the Luapula district, like the Ushi of Chief Mweri-Mweri,
for instance, who fled to the marshes along the Luapula river, in order to
avoid the Administration's labour and hut tax demands, may have also evoked
the anger of their respective officials through such reactions.
At this stage of the hut tax impost, the Administration of North-Eastern ..
Rhodesia could hardly boast of any positive evidence on the role of fiscal
pressure as an effective weapon for inducing labour migration to the South.
Indeed, only the Zumbodistrict, may be said to have played this role of sup-
plying labour to the Southmore prominently than others, by 1902, as the Luano
and the Soli of the Feira division and also the LaIa of the Mkushi dlvtston of
the same district were reported to be doing, in gravitating towards the labour
markets of the South in increasing numbers.
The other potential North-Eastem Rhodesian source of migrant labour
for Southem employers, the East Luangwadistrict, was in 1902 extenstvely
used simply to meet the local labour requirements. For this reason, the
Chewa and the Bisa of the Nawali1a(later Lundazi) division were heavily re-
lied upon as carriers in both the private and official sectors, whilst their
kinsmen in the Petauke division, of the same district, were the main source
of labour for the Sasare gold mines, operated by the North Charterland Ex-
86ploratlon Companyin that part of the territory. These mines were, ob-
viously, benefitting from the 'push-factor', arising out of the imposition of
the hut tax and may have won official approval in this respect, unlike the
Bwana Mkubwaand the Broken Hill properties of the Rhodesia Copper Comp-
any in the 'Hook of Kafue', which antagonized Codrington, in October 1903,
because of their reliance on private agents to recruit labour from the Bemba
87country. In short, labour mobilization, for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia,
85C•O. 417/365: DIgest of the Reports of NICs in N/E/Rhodesia for two years
Ending :March31, 1902: Enclosed in Codrington to Sharpe: July 21, 1902.
86Ibid.
87C.O. 417/401: Report on the Employment of North Eastern Rhodesian
Natives by the Rhodesia copper Companyand Conditions of Engagement,
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had not yet taken any tangible form in North-Eastern Rhodesia by 1903. The
means for exterting fiscal pressure, as a medium for labour extraction, had
not yet taken root and in those areas, where positive response was observed,
the incipient labour migration to the Southwas offset by the mfntmal internal
requirements of the period.
InNorth-Western Rhodesia, labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia was
less complicated than itwas in North-Eastern Rhodesia, right from the start.
The direct control of the High Commissioner for SouthAfrica over this terri-
tory and the orientation of its administrative philosophy towards the South,
greatly simplified matters for the co-operation of officials, on both sides of
the Zambesi, to meet the wishes of colonist employers of labour in Southern
Rhodesia even before the RNLB appeared on the scene in 1903. From the beg-
inning, North-Western Rhodesia was viewed as an important theatre for the
operations of labour recruiters from the South, whether by private connois-
seurs or through the agency of early amorphous labour organisations, as we
88have already observed. The Admmistration of this territory had even openly
committed some of its officials, like the District Commissioner of the Batoka
district, bordering on the Zambesi river, to assist the colonist employers of
- Matabeleland with labour recruitm.ent m the Mashukulumwe (lla) and Tonga
country, lying between the Zambesi and the Mazabuka plateau, as early as
1900. 89
What appeared actually deficient in the whole process of labour recruit-
ment in North-Western Rhodesia, before the arrival of the RNLB on the scene,
was the machinery by means of which the excesses of private agents could be
governed. Such a machinery, of course, involved the imposition of essential
restrictions on the activities of these agents and their African touts, much in
the same way the amendment to Native Regulations of Southern Rhodesia, in
April 1901, threatened dire consequences to unscrupulous labour touts in that
90territory. Indeedthe activities of a group of labour touts, led by a 'Cape
Boy',named Jolm Zulu)andbelonging to the firm of Messrs Acutt and Crewe,
91among the GwembeTonga, m June 1900, In the Baroka district, are here a
by Richard Goode. Administrator's Secretary. NLE/Rhodesia: August 1,
88 1904.
89Vide: Supra: PP.419-2'
c. O. 417/310: Major Cogndonrs Proposals for the System of Admmistra-
90 tion of N/WIRhodesia: July 12, 1900.
Vide: C.O. 417/319: Draft Native Regulations Amendm.entOrdinance: Encl-
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clear demonstration of the ease with which the North-Western Rhodesian
government had allowed the agents of SouthernRhodesian colonist employers
to operate in the pre-RNLB era. Under these circumstances, even the impos-
ition of hut tax among the Tonga, Ha and other communities outside Barotse-
92land proper by 1901, was a mere formality, which bore little impact on
the process of labour migration before 1903.
But it is particularly in connection with the conscious and deliberate
efforts of the two administrations of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhod-
esia to promote labour recruiting activities in and after 1903 that the argument
on the favourable cltmate.tn which the RNLBoperated,becomes clear. By
1904, the lethargy, which had characterized the attitude of the North-Western
Rhodesian government towards labour recruitment for SouthernRhodesia,for
example, was being speedily replaced by a tighter system of control in favour
of the RNLB agents rather than anyone else.
In October 1903, barely a month after the formation of the Bureau, the
Administration of North-Western Rhodesian government issued instructions
for all agents of the Bureau in the territory, whose accreditation had the
backing of the Bureau Manager, Val GieIgud, to report to the District Com-
missioners in the respective districts where they were stationed. The move
was designed not only to facilitate co-operation between the Native Department
officials and these agents, but also to exclude any form of competition.with
the Bureau, in the matter of labour recruitment in the territory. In this in-
stance, the North-Western Rhodesian Administration was particularly con-
cerned about the activities of 'undesirable' and 'irresponsible' touts, working
for the Wanlde rallway sub-constructors and operating in the Falls (Kalomo)
and the Batoka districts. These agents, whowere said to be mostly of low-
93class Greek origin, were, apparently, using those techniques peculiar to
the profession of commercial-minded labour recruiters, going about their
business with 'natives masquerading as police'; actions, which, the officials
feared, were likely to undermine stability in these districts and,consequently,
required that Bureau agents be 'properly introduced to the natives. ,94
91 osed in Clarke to Milner: January 14, 1901.
Vide: C.O. 417/319: Statements of Trooper George Skinner; Siandumbl and
92 Jim before John Carden, JP at Sebungwe:June 26, 1900.
93Colson: Social 0 anisation of the Gover GwembeTo a: PP. 29-30.
C.O. 417/400: Report on the Administration of N hodesla for the Year
Ending March 31st, 1904 (byH.M. Hole, Ag. Administrator).
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Itwas after what was regarded, in official circles, as 'proper introduct-
ion', that the Bureau agents were thus guaranteed. by the Administration
'to receive every assistance possible' from the District Commissioners. 95
Indeed.as an immediate result of this co-operation between the Administration
and the Bureau, the agents of this newbodywere allowed to proceed with
their recruiting activities, in spite of the inconveniences these activities fre-
quently caused. In the Mapanza sub-division of the Batoka district for example,
in spite of the fact that the Companyhad not yet succeeded in establishing full
control over the area, not to mention the local demand for labour by the Cop-
per mines nearby, Nielsen, the Bureau agent in the region, was,however.
allowed to proceed with his recruiting activities for the sake of forwarding
this labour to Southern Bhodesta, 96
In fact, the co-operation of the Administration of North-Western Rhodesia
with the Bureau did not merely consist of vague and deceptive assurances to
the potential labourers that 'they ~will)- be safe in engaging themselves to work
97
for the Bureau, and. •• ~ill* be regularly paid and fairly treated. ' This co-
operation was more fundamental and mUlti-dimensional in its character. The
extension of taxation, between 1904 and 1905 to include such areas as Barot-
seland proper, was one subtle calculation to widen the spheres of labour re-
cruitment to the advantage of the Bureau. The same could also be said of the
Company's pressure on Lewanika, to abolish 'domestic slavery' in his domain,
which consequently rendered available, an increased reservoir of manpower to
largely benefit Bureau agents.98 Thus the Administration of North-Western
Rhodesia was quick to comment, triumphantly, on the combined effect, both
taxation and the liberalisation of Lewanika's domestic poltctes had produced
in relation to labour migration from the Barotse Valley in distinctly optimistic
terms. According to F. C. Macaulay, the District Commissioner at Mongu,
labour migration. from the Barotse Valley had wan total response by 1904
94C.O. 417/387: S.M. L. O'Keefe, Secretary, Department of Administrator,
Livingstone to Private Secretary, Administrator's Office, Salisbury:
95 October 9, 1903.
Ibid: O'Keefe to GieIgud, Bulawayo:October 9, 1903.-96C.O. 417/398: Report on District matters by F. V. Worthington, D.C..
97 Batoka District for January, 1904.
C.O. 417/400: Report on the Administration of North-Western Rhodesia for
98 the Year Ending March 31. 1904.
BSACo. Director's Report and Accounts for the Year Ended March 31. 1907:
P. 8.
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and, consequently, villages were reported as being 'very empty -(since)- many
boys -(were)- going to seek labour in the South.•• '. 99
Of particular interest amongst the officials of the territory, was the fact
that even members of the Lozi aristocracy, generally regarded as rather
contemptuous of minework preferring, as they did, only such posts as clerks,
compound police or other positions of responsibility tending 'to foster their
sense of tribal distinction', 100were here recorded as ignoring Lewanika's
opinion on the matter and jofnfng the cue to migrate to the Southern.labour
markets. Indeed.even at this early stage, Macaulay recorded the death of the
son of Ngambela Mokamba, a top figure in Lozi poUtical circles, at the Wankie
Colliery, for which the father consequently received, in the process, some
101remuneration. For the RNLB, these proceedings in North-Western.
Rhodesia portended a promising future.
North-Eastern Rhodesia, the other chief source of labour across the Zam-
besi, also geared its machinery accordingly, to meet the demands of the
Bureau on labour recruitment. But here the main problem facing the Adminis-
tration' by 1903, was the increasing tempo of development in the western dis-
tricts of the territory, namely the Zumbo, Kafue andWestern. Luangwedist-
ricts. In the Kafue district alone, at the Broken Hill and BwanaMkubwa
mining properties, a force of about 850 labourers was engaged at what seemed,
by North-Eastern Rhodesian standards, a relatively high rate of wages of 10/-
102per month. With increased prospecting and development of claims in these
western. distriCts, the Administration In question even feared that labour de-
mand would rise and thus leave the territory in a difficult posttton,
For one reason, North-Eastern Rhodesia's transportation problems were
more complex than those of its counterpart, North-Western Rhodesia. For
instance, while the latter could anticipate, with relief, the completion of the
railway line to Livingstone by 1904, North-Eastern Rhodesia still faced in-
99C. O. 417/399: Report on District Matters by the Acting District Commis-
sioner(F. C. Macaulay), Barotse District, for Feb., 1904.
100Armour: 'Mlgrant Labour in the Kalabo District of Barotseland (Northern
RhodeSia)': Bulletin of the Inter-African Labour Institute: 1962: p, 27.
101C.O. 417/399: Report on District matters by Acting District Commissioner
102 (F. C. Macaulay).
C.O. 417/401: Rmrt on the Employment of North Eastern Rhodesian Nat-
ives by the Rhodesia Copper Companyand Conditions of Engagement (by
Richard Goode):August 1, 1904.
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surmountable problems with regard' to transportation. With most of the
wagon roads from the Southclosed in 1903, due to the outbreak of lung sick-
ness, North-Eastern Rhodesia was forced to fall back on its manpower for
tenga-tenga (carriers); a situation which, nonetheless, looked hardly promis-
ing, due to the scanty population of the territory.
As the North-Eastern Rhodesian Administration aptly pointed out in April
1903, in the Kafue and Zumbo districts, which covered an area of about
40,000 square miles, the populationwas estimated at about only 35,000 in-
habitants including men, women and children. The number of abl&bodied men
103was merely 5,250. Taking into account that the Zumbo and the Kafue dis-
tricts were, in addition, the most promising areas In terms of minerai pro-
duction and, at the same time, also served as corridors through which routes,
for supplies from the South, entered the territory, some officials of the Ad-
ministration of North-Eastern Rhodesia could, understandably, not help feeling
uneasy about an impending competition for labour between the mining industry
and tenga-tenga within the territory, with the result that local supply would
probably fail to meet this demand. Indeed.local interests were already calling
for measures to nip the whole process of labour migration to the South in the
bud, even at that early stage, to avoid any harm being done to their sources
104of labour supply.
But the commitment of the North-Eastern Rhodesian government to
labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia was, however, not at all affected by
any of these forebodings, so volubly articulated by vested interests In the ter-
ritory. Thus In June 1903, Cod'J!ingtonsquarely met the protests of the
Northern Copper Company, on labour recruitment for interests South of the
Zambesi, by indicating that the whole process had its origins in voluntary
labour migration and that all what his govemment was only doingwas to en-
courage both this movement and labour recruitment for work. South of the
Zambesi, so as to minimise the incidence of 'unrestricted' recruitment of
105labour in the territory. Even under extreme disappointment with the Admin-
103C.O. 417/385: MemorandumonRecrult1ng of Native Labour for the South
African MInesby p. H. Selby, Civil Commissioner and Magistrate. Kafue
10 and ZumboDistricts to Codrington. April2, 1903.
4fuid: H.U. Moffat, Manager, The Bechuanaland Exploration Co. Ltg" and
The Northem Copper (BSA) Co, Ltd., Bulawayo, to Codrington, Fort
Jamesm, Aprll 3, 1903.105 ..Ibid: Codrington to Moffat: June 17, 1903.-
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istration of Southern Rhodesia over the latter's unco-operative attitude in
connection with the repatriation of recruits, as occurred also in 1903 during
106the Hayes affair, Codrington remained heavily committed to the arrange-
ment, whereby North-Eastern Rhodesia was to play the role of a reservoir of
labour for the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia. Indeed,most of the
southern districts of North-Eastern Rhodesia, especially those bordering on
the Zambesi, were, by 1903, quite inextricably enmeshed in this web of lab-
our migration to the South,with the result that little could be dane to reverse the
process. The Fort Jameson Administration itself was, in the first place,
actually responsible for such a situation, which it had initially regarded as a
means through which the people of the Southern districts could earn their hut
tax by working on the mines in Southern Rhodesia. 107
Thus whilst North-Eastern Rhodesia could not easily break off its intri-
cate relationship with Southern Rhodesia on labour supply, by the time the
Bureau was formed, it sought an alternative method whereby it could system-
atize the whole process of labour migration, in order to meet both the inter-
nallabour demand and its external commitments. The graduated tax of early
1904 was expected to produce the required magical results. Under this new
system of taxation, those people living in the northern districts on the Tangan-
yika plateau and the Bemba country were expected to pay a 3/- hut tax per
annum, as they had 'some difficulty in finding employment. ' In the relatively
more advanced district of the East Luangwa, the taxation rate was fixed at 6/-
per hut, whilst in the Zumbo and Kafue districts in the South, it was 12/- per
hut. The Southern districts were heavily charged in this manner, because of
what the Administration considered to be 'the increasing facilities for earning
money at ~the)- mines both North and Southof the Zambesl ••• ,108 Implfclt
in this graduated tax system was, of course, the expectation that labourers
from the 3/- tax belt would make their way to work in the Fort Jameson reg-
ion, whilst the Fort Jameson people, and,subsequently, those of the Zumbo and
Kafue districts also, would all in turn be released for labour supply to the
markets South of the Zambesl. _Asa matter of fact, the Native Commissioner
106
107Vide: Supra: pp.
C.O. 417/363: Report of the Acting AdmJnistrator (C. p. Chesnaye).
,&E/Rhodesia on the Operations of the Hut Tax for the Half-Year Ending:
September 30. 1901.
108C. O. 417/398: Codrington to Sharpe: February 4, 1904.
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of the Mirongo division of the North Luangwadistrict, <.. Mr. Young, had
actually brought a party of 887 labourers from his area to work in the Fort
Jameson division of the East Luangwadistrict, as early as May1903, with
109this very idea in mind.
But whether this plan of the North-Eastern Rhodesian Administration, to
distribute labour supply equitably to the satisfaction of both internal and ex-
ternal requirements, ever worked, is another matter. For the purpose of
this study, it is argued, that the plan appears to have envisaged a situation,
whereby the mobility of labour had to be effected as easUy as posstble, with-
out the usual inconvenience imposed by long distance travel The whole idea
appears to be vindicated here by the willingness of Codrington, in conjunction
with the Portuguese authorities, to construct a direct labour route, running
between Fort Jameson and Salisbury via Cachumba on the Zambesi, rather
than Feira, further to the West and thus reducing the distance between the two
points by half. 110 From the point of view of the new Bureau, it was essentia-
lly this willingness and consequent readiness to co-operate, on the matter of
labour recruitment and mjgration,which the Administration of North-Eastern
Rhodesia so amply demonstrated by 1903, which counted in the f1na1 analysis.
Like its counterpart in North-Western RhodeSia, the Administration of North-
Eastern Rhodesia,therefore,played a sfgniflcant part in creating a positive
environment in which the new labour body could effectively fulfill its functions,
in relation to the recruitment and distribution of trans-Zambesian labour.
From the foregoing argument, it is clear that by dicta and well calculated
labour-inducing activities, the governments of the two northern territories
played a positive role in guaranteeing the success of the RNLB in its initial
stages. What the Bureau also required, to reinforce these positive factors in
its favour, was sound psychological and moral backing to justify the ethos on
which its ideals were founded. The whole scheme of recruiting cheap immi-
grant labour had to have some form of ethical justification and this too was not
lacking, especially by 1903. The colonists of Southern Rhodesia, true to their
sense of profesionallsm on labour matters, were, at this time, agltating for
increased fiscal pressure to maximise the supply of cheap and Involuntary
labour. The objectives of the 1903 agitation for an increased rate of
109C•O. 417/385: Codrington to BSACo~:May13, 1903.
110C•O. 417/386: Milton to BSACo.: September 14, 1903.
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taxation for the Africans of Southern Rhodesia were, therefore, quite appa-
rent and certainly coincided with the ideals for which the Bureau was formed,
in the first place. Of course, for public consumption, the Administration of
Southern Rhodesia referred, in euphemistic terms, to the raising of poU
tax from 10/- to £2 per annum, with an extra 10/- for every extra wife for
polygamous husbands, as a morally justified contribution to the territory's
revenue by a people obviously grateful to the benefits of Pax Britannica, whilst
the impost on extra wives, was in turn, equated to income tax on 'luxury
111goods'. But other parties in the bargain were not so devious.
The High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, whowas, at that time, also
pursuing a scheme, whereby Indian labour could be imported into SouthAfrica
112for railway work and other aspects of the post-war reconstruction programme,
was actually encouraged by this movement to increase the rate of taxation for
Africans in Southern Rhodesia. In this measure, he saw a ray of hope in
mobilising labour, not only for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia, but also for
the territories below the Limpopo, whrther 'surplus' labour wouldbe consenquently
.",.".' exported. 113 For this reason, MIlner,inevitablY,differed openly with
his junior in Salisbury, the Resident CommisSioner, Sir Marshall Clarke, who
was altogether opposed to the £2 tax. The High Commissioner thus went on
to justify his position on the matter, in the following terms:
Myown view is that, while I deprecate absolutely tax Intended
to force natives to labour, I think that there should be reas-
onable taxation and that they ~natives)- cannot cO'f~ if
inCidentally its imposition compels them.to work.
With such backing from highly placed Imperial officials, the intentions of the
Administration and colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia, to derive maxi-
mum benefit from fiscal pressure as a form of administrative coercion to
procure unfree labour, need no further clarification.
Other divers interests in the country were also quite aware of the sini-
ster intentions of the 1903 movement to raise the rate of African taxation.
But their reactions to this movement were largely conditioned by the degree
to which the proposed increase was bound to affect their own particular sect-
111C.O. 417/373: Milton to Milner: May27, 1903.
112Vide: Supra: pp.291-4
113C. O. 417/373: Milner to Milton: Telegram: June 16, 1903.
l1~id: Mi1ner to Clarke: Telegram: June 25, 1903.-
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ional interests. Thus those missionaries, whowere heavily engaged in
farming at their own institutions, wouldnot be soothed at all by the Admini-
stration's promises that they wouldbe exempted from the new rate of taxation,
because of their efforts 'to teach natives the value of labour' through engag-
ing the latter in agricultural pursuits. The Chishawasha mission, run by the
Jesuits and with a resident African tax-paying population of 400 males on it
huge latiftmdlas by 1903, easily became the spokesman of these farmer-
missionaries, whose interests were thus being threatened by the new Inpost
115in a number of ways.
In the first place, it was suspected that the new rate of taxation threaten-
ed to raise the African wage tariff In the farming industry as a whole, where
the general rate had hitherto been estimated at an average of 10;J- per month,
with the result that only few farmers wouldbe in a position to pay their lab-
ourers anythingbeyond 15/- per month. Secondly, missionary-farmers de-
plored the assumption, underlying the proposed tax legislation, that the
African labourer had no sense of discrimination In relation to the nature and
conditions of work he engaged in and that, consequently, the element of com-
pulsion, which the proposed tax implied, would make little difference in
labour turn -out insofar as the needs of both the mining and the farming In-
dustries were concerned.
As Father Richartz of Chishawasha viewed the situation, the new tax legi-
slation certainly required the African labourer to work for longer periods
with the result that the labourer wouldbe even more discriminating in his
choice of work than before, preferring, in the event, to work only in those
more remunerative jobs. In this case, the mining industry wouldnaturally
gain the upper hand to the disadvantage of the farmers, who obviously could
not afford to pay comparable wages. From. Father Richartz's point of view,
therefore, such a situation was totally indefensible, not only in terms of the
inequitable distribution of labour which it implied, but also because It was
against the ethics of labour Utilization and,consequently,detrimental to the
African labourer. The Jesuit cleric thus concluded:
It demoralizes the native if he get s abnormal wages before
he is worth it and he will never be ready to be taught to work
115
For the role of the Chishawasha Mission as a land-holder and its dealings
with its African tenants, Vide: L. Vambe: From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe:
Heinemann: London:1976: pp. 4-5, 36-8.
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and learn trades etcl1~sic)- if he mows he can earn money
without -{training)-.
Moreover, this farmer-missionary also envisaged a situation whereby the new
tax requirements could only stimulate Mrican agricultural production and
consequently put the mission farms out of business, as they would obviously
be required to compete with the Mrican peasant farmer who produced his
grain more cheaply.
All these views of Father Richartz were supported by farmers living on
the fringesof the territory of Southern Rhodesia, like those constituting the
Gazaland Farmers' Association of the Melsetter district. According to the
standpoint of the Melsetter farmen,the new tax measure was deliberately
designed to promote the interests of the mining industry, whilst ,on the other
hand, it could only be regarded as 'detrimental to the farming industry at
117large and ruinous to the district of Melsetter. ' For this particular district,
where the average wage rate paid by a predominantly Boer farming popula-
tion was only 5/- per month and where the populationwas mostly 'Shangaan',
then regarded as excellent mine labour and naturally in great demand outside
the district, the future did not look at all promising. Besides, the white
colonists of the area were in a state of paranoia due to the 25 mile stretch of
boundary the district shared with the Portuguese territory, which, itwas felt,
was a disadvantage in the event of an African rising breaking out once more.
Yet whilst these arguments, on the advantages and disadvantages of in-
creased taxation and Its bearing on African labour supply, were quite impre-
ssive in their own way, for the relevance of the RNLB,then in Its formative
stage at the tim.e, it is essentially the psychological and other non-economic
issues related to labour mobllisatlon, in a racially composite colonial society,
which matter here. Such issues played their part in contributblg to the whole
make-up of an evidently commodius environment, in which the new Bureau
could take up root, with guarantees of reasooable moral support. In this
particular case, the operations of the poUtics and economics of group domin-
ance in a colonial setting are quite evident in the irratiOnality and contradict-
ions which characterized, particularly, the demand for labour.
Thus in 1903, when the Administration of Southern Rhodesia was arguing
116C. O. 417/373: Father F. J. RIchartz, S. J. Chishawasha to Clarke, Salis-
117 bury: July 6, 1903.
!2!!!: Massy-Swynnerton to Clarke: August 4, 1903.
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in favour of increased taxation for the Africans in that territory as a means
'for obtaining mining labour to meet requirements', 118 it was reported, not
without some embarrassment, that labour supply was so plentiful in the
country that it had to be exported to the Rand. Indeedjtn some districts, like
that of Hartley in Mashonaland, the Native Commissioner indicated that there
had been a labour surplus since 1902 and, by 1903, it had even worsened to
such a degree that some alien labourers from Nyasaland, then entering the
119country, could not find employment, The situation actually deteriorated,
between March and May1903, when local labour was also driven onto the
market, due to drought and the subsequent poor harvest of that season. The
outcome in this respect was, therefore, a general reduction in wages and the
turning down, by colonist employers, of those localsand alien labourers from
120Nyasaland whom they classified as 'raw natives' or 'surface labour. ' Yet
it was against this background that fiscal pressure, in form of increased
taxation, was to be applied.
In view of the obvious contradictions underlying these events of 1903, one
is, of course, bound to look to the peculiarities of racially composite colonial
societies, to provide a satisfactory explanation to a somewhat unrealistic
situation of this nature. In this particular case, it is apparent that the opera-
tional theories resorted to here had their origins in those fossilized frontier
and race attitudes, born of tlEearlier phase of actual physical conflict between
the 'colonizers' and the 'colonized'. In this regard, the extraction of labour
from the subject colonial groups, by legitimatized administrative coercion,
was less significant as an economic measure than it was as an exercise in the
politics and psychology of group dominance within the colonial setting. Thus
in recommending the new rate of taxation to the HighCommissioner and point-
ing out that the levy on extra wives should be treated as equivalent to a
charge on 'luxury goods' to polygamous husbands, Miltonwent on to reveal
also a characteristic disrespect for African traditional society, by adc:Ungthat
these extra wives were 'really only concubines, not having been married
according to native custom' and were, therefore, merely living with their
'Ii!
118!2!!!: Milton to Milner: May27, 1903.
119C.O. 417/372: Report of W.E~ Scott, N/C, Hartley for July 1903: Quoted
in Clarke to Milton: September SO. 1903.
120Ib1d:Extract from the Rhodesia :fIerald, July 11, 1903: Enclosed in Clarke
to Milner: July 13, 1903.
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'reputed husbands' to preserve a superficial 'state of decency. ,121
Suchutter comtempt for African traditional societies, of course, had
little to do with the question of labour supply, but had its basis in the general
belief amongst whites, at the beginning of the twentieth century, that African
traditional societies were too undeveloped, inchoate and fragmentary to be
regarded as serious obstacles to colonial enterprise and social change. These
assumptions, which had their origins inwhat early whites regarded as the
untenability of the doctrine of cultural relativism within the African setting,
are best described by Cairns who indicates that:
The presumed ephemeraUty of tribal customs justified an
absence of concern -(amonst the whltes)- as to their basis
and interrelationships. That tribal cultures were integrated,
that they possessed •.• emotional value for their adherents,
and that as a consequence the problem of social change was
highly complex and deeply disruptive of an existing network
of social relations - 'i~e aspects of the contact situation
were simply ignored.
Some contemporaries of Miltonwere actually quite cognisant of the psy-
chological and racial Implications which the new taxation rate was also required
to satisfay within the colonfst society of labour in SouthernRhodesia. Thus
Father Richartz, the head of the Chlshawash Mission near Salisbury, could
not disguise his disappointment with the racial animosity evinced by some of
his colleagues in the Executive of the :M:ashonalandFarmers' Association. As
he observed, after attending a meeting to ratify the new rate of taxation for
Africans in mid-July 1903, the grounds onwhich those members of the Farmers'
ASSOCiation,'who -(were)- notorious for not being able to get boys on account
of their rough ways of dealing with them, ' supported the new measure were,
simply, the promises this measure proffered on forced labour as well as the
chance it allowed them to express 'a bitter racial hatred against the natives
and their protectors -(the humanitarians)-.' For these reasons, this mtssfon-
ary-farmer, whowas also very disillusioned by the whole question of SJuthemIhodesia's
mnaganEllt of 'native af.fa:irs', subject to these colonist influences, thus com-
mented on the Mashonalandfarmers' proceedings as follows:
I was so disgusted at the outburst of the rude hatred against the
natives, that I am considering whether it is becoming for me to
have anything to dowith man, who are not ashamed to speak as
121C.O. 417/373: Milton to Milner: May 27, 1903
122Cairns: ,22. £!h p, 166
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123some members did, or applaud at such utterings.
In Father Rtchart s's own words, the new legislation and its concomitant
demands on the African subject societies were actually designed to deal with
the latter 'as if they were less than slaves. ,124
In this connection, the non-economic determinants of the measure on in-
creased Mrlcan taxation and its purported labour supply functions were appar-
ent. Indeed, to argue solely on the merits of the proposed measure to augment
labour supply, as the Administration of Southern Rhodesia did, when in Masho-
naland, In particular, llterally 'hundreds' of potentlallabourers were, in 1903,
being tumed away and could not get work 'either because they were unsuttable
125or because there was no work for them, ' can only be regarded as ridiculous.
From the preceding analysis and for the purpose of this study, it is, therefore,
argued that the mafn objective of the 1903 movement to increase the rate of
taxation, for the Africans in Southem Rhodesia, was not so much intended to
increase the labour turnout as it was designed to reinforce the psychological
and other non-economic features of a coloo1al environment which made the ex-
ploitation of unfree labour from the subject peoples by the dominant group
easier and morally justifiable. It was in the midst of this movement that the
RNLB was born and, as a sign of the times, the preoccupation of this body, in
its first years of existence, centred, more or less, on exporting surplus
labour rather augmenting. the supply for the local market.
During the period 1903-6, when the administrative structures across the
Zambesi had been finally updated and the technology of labour recruitment
was definitely improved on both sides of the river, as proven by the creation
of the RNLB, the ironies and contradictions underlyfng the processes of labour
mobilisation in a politically and economically restrictive setting, like that of a
racially stratified colonial society, became quite evident. The new labour or-
ganisation, which was formed between July and August 1903 with the BSACo's
financial backing to enable it to establish a sound infrastructure on both
sides of the Zambesl, in form of rest houses and compounds and to purchase
horses and mules for its agents, appeared to be well set for a good beginning.
Indeed,with the support of both the mining and farming industries, to work for
123C• O. 417/373: Father Richartz to Clarke: July 15, 1903.
12~id,
125Ibid: Rev. John WhIte, General Superintendent of the Wesleyan Missice in
S. Rhodesfa,to Clarke: July 23, 1903.
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the exclusion of labour recruitment by independentor private labour agents,
which in this case was vouchsafedby the assurances of the Administration of
Southern Rhodesia to regulate and restrict the issue of recruiting licences, 126
the RNLBwas certainly destined to dominate the field of labour recruitment on
both sides of the Zambesi, from the start, and to consolidate its monopoly
over the years.
But as haBbeen indicated already, the RNLBwas born at a propititious
time. In fact, it might be said that the tiDes weresofavourable for the cause
of labour mobilisation that the new labour organisation was nearly put out of
function, as independent labour flooded the market from both internal and ex-
127ternal sources in 1903. With the unsolicited efforts of the Native Depart-
ment to encourage the Native Commissioners in the famine-stricken areas,
like the Lomagundi, Inyanga and Mrewadistricts, to forward labour recruits
to the nearest mining properties in return for grain, in order to avoid the
free issue of foodby the government to those African communities so af-
fected and thus, allegedly,encouraging a credence among these people that
'they need never work "for in the time of scarcity the Government will feed
128 .
-1usr- for nothing"', as the officials imagined, the labour market in South-
ern Rhodesia was literally saturated.
Those Southern Rhodesian colonist employers whocomplained of short-
age in 1903 were, more or-less, actuated by eclectic proclivities rather than
genuine grievances based on the realities of the situation. Thus the Gwanda
mine authorities of Southern Matabeleland, who complained of shortage at
this time, were, in reality, simply trying to draw the attention of the Admin-
istration in Salisbury onwhat they viewed as the arbitrary measures of the
Transvaal government in prohibiting the movement of labour from that terri-
tory Into Southern Rhodesia. Labour supply from other sources was.actually,
quite plentiful, but the Gwandamines felt that the 'Blantyre Boys' from Nyasa-
land, then offering their services, were generally 'unsatisfactory as mine
Iabourera', being more vulnerable to pulmonary epidemics and other diseases
than other labourers.129 The Boer farming community around Enkeldoorn~
126C•O• 417/386: Milton to BSACo.: September 14, 1903.
127Vide: Supra: pp.437-8
128C•O. 417/373: W.S."Taberer, Acting C/N/C, Salisbury to Milton: September
3. 1903.
129Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary. Salisbury: August 14,1903-
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in the Charter dtstrtet, could also not procure an adequate supply of labour
from local sources, even under famine condtttons, because their conception
of farm labour was too feudal to induce sufficient respondents. 130
A situation like that of 1903/4, in which the glut of labour supply
threatened the Bureau with redundancy, could only compel the new organ-
isation to diversify its activities in other directions and the subsequent role
of the RNLB, as a satellite of the Rand mining indllstry between 1903 and
1906, was, therefore, a natural development from these bizarre circum-
stances. The flood-gates against labour recruitment in the Rhodesias for the
Rand and other South African interests had actually been shaken, in January
1903, by the Chamberlain visit to the African sub-continent and the subse-
quent Bloemfontein Conference held in March of that year. To avoid the
politically and soc1ally embarrassing consequences which Asiatic labour im-
portation entailed, as the coloatst employers in this part of African sub-
continent currently demanded, the advise given to these employers by the
Imperial authorities was to exhaust nearby African sources first, starting
131
with those possible sources of labour supply in British Africa in particular.
Itwas,therefore,in accordance with these recommendations that the Rand
m1n1ng industry, through its labour organisation, the Witwatersrand Native
Labour Association (WNLA), l~ed its application for labour supply from the
Rhodeslas in early 1903, proposing, at the same tim,e, a new agreement with
the m1n1ng industry of Southern Rhodesia for the equitable distribution of this
132
commodity between the two sets of employers.
Indeed,if the Rand employers had,at this stage/any doubts on the results
of their application, these were, at the time, dispelled by the confident
assurances of highly placed officials either to the effect that Southern Rhod-
esia was in no position to prevent WNLA from recruiting labour in its terri-
tories because, under Section 20 of the Royal Charter, the BSACo. was
forbidden to create any monopolies in economic affairs in these territories~33
or because it was simply felt that such a course of action was too 'illiberal'
130C• O. 417/399: Report by G, Me Odlum on Agriculture in the Enkeldoorn
Portion of Charter District: March, 1904.
131
132Vide: SUpra: PP.277-8
C. O. 417/383: A. N. Goldring, Secretary, Transvaal Chamber of :Mines,
to Lagden: February 3, 1903.
133Ib1d: Sir G. Y. Lagden., Secretary for Native Affairs, Transvaal, to
""'Milner: February 11, 1903.
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134for the Rhodesian authorities to resort to. This streak of confidence, on
the potentiality of the Rhodesias as ellgible sources of labour supply, affected
not only the Rand mining industry, but also the South African railways, when
they later entered into the bargain in their turn. With the two principal agents
of the Central South Mrican Railways already accredited and stationed at their
headquarters at Syringa Siding, South of Bulawayo, in Southern Rhodesia by
mid-1903, this group of employers was quite certain to procure a regular
labour supply of at least 'five hundred boys a month' from Southern Rhodesia,
especially as this type of supply was considered merely 'surface labour' over
135
which the Southem Rhodesian mining industry would have no qualms.
This confidence on the part of the South African employers in relation to
labour supply from the Rhodesias, which appears to have been inspired,
largely, by wrd Mllner, the High Commissioner for South Africa, at the time,
did not, however, suffiCiently take into consideration the sensitivity of local
interests and officials on both sides of the Zambes1. The Une of argument
1nitlally pursued by the BSACo. and i(s officials was that priority should be
136
given to local interests,in general,over the Issue of labour supply. In
North-Western Rhodesia,for instance, where a similar application had been
made at the time by Robert WUllams to Iswanika for 1,000 labourers to
work on the Benguela Railway, the authorities felt that, with their own rallway
line from the South then in construction and the prospective demand by the
copper mines in the 'Hook of the Kafue', the territory was in no position to
137
meet external requirements such as those of the Rand and Robert WllUams.
In North-Eastern Rhodesia too, the intentions of the South African employers
were evidently frustrated by the dog-in-the-manger attitude of those mining
concerns operating there and also, to some extent, by the frigid attitude of
the authorities in the territory towards labour exportation to South Africa. The
leading opponent to these overtures by South African interests was, apparently,
the Bulawayo-based Northern Copeer CompanY, owning some mining properties
in the Kafue region and which was also headed by H. U. Moffat, of Bechuana-
13~id: Milner to Lagden: February 19, 1903.
135C•O• 417/386: MIlner to Miltoo: Telegram: July 31,1903.
136c.O. 417/371: Miltoo. to Milner: March 5, 1903; and BSACo. Directors'
Report and Accounts, March 31st 1904: p. 14.
137C•O• 417/372: CoL Harding to Imperial Secretary, Johannesburg, May 16,
1903.
443
land Exploration Company fame.
In Moffat's view, any permission to allow the Rand labour organisation
to recruit labour In that territory on the very doorsteps of his company's
properties was not simply absurd, but also threatened these local interests
with ruination, arising out of unfair competition with external economic in-
terests against which they should normally seek official protection. He sum-
marized the plight of mfnlDg cmcerns In North-Eastern Rhodesia in this
manner:
If the Rand are allowed to recruit labour, not only will the
rates of wages be raised to the Rand scale, but we shall
also probably lose a large amount of labour and therefore be
very short; --(and)- In addition to the high wages per hour
there are other ~~ements for the native labourers to go
to Johannesburg.
Moffat's anxieties were vindicated by the pesatmtsm of P, H. Selby, the
Civil Commissioner and Magistrate of the combined districts of the Kafue and
Zumbo <., where most of the activities on mineral prospecting and product-
ion were then going OIl. Selby, who felt that the scanty population of these
districts could, In no way, meet the local labour demand, perceptibly poured
cold water onto any prospects of labour exportation to the Rand when he
asserted In April 1903 that:
We -(North-Eastern Rhodesiar have, our own labour problem
already and in place of being treated as a possible recruiting
ground for work in the South we are qualified, by the rich dis-
coveries In our Western districts, by the projected extension
of the railway ~er to these mines, and, unhappily, by our
sparse populatim, to rank pari passu with other territories,
whose material prCft19ess depends entirely on the exploitation
of mineral wealth.
Fortunately for the Rand employers, Selby's superiors did not seem to
share his drastic views on this question of labour exportation to the South.
But whilst they could not take any overtly obstructive measures to the dis-
advantage of the Rand and other employers In the South, they did not, however,
offer any concrete promises on the regular supply of labour from this source,
preferrfDg,as they didJto hide behind piOUSbut empty phrases to the effect that:
138C. o. 417/385: H. U. Moffat, Manager, The Northern Copper (BSA) Com-
pany Ltd., Bulawayo, to Codrington, Fort Jameson: April 3, 1903.
139!!!!!!: Memorandum on Recruiting of Native Labour for the South African
Mines by P, H. Selby••• to Codrington: April 2, 1903.
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••• every encouragement short of actual Interference or direction
-(wouldr be given by the local Administration to enable the
natives of North-EHtfm Rhodesia to seek employment wherever
they may think tit.
yet In spite of everything, the attitude of the colonist employers and
offtc1als of the trans-Zambeslan territories, with regard to the Rand's
application for labour, was, to say the least, quite diplomatic. Their counter-
parts In Southem Rhodesia, as represented by the mining Industry of Mata-
beleland, were,at flrst;all out for a tit-for-tat policy. They Initially saw in
the application of the Rand an opportunity to make the latter taste a portion
of their own medicine. In this particular case, the Rhodesia Chamber of
MIneswanted to revenge for the ban, then recently imposed by the Transvaal
authorities, on labour supply from the northem Transvaal onwhich the mines
141of Southem Matabeleland had relied during the Anglo-Boer war and after.
With the appearance of the RNLBon the scene, the colonist employers and
offtc1als of Southem Rhodesia, in particular, quickly began to change their
attitudes towards the Rand and WNLA over this issue of labour supply. The
management of the Bureau was, in this case, the primary force in this sudden
volte-face amongst these employers and officials in their relations with their
opposite numbers below the Limpopo. Ofcoarse, after the futile wartime
arrangement between the Rand and the Southem Rhodesian mining industry
for mutual exchaoge of labour supply, which had onlybeen terminated In
December 1902,142 it required some ccmvlncing, just a few months later, to
persuade these people on the advantages of another arrangement. Yet this
was essentially what the management of the Bureau did and ultimately succeed-
ed In arranging for a marriage of convenience between the RNLB itself and
WNLA, in order to cope more effectively with the supply and demand of lab-
our within the regional economic system of the sub-continent as a whole.
In the first place, the Bureau had been established at a time when labour
surplus, rather than shortage, was the main problem. Indeed, faced with a
situation, whereby some of the districts like Hartley were suffering from an
inundation of labour supply whilst In the Wanldedistrict the competition bet-
140Ibid: Extract from the Annual Report on the Administration of N/E Rhodesia
for the Year Ending March 31, 1903.
141C.O. 417/386: Rhodesia Chamber of MInes, Bulawayo, to Chief Secretary,
Salisbury: Telegram: September 17, 1903.
142
Vide: Supra: pp.183-S
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ween the Colliery and the construction work then being undertaken by the
Beira and Masbona1andRallway Companyhad reduced the supply to the barest
minimum, it was naturally assumed that the Bureau's functions would also
involve the equitable dlstrfbution of labour and, in this way, facilitate its
Internal mobility from those areas where none was required to the ones where
143the demand was more apparent. Besides, there was also the financial
factor in the bargain. In fact, even those BSACo.omcials, whohad initially
opposed the overtures of the Rand on labwr recruitment in the Rhodesias,
had indicated, at the same time, that they were quite partial to a scheme
whereby WNLAwouldbear half the costs involved in recruiting labour for
both the Rand and the SouthernRhodesian mining industry. In 1903, these costs
144were estimated at £20,000. Indeed,the financial factor, in the relation-
ship between the Bureau and WNLA,was so potent that, by 1906, the former
was actually deriving a substantial part of its revenue from this source and,
145
for this reason, wanted the relationship to be retained accordingly. The
very fact that WNLAwas prepared to spend as much as £10 per labourer, in
recruiting expenses, compared to the Bureau's 30/- per head, was signifi-
cant in the arrangement.
Other factors of non-economic variety may have also influencedboth the
011gtn and course of the RNLB/WNLApartnership. From the deductions of
Gielgud, the Manager of the RNLB, after he had worked with this body for an
eight-month period, stretchiDg from September 1903 to April 1904, it is clear
that the new body was disconcerted not only by the increasing labour surplus
from both local and trans-Zambesian sources, but also by what it viewed as
the poor quaUty of this labour; a factor which, it was alleged, might have dis-
pleased the local colonist employersJ in consequence. The fact that the 1903
glut, precipitated by short-tlme famine labour turnout, was actually being
worsened in 1904, by the current closure of some of the mining properties,
due to a general economic receasioo and also because of an inexorable red-
unction in the labour force as mfnes, like the WankleColliery, resorted to
143C•O. 417/373: Clarke to M1ltoo:September 30, 1903.
144C.O. 417/371: Miltoo to Milner: March 5, 1903.
145Vide: C.O. 417/392: Val Gielgud, General Manager, RNLB)toRhodesia
Chamber of Mines, Bulawayo:April 26, 1904.
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146machinisation, was of no bearing to the Bureau management. All that had
gone amiss and waa.therefore.responstble for the mess, the management of
the Bureau concluded, was a process which had its origins in the nature and
habits of the class of recruits the Bureau had hitherto specialized in. Here
the recruits from South-Western Matabeleland, Southern Mashonaland (the
Victoria Circle) and those from North-Eastern Rhodesia across the Zambesi
were singled out as scapegoats, for either real or imaginery defects as
labourers, in me form or another.
For the recruits from the BuUllma district in South-Western Matabele-
land, their crime, in this instance, was the job preference they exhibited;
notably their preference to work mly in Bulawayo and nowhere else. To the
Bureau, which had recruited them in the first place, this disinclination by
recruits to work outside certain districts tended to undermine its efforts to
distribute labour to properties throughout the country and, in this way, frus-
trated this organisatim's objectives. As for the 'Victoria boys' from Southern
Mashonaland, where labour supply was then considered to be quite plentiful,
their main problem was that they were generally regarded as 'unsatisfactory'
by employers, who evidently turned them down 00. account of 'their unrelia-
bUity and difficulty to manage'. Moreover, the mine managers in Matabele-
land were reported to be generally opposed to the engagement of 'Victoria
boys' because of the concomitant requirements this entailed, in form of em-
ploying more compound managers or interpreters conversant with the Shona
147language in order to deal with them. Similarly, the trans-Zambesian
recruits from North-Eastern Rhodesia were, by 1904, also increasingly
falling out of favour with the Bureau, because of a characteristic breakdown
in relationship between these charges and their mentors, the Bureau agents,
once these recruits had crossed the ZambesL In trying to establish the cause
for their desertion and why these foreign recruits could not be controlled by
Bureau agents and messengers en route to their respective centres of employ-
ment, Gielgud concluded:
These natives -(from North-Eastern Rhodesia)-, are very
suspiciOUS and appeal4g have no confidence in anyone when out
of their own country.
146
147C. O. 417/392: Clarke to Milner: May 3, 1904.
Ibid: Gielgud, Manager, RNLB to Rhodesia Chamber of Mines: Bulawayo:
1
April 26, 1904.
4Bn,id.
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In essence, what Gielgudwas doinghere was the traditional colonist
technique of applying far-fetched misconceptions to explain a general break-
down in master-servant relationships with the result that African labour
recruits were seen, through their disobedience, as challenging the authority
of their white mentors and thus frustrating the matn objectives of the insti-
tution of unfree labour. Of course, under any other circumstances, the co-
operation of these African recruits wouldhave been successfully effected
through the liberal application of coercion in one form or another. But dur-
ing this period 1903~, the appropriate remedy, at least as far as the Bureau
management was concerned, was to forward these 'miscreants' and the like
to labour markets below the Limpopo, where the 'raw' ones wouldbe 'trained'
and subsequently return to their home market the richer in experience and
skills, whilst the Bureau itself would inadvertently gain In revenue, in form
149of capitation fees. This line of argument was quite powerful and appealing
to the colonist employers of labour in SouthernRhodesia and, once GieIgud
succeeded in convincing them, it carried away the day and thus ended up
reducing the RNLBto a mere surrogate of WNLAup to 1906.
What actually rendered the RNLB/WNLAarrangement of 1903-6 so un-
balanced and patently in favour of the Rand organisation were the differen-
tials in power and strength between the twobodies. The RNLBwas acting
from a weak position; impecunious as it was and floodedwith cheap labour
which it was obviously prepared to dispose to the highest bidder. WNLA, on
the other hand, was negotiating from a position of strength, backed, as it
was. by adequate financial resources and lavish political support. Because of
these factors, even in a situation where WNLAwas asking for favours to
recruit labour, this had, apparently, to be carried out on its own terms.
Three main aspects of this WNLA/lNLB accord demonstrate very
clearly the respective positions of these twobodies. Firstly, WNLAwould
not accept the pre-condition in the agreement that North-Eastern and North-
Western Rhodesia were to have first claim over labour supply across the
Zambes1. From WNLA'spoint of view, this stipulation was destined to off-
set the volume of labour supply from these trans-Zambeslan territories,
given the fact that there were. in the first place, no sufficient guarantees on
regular labour supply from the region and that, even if such supply were
149Rhodesia Chamber of MinesAnnualReport 1905: p, 65.
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available, the employers of SouthernRhodesia wouldbe in a more advantageous
position over this supply of labour than their counterparts at the Rand. Sec-
ondly, the Rand labour bodywas, from the start, patently half-hearted over
the demand by SouthernRhodesian colonist employers that it should use its
influence with the Portuguese authortttes. to render available to Southern
Rhodesia, labour supply from Portuguese East Africa, especially in the region
adjacent to SouthernRhodesia's Melsetter district. As WNLAitself confessed,
this SouthernRhodesian demandwas almost impossible to carry out, as it
was, more or less, a matter of mutual negotiations and reciprocal concess-
ions between the Administration of SouthernRhodesia and the Portuguese
150authorities. The third and final factor dealt with the issue of repatriation
of northern labour recruits, once they had completed their stint at the Rand.
Here the essential features and objectives of labour exploitation, within
the constraints of a colonial setting, are very clearly demonstrated too. The
refusal by a seml-officiallabour organisation to bear the responsibility on the
repatriation of recruits, even those cases involvingthe indigent, the sick and
misfits, was not only a demonstration of the destre, by the employers in
question to squeeze the maximum out of their labourers at the most irredu-
cible minimum in capital outlay, but that such a stance should have wonthe
support of the Imperial officials, both in Londonand SouthernAfrica, is ir-
refutable evidence on how the mining industry in this part of the world had
succeeded in holding everybody captive, within a particular system under its
dominant influence. The fact that everyone of consequence. ranging from the
colonist employer to the finanCier, politician and labour recruiter, seemed to
be in league over one of the fundamental requirements in successful and per-
manent labour recruitment by a professional body,151 is a classical demon-
stration that the mining industry in early SouthernAfrica had reached a
stage, where it could have been easily mistaken for a monoculture, in very
much the same manner as the sugar industry was treated in the West Indies,
at the time. Against this background, the influence of the Randwas, undoub-
tedly, ines timable.
150C.O. 417/385: J. Cowie, Acting Secretary, Transvaal Chamber of Mines,
to Lagden: May8, 1903.
151Orde Browne discusses, in detail, the advantages of spcnsored repatria-
tion in labour recruitment. Vide: Orde Browne: oPe cit. PP. 60-1.
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As a matter of fact, in this particular case, where the repatriation of
Rhodesian labour recruits, from both sides of the Zambesi, was concerned,
once WNLA had been exempted from the requirements of Southern Rhodesia'S
Native Employment Ordinance No.9 of 1899 and once this labour body's agent,
Captain Goodyear, then based in Mafeking, had visited the country to carry
out arrangements for the receptloo of the Rand-bound recruits at specified
WNLA bases in Umtali and Bulawayo,152 its obligations, with regard: to the
welfare of these alien labourers, were henceforth minimal. The initial
plea of the Resident Commissiooer in Salisbury, on the questim of the repat-
riation of labourers from the Rand so as to facilitate the task of tracing
153missing ones and also to encourage further recruitment, totally failed to
impress WNLA. All the coocessioos this body could make, in relation to the
repatrlatloo of these foreign recruits, were promises to put at their disposal,
its rest-houses between Krogersdorp and MafeldDg, for those recruits who
were prepared to walk this distance to the railhead, as well as a probable
reduction in the 30/- train fare, for recruits travelling in batches of no less
154
than 20 individuals at a time, between Mafeking and Bulawayo.
From the Colonial OfficialS point of view, the Resident Commissimer'B
insistence 00 WNLA beariDg the expenses and respoosibiHty on repatriation
was besides the point. AllWmt mattered was that:
••• a responsible white man should take his -flabourer'st
ticket -ftrain~ from him ffigenerally speaking, 'forward' him
whther he wants togo.
In a nutshell, WNLA won the day,in an arrangement highly regarded by the
RNLB as eliminating unfavourable competition between the two bodies for
labour supply and, at the same time, affording no chance to the private labour
agent to perpetrate his nefarious trade either in Southern Rhodesia or in the
trans-Zambesian territories.
For the cause of trans-Zambesian labour migration into Southern
Rhodesia, the period between the birth of the RNLB and the termination of the
mLAjRNLB accord in 1906, may rightly be treated as a stage, when the
152C. O. 417/392: Gielgud to Taylor, C/N/C, Bulawayo: May 5, 1904.
153!2!!;!: Clarke to Milner: August 16, 1904.
15~id: E. J. M. Macfarlane, General Manager, Transvaal Chamber of Mines,
to Lagden: May 28, 1904.
155!2!2: Minute by Grindle: July 1, 1904.
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movement virtually reached its nadir. Whilst the new labour organisation,
the RNLB, was born amidst a flurry of fanfare and optimism, its achieve-
ments were, essentially, either negative or irrelevant, at this particular
stage of its history. The trans-Zambesian governments were, as usual, pre-
pared to meet the requirements of this newbody through their perfervid co-
operation in the field of labour recruitment for the sake of the Southern
Rhodesian labour market. In SouthemRhodesia itself, the Administration,
employers of labour and the white colonist population in general, had succeeded,
by 1903, in creating a suitable atmosphere inwhich the new labour organisa-
tion could operate with a wholesome amount of moral and ethical justification
before it; a situation naturally made possible by the contemporary movement
to raise the rate of African taxation and, consequently, mount intensified
fiscal pressure to facilitate cheap labour mobilisation within the framework
of a colonial setting.
Yet at the same time, the cumulative effect of these divers factors, it
must be admitted, was to create a large surplus of labour supply on the
Southem Rhodesian labour market, giving rise to a number of negative con-
sequences. The WNLA/RNLBarrangement, discussed above, whereby both
the trans-Zambesian territories and Southem Rhodesia were temporarily
reduced to labour reserves of the Rand, whilst their labour organisation just-
ified the inequitable arrangement onthegrounds of its ownindigence, was only
one feature of these consequences. Itwas not tiIl1906, therefore, that the
situation was reversed, partly because of the growing dissatisfaction amongst
the white colonists in SouthemRhodesia and also because of the changing
economic conditions of the subsequent period 1907 to 1914. These changes
materially affected the process of trans-Zambesian labour migration into
Southern Rhodesia during the course of this subsequent phase.
A number of variables of economic nature, may be said to have influenced
the relationship between SouthernRhodesia and its trans-Zambesian
sister states and, consequently, the course of trans-Zambesian labour mig-
ration between 1907 and 1914. To understand the history of trans-Zambesian
labour migration during this period, it is also necessary to identify these con-
temporary factors, which operated in such a profound manner as to shape the
volume of trans-Zambesian labour migration as well as the tempo of economic
development on both sides of the Zambesi. Firstly, van Onselen has argued
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that in the period after 1907, the BSACo. succeeded in controlling the specu-
lative element in Southern Rhodesia and, by so doing, managed to attract the
attention of larger but cautious capitalists of SouthAfrica, thus encouraging
them to invest some of their capital in the mining industry across the Lim-
POPO. 156 This was obviously an important step in the development of the
mining industry of Southern Rhodesia.
But the significance of this post-I907 move must be measured in rela-
tion to the second factor, whichwas also of no mean dimension in the context
of the BSACo.'s economic activities. The factor we have here in mind is
the liberalisation of the Company's fiscal pollcy in relation to its royalty
claims over mining and mineral production, thereby openingup the sluice-
gates for the rise of the largely impoverished solo prospectors and small-
workers, who came to occupy a conspicuous place in the country's history
in the subsequent years. In statistical terms, the BSACo. introduced a new
system, in 1907, on which its royalty claims were to be made. Instead of
the usual 'five per cent' fiat rate, then fixed as the basis of these claims,
a graduated system was introduced, ranging from exemptions for those prop-
erties producing a gross value of below £1,000 in monthly output to about 7i
157per cent of the gross value of output for the exceptionally rich ones.
Of course, the move towards the liberalisation of the Company's fiscal
policy was not carried out for any altruistic motives. Itwas, in fact, part
and parcel of a chain of reactions which together contributed to the general
shift in the tone and trend of the BSACo.'s economic philosophy. Perhaps, it
could be argued here, that once the speculative era had come to an end in
1903 in Southern Rhodesia and the subsequent recesston.covertng the years
1903-6Jhad exposed the wealmess of the mining industry, as the sole economic
base the Company could hitherto boast of, it was natural that the BSACo.
should, therefore, look for alternative economic avenues and canalize its
developmental efforts in a new direction. Such a line of argument, as we have
posed here, of course, aptly justifies the role of the third portent factor which
shaped the economic scene in Southern Rhodesia and also, to some extent, in
156Van Onselen: Chibaro: PP. 26-8.
157'Declaration of Policy by the Visiting Commission made in Bulawayo on
19th October, 1907': in BSACo.Directors' Report and Accounts: March
31, 1907: lee, cit
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the trans-Zambesian territories during this period This is, in short, the
birth of capitalist agriculture.
The establishment of a separate administrative department, the so-
called Lands or Estates Department under the direction of C. D. Wise in
1905, to take charge of the Company's commercial agricultural schemes and
158matters pertaining to general land settlement, certainly heralded the birth
of what Arrighi describes as a white rural bourgeoisie whose influence and
competition with the mining industry, over labour supply, was apparently
beginning to tell, especially between 1907and 1912,159
Across the Zambesi too, new developments were also beginning to
appear in the period after 1907, Here, for instance, the completion of the
railway line to Broken Hillin 1906and its extensiro to the Katanga border in
1909, were both Significant feats, which drastically affected the basic econ-
omic structure of this region. On the agricultural front, the railway ltne
facilitated a general influx of colonist farmers who settled, especially on the
Batoka plateau (later Mazabukadistrict) and in the Mashukulumbwecountry
along the railway line; areas recommended by the BSACo. officials for their
respective suitability for agricultural and pastoral farming potentiaL 160 On
the other hand, the development of the mining industry, which the arrival of
the railway line in the trans-Zambesian territories engendered, appears to
have been the cause for concern, on the part of the BSACo. Whilst local
demand for labour, by the burgeoning copper-mining properties in the Kafue
region, could be met with minimum inconvenience to labour exportation to
Southern Rhodesia, the case was quite different in relation to the Katanga
mines.
In fact, as far back as 1901, the people of the Luapula Valley and, to
some extent, those living on the Tanganyika plateau, in North-Eastern
Rhodesia, had been used to proceeding to work at the Kamboveand the Star of
the Congomines in the Katanga. This phenomenonwas as much a result of
the ethnic affinities existing between the various national groups on both sides
158The BSACo.Report on Land Settlement in Southern Rhodesia by C. De Wise:
~: p.4.
159Arrighi: The Political Ecroomy of Rhodesia: P. 19.
160Extracts from the Report of the Acting Administrator of N/W RhodeSia
-{Lt. John Cardenr for the years 1906-1907; in BSACo, Directors'Rep-
ort and Accounts: March 31st, 1907 PP. 62-3.
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of the Luapula river as it was also a side-effect of the increasing economic
interaction between those people on the British side of the river and their
161counterparts in the Belgian Congo. The popularity of material goods from
the Belgian Congo, particularly the brand knownin African terms as
162mokambo, must have also contributed to the progressive gravitation by the
people from the Luapula Valley of North-Eastern Rhodesia, in general, in
this direction.
For the sake of the BSACo. after 1906, when the extended railway system
facilitated access and travel between North-Eastern Rhodesia and the Katanga,
the problem was not a minor one. Indeed,since Robert Williams and Company
took over the UnionM1nieredu Haut Katanga and its properties, like the ~
of the CongOin 1906, they became increasingly dependent on North-Eastern
163Rhodesian labour supply from that time onwards. In fact, between 1907 and
1914when the WorldWar Ibroke out, the challenge posed by the Katanga mines
had become so ominous that the BSACo. officials on the Rhodesian side of the
border had to resort to deliberately disruptive tactics by either re-routing the
direction of labour emigration from the Luapula Valley and elsewhere or by
openly destroying all the canoes which crossed the Luapula river into the Bel-
. 164gian Side without any due authority. In another respect, the belated
attempt by UnionMiniere to import its own Chinese labour force, in June
1913, via Beira, Bulawayoand Broken Hill, 165when other colonist employers
of labour in the sub-continent had, by that time, written off this type of lab-
our, is a clear demonstration of the enormity of Katanga's labour problem
and, by the same token, the intensity of the rivalry for labour supply between
Katangan colonist employers and their Rhodesian counterparts. It was, there-
fore, within the framework of this peculiar setting that the RNLBwas to
operate and also react to the manifold challenges arising therefrom, especially
during the period 1907 to 1914.
161
162Cmmison: Ope cit. PP. 25-9.
Dr. Kaunda, the President of Zambia, makes some fnterestlng references
to his escapades into the Be1gianCongoto procure Mokambogoods in the
1940's. Vide: K. Kaunda: Zambia Shall Be Free: An Autobiography:
163 Heinemann Books: London:1974 (Reprint): PP. 30-9.
Meebelo: OPe cit. P. 84.
164 ._ . _ __ _
Sh()lto Cross: The WaoohTower Movementin SouthCentral Africa 1908-
!2!2.: D. Phil. thesis (unpublished):Oxford: October, 1973: PP. 287-8.
165
C.O. 417/534: Buxtm, Johannesburg,to Corner, Bulawayo: June 25, 1913.
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On the credit side, it may be argued here that after its dubious rappro-
chement with WNLA, the RNLB emerged on the trans-Zambesian scene with
a new zest and vigour; assets whichwere quite essential to this organisation,
at this juncture, in order to recoup the confidence of its constituents, the
colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia, and thus ascertain the base of its
financial backing. Official support, too, was not, by any means, lacking. In
North-Eastern Rhodesia labour recruiting activities by agents ofWNLA, for
the benefit of the Rand, were suspended towards the close of 1906, due to the
incidence of an unusually high mortality rate, amongst recruits from this
territory, at the Rand mines. With this exit ofWNLAagents, every encour-
166agement was, thereafter, made to enable RNLB agents to fill the gap. Once
the Bureau hadjtherefore.found its feet again, it became increasingly difficult
for WNLAagents, operating from the neighbouring Portuguese territory and
Nyasaland, to challenge its monopolyover North-Eastern Rhodesian labour
supply and, for its role in staving off competition from WNLA, the colontst
employers of Southern Bhodesta, in particular, were beginning to appreciate
the value of their labour organisation and its part in the country's economic
167development.
In North-Western Rhodesia, the measures introduced, in 1907 and after,
by the Admmistration, greatly contributed to the newly foundconfidence of
the Bureau and, in the process, paved the way for the gradual consolidation
of this organisation's monopoly in the field of labour recruitment. Perhaps,
a streak of luck, on the part of the Bureau, may be discerned here in the
departure of Coryndon to Swaziland, in Apri11907, as Resident Commissioner.
This official's exit, of course, meant the end of a less formalized system of
administration and, in like manner, the end of the era of the private labour
recruiter, whom Coryndonhad tended to favour, in spite of the unsavoury
168reputation of this class of people. Coryndon's successor in North-Western
Rhodesia, Codrington, was a st; ckler to bureaucratic systems and regulations.
Thus once he had moved from Fort Jameson to Livingstone, his tastes and
handwork soon became apparent. In this respect, the restrictions and require-
166General Report on North-Eastem Rhodesia for the TwoYears Ending
167 March 31, 1907: in BSACo.Directors' Report and Accounts: PP. 71-2.
Report of the Managementand Finance Committee to the Annual General
Meeting of the RNLB:August 27, 1908: P. 26.
168C.O. 417/435: Minuteby Grindle: May24, 1907.
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ments imposed on labour agents by the Native Labour Ptoclamation No, 18 of
169
1907, were certainly indicative of the changing administrative mood in
North-Western Rhodesia.
For private labour recruiters, like those of Major Heany's East Gwanda
mines who, because of this mining boss' special relationship with Coryndon,
had hitherto had things their own way. these changes may not have been so
favourable, But as far as the Bureau was concerned, the 1907 administrative
measures were quite a bom; particularly so that they not only aimed at weed-
170ing out those labour agents of 'an undesirable character'. but also because
they guaranteed this body's expenses by providing punitive measures against
those recruits, who broke their contraciBwith the agents, through desertion
and in other ways, 171 Moreover, the registration fees, ranging from 2/-6d
to 5/- on labourers recruited for service in either North-Western or Southern
Rhodesia, imposed on the labour agents might have appeared ridiculously
Uttle to the Colon1al Office, 172 but not to the Bureau, Indeed Ithe Bureau
could only appreciate such low charges as they were actually designed to
minimize this body's expenses in labour recruitment.
In Une with these supreme efforts, by the respective administratiOllS of
the BSACo, territories, to promote the general cause of trans-Zambesian
labour recruitment in order to benefit southern labour markets, the RNLB
sustained a number of reforms in its organisation and infrastructure during
this period and, by the same token, its activities were Significantly revamped,
particularly between 1907 and 1910, The 1911-1914 period was, of course,
more Significant in the history of the RNLB and trans-Zambeslan labour mig-
ration and, for this reason, deserves a more detailed analysis within its
173proper context. In the years 1907 to 1910, the Bureau grew in stature and
its activities were Significantly intensified. By 1910, the recruiting opera-
tions of this body spread over a very wide geographical expanse, ranging from
169Ibid: 'Conditions Under Which the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau Shall
"""Recruit Labour in North-Western Rhodesia': Enclosed in Selborne to
170 Elgin: April 8, 1907,
C,O, 417/437: H. M. Hole, Acting Administrator, to Lord Selbome, May
~171 17, 1907~
!2!!!: MInute by Grindle: September 4, 1907,
172Ibid: Minute by R. H. Griffin to Risley: September 3, 1907.-173Vide: Makambe: 'Colmtalfsm and Racism, , ,. '
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Lake Mweru, in North-Eastern Rhodesia, to Beira in the South-east, in the
Portuguese territory, and from. Lake Tanganyika in the north, on the borders
of North-Eastern Rhodesia with the then German territory of Tanganyika,
to Bechuanaland Protectore in the South-West. In short, the whole sphere
of Bureau operations actually covered an estimated total area of about 900
miles in length and another 900 in breadth, as the Bureau management,
174boastfuly, claimed.
In like manner, this labour organisation had, by this date, managed to
cover about 900 miles on the ten or so major and minor routes, which its
agents used for forwarding recruits into and in SouthernRhodesia, with rest
houses and food depots. These rest houses and food depots were meant,
specifically, to facilitate the movement of recruits along the various Bureau
labour routes, differing as much in distance and strategic importance as the
950-mile one between Lake Tanganyika in the north and Feira in the South,
on the one hand, and the shorter internal route between Fort Victoria and
Selukwe, which covered only 60 miles, on the other.
The Bureau's recruiting and fOlWardingagents were posted and located,
literally, in every nook and corner of this whole geographical continuum,
which served as the theatre of its activities. Thus when the Bureau machinery
had reached its maximum growth in 1910, its officials and workers were
spread all over Zambesia. On the Tanganyika plateau and the northern part
of North-Eastern Rhodesia in general, after a visit by T. N. Micklem,the
Bureau Inspector from. the organisation'S headquarters in Bulawayo, the
existing team of Bureau officials was considerably strengthened. Hitherto,
Bureau activities in this region had been under the charge of four men,
namely, Douglas Hawksley, the Inspector of Recruiting, based at Fort Jame-
son, and two assistants, of whom J. E. Hugheswas the Recruiting Agent in
the Mweru and neighbouring districts, whilst D. Ross served in the Awemba
district. Completing the pre-1910 list of Bureau official in the region was a
175
certain Mr. Foord, whowas the Forwarding Agent at Kasama.
By 1910, however, another set of officials was introduced to ,reinforce
174._""Reporton the Proceedings at the Annual and Quarterly General Meeting of
the RNLB Management and Finance Committee held at Bulawayoon Thurs-
day,May 26th. 1910: p, 97.
175A3/18/30/26: MemorandumonRecruiting in N. E. Rhodesia by D. Hawks-
ley, Inspector of Recruiting: July 28, 1909.
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the old hands and to make the work of the Bureau more systematized and
effective. Of these new officials, R. A. Osborne was appointed an addi-
tional Inspector of RecruitiDg and, in this capacity, was to assist Hawksley,
who also held this post at Fort Jameson. W. B. Chamberlain was
stationed as the Recruiting Agent in the Luapula district; R. N. Smith in the
Tanganyika district whilst J. H. Norton was posted to the Awemba distrIct,
to work side by side with Ross, whowas already operating in the same area.
In fact, Norton's duties appear to have confined him mainly to the Chinsali
and Fife sections of the Bemba country, the remainder being left to his pre-
176decessor.
The enlargement of the Bureau machinery in the field, in North-Eastern
Rhodesia in 1910, can be interpreted in a number of ways. From one point
of view, it might be argued that the move was a response to Hawksley's hue
and cry, in mid-1909, that the increasing demands made on him andhis few
assistants were becoming unbearable. Indeed,up to 1909, Hawksley himself,
whose office combined both administrative work at Fort Jameson and recrui-
ting activities in the three divisions of the East Luangwadistrict, amongst the
Chewa, Ngoni, Nsenga and Tumbuka peoples of the region, foundhimself in
such a tight comer, as he confessed, that he had actually given up the work of
touring the districts1for recruiting labourers, to his African touts and mess-
engers, preferring to concentrate his efforts, as he did, on superintending and
forwarding these recruits to Feira.
Similar problems appear to have been faced by Hawksley's assistant
officials in their respective regions, especially the two recruiting agents,
Hughes and Ross, whose activities were hampered by the fact that the recruit-
ing season was rather short, lasting for only five or six months and being
177
essentially governed by the ram season, as It was. Though the Bureau
management in Bulawayo, at first, tried to alleviate the problems of Hawks-
ley and his team in North-Eastern Rhodesia, W allow:Jng the Impector flrRecruiting
himself to purchase a second-hand motor cycle, in order to increase his
mobility, and to employ 'a responsible native clerk at a salary not to exceed
176Report of the RNLB :Managementand Finance Committee and Audited
Accounts for Six Months Ended: June 30th, 1910: P. 11.
177A 13/18/30/26: MemorandumonRecruiting in NzE. Rhodesia by HaWkSley:
July 28, 1909.
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178£50 a year' for office work at Fort Jameson, these measures do not seem
to have brought any immediate improvement in the Bureau operations in
1909. The Hawksley view that the work of the recruiting agents in the field
might have been stimulated by paying them.on commission basis, at the rate
of 7/ -6d per recruit, rather than paying them.partly in salary and partly on
commission, as was the case in 1909, should be treated here as a candid
acceptance that things were not going on too well with the Bureau operations
in that part of the world.
Yet from another angle, it is also proper to regard the steps taken by
this labour organisation in North-Eastem Rhodesia, in 1910, as generally in
keeping with this body's developments in other parts of the geographical
sphere inwhich it carried out its work. As amatter of fact, the Bureau had
pursued such a vigorously expanstontst line of action, in its post-1907 act-
ivities, that it had estabUshed recruiting depots in such diverse places as
179Kimberley in the Cape colony by 1908, whilst the Gaberones and Palapye
stations in Bechuanaland Protectorate, under a Recruiting Agent named B.
Perfect, were estabUshed simultaneously with those of the Kafue region
180across the Zambesi, under J. Spencer Warren, in 1909.
Indeed/by 1910 the Bureau machinery had become so well organised that
it looked quite impressive. All in all, it consisted of 22 officials at the head-
quarters in Bulawayo and the sub-office in Salisbury, as well as 32 forwarding
and recruiting agents, in the field, in Southem Rhodesia and those surround-
ing states where the Bureau had permission to recruit labour. At the head-
quarters in Bulawayo, this labour organisation was headed by Philip L. Jen-
kins' the General Manager, assisted by Mlcklem9 the Inspector, and a number
of executive officers. Throughout Southem RhodeSia, the more important
sub-offices were those established at Fort Victoria under Walter Goddard,
the Superintendent of the Victoria Circle, with a number of agents throughout
Southem Mashonaland in his charge; the Salisbury office under J. S. Loosley
as its General Agent; Sinoia under the former Native Com.missioner of Mtoko,
F. R. Byron, 181but, by 1910, a Bureau Superintendent,and, finally, the
178Ibid: Ibilip Wrey, Charman, RNLB, Zomba,to Hawksley, Fort Jameson:
179 July 29, 1909.
Report of the RNLB Management and Finance Committee for Twelve Months
180 Ended December 31st, 1908: p, 5.
Report on the Quarterly Meeting of the RNLB Management and Finance
Committee Held on May27th. 1909: p. 29.
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Hartley depot which was entrusted to the Acting Agent, B.A. Cope.
The same structural organisation, described above, was replicated in
North-Western Rhodesia. In this case, however, there were about seven
Bureau officials posted in various parts of the territory and headed by P, E.
Webb, the Compound Manager and Recruiting Agent of the Kalomo, Sesheke
and Senanga districts, with Livingstone as his base of operations. 182 In this
lot, W. Frykberg, the Special Recruiting Agent for the Kasempa district,
appears to have been the latest addition to the team, as this district had just
been opened to recruiting activities in early 1910, with the first batch of
183recruits arriving in Bulawayo only in June of that year.
As far as North-Western Rhodesia was concerned, the re-organisation
of the Bureau machinery in that territory may also have been prompted by
the growing concern in Bulawayo, over the decline in the volume of recruits
from, this region, particularly noticeable in 1909. Though railway construct-
ion work in the territory may have been largely responsible for this decline
in labour migrants to the South, this unwelcome trend in the affairs of the
Bureau, actually necessitated a visit to Barotseland by Micklem, in June
1909, to try and increase the supply from that region. Indeed,the situation
was, in every sense of the word, quite ominous for the Bureau, given the
fact that Nyasaland had not fully agreed, at that stage, to allow massive
labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia, whilst in North-Eastern Rhodesia,
the only other major source of labour, sleeping stcknesa had just broken
184out. In fact, both the reorganisation of the Bureau in North-Western
Rhodesia, in 1910, and the Micklem visit, the year before, should be seen in
the light of this desperation to ascertain a continuous now of labour from
external sources; a phenomenonwhich the Bureau tried to reinforce, during
the same period, by making an unsuccessful application to procure more
labour supply from German South-West Africa.
In a nutshell, the reorganisation of the RNLB machinery and the disper-
18118 Vide: Makambe: 'Colonfa1fsm and Raclsm. ••• '
2Heport on the Proceedings at the Half-Yearly and Quarterly General Meet-
ing of the RNLB Management and Finanoe Committee Held on December
183 8th, 1910: P. 11. ' ." ,
Report of the RNLB Managem,entand Flnanoe Committee and Audited
184_Accounts for Six Months Ended June 30, 1910: loc, cit,
RNLB Report and Acco1Dltsfor Six Months Ended June 30th, 1909:
PP. 38-9.
460
sal of Bureau officials and workers over a wide area, by 1910, were indica-
tive of not only the general spirit of renascence which had gripped this body
since its unfortunate marriage of convenience with WNLA, but were also
symptoms of a new determination by both officials and employers of labour to
refurbish this labour organisation with those credentials which contributed,
in a general manner, to the overall success of most semi-official labour org-
anisations. From this point of view, officials on both sides of the Zambesi
hoped that the RNLB would bear the image of a well-managed organisation;
manned by responsible officers and workers and liable to control by the res-
pective governments in terms of its recruiting activities, arrangements for
the care of the labourers it recruited and the management of its finances.
The employers on their part viewed the Bureau as the appropriate Instrument
through which unnecessary competition for labour amongst individuals could
be eliminated, whilst/at the same ttme.guaranteemg the necessary supply of
labour at cheap wage rates. But, most important of all, both the officials
and employers saw, in the Bureau, a veritable panacea against the general
malfeasance, which the private labour agent and his unscrupulous ways,
frequently, left behind in the wake of his activities. For this reason, Worth-
ington, the Secretary for Native Affairs in North-Western Rhodesia, was,
understandably, overwhelmed with confidence and optimism, when he ass-
essed the position of the Bureau in March 1908, in the following terms:
••• ,that)- many changes have been effected in the methods
of recruiting by the Agents of the Rhodesia Native Labour
Bureau.
Each change has been in the right direction, and I do not
hesitate to say that a keen desire has been exhibited by Mr
McDonald ,Bureau Chairman)-, his committee and the
staff, to place the Bureau's operations on a sound and equi-
table footing.
The welfare of the native appears to be kept well in sight,
and it would seem that the old abuses connectrg5with in-
dependent recruiting are a matter of history.
Worthington's confidence would have been redeemed, in one way or
another, but for the manner inwhich the Bureau infrastructure across the
Zambesi fatled to cope with the increasing volume of labour migration and
185A 3/18/30/17: F. Y. Worthington, Secretary for Native Affairs to Admini-
strator, Livingstone: l\1'a.rch9, 19D8.
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recruitment for Southern Rhodesia. Because of both inadequate Infrasrructure
and the inefficient manner in which labour recruits were handled, the effects
of the journey to the Southdid not look quite glamorous, to say the least. Of
course, the enormity of the problems faced by trans-Zambesian labour mig-
rants between 1907 and 1910may not have equalled the dimensions of those of
the pre-1906 era,when the journey to Southwas a virtual 'middle passage' for
the trans-Zambesians. But, all the same, even in this railway age, in which
the Bureau was now operating under changed circumstances, its activities
were often marred by dubious arrangements, which, consequently, had
adverse effects on the welfare of the trans-Zambesian labour recruits.
During the period under discussion, trans-Zambesian recruits collected
from the Tanganyika plateau and the Bemba country, for instance, were gen-
erally delivered to the Forwarding Agent, Mr. Foord,at Kasama, where they
were forwarded to Feira via Fort Jameson; being joined there by battalions,
similarly recruited in the East Luangwadistrict and across the border in
Nyasaland. 186 Alternatively, these recruits from the northern part of North-
Eastern Rhodesia wouldbe banded together with their compatriots from the
West Luangwa, the Zumboand Kafue districts and were then forwarded to the
rail head at Broken Hill. 187 Here the Bureau had established a reception
compound of a semi-permanent character, consisting of a number of reed and
grass huts, located some seven miles from the rallway station and capable of
188
accommodating as many as 500 recruits at a time. But the accommoda-
tton,thus provided at Broken Hill by the Bureau, was, unfortunately, con-
demned by govemment officials for various inadequacies and alternative
arrangements were, therefore, made through H.U. Moffat, to allow the
latter's copper mining company at Broken Hill to place its more suitable com-
pound at the disposal of the Bureau for this purpose, as long as the Bureau
Recruiting and Forwarding Agent, T. J. Christison, for Broken Hill, Nd-
ola, Mwomboshiand surrounding districts took charge of the maintenance of
the buildings. 189
186A 3/18/30/26: MemorandumonRecruiting in N.E. Rhodesia by Hawksley:
187 July 28, 1909.
Vide: AppendixiK: RNLB Labour Routes, Rest Houses and Food Depots as
188 in 1912 (Map).
A 3/18/30/1'7: Philip L. Jenkins, Secretary, RNLB to Civil Commissioner,
189 BulawaY°l.March14, 1908.
Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayo
to Private Secretary, Dept of Administrator, Salisbury: March 30, 1908.
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With regard to the rationing of recruits, the measures taken by the
Bureau itself, allowed, as usual, for minimal expenditure on this particular
item. The normal measure of rations for recruits, from districts outside
Broken Hill, was either in form of salt or calico, at the rate of twoyards
per week, valued at about 3d. With these articles, the recruits then bartered
them for grain or other staple food items that constituted their posho (rati-
190ons). The main reason behind this system of rationing, derived from the
JftCt1ce orb labour agents, themselves paid on the basis of both commission
and salary as they were, was, of course, to minimize their costs on those
recruits they had engaged. Alternattvely, this rationing system might have
been simply connected with the physical constraints imposed on both the
agents and recruits by the lack of an adequate communications infrastructure.
Indeed. as Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner for Matabeleland, dis-
covered, during an official investigation in the activities of the Bureau across
the Zambesi inMarch 1905, the question of conveyinggrain from the Luangwa
river to Broken Hill or from the Mkushidivision of the Zumbo district, dis-
tances of about 210 and 90 miles respectively, was considered 'prohibitive
and impractical. '
In fact, the whole business of supplying rations to labour recruits in
these areas, where grain was frequently scarce, was complicated by the fact
'that it would have raised the rationing costs to about 4d per diem per recruit,
which the agents would not, naturally, have welcomedwith eagerness. In-
deed, even at the Broken HUI Compound,where the Bureau was obliged to
provide its recruits with rations at the cost of 2id per recruit per diem, the
food was not of the best kind. Taylor accordingly commented on this kind of
food, Indicating that:
It ~the meal and graln)- was of a very bad quality and
full of weavils, andwouldcertainly be condemned if
supplied to ¥Mives working on the mines ~in Southern
Rhodesiah
For these and similar reasons, official pressure was, therefore,lbrought to
bear on the RNLB to introduce changes also, in connection with the feeding of
recruits bound for the South. Thus arrangements were subsequently made,
190
Gelfand: OPt cit. PP. 110-1.
191!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C Bulawayoto Secretary, Department of Administra-
tor: March 30, 1908.
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on Taylor's initiative, for the Bureau to procure regular supplies of better
quality grain from the African Lakes Company and also from a farmer, named
Johnson, living some 15 miles away from Broken Hill. Codrington too stip-
ulated that the Bureau should provide meat rations to its recruits, to the
amount of one beast for every gang of 300 labourers.
The actual process of transporting these Bureau recruits, from Broken
Hill to Livingstone and thenceforth to Bulawayo, raised other issues during
the 1907-1910 phase of this labour body's operations. The length of the
period of detention, the recruits underwent at Broken Hill, was determined
mainly by the nature of the arrangements the Bureau agents '.had, with the
railway officials, for conveying the labour recruits to Livingstone. But even
when Livingstone was reached, there was also the Wlcertainty as to whether
these recruits were to be sent through to Bulawayowithout any delays <Xl the
way or not.
For the recruits' feeding arrangements en route, provision was made by
the Bureau to allow the gangs of travellers to get supplies at two points
along the three-day train journey between Broken Hill and Livingstone. These
two points, where the train had a night's stop at each of them, were Kafue and
Choma. Here agreements had been reached with local traders, Mr.
Adams at Kafue and a Mr. McPhail at Choma, to provide fresh food supplies
to Bureau agents and recruits on their way to the South. At Livingstone too,
when the gangs of recruits did not pass directly to Bulawayo, compound
a:xommodatianand rations were also provided, whilst thorough medical ex-
amination was carried out, to screen and detain those of their number, whose
health had succumbed to the rigours of the journey.
An interesting aspect of the Livingstone part of the journey is the fact
that, whilst the recruits waited for the f:inalarrangements to enter Southern
Rhodesia, they were essentially responsible for the preparation of their own
food. Indeed.In 1908, before the Bureau depot at Livingstone had a grinding
mill like its Broken Hill counterpart in the north, the main pre-occupation of
the recruits, as they wafted here, was the stamping of grain, for food, in
wooden blocks made for the purpose; a precess then highly regarded by the
Bureau Medical Officer at this point, Dr. G.A. Ellacombe, on the grounds
192that such food retained most of its nutrient value. It was actually at these
192!!!!!!: Jenkins to Civil Commissioner, Bulawayo: :March14, 1908.
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main points and depots, like Broken HUI and Livingstone, too that the Bureau
recruits, except those from North-Western Rhodesia where the government
had discouraged the practice, were also issued with blankets, jerseys and
193lm1ckerbockers. The expenses on these items, which the government of
North-Western Rhodesia turned down as too exorbitant, were later deducted
from the trans-Zambesian labourers' meagre wages; an eventuality that
frequently caused some misunderstanding between the employers and the lab-
ourers, as the case of the Angoni labourers at the Bonsor mine, in 1900,
demonstrates. 194
The preceding arrangements by the Bureau, to maximise the effective-
ness of its machinery beyond the Zambesi, were apparently supported by the
BSACo. officials on both sides of the river. The Bureau was, by 1910, at
least In the eyes of the government officials, approaching a stage, whereby
it qualified to be treated as the ideal organisation that they required Ito shield
administrative personnel from any form of political embarrassment, which
labour abuse, especially In the overseas press, entailed, when government
officials were involved. But perhaps one defect, which appears to have
marred the mirror -image perspective the officials had of the Bureau during
the period under discussion, concerned the journeys of the recruits between
Livingstone and Bulawayo. In this case, even the most ardent supporter of
this organisation, Worthington, the SecretarY for Native Affairs at Livingstone}
whose praise-singing on this body we have already demonstrated, was evid-
ently discouraged by the nature of the train Journeys the Bureau recruitB were
compelled to undertake. Thus he observed, accordingly, in early 1908 that:
An improvem.ent could most certainly be made in the directim
of Railway accommodation between Bulawayo and Broken Hill.
I have drawn. the attention of the Bureau to this one unsatis-
factory feature in their organlsatim, but received the assurance
that the Railway Company has refused to furnlsh a more sani-
tary type of carriage. I have on several occasions met the
train in -(at Livingstone)- from the South and have seen
natives white with lime emerge from the Insanitary and over-
crowded cattle trucks in which they are repatriated. I have
also noticed that the atmosphere they have had to breathe
was heavily lmPregnated with free lime and desiccated
cattle dung.
193......-Report on the Proceedings at the RNLB Quarterly General Meeting Held at
194 Bulawayo on December 8th, 1910: p, 43.
Vide: Supra: pp.187..8
195A 3/18/30/17: y/forthington to Administrator, Livingstone: March 9, 1908.
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Such conditions as these, recorded byWorthington, obviously required
to be eliminated if the Bureau had to improve its image amongst the govern-
ment officials and the African societies from whom it procured its quarry.
Taylor too made similar comments in relation to the train journeys of the
Bureau recruits, pointing out, particularly, the shortage of accommodation
in the trucks provided for these recruits and the absence of amenities, which
196in this case Included drinking water.
Because of the fact that this criticism, emthe train journeys and the
general conditions of the Bureau recruits to and from the South, was partly
directed towards the management of the rallways division, the Bureau too
managed to emphasize the shortcomings of the railway management as the
cause of its undoing. Thus it complained bitterly against the rallway author-
ities, In this case the Belra and MashonalandRailways, for the limited roll-
ing stock they often placed at the disposal of the Bureau to transport it rec-
ruits. The Bureau, apparently, could not see any justification in the practice
of the railway management, whereby the latter provided only six trucks, each
carrying about 50 recruits, at peak periods, when large numbers of trans-
Zambesian recruits were forwarded to the South. It was quite obvious, from
the Bureau's point of view, tlutthe attitude of the railway authorities was, in
many ways, responsible for situations. whereby Bureau recruits were 'en-
trained on long journeys in cattle trucks, which -(were}-often over-crowded,
with the result that the natives frequently arrive-(d}- at their destination in a
197condition unfit for work. ' To avoid the recurrence of these unfortunate
situations, the Bureau,therefore,requested for an increased number of trucks
for Its recruits.
On the importance of adequate accommodation, as a necessary factor
on the fitness of the trans-Zambesian recruits on their arrival in Southern
Rhodesia, the labour bodywas also backed by well1nformed optnton, to wit
the Pneumonia and Scurvy Committee, which emphasized a similar line of
argument in its report in 1910. This Committee even went further in this dir-
ection by calling for some form of legislation to prevent the practice of
over-crowding recruits aboard trains, emtheir way to the Southern labour
196Vide: Supra:p.463
197MonthlyReport of the RNLBManagementand Finance Committee:
August 18th. 1910: p.2
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198centres. In fact, the Bureau felt quite aggrieved, in the final analysis, by
what it interpreted as evident lack of co-operation on the part of the railway
officials over issues of great moment to their major customer, this labour
organisation. The expenses the Bureau incurred, in connection with railway
transport, were actually increasing yearly, rising, for instance, from £5,911
for the last half of 1908 to £6,920 for the first half-year of 1910. Moreover,
the manner in which the railway system operated up to 1909, for example,
seemed quite loaded against the Bureau, which could only result in increased
expenses. Here the Bureau's Managementand Finance Committee laboriously
drew the attention of its constituents to the effects of the railway system,
particularly. in relation to the detention depots between Livingstone and Broken
Hill, where the delays in forwarding the recruits had inevitably led to an
increase in Bureau expenses. It stated its case as follows:
••• up to quite recently there has been only one train a
week from Broken Hill to Livingstone, necessitating a
detention of natives at the various rail heads for f~fPe-
times fully a week before they can be forwarded.
Under these circumstances, the Bureau, naturally, felt quite justified in
deploring the negative role played by the railway authorities in the process of
trans-Zambesian labour recruitment. The railway factor was thus seen as
undermining the effort of the Bureau in promoting the cause of trans-Zambesian
labour mobilisation for the benefit..,of the colonist employers of Southern
Rhodesia. Yet to be fair to the railway authorities on both sides of the Zam-
besl, the railway system, in the region, had never been laid down, in the
first place, as a means for facilitating the mobility of the African traveller
per se. Itwas more or less a speculative venture designed to benefit those
centres of white settlement where industrial development looked promiSing
and,for this reason,African areas of settlement had been deliberately by-
200passed by this transportation system. In short, the Bureau whose exist-
ence and survival actually depended on the several African societies from
which it obtained its com.modity, the labour recruit, was here, unwittingly,
a victJ:m of factors beyond its control.
198_-Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Prevalence and
Prevention of Scum and Pneumonia Amoogst Native Mine Labourers
~: (Salisbury:) PP. 9-10. •
199Report of the Quarterly Meeting of the RNLBManagement and Finance Com-
200 mittee Held en May27th. 1909: P. 29.
Vide: Supra: ppAIO-1
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But fortunately for the RNLB, the railway factor, either during the 1907-
1910 period or after, did not materially affect the progress this labour organ-
isation was destined to attain at the time. Indeed,the railway factor served
only as a minor drawback to Bureau activities, especially in the field of
trans-Zambesian labour mobilisation, but other positive factors of the period
far outweighed the negative ones. With the backing of respective govemments
and BSACo. officials, on both sides of the Zambesi and abroad, the RNLB
established an unassailable hold in the field of labour recruitment and, with
the support of official Instruments, such as SouthemRhodesia's Labour Fees
Ordinance of 1906 and later the Labour Tax Ordinance of 1911 which guaran-
teed the financial side of Bureau affairs, this body turned into a virtual
semi-governmental organ, whose monopolyin matters of labour supply,
especially in the BSACo. territories, was beyond anyone's challenge. Such
an image of this labour organisation is here vindicated by the intenSity of
the Bureau's activities between 1907 and 1914, and how these affected the
African communities in the trans-Zambesian region, in particular, where
this body operated more vigorously.
An interesting combination of factors emerges at this stage of trans-
Zambesian labour mobilisation. The officials and employers had, by 1907,
significantly perfected the technology of labour recruitment, as the RNLB
symbolized, and yet, on the other hand, the tempo of economic development,
during the period 1907-1914, had risen to such a degree that increasing
demands were being made on the Bureau to supply some of the essential mat-
erial to meet the needs of those variables, mostly of economic kind, which
exercised ,much influence on the contemporary scene in South Central
Africa. Indeed,in some cases the Bureau was forced to resort to desperate
measures, either to keep in harmony with the tempo of these developments
or, as in the case of the contemporaneous activities of UnionMlniere in the
trans-Zambesian territories, to stave off, by crude means, any possible
201challenge of injurious nature. Throughout this whole drama, the activities
of the Bureau, either on its own or in competition with other interests, had
telling effects on the African societies, particularly in the trans-Zambesian
territories, the focus of our interest here as the source areas of labour
migration to the labour centres of Southem Rhodesia.
201Vide: Supra: pp.453-4
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As we have indicated before, one of the most effective weapons applied
by the trana-Zambestan governments for the benefit of the Southern Rhodesian
colonist employers was taxation. By this form of administrative coercion,
government officials across the Zambesi came to form an essential in-
202gredient in the process of labour emigration to the South. By 1907, the
application of fiscal pressure had become a more universal phenomenonin
these territories, particularly so at a time when the RNLBhad just revived
its activities to meet the growing demand for labour in Southern Rhodesia. As
far as the African communities of these territories were concerned, there
were few alternatives to labour migration, by means of which they could effe-
ctively meet the challenges of taxation.
In North-Western Rhodesia, where Lord Selborne, the HighCommissioner
for SouthAfrica, had paid a visit in October 1907, to confer with Lewanika
and other members of the Lozi aristocracy, the only other ecooomic alterna-
tives which would have enabled the African societies of the area to meet the
government's economic demands were agriculture, collection of rubber and the
sale of cattle. But even these alternatives had their own limitations. The
sale of stook, for example, could not prove viable due to the absence of
markets for the purpose and for those cattle-owners, whowere prepared to
part with their herds, the prices paid by the so-called 'kafflr truck' traders,
for these animals, were ridiculously low; paying, as the latter did, about 30/-
per beast in Barotseland, only to sell the same stock in Bulawayofor a
market value of £6 each. For fear of losing their stook in this manner, few
African societies of North-Western Rhodesia were, therefore, willing to sell
their stock to meet the government's tax demands. For this reason, Lord
Selborne could thus comment, with obvious disappointment but little under-
standing, on what he interpreted as the ultra-conservative attitude of the
Africans towards their cattle, that:
Nothingcould be more apathetic to progress than the way in
which a SouthAfrican native normally treats his cattle. He
neither sells them, nor eats them, nor uses theio3 -{but)-simply
looks at them as a miser does at his treasure.
If, according to Lord Selborne's view, this African conservative attitude
towards stook had prevented cattle-owners to sell their animals, even in
202Vide: SUpra:PP.425-8
203C.O. 417/437: Lord SeIborne to Lord Elgin: November 11, 1907.
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moderation, to meet tax demands, it had also, as a result, contributed posi-
tively towards labour migration. In 1907, in particular, when the Broken
Hill and the Bwana Mkubwa mines were closed down, labour migration to
Southern Rhodesia was said to be on the increase, as people from the trans-
Zambesian region went down to earn money for taxes. The High Commiss-
ioner himself, who regarded this development as 'a good thing', urged both
officials and employers in Southern Rhodesia to provide sufficient inducements
in terms of sound working conditions and a reasonable minimum wage, to
204make labour migration a viable movement.
In some parts of North-Western Rhodesia like the Kafue district, for
example, the rate of labour migration, especially among the Mashukulumbwe
had begun to worry the people. Indeed,the Mashukulumbwe elders were
becoming so concerned about their young men, who left for Southern Rhodesia
and never returned, that they nearly rose up in revolt in September 1907. The
dilemma of either losing their cattle in stock sales to meet the tax demands
or sending their sons onto an uncertain journey to Southern Rhodesia was
rather too much for these Ha (Mashukulumbwe) and, for that reason, the irate
parents burnt down the mission station of the Primitive Methodist Missionary
Society in the area, driving its resident missionary, the Rev. William Chap-
205man and his wife, helter-skelter into Broken Hill.
The reaction of the Mashukulumbwe to the forces of fiscal pressure and
labour migration were only a minutae to the variety of events, which affected
several African communities. in the post-1907 era of Bureau recruiting
activities and official commitment to labour migration to the South. In fact,
one feature of official policy towards African taxation, in the trans-Zambesian
territories, was that tax defaulters and anybody in potential need of tax
money were very often press-ganged into the drag-net of the Bureau and,
accordingly, forwarded to Southern Rhodesia. In October 1907, while Cod-
rington was on holiday in Madeira, for example, Colonel John Carden of the
Barotse Native Police, who acted as the Administrator of North-Western
Rhodesia, was put in an awkward situation, whereby he was forced to defend
government policy with regard: to the practice of forwarding tax-defaulters
20~id.-205C. o. 417/437: Extract from the Report the District Commissioner,
Mashukulumbwe. for September, 1907.
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206to the Bureau for exportation to the South. Apparently, an indiscreet
private individual in the territory had let the cat out of the bag and informed
the High Commissioner that:
••• it is a practice in this coontry ~orth-Westem Rhodesia}-
to collect natives who have not paid their tax within the prescribed
time, and send them under escort, to work off their obligations
at the Southem Rhodesia Mines; in other words, to impose a per-
iod of forcWtabour in the mines as a penalty for non-payment
of the tax.
What Carden actually protested againsthere. was the strong emphasis the
anonymous informant in question had placed on the role of the govemment of
North-Westem Rhodesia in procuring 'forced labour' for the Bureau. To this
official, the policy was milder than that, as all what his govemment did was
that it 'encouraged' the tax-defaulters 'to get into touch with recruiting agents
from the South, and engage themselves for a period of mine work. '
In the final analysis, the difference in the opinions of the govemment offi-
cial and a private source, on this matter, was merely one of semantics
rather than anything substantial. What actually emerges, in the process, is
the degree of mutual co-operation between a semi-official labour organisa-
tion and administrative officials in promoting trana-Zambes! labour migra-
tion to the South. Employers and officials, on both sides of the Zambesi,
were evidently in league over the issue, but they wanted to play the game with
the cards close to their chests. Yet as the heat generated by the activities of
the Bureau became more intense, it became increasingly difficult to control
the course and nature of those events, whereby the identity of interests bet-
ween the Bureau officials and their govemment counterparts was inextricably
blurred. In the main, it was the African who suffered in consequence. either
as a potential labour recruit or as a member of a particular administrative
unit. The proceedings in the Gwembe division of the Batoka district of North-
Westem RhodeSia, between 1907 and 1910, are an interesting study in the
methods adopted by an alliance of Bureau and administrative offiCials in the
process of labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia and the adverse effects
which ensued, as an aftermath.
The imposition of hut tax in the Buni-Kariba or Gwembe sub-division of
206C. O. 417/438: Carden to Codrington: October 21, 1907.
207Ibid: Quoted in Carden to Codrington: October 25, 1907.-
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the Batoka district in 1904 was apparently followedby a chain of events
which did not portray any positive picture of BSACo. rule among the Gwembe
Tonga people. The Collector of this district, J. C. Macnamara, had,
evidently, indulged in a number of activities, between 1904 and 1907, during
the course of which the GwembeTongawere said to have been treated 'with
utmost brutality', whilst the; , same activities were condoned in official
circles as 'only to be expected In a district inhabitated by a particularly raw
208and uncivilised type of native•••• ' But with the arrival of the Bureau
agent, G.A. Cooke, in the area in early 1907, Macnamara's activities were
greatly intensified as he tried to m.eet this agent's demands for labour; hence
the origins of the so-called 'minor uprising' among the GwembeValley people
209of this area in that year.
A number of causes may have been particularly responsible for this spurt
of activities, which coincided with Cooke'S arrival In this part of the Batoka
district over which he was to take charge, In addition to the Mashukulumbwe
country, as the RNLB's Recruiting Agent. Onewhite colonist by the name of
Charles N.B. Venables, also nicknamed 'Mandala' by the Africans of the
Gwembe sub-district, made an Interesting Introspection on the alliance bet-
ween Macnamara and Cooke. Venables himself had been Uvingon his farm,
called 'Venablesdale', straddling the twoGwembeTonga chiefdoms of Sigongo
and Simamba,stnce 1905, and thus had observed the progress of Macnamara's
reign in the area, without allying himself to it, from the beginning. The moti-
ves behind Macnamara's zeal to aid the Bureau agent In his area apparently
derived from both personal designs and administrative requirements and the
Increased activities, which this official of the Gwembedistrict consequently
mounted between 1907 and 1910, were, essentially, a reflection of a situation
best described by Venables as one whereby 'too many Interests -(were)- m-
210volved' In simple terms, the situatt<l1 which brought about the woes of
the GwembeTanga when a Bureau agent was posted thither during the reign of
Macnamara was caused by a number of factors linked together, in a dialect-
teal pattern, best expressed by Venables, in the followingmmmer:
208C.O. 417/466: C. N.B. Verables to Richard Goode, Administrator's
Secretary: Livingstone: January 16, 1909.
209Colson: Social Organisation of the GwembeTonga: PP. 29-30.
210Mas. Brit. Emp. S.22/Flle G. 184: Venables, Kafue, to Travers Buxton,
Secretary, APS: December 23, 1910:APS Papers: Rhodes House. Oxford.
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• .• all over Rhodesia ~orth and South)-.•• labour is forced
for Govt (sic) purposes and for the mines whose working up
high pressure demands a large supply of native labourers, and
as the British SouthAfrica Companydepends largely for its
commercial revenue (as distinct from administrative revenue)
on the royalties paid it by the mines the largest returns of
natives of their Districts employed through the RNLB gains
official credit: and not only so, but one continually hears it
alleged of offi.cials of the Native Department that they are
receiving a share of their commission from their recruiting
agents, and presents from mine man3fffs and others for
supplying them with native labourers.
In this :Macnamaraaffair, the various parties in the deal on Tonga labour,
therefore, were Macnamara himself and Cooke,the Bureau agent, who
operated in the field in the Gwembedistrict; the Administration of North-
Western Rhodesia, which received the registration fee on labour recruits;
the BSACo. which benefitted on its royalties, whilst the Bureau as a body got
the £1:10/-:0d capitation fee on recruits delivered to the mfnes under its
212charge and not as independent labourers. For the Bureau, however, its
dependence on coercive official methods of recruiting labour was a far
greater advantage than anything else other parties in the game could ever
gam. Of course, towards the close of 1910, when this labour organtsattonwas,
~noated as a joint stock company, with a large proportion of its capital
being subscribed by 'the BSACo. or persons connected with that Company', to
use Venables's phrase, the reliance of this body on official effort to procure
labour became even more overt and axiomatic. To individuals who managed to
stand on the sidelines and take stock of the effectiveness of this alliance of
interests, as Venables did in the Gwembedistrict, the outcome was easily pre-
dictable; hence this colonist's despair:
I cannot see that the reconstructed Rhodesia Native Labour
Bureau will be able to attain its avowedobject of greatly
increasing the labour supply for the mtnes of Southern Rhodesia
without the acti~ co-operation of the officials of the Native
Affairs Department ~North-Western R4.ft!sia)- whichwould
mean the continuation of forced labour.
Of course, the co-operation between the Bureau and government offiCials,
which was so prevalent in the Gwembesub-dfstrict between 1907 and 1910, was
by no means a new phenomenon. It was, practically, the fruition of the dom-
211nug: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
212Ibid: Venables to Buxton: December 23, 1910.-
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inance in South Central Africa of a politico-cum-economic power, which
BSACo. rule symbolized, and the effects of this alliance were patent all over
the region, both beyond and below the Zambesi, especially in the field of
214labour mobilisation. What actually arouses the interest of an analyst of
the proceedings in the Gwembearea, at this particular period, are the
methods used by an administrative official there to appease the interests of
the Bureau and those associated with this body. These methods reflect not
only the extent of the brutality which Macnamara deployed, but also the
attempt which this and associated officials made to resort to those tactics
that tended to reinforce the degree of psychological dominance and control by
one segment over others in a racially stratified colonial society.
Thus in the name of labour mobilisation, the GwembeTonga, especially
tax-defaulters and general malcontents, were 'tied up to their necks in sacks
and set In the sun'; they had 'their arms tied up above their heads' only to be
released 'after some time when the blood ~d)- receded from their arms ••• ':
were floggedwith the 'sibaba' (sjambok)with atrocious results or had their
corn-stores burnt down, whilst the owners were shot, allegedly, for insur-
rection, when they ran away into the bush to escape Macnamara's high-
handed methods, as occurred in June 1907, a month after the arrival of the
215Bureau agent in the district. The flogging meted onto these GwembeTonga
was so thorough that not a few individuals, whohad fallen victim to the prac-
tice, were reported to have either died or committed suicide as a result,
especially among Chief Sigongo's people.
Of special relevance for this study, is the manner inwhich Macnamara
raised recruits for the Bureau to despatch them to Southern Rhodesia. Appa-
rently, the method initially adopted by this·official was to tour the district,
together with the Bureau agent, collecting such recruits as they came across
in the process. However, because of the .admlnistrative tactics, which Mac-
namara generally applied in dealing with his charges, this method apparently
failed to work, as the GwembeTooga came to regard their official 'in such
dread' that on hearing that he had camped near their villages, on patrol, and
intended to send his messengers, 'to call them in', they consequently 'stam-
21~id.-
214Vide: Makambe: 'Colooialism and Racism•••• '
215!!ili!: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
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peded into the bush and did not return untll Mr Macnamara's departure •••• 2~6
The second method alsoadoptecl by Macnamara, when his personal
effort had thus been frustrated, was to send his messengers with instructions
217to, in euphemistic terms, 'bring in' the people 'to see -(him)-. ' This
method was quite effective, though the techniques employed in the process
were, to say the least, often bizarre, whilst the results were obviously dis-
tressing. On their errand, these messengers, whose primary duty was to
collect recruits for the Bureau, were not selective at all. They took anybody
they encountered, including those labourers already engaged to local colonist
farmers and traders and were either on leave or about to start their terms of
service with their respective local employers. It was, essentially, for this
reason that Venables started his opposition to Macnamara's activities, as the
former's labourers were amongst those recruits, collected for the benefit of
218the Bureau in April 1908.
An interesting dimension of the recruiting activities of the Native Depart-
ment messengers in the Gwembe district, between 1907 and 1910, is the
manner in which Uttle regard was placed on the agricultural pursuits of the
local peasant communtttes, The Gwembe Tonga were recruited at the peak of
the agricultural season, when their crops required to be gathered in and when
it was important for the able-bodied men to build grain stores for .
the impending harvest. The results were obvious and Venables who lived
amongst them protested that:
The District -(Gwembe)- is overrun with baboons and wild pig
and In addition birds descend in storms on the fields of
ripening Kaffir corn and millet; now that all the men are
being called away, a greater proportion of these crops are
bound to be lost, the women and children being quite in-
capable, by themselves, of protect:!ng 'the:aelds fran 'the ravages <t'19
these pests,an latar an in the seas on, famine is bound to result, .•. 4:f
Here was a typical case, where the economic emasculation of peasant
agriculture was being encouraged, by enforcing the process of proliterian-
isation onto the African peasantry and thereby encouraging the development of
216c.O. 417/466: Venables to Acting Administrator: Livingstone: December
12, 1908.
2171!2!2: J. C. Macnamara to Venables: April21, 1908.
218~: Venables to Macnamara: April 20, 1908.
219Ibid: Venables to Lord Selborne: March 6 and 7, 1909.
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an imbalanced ecmomy, through a phenomenonwhereby labour migration
placed cheap labour at the disposal of capital in particular areas, where such
labour was required. Such practices were a common feature in the BSACo.
220territories, especially In Southem Rhodesia. Yet the BSACo. offiCials, on
both sides of the Zambesi, often insisted that labourers, even though pro-
cured by means which meant their direct impoverishment and other forms of
economic deprivation, were quite cmtented with their lot. In the Gwembe
district, where messengers press-ganged Tonga recruits for the Bureau and
matched them down 'with ropes around their necks', as if they were 'crimln-
221ala', because it was feared these recruits 'might run away', official
opinion was conclusive that such labourers offered themselves willingly to the
Bureau. In any case, these recruits were, euphemistically, 'persuaded' to
look contented with their engagem.entwith the RNLB. Venables here ex-
plained the procedure taken to effect the desired results, by the officials, in
one particular district:
•.. itwas the custom when labourers were required for any
purpose to send out Govemment messengers (native) through
the District. These messengers would retum with gangs of
natives tied in single file with ropes round their necks.
When they approached the settlement the ropes would be
taken off and the messengers would order them to sing, and
those who did not do so they ~messengers)- would 'encourage'
with sjambok, and that, ••• was whynatives used to appear as
delighted at the prosmt of doing the particular work they
were brought In for.
The activities of Macnamara in the Gwembe district, whether to promote
the cause of labour recruitment or for other purposes, were, therefore, not
at all out of the ordinary. They appear to have tallied with the general
pattem of events in this part of the trans-Zambesian territory, at the time.
The officials themselves also appear to have constituted a class of men, who
were already set in their beUefs, on particular pattems of behaviour and on
the distribution of power and privileges In a racially composite colontal soc-
iety in which they carried out their day-to-day activitiea. In resorting to
coercive methods of extracting labour, these officials were not merely carry-
ing out an exercise of economic character, but were also fulfilling some of
..,
220Vide: Infra: pp.94 5 - 6
221!!tl!!:Venables to Goode: January 16, 1909.
222
MBs. Brit. Emp. S.22/File G. 184: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
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those functions which their status and patronage over the subject peoples, in
a colonial situation, entailed and the use of coercive means, either to procure
labour or enhance their privileges, was, nafnrally, in keeping with the pre-
conceptions of these administrative officials either in the trans-Zambesian
territories or in colonial societies elsewhere.
Thus in North-Westem Rhodesia, during the period of intensified Bureau
activities between 1907 and 1914, the rigours which the African societies
suffered, at the hands of both administrative officials and Bureau agents, had
their ethical justification in the sense that the general administrative philo-
sophy, in these BSACo. territories, was geared in such a manner that those
officials, who were caught by the law with their pants down, were often exon-
erated in one way or another. In fact, as the drama of the Gwembedistrict
unfolded between 1907 and 1910, it began to emerge that the activities of the
officials, in this and other districts in the territory, had the official backing
of Worthington, the Secretary of Native Affairs himself. This supremo had
apparently assured his juniors that '••• sub rosa,they -{could)-inflict floggings
and imprisonment' on the subject peoples, over whom they were in charge,
and that 'if any complains were made that he -{MrWorthington)- would see
223
that they did not get into trouble over it. '
This deal, between Worthington and his junior officials, was adherred to
so faithfully by the Native Departm.entpersonnel in North-Westem Rhodesia
that up to 1913, whenWorthington left BSACo. service, they had no problem
in applying pressure to procure labour in form of carriers, even though the
conditions of service in the porterage industry, especially under govemment
224employ, were patently deplorable. During the Macnamara reign, in the
Gwembe district, he and his contemporaries were not fotmdwanting, once
this sanction had been provided by their superior. Thus they instituted a
system, paradoxically, styled 'District Discipline', whereby African mal-
contents and defaulters were imprisoned arbitrarily and subsequently classi-
fied as 'District Visitors', Hable to be drafted for forced labour, either for
building govemment sub-stations or any other work for traders and other
private individuals, whopaid the administrative official concemed, for such
223Ibld
224C. O. 417/539: R. I. Hughes, Assistant Magistrate, Kalomo, to Goode:
Livingstone: February 14, 1914:
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225services.
It might also be remarked here, for observation, that whilst the attitude
of the head of the Native Department in North-Western Rhodesia encouraged
a general resort to coercion as a way of raising labour supply, it was not
simply the abundance of labour that individual officials in that part of the terri-
tory enjoyed most. What these administrative officers seemed to have revelled
in, with utmost delight, was the exercise of personal authority and the psy-
chological satisfactioo which this implied, in terms of their status as a class
amcmgst the subject peoples. Thus their behaviour was aptly portrayed, in
1910, as follows:
The main body of officials may be said not to be systematically
ill-treating the natives but rather to domineer over them and
to be apt occasionally to break out into violent measures, more
particularly if they -(officials}-imagine that they have not been
treated with sufficient deference. They are, as a rule, most
rigid In their exaction of homage from the natives, whomust
all fall to the ground and clap their hands or thighs at the
sight of an official, even a clerk, in the outside districts.
Some appear to think it increases their authority to order a
chief's ears to be boxed at a general meeting or if a Headman
does not at once concur with what he is told they consider ~
application of a sjambok as the most convincing argument.
This type of behaviour, amongst the administrative officers of North-
Western Rhodesta, was, of course, influenced by various aspects of early
black/white contact. in this part of the world Early Britons to the trans-
Zambesian region had been greatly impressed by the customs of the Lozi and
the respectful manner jn which these people were treatBiq,thesubject ethnic groups.
Thus at Sesheke, in March 1899, the Gibbonsparty of white adventurers re-
corded a show of 'extreme courtesy', staged by the subject Toka and Subia
towards the Lozi, indicating that:
Every time an inferior speaks to a superior he claps his
hands and also whenhe has finished what he has to say.
When his superior speaks to him he claps his hands and
says 'shangwe' (a word denoting respect).... When the
Mokwaior Letia are about, you hear the hands ~pping in
unison Ukevolley firing, only in better untson,
225Mas. Brit. Emp. S.22/File G. 184: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
226C•O. 417/494: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910: Enclosed in Buxton to
Col. J, E. B. Seell: October 21, 1910.
227Entry for March 23, 1899: in Wallis (ed.): op, cit. p, 102.
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These whites, whether travellers or officials, were, however, disappointed
to discover that the subject peoples in Barotseland did not 'clap hands to a
white man' and were particularly annoyedwith this evident denial, by these
peoples, of the white man's superior status. The Tonga, for instance, in-
curred such a large measure of disfavour amongst the early whites. that
the latter regarded them as 'a set of idle insubordinate thieves' and even
wished 'the Matabele had exterminated them while they were about it. ,228
In a nutshell, the demand for respect, by the Native Department officials
in North-Western Rhodesia, which they mixed together with labour extraction
activities in the 1910's, was certainly a carry-over from attitudes of long
historical standing. What may have been a new factor, especially in the case
of the Gwembedistrict, is the manner in which the Administration, as a
whole, lent its support to the activities of its officials, even when such acti-
vities were evidently out of tune with the general trend of administrative
ethics. Of course,Worthington's attitude was quite clear on the matter and
his views on racial matters were even less palatable. 229 Yet it was Worthing-
ton's superiors who openly took up cudgels, on the Gwembeproceedings, to
defend, especially, the alliance between administrative officials and the
Bureau on labour recruitment.
Before the Imperial authorities In Pretoria and London, the Administra-
tion of North-Western Rhodesia, at first, attempted to dismiss the Macnamara
activities by discrediting Venables, whohad successfu.l1ydisclosed the affair,
as a renegade and a man of ignoble character, whose views were not worth
paying attention to, as he had been in the habit of keeping African 'concubines'.
This line of defence, however, mIsfired, when Venables not only admitted his
part in these moral accusations, but also revealed that the pract1ce of keeping
African 'concubines' was so commonplace, before the large-scale immJgra-
tion of white colonists in the region, that even Codrington, the late Admini-
strator) was also Involved In the game. In fact, this perSistent critic of the
activities of BSACo. officials In the trans-Zambesian region. only managed
to invalidate this line of defence, pursued by the Administration of North-
Western Rhodesia, when he threatened to expose some of the highly placed
officials in South-Central Africa, who, literally, kept,for themselves,
228Entry for March 19, 1899: inWallis (ad. ) oPe cit. p, 101.
229Vide: Supra: p.477
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'harems' of African women. 230 The second line of approach, adopted by this
Adm1n1stratlon, was, perhaps, less evasive and, In essence, vindicated the
affinity of interests between the various governments of the region and RNLB.
Although Itwas clearly demonstrated, at the time, that the people of the
Gwembe division of North-Western Rhodesia, like their neighbours In the
Feira district, were quite capable of proceeding, on their own without being
channelled through the Bureau, to the labour centres of Southern Rhodesia,
arriving at places like the Ayrshire in the Lomagundi district after 'a jour-
ney of from eight days to a fortnight and -(carrying)- an abundance of food
231from their own homes for the journey ••• " the authorities of this territory
would, however, not agree to this. In any case, they were quite aware that
any approval, by them, of such developments would, of course, justify the
phenomenon of independent labour migration to the South and, consequently,
frustrate the functions and objectives of the Bureau, which they supported so
much.
Thus in the Macnamara case and that of his immediate successor, R. I.
Hughes, whereby administrative pressure was employed to supply recruits
to the Bureau In the Gwembe district, the official line of argument was that
tax-defaulters and those people In need of money were, Simply, 'advised
that it -(was)- their duty to earn money ••• , and if work -(could not)- be
offered to them locally they -(were)- shewn that there -(was)- a means in the
232
Bureau of earning -(money)- easily .••• ' To add a sanctimonious note to
the whole affair, the Administration of North-Western Rhodesia tried also
to convince the Imperial authorities, with regard to the Gwembe proceedings,
that Its officials were helping the Bureau to recruit labour, because this was
to the advantage of the labourers themselves. With this in mind, Lawrence
A. Wallace, the Acting Administrator in Livingstone informed the High Com-
missioner that:
Knowing the evils that resulted before from the independent
stream of labour going South I cannot agree that It Is to their
-(labourers ')- advantage that passes should be indisCriminately
given to them or that recruiting should be allowed to anybody
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230C. O. 417/493: Venables to Lord Gladstone, May 11, 1910.
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C. O. 417/483: Venables to Imperial Secretary, Johannesburg: July 18, 1910.
232
C. O. 417/484: L. A. Wallace, Acting Administrator, Livingstone, to Lord
Gladstone: September 9, 1910.
except to the Labour Bureau which has the guarantee of the
Southem Rhodesian Ad~~istration -{of fair treatment and
medical esamtnatton)-,
The rank and file colonists in North-Westem Rhodesia who witnessed the
proceedings in the Gwembe district either remained indifferent or expressed
outright support for the stance taken by the Administration as opposed to that
of Venables. A school of thought, within the colonist circles, represented by
234Leopold F. Moore, based at Livingstone since 1904, and his paper, the
Livingstone Mail, was quite candid on this issue. They viewed forced labour
in terms of those nebulous theories on the white man's noblisse oblige and the
attendant black man's burden, popularly held by the supporters of the cause
of imperialism and colonial control at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Accordingly, the LiviIyptoneMaiI justified forced labour, on which the Bureau
depended in this territory, on the following lines:
The allegation that they -(natives~ are forced is another
matter. To Europeans the idea is repugnant, but as a South
African of seventeen years' standing we -{colmists~ are not
so sympathetic. To leave the native in the veld, under the
circumstances created by the Company's -E BSACo. 's~ suppres-
sion of intemecine warfare, is to leave him to degenerate into
a prolific nuisance.
To force him to work is only to assimilate his condition to that
of the white man. None of us would work if we were not forced
to, and if we remained content with what satisfied him, we
should be even as he. On the question of Tax, again.... There
may be objections to it, but the law is that he -{should~ pay, and
somehow or another he has to be made to pay. There will be in-
justice and oppression, - we -{Englishmen~ have experienced
these things ourselves, - and vi~g is notoriously triumphant
in theatrical performances only.
Of course, the reactions of the white colonists to cases of abuse in rela-
tion to labour recruitment, as the Gwembe district affair demonstrates,
were governed by a number of practical considerations. The colonist farmers,
for instance, had complained In 1909 about their problem of labour short-
age, which they attributed to the fact that 'all the available natives were
-{be1ng~ regularly drafted to work on the Southem Rhodesia mines through the
RNLB~236 But the BSACo. officials in North-Westem Rhodesia successfully
233Ibid.
234For Moore's activities In the anti-Asiatic campafgn in Southem Rhodesia:
235 Vide: Chapter 3: w.26S-75
C. O. 417/494: Extract from. The LiyblgstoneMaiI February 5, 1910.
Enclosed in Buxton to CoL Seely: April25, 1910.
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quietened these colonist farmers by instituting an arrangement, whereby the
RNLB supplied them with all those recruits, rejected by the Bureau's Medi-
cal Officer at Livingstone or Broken Hill, as unfit for minework in Southern
Rhodesia and for which the farmers were in tum required to pay a capitation
fee of 5/- per labourer to the Bureau as well as guarantee a wage rate ranging
from 5/- to 7/~d per month.237
Such an arrangement may have worked well for the farmers, but for the
recruits, who had been engaged on the promises of high wages in Southern
Rhodesia, where, in accordance with the contemporary official parlance, they
could earn 'easily In one month far more than they -(had)- to pay -(In taxes)-
238in a year .•• " their shock and indignation, at finding themselves packed
off to a neighbouring farm and engaged at a rate they could have as well
received from the local employer in their own home distriCts, must have been
inestimable. In short, the arrangement was a very convenient one to the
Bureau, which used the farmers of North-Western Rhodesia as a clearing
house. Venables summarized this arrangem,ent quite aptly:
It is a poor satisfaction for the farmers. The British South
Africa CompanyAdministration -(North-Western Rhodesia~
having enserfed practically all the able-bodied natiyes through
the RNLB the latter handed over to the farmers all the weak-
lings whom they could not dispose of to the mJnes (whopay
royalties to the BSACompany)for £l-lO-Od per head, and who
otherwise would have been left on their -(Bureau's~ hands and
whom they would have had to send back to their homes at their
own expense. The unfortunate farm,era had either to r;ygve
the RNLB of its liabil1ty or go without labourers at all.
In a nutshell, the white colonist, In general, was presented with what
looked, virtually, like the proverbial Hobson's choice over this issue of
collaboration between administrative officials and the Bureau to recruit
labour. The colonist farmers were largely dependent on the Administration
for their labour supply and,therefore, they feared that any disapproval of
administrative activities, on their part, could consequently lead to retalia-
236Mss• Brit. Emp. S.22/File G. 184: Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
237Ibid: Extract from The Livingstone Mall: February 7, 1910: Enclosed in
Venables to Buxton: June 23, 1910.
238C•O. 417/484: Wallace to Lord Gladstone: September 9, 1910.
239Mss• Brit. Emp. S. 22/FUe G. 184: Venables to Buxton: June 23,
1910.
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tion, usually in form of an organised effort 'to boycott the complainer'. The
traders too were equally at the m.ercy of the Administration, which 'could
refuse to re-issue a trader's licence without giving any reason for the ref-
240usal, Indeed, when Venables attacked the nature of proceedings in the
Gwembe district, he was,for instance, not only branded 'an extremist', but
was also warned that should he press on his charges against administrative
241officials, 'things wouldbe made unpleasant for -(b,im)-.'
Thus through this use of intimidation against the white colonists and, at
the same time, conscious of the demand for forced labour by the only news-
paper in the territory as well as the mortal dread of the African peoples, to
complain against the high-handed methods of administrative officials to
promote the cause of labour migration through the Bureau,the Administration
of North-Western Rhodesia could, smugly, continue to advocate the need for
liaison between BSACo. officials and the Bureau over the issue of labour
supply to markets below the Zambesi. Even if this liaison was not in the best
interests of the subject peoples of the respective distriCts, where Bureau
operations were carried out, the Administration could, at least, rest contented
with its capability to contain any leakages to the outside world, as Venables
indicated in June, 1910:
When therefore the Administration ~of North-Western Rhodesia)-
states that ill-treatment of natives by officials and forced labour
is not common they do so with a fair degree of confidence that
those who. the true state of affairs will not dare to contra-
dict them.
The Gwembedistrict proceedings of 1907 to 1910present an interesting
aspect of trans-Zambesian labour migration to Southern Rhodesia, under the
aegis of a semi-official organisation and with the blessings of the BSACo.
officials in South Central Africa. At this particular period, a combination of
various factors may have been responsible for the inordinate pressure that
was brought to bear, in this manner, on the African societies in the trans-
Zambesian territories where the Bureau operated with such vigour. Indeed,
it might not be out of place to collate here proceedings, like those in the
Gwembe district, with the outbreak of sleeping sickness in the northern
portion of North-Eastern Rhodesia, which restricted the scope of Bureau
240IbId.-241IbId.
242IbId.-
483
activities for three years between 1907 and 1910 in particular. Perhaps the
incidence of this epidemic may have influenced the Bureau to shift its pressure
from the North-Eastem Rhodesian portion to the North-Western Rhodesian
section of the trans-Zambesian region, with the inexorable consequences,
which we have discussed above, as constituting a feature of trans-Zambeslan
labour migration. to the South.
But in its own right, the Sleeping Slc1m.essepidemic appears to have
presented other interesting aspects in the genesis of trans-Zambeslan labour
migration to the South. BSACo. officials, who had always felt disconcerted
about the position. and monopoly of the RNLB over trans-Zambeslan labour
supply, actually used this epidemic to vitiate those strands of competition
still posed by WNLAof the Rand and the UnionMiliere of Katanga. In the case
of WNLA, the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia had never forgiven
this body for the role it had played before 1907, in using Its economic power
and influence to reduce the RNLB to the status of a mere satellite of the Rand
interests and, at the same time, neglecting the Issue of labour supply from
the Portuguese territory. where WNLAwielded a lot of Influence, whilst
Southern Rhodesian colonist employers themselves needed such labour so
much. Moreover, the activities of WNLAagents, whowere deeply involved
in labour poaching from Southern Mashonaland, were a constant sore point
amongst the white colonists of Southern Rhodesia.
Thus when Sleeping Sicmess broke out, a number of colonist associations,
representing all shades of opinion, met in Salisbury. in December 1907,
demanding total prohibition of WNLArecruits from the North, using Southern
Rhodesia for transit purposes. Actually, the Administration of Southern
Rhcdesta, mindful of the opposition of its citizenry, had stipulated that WNLA
243could make use of UmtaUonly as its entreport into the country. But this
suggestion did not satisfy the employers of labour at the Rand: who felt that
since their recruits were raised in that part of Portuguese Zambesia. bet-
ween Tete and Zumbo, the natural route for them to take was that running
between Fort Jameson via Feira and Mazoe and then onto Salisbury, where
they were to be entrained for the Rand. WNLAcould not trust the use of Um-
taU, which, it felt, was too near the territories of the Mozambique Company,
243C. O. 417/451: Milton. to Chester-Master (?), 1908: Quoted In Chester-
Master to Lord Selborne: Telegram: January 3, 1909.
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that had openly prohibited labour recruitment for the Rand. 244 For these
reasons, WNLA had gone ahead with its plan to use the Fort Jameson-Feira-
Salisbury route and, in fact, Eustace, the former Manager of Labour Board
of Southern Rhodesia, had been appointed to take charge of WNLA matters in
Salisbury.
WNLA's arrangements were, however, put to a severe test, once sleeping
sfekness was detected in some parts of North-Eastern Rhodesia. Perhaps by
coincidence rather than design, it came to llght, at the beginning of 1908,
that two of the gangs raised by WNLA, which appeared in Salisbury as having
come from· W. R. Burne, an agent of this body, based at Fort Jam.eson,
had actually come from the Songea district of the German territory of Tan-
ganyika; an area adjacent to the Tanganyika, Mwe.ru and Luapula districts of
245North-Eastern Rhodesia. When medical evidence in SaUsbury showed
some positive symptoms of sleeping siclmess amongst these recruits from
German East Africa, BSACo. officials in Salisbury regarded this as a god-
send opportunity, to strike a humillating blow against their old rivals at the
Rand.
Indeed~Mllton, the head of the Salisbury Administration, made no effort
to disguise these intentions, when he informed the High Commissioner about
the ire of the mining industry of Southern Rhodesia on the 'inadvisability of
allowing these gangs to find their way through this Territory -{Southern
Rhodesia}-', as two years before, they had 'caused a mutiny in the Compound
of a large mine ••• by exaggerated stories of the conditions under which they
246
were engaged to work -{at the Randh ' In a note to London Wall, Milton
was even more forthright on the vengeful intentions of his Administration on
the matter, when he stated that 'the Influence which would be exercised on our
natives by the passage of well fed gangs engaged at high wages' was naturally
harmful. 247
It is probable that even more drastic measures would have been taken
against WNLA's trans-Zambeslan recruiting activities had General Louis
Botha's governm.ent, in Pretoria, not lXlt pressure on the Hfgh Commissioner,
244__
Lbid: Lord Selborne to Lord Elgin: February 10, 1908.-245
C. O. 417/461: A. Mo Fleming, Medical Director, to Milton: January 15,
246 1908.
!2!!!: Milton to Lord Selborne: January 15, 1908.
247!2!!!: Milton to BSACo. January 17, 1908.
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threatening to demand compensation for any losses sustained by the Rand
248mines, consequent to the actions of Southern Rhodesia. The High Com-
missioner too warned the Salisbury Administration against taking measures
which could compel WNLA to switch off the use of the Umtali route for for-
warding trans-Zambesian recruits to the Rand, in favour of the sea route via
Chinde and Delagoa Bay; a move which, the Imperial official concluded, could
also mean. an. economic loss to Southern Rhodesia's railways an.d store-
249keepers, who had largely benefitted from the existing arrangements.
The efforts of the BSACo. officials of the Salisbury Administration to
consolidate the RNLB monopoly over trans-Zambesian labour supply by
emasculating parallel activities in the same region by WNLA were, there-
fore, here folled by the preponderant economic and pol1ticalinfluence the
Randlords an.dtheir sympathisers wielded. Thus the deploym.ent of this in-
fluence, by the Rand employers, to mitigate those geographical disadvantages,
which WNLAwas subjected to within the regional economic structure of the
sub-conttnent, successfully saved this labour body from any adverse conse-
quences arising from the vindictive actions of the Salisbury Administration.
For this reason, it is easier to appreciate the bitterness of the Salisbury
officials against the staying measures of the High Commissioner to save WNLA,
250which were readily denounced in Salisbury, as out-rightly 'dictatorial'.
On the other hand, the Union M1Qerewas not as lucky as WNLAwas, on
this question of competition for trans-Zambesian labour supply with the RNLB.
Once the presence of sleeping sickness in Northern Eastern Rhodesia was
reported in 1907, the consequences of the restrictive measures imposed by
the BSACo. officials of the trans-Zambesian territories caught the Katangan
employers in the face at full blast. The restrictive regulations, lmposed on
labour recruitment from the Mweru, Tanganyika and Luapula dis tricts, then
classified as 'infected areas', and the North and West Luangwa districts, also
regarded as areas 'under observation', and altogether located in the northern
251portion of North-Eastern RhodeSia, were a crippling blow to the Katanga
mines.
248C. O. 415/451: Prim.e Minlster's Omce, Pretoria, to Lord Selborne,
249 January 16, 1908.
!M!!: Lord Selborne to Lord Elgin: February 10, 1908.
250C. O. 417/461: M11tonto BSACo.: January 17, 1908.
251Ib1d: Wallace to BSACo.: December 5, 1907.
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Moreover, these restrictions were devised in such a way that few points
of exit, from these affected districts, were designated, thus, in this manner,
severely curtailing voluntary labour emigration. Besides, such points as
those officially recognised by BSACo. authorities for exit purposes, like
Abercorn, on the Tanganyika border, and Madonaand a few others, on the
Congo frontier, were even considered too many by the authorities on the
Rhodesian side of the lAlapulariver, whohad no illusIons about what they
regarded as the extremely lax supervision, on the part of the Be1gianauthor-
ities, over migrant labour from those areas of North-Eastern Rhodesia
affected by sleeping stcknees, between 1907and 1910.252
For the Katangan colonist employers, the implications of these restrict-
ive measures introduced in North-Eastern Rhodesia were wide-ranging in
terms of their economic repercussions. It was not necessarily the new
requirements, which forbade voluntary labour migration to the Congoand had,
in turn, necessitated a situation whereby carriers engaged to convey sup-
plies for the minblg companies on the Belgian side of the border simply
dumped them at Madma or any other border post, that worried these employ-
.ers, The compulsory resettlement of the African communities of the Luapula
Valley, the Mweru district and the Tanganyika plateau, away from the river
valleys and lakes to new areas, free from sleeping s1cmess and varying from
17 to 77 miles in distance from.their former homes, evidently had profound
implications for the course of labour migration to the Congo, from these
employers' standpoint.
The Katangan employers had, apparently, banked on clandestine migra-
tion to sustain the " existing movement of labour between the two territories,
on account of not only the ethnic ties between the contiguous African societies
on both sides of the Luapula frontier, but also because, it was felt that the
peoples of the Luapula Valley had developed some 'allegiance to men in the
Katanga whom they -{ha,drknown well for years and -{hadr learnt to like and
,253
trust. With the introduction of resettlement villages. in whfdl,even RNLB
agents were scarcely allowed to operate, except under tight supervtston, due
252C. O. 417/492: A. May, Principal Medical Officer, to Goode: Livingstone:
April 21, 1910.
253Ibid: Dr. Arthur Pearson, Late Senior Medical Officer, UnionM1n1eredu-Haut KatanKa,toWallace: Livingstone, April 4, 1910.
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to fear, on the part of the administrative officials, that labour recruiting
254might undermine the stability of these new villages, Katangan colonist
employers could not help expressing their disappointment over the possible
loss of labour supply, especially from the Laapala Valley, which they con-
sidered 'one of the best districts' for the purpose, as far as the Belgian Congo
255was concerned.
Indeed, even Bureau agents, stationed In this part of North-Eastern
Rhodesia, like Hughes, the Recruiting Agent for the Mweru district, appeared
to agree with this view of the Katangan colonist employers. As a matter of
fact, Hughes himself had also expressed his concem over the resettlement
scheme involving the Lunda of Kazembe, whichwas, to him, bound to hinder
the recruiting activities of the Bure&Mamongstthese people. Thus he Informed
the Bureau management in Bulawayo, In September 1910:
I shall not be allowed to recruit Kasembe's Alunda (sic) -
the people who are being moved - before next dry season.
The A1lUldaare the best natives in the District -(Mweru)-and
have been in the habit of going to the Congomines. A
thousand are supposed to be there now. The officials fear
scarci~ttf food among the Natives who have just been
moved.
In the final analysis, the Lunda and associated ethnic groups were moved to
257new areas, only to be returned in the 1920's. For the Katangan colonist
employers, the resettlement measures presented, at least, a tem.porary set-
back In the pattem of labour emigration from this region to the Congo, which
had very deep roots.
What further worried the Katangan colonist employers, with regard to
the incidence of sleeping sicmess In North-Eastern RhodeSia, was the way In
which BSACo. officials, in the trans-Zambeslan territories manipulated the
situation to obstruct labour migration to the Katanga, in the name of sanitary
measures, and, by so doing, brought into play their vindictive policies to jus-
tify long-establfBhed prejudices towards these employers of the Belgian
territory. Yet in spite of the Katangan employers' prophecies on the doom and
25"N 3/22/11/1: Assistant Magistrate, Mbereshi, Mweru District to Hughes:
September 8, 1910.
255C•O. 417/492: Pearson to Wallace: April4, 1910.
256N3/22/11/1: J. E. Hughes, Bureau Agent, Mweru District, to Jenkins,
Bulawayo, September 30, 1910.257 .,- . - .
Cmmison: OPe cit, p, 24.
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disaster that restrictive measures on. the Rhodesian side were likely to cause,
in form. of labour migrants from the affected areas either residing perman-
ently in the Congoor proceeding by stealth, especially since it was not
practicable to patrol 'three hundred miles of river -<Luapula~along the bank
258with native soldiers ••• " BSACo. officials, on both sides of the Zambesi,
would not lose sight of the manifold advantages. which the incidence of sleep-
ing sickmss, apparently, portended. They might have been frustrated in
their intentions to deal with WNLA, accordingly, on. the issue of trans-
Zambesian labour, but it was a different story altogether with the Katangan
colonist employers in particular and voluntary labour emigration from these
Company territories in general.
Having prescribed sanitary standards of their own in their own territories,
the BSACo. authorities set out, in a rather cold-blooded manner, to benefit
the RNLB, with regard .:to its ftmctions as a purveyor of trans-Zambesian
labour supply to the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia. In official
language, rather than allow clandestine labour migration to the Congo, where,
it was alleged, 'the precautions against sleeping siclmess -<were~ lmownto be
lax, ' BSACo. authorities, in the trans-Zambesian territories, felt that 'this
tendency -<could~best be counteracted by diverting the labour to S. Rhodesia
259(sic), ' which these authorities regarded as 'a legitimate source of employ-
ment. ,260 After all, themedf.cal authorities in Northern Rhodesia (for North-
261
Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia weremout to amalgamate by 1910)
were quite confident that Southern Rhodesia was better able, in their own
opinion, to deal with compHcations, arising from any outbreak and spread of
sleeping stekness which labour recruitm.ent from suspected areas entailed.
Indeed.Dr, A. May, the Principal Medical Officer of the two northemterrl-
tories, was here prepared to vouchsafe the 'strictest precautions', having
been guaranteed these, in tum, by his counterpart, Dr. A. M. Fleming, the
Medical Director of SouthernRhodesia. 262
For its part, the RNLBwas taken into the confidence of the BSACo.,by a
number of promises and measures, to canalize labour migration solely through
258C. O. 417/492: Pearson to Wallace: April4, 1910.
259C.O. 417/491: Hole to BSACo.: January 10, 1910.
260Ibid: Dr. May to Dr. Fleming: December 28, 1909.-261Vide: C.O. 417/476: BSACo. to C.O. : June 9, 1909.
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this labour body. In the first place, instructions were issued to administra-
tive officials, in several districts to across the Zambesi, to forego the
practice of giving out passes to potentia1labour migrants to the South, but to,
263
alternatively, direct these intending labourers to the Bureau. After an
inter-governmental committee, which also included a representative of the
Bureau, had made a survey of the areas affected by sleeping sicmess in
May 1910, the positioo.of the Bureau over labour recruitment in the dist-
ricts in question and in the trans-Zambeslan territories in general was
greatly strengthened. The message of this Committee, composed of Dr. May,
Dr. Fleming and Wrey, the Bureau Chairman, though obviously one-sided,
was quite clear:
No recruiting for SolithernRhodesia shall be allowed within
the closed area except through the agency of the Bureau. •• and
no voluntary labour shall be allowed to leave the closed area
either for Southern Rhodesia or for Be1g1anTerritory.
Moreover, the government of North-Eastern Rhodesia was required to
guarantee that:
••• as long as SouthernRhodesia is drawing labour from this
source ~orth-Eastern Rhodesia)- no recruiting of labour for
BeJgian Territory will be allowed in the closed area without
the mutual cons!lr4of the SouthernRhodesia Administration
and the Bureau.
From the preceding evidence, it is incontrovertible that. the BSACo.
officials on both sides of the Zambesi were determined to achieve what the
Bureau had hitherto failed to do; that is, to outplay both labour emigration to
the Congo and independent exodus from the trans-Zambesian territories to
Southern Rhodesia by simply providing credible inducements to the poten-
t1allabour migrants. In entrenching the monopolyof the Bureau, as the
BSACo. officials sought to do between 1907 and 1910 in specified areas of the
trans-Zambeslan territories, it became clear that labour recruitment,
merely as economic function without direct poUtical backing, was but an
empty shell; and this was what they Intended to rectify.
Thus through a well devised master plan, the BSACo. off1clals were able
262C. O. 417/492: Dr. May to Goode:Aprl121, 1910.
263C.O. 417/484: Wallace to Lord Gladstone: September 9, 1910.
264C.O. 417/492: Memorandum onRecruiting in Closed Areas in the Luapula
and Kalu.ngusiDistricts: May14, 1910.
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to streamline both independent labour emigration and competitive labour
recruitment by other parties in North-Eastern Rhodesia, not only by streng-
thening the hand of the RNLB, the BSACo.'s offspring, but also by laying
down specified routes, especially from the northern portion of this territory,
with medical centres at places like Kawambwain the Mweru district; Fort
Rosebery in the LuapJla district; Mporokosoor Abercorn in the Tanganyika
district; Ndola in the Kafue district and at Bulawayo inMatabeleland 265 Fin-
ally, a special camp was established at Fundu, OIl the fringes of the affected
area, at the cost of £2, 000 a year in maintenance expenses, to monitor move-
266ments of people into and outside this region. In one sense, the sleeping
sickness affair produced a number of advantages for the Bureau in more ways
than ane. In this respect, it might be pointed out here that it was these extra-
ordJnary conditions, ensufDg from the outbreak of this epidemic, which also
provided the Bureau and employers of labour in Southern Rhodesia with a
rare chance to procure a stable labour force, as officials across the Zambesi,
anxious to restrict the constant movement of labourers to and fro and thus
minimize the spread of sleeping sickness, were quite prepared to allow the
Bureau to extend the recruits' normal twelve months service to between
eighteen months and twoyears. Moreover, these long-term service recruits
were also allowed to take along their families to Southern Rhodesia, so long as
267
the Bureau was prepared to meet the transportation expenses.
The benefits of a combination of the twin factors, to wit, administrative
fiat and a fortuitous malady, were quite noticeable in the BSACo. territories,
at least, as far as Companyand Bureau officials were concerned, between
1909 and 1914. As may be obvious from the preceding discussion on the
genesis of Bureau monopolyover trans-Zambesian labour supply, these ad-
vantages, ensuing from the 1907-1910 events, were mainly for this labour
organisation and its administrative sycophants. But such advantages, some-
how, generally tended to operate against the interests of most of the rank and
file colonists as well as the African subject peoples in the Company territor-
ies.
265Ibid.
266Vide: PlateXllI: On the Iuangwa River near Fundu during Sleeping Sickness
Investigations (1911).
267C.O. 417/491: Hole to BSACo.: January 10, 1910.
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As early as 1909, the Companyand Bureau officials began, openly, to
exploit the situation in North-Eastern Rhodesia to their ownadvantage, much
to the resentment of those colonist sectors, which did not benefit from these
official proceedings, but were rather grievously handicapped instead. One
such occurrence, that amazed the North-Eastern Rhodesian colonists, was the
manner in which the BSACo. officials, successfully, raised labour supply
from the region, adjacent to the so-called 'sleeping sickness guard area', for
Messrs George Pauling and Company's railway construction work in 1909.
This region, between the Johnston Falls on the Luapula river in the South and
its Munushi tributary in the north, on the eastern bank, where the Lunda, the
Tabwa, Chishinga and other associated ethnic groups were resettled, was
officially closed to labour recruitment. Yet in this instance, these railway
constructors, whowere part of the Beira and MashonalandRailway Company
in which the BSACo. held shares, were assisted by administrative officials to
utilize labour from the 'affected area' and thus effect the railway extension
268
from Broken Hill to the Congoborder.
This administrative assistance to interest groups, associated with the
BSACo. in oneway or another, may not have surprised white colonists, as it
was commonplace in the Companyterritories anyway. What actually aroused
colonist arudety during the sleeping sickness prohibitions was the manner in
which, over the years, bona fide small-scale employers of labour were
systematically. deprived of their labour recruits, allegedly for detention at
the Fundu quarantine camp, only to encounter the same recruits,later,on their
way to Southern Rhodesia, under the auspices of the Burea. It was against
these devious methods of procuring trans-Zambesian labour that individual
colonists like George Graham, formerly a farmer in the l\firushidivision of
the Zumbo district in Northern Rhodesia but settled in Salisbury by 1912,
vehemently protested against to the local officials of the BSACo. and, sub-
sequently, solicited the aid of the Aborigines Protection SOCietyon the matter
in August 1912. As Graham viewed the situation, the BSACo. offlcials in
South Central Africa were merely using sleeping stckness 'as a cover for
aiding the RNLB', 269whilst the latter was, in turn, 'enslaving the natives of
268Mss• Brit. Emp. S.22/Flle G.184: Extract of a letter by George Graham
269 to Editor, Rhodesian Opinion:August 8, 1912.
,!2!2: Graham to Sir Henry Birchenough, Resident Director, BSACo. (Com-
mercial Branch):Salisbury: August 13, 1912.
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Northern Rhodesia by forcing those who -(wished)- to work in the South to do
270so through the Labour Bureau. '
This resentment, amongst the white colonists over the course of trans-
Zambesian labour migration and recruitment for the South, under the auspices
of the Bureau and the BSACo., was gradually gathering momentum inNorthern
Rhodesia, in the last fewyears before the outbreak of World War I. White
colonists of the region were also becoming disillusioned by what they regarded
as a one-sided partnership between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which
tended to favour the latter. It might also be pointed out here, that since the
amalgamation of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia into one terri-
tory of Northern Rhodesia in 1911, a number of phYSicaland economic changes
were already taking place in this trans-Zambesian domain of the BSACo.
Sir Henry Birchenough, the Resident Director of the commercial branch
of the BSACo.whowas then based in Salisbury, was amazed by these changes
when he visited Northern Rhodesia in 1912. The contrast in conditions since
his last visit to the region in 1907, when there were only 'a few••• farmers,
chiefly Dutchmen' settled in the Kalomodistrict, with the 1912 situation,
whereby the potentialities of these trans-Zambeslan territories for cattle
farming and cotton growing and the proximity of a huge cattle market In the
Katanga had attracted a large colonist population, was, to this knight, un-
271believable. Besides, this colonist population of Northern Rhodesia was
still growing, with the years 1913 and 1914, for Instance, recording a net
increase of forty per cent of population growth and thus bringing the number of
white inhabitants to a total of 2,250, as opposed to an estimated 875,000
272Africans.
Yet in spite of these very encouraging symptoms for the BSACo.'s col-
onization schemes and the prospects for amalgamating Northern and Southern
273Rhodesia being mooted during this pre-World War I period, the settlers of
Northern Rhodesia felt themselves systematically antagonized by the Com-
270271!2!!!:Graham to Buxton: August 14, 1912.
Extracts from Report on Rhodesia by Sir Henry Birchenough: Bulawayo,
December 1912: in BSACo,Directors' Report and Accounts, March 31,
272 ~: PP. 108-9.
BSACo, Directors' Report and Accounts: March 31, 1914: p, 15.
273'Report of a Speech made by Mr Rochfort Maguire at Salisbury, Rhodesia:
March 22, 1913': Annexure ill in BSACo, Directors' Report and Accounts:
March 31, 1914: P. 53.
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pany's policies over labour migration to Southern Rhodesia. Colonel A.H.
St. Gibbons, a former military officer with the East Yorkshire Regiment, who
had organised an expedition of military men from Natal to Barotseland bet-
ween 1898 and 1899274and had later on settled downto farm near Lusaka in
the trans-Zambesian part of the Companyterritories, may have aptlyarticu-
lated the mood of these disillusioned colonists over the unbalanced relation-
ship, between the twoRhodesias, on the labour issue.
In August 1912, Colonel Gibbons complained directly to the Colonial
Office over the manner in which the BSACo. officials were totally ignoring the
interests of the local colonist farmers of Northern Rhodesia and thus 'seri-
ously hampering progress here -{in Northern Rhodesia)- for the benefit of
mines in the Southin which its -{BSACo.'s) management -{was)-collectively
275 ,and individually interested. ' InGibbons view, the matter had become
so serious that the colonists of Northern Rhodesia had decided on some form
of confrcmtationwith their local administration to demand 'fair play' rather
than let things drift into a situation whereby the territory would, virtually,
'come to be looked on as a mere commercial agent for Southern Rhodesia••• , '
whilst the settlers themselves felt that they were In a predicament where
'Peter -{was)-systematically robbed to pay Paul -{SouthernRhodesia)- who in
turn ~ould)- hand over -{tothe BSACo.r a percentage of the pillage in
dividendform. ,276
Gibbens' anxieties over labour emigration from Northern Rhodesia to the
South did not appear at all pretentious andwere shared by a large proportion
of the country's farming communities. The North-Eastern Rhodesia Agricul-
tural and Commercial Association. which inCidentally included in its member-
ship not only farmers but also traders and missionaries as well, was quite
critical of the process of labour emigration from the then defunct territory
which it represented. To the farmers of this region, labour migration to
Southern Rhodesia was, clearly, the cause of the region's economic ills in
form of the rising rate of wages and the difficulties of establishing a viable
cotton growing industry. Moreover, with sleeping sickness not yet overcome,
274Vide:Wallis (ed.): OPe cit. PP. xxi-xxill.
275C. O. 417/521: CoL A. St. H. Gibbons, Ingwere Estate, Lusakas, to Col.
Seeley: August 1, 1912.
276lbid.
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it was also felt that the decision of the local Adm1n1stration, in throwing open
a large number of districts to labour recruitment for Southern Rhodesia, was
detrimental to the interests of the territory. More infuriating to these col-
onists still, was the fact that though labour recruitment for the mines of
Southern Rhodesia was allowed, that for tenga-tenga labour to Blantyre and
Tete was still impeded by a maze of sleeping siclmess regulations.
Whilst the colonists of the former North-Eastern Rhodesia would have
liked to see labour migration to the South prohibited as a phenomenon, they,
however, also concluded that the problems of this particular region could best
be solved by amalgamating with Nyasaland rather than the rest of the Rhod-
277
esias. This fear of possible amalgamation between Northern and Southern
Rhodesia was not merely influenced by the geographical location and histori-
cal links of the former North-Eastern Rhodesia with Nyasaland, but was also
a product of these economic factors, which tended to undermine the develop-
ment of a meaningful symbiotic and equitable relationship between the Rhod-
esias. Indeed, even the farmers of the Kafue region in former North-
Western Rhodesia, who were by no means influenced by sentimental ties with
Nyasaland, felt that the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, without any re-
forms in the BSACo. 's economic policies, could only lead to a situation
whereby the RNLB, primarily designed to serve Southern Rhodesian interests,
would spread its Influence all over Northern Rhodesia 'with the object of
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depleting it of its labour supply •••• '
The protests and general resentment of the colonists farmers, traders
and missionaries of Northern Rhodesia over the role of their territory, as a
labour reserve for Southern Rhodesia, were patently futile. If anything, the
genesis of trans-Zambesian labour migration and recruitment for Southern
Rhodesia was not simply a means by which the local administration of North-
279ern Rhodesia could acquire revenue. It was more fundamental than that.
Trans-Zambesian labour migration into Southern Rhodesia was essentially
277 C. O. 417/521: J. L. Bruce, Secretary, North-Eastern Rhodesia Agricul-
tural and Farmers' Association to J. C. Marshall: Fort Jameson:
October 11, 1911.
278..!!2!!!: Col Gibbons to Col. Seeley: August 1, 1912.
279For this view on trans-Zambesian labour migration and revenue: Vide:
Mackenzie's articles: 'African Labour in the Chartered Company
Period: p, 50 and 'Colonial Labour Policy and Rhodesia': P. 8.
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in keeping with the strategy of the BSACo. to develop an export-import orien-
tated economy below the Zambesi and was in this respect, more or less, a
political decision rather than anything else. For the white colonists of
Northern Rhodesia to protest against a politico-economic arrangement of
long-standing, as they did just prior to the advent ofWorldWar I, itwas
simply a child's play, tantamount to scratching the body of an elephant with a
hair-pin. The paramountcy of SouthernRhodesia's economic development,
at this time, was still a very important priority in the eyes of LondonWall
and, naturally, no protests from the colonists could alter the existing arrange-
ments.
As a matter of fact, for the three-year period before the outbreak of
World War I, labour recruitment in Northern Rhodesia for its Southern
counterpart was immensely intensified. The influence of the RNLB in the
trans-Zambesian colony had become simply pervasive. With the growing
labour demand and the increasing competition between the mining and farming
industries of Southern Rhodesia over the supply of this commodity between
1911 and 1914, the Bureau had apparently to be reorganised to meet these new
challenges.
On the financial side ()fthe affairs of this labour organisation, the BSACo.
renewed its financial commitment to the Bureau, with an annual subsidy of
280£12,000, also supplemented by an offer of £3,000 from the railways. To-
gether these sums of moneywere supposed to make up for the losses sustained
by this body, in form of a prospective contribution from the finance houses in
Londonwith mining interests in SouthernRhooesia, which had agreed to raise
a sum of £25,000 to enable it to function and expand its field of operations, on
condition that it would be transformed into a Limited Liability Company, with-
281out any government control whatsoever. But this condition was, unfortuna-
tely, inacceptable to the colonists of SouthernRhodesia, who feared that a
labour body, run on the basis of a private company, would be subjected to the
whims of its shareholders and, consequently, corner the labour market to the
disadvantage of non-members, with dire results for rank and file colonist em-
280C•O. 417/512: Proceedings of the first General Meeting of the RNLB (new):
Extract from The BulawayoChronicle: June 24th. 1912.
281C. O. 417/497: Burns-Begg to Lord Gladstone: June 1, 1911.
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ployers. For fear of creating a monopoly over labour supply in the BSACo.
territories for the benefit of a few chosen employers, the new RNLB would
there not accept the offer of the London financiers and, naturally, lost this
capital. Secondly, the Bureau's financial prospects were also seriously under-
mined by the 1911-1912 revolt of the farmers over the Labour Tax Ordinance
of 1911, by means of which the Bureau would have been guaranteed an annual
283income of about £22,000.
In spite of these financial drawbacks and debts, amounting to over £21,000,
inherited by the reorganised Bureau from its predecessor, the renewed
organisation went ahead with its programme of action on labour recruitment.
An Interesting aspect of this body's plans was the restructuring of its machinery
in order to invigorate its activities in the field. Like its predecessor in 1907,
the new Bureau initiated changes in its management and field staff in Northern
Rhodesia and Masbona1and, which were its main areas of operation by 1912.
These areas of operation were divided into circles; two for Mashonaland, to
wit, Northern Mashcmaland Circle, centred around Salisbury and covering the
northern and eastern districts of this province, as well as the Victoria Circle,
consisting of the whole of Southern Mashonaland.
But the Mashcmaland Circles, headed by ~ M. C. Stokes, the province's
Bureau manager with his branch office in Salisbury, were abandoned by
mid-1912, for a number of reasons. Actually, the Bureau had become so un-
popular with the local African societies that even before the reconstruction of
this new body in 1911, moves were being made to abandon local recruiting
activities inside Southern Rhodesia. In the main region of Bureau activities,
the Victoria Circle, it was observed that the local people, especially in the
Ndanga and the Chibi districts, were becoming more interested in proceeding
to the Rand than working inside Southern RhodeSia; hence the avowed assertion
by the Shona chiefs of the region, to the authorities, that:
If you send us to the Transvaal we wUl go, but we do not wisis4
our people to go -(to work)- through the Bureau in Rhodesia.
This negative attitude towards the Bureau was falthfu.lly reflected in the
282Ibid: Speech by Sir Charles Coghlan, M. L. C. : Quoted inRhodesia Herald:-May 20, 1911.
283C. O. 417/512: Proceedings of the first General Meeting of the RNLB (new):
June 24th, 1912.
28~id.-
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trend of this body's recruiting activities in the Victoria Circle, towards the
close of 1911 and the beginning of 1912, when Bureau officials hoped to take
advantage of the season's exceptional drought and food shortage to raise a
sizeable labour supply from this source. Whenonly 47 labour recruits
offered their services through the Bureau, the management, consequently,
decided to withdraw, not only from the Victoria Circle where Bureau buildings
and a plant in Fort Victoria were sold off in March 1912, but also in the Nor-
thern MashonalandCircle as well, where the Bureau's reception depots for
aliens at Mtokoand Mrewawere temporarily shut up.
In one respect, the suspension of Bureau operations, inside Southern
Rhodesia in 1912, gave way to increased efforts in Northern Rhodesia. Here
the territory was divided into six circles and headed by an aclmowledged
Bureau Inspector. These divisions were the Barotse Circle, headed by C. C.
Bisset, with his headquarters at Senanga: the Batoka Circle under G.A. Cooke,
with headquarters at Kalomo; the LuangwaCircle under T. J. Christison,
based at Broken Hill; the Luapula Circle, headed by R.A. Osborne, with his
headquarters at Fort Roseberyj the AwembaCircle under A. Stephenson,
based at Kasama and,finally, the AngoniCircle, headed by Bureau Inspector,
D. Hawksley, with his base at Fort Jameson. These respective circles of
Northern Rhodesia, in tum, consisted of a number of surrounding districts,
amounting to three or four in each case, in which the Bureau Inspector was
assisted by two or three white officials, termed Bureau agents, making up a
total of 16 altogether, and backed by a whole retinue of 'native runners', to
the number of twenty under each Bureau agent. In charge of the whole terri-
tory of Northern Rhodesia, as a field of Bureau recruiting activities, was
T. N. Mlcklem, the territory's Bureau Manager, whowas answerable to the
Bureau headquarters in Bulawayo, under the control of H.W. Kempster, the
ManagingDirector; P, L. Jenkins, the General Manager and George Upton,
285
the Bureau's Secretary.
In essence, the restructuring of the Bureau machinery in Northern
Rhodesia, in 1912, was designed to achieve two main objectives; to reduce the
body's standing charges whilst, at the same time, increasing its efficiency by
effecting 'closer recruiting -(activities)- and getting into touch with the native
285A 3/18/30/18: ManagingDirector's Circular No.1 to the Staff of the Bureau
Generally: n,d. Enclosed in H.We Kempster to BSACo, Treasurer: Salis-
bury 13, 1912.
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in such a way that he ~would~ have the idea of work in Southern Rhodesia
286constantly before him, even in his ownvillage. '
For attaining its ambitious, but conflicting objectives, the Bureau, there-
fore, laid less emphasis on the role of its more expensive white manpower,
but, instead, relied more heavily on the less expensive African touts. For
this reason, the 'twenty native runners", under each Bureau agent, engaged
and endowedwith power of recruiting, but without uniforms except Bureau
badges only, were the key to the success of the Bureau plans. Thus the role
of the Bureau's African touts was envisaged as one of faithful disciples 'who
~would~ live in the villages and ~would~ constantly move about amongst the
natives' in order 'to keep the existence of the Bureau and the opportunity for
going to work ~in Southern Rhodesia~ constantly before the native and in this
way to attract the increased numbers ~of recruttsj- which ~would~ render the
commission remunerative -(to~ those engaged in recruiting -(the Bureau
287agentsj-," The whole scheme was apparently an ingenious device to decen-
tralize the activities of the Bureau in such a manner that inducements were
allotted to the people whobore the least burdens of recruiting, to sustain
morale in the field of operations and thus sustain the body's efficiency in
labour recruiting.
Moreover, attempts were also made to try and improve other features of
the Bureau's operations in this trans-Zambesian territory. Thus whilst the
new Bureau, in its drive to reduce expenditure, did awaywith the horse and
cart transport, which its predecessor had provided to its agents at the cost of
over £500 per annum inmaintenance fees, it could not, however, cut downon
the eighteen forwarding and distribUting compounds. which the old Bureau had
established, on the grounds of those specific geographical and other physical
288factors governing the recruitment of trans-Zambesian labour. MIndfulof
the importance of the physical condition of the labour recruits on their arrival
at employment centres in Southern Rhodesia, the new Bureau decided to con-
solidate rather than reduce the existing facilities in the field of operatioos,
with the proper care and health of the recruits on their way to the South, as
its main concern.
286 -!2!S: Managing Director's (Kempster's) Circular No.2: On Reorganisation
287 of Recruiting inN. Rhodesia: January 1, 1912: In Ibid.
2881bid.
C.O. 417/512: Proceedings of the first General Meeting of the RNLB (new):
June 24, 1912.
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Three main routes were, by 1912, ear-marked for the purpose of con-
veying recruits from the extreme northern districts of the former North-
Eastern Rhodesia territory. These were the Fort Rosebery - Ndola -
Livingstone route to Bulawayo, via the Nkankami ferry, provided by the
Bureau on the Luapula river, for recruits from the Luapula, Mweruand
Tanganyika districts; the Kasama - Mpika - Serenje route, via Broken Hill
and Livingstone, to Bulawayo, for labourers from the Bemba country and
finally, t:beFort Jameson - Feira - Kanyemba route to Sinola, for those rec-
289ruits from the East lAlangwadistrict bound for Salisbury.
Efforts were also made too to standardise the rations of recruits on their
way to the South. Those recruits, using the Fort Rosebery - Ndola - Living-
stone route from the Luapula Valley and beyond, were, apparently, better off
in terms of food supply, as the districts through which they passed usually
provided the necessary supplies, as long as the recruits had their calico
poshos, the popular currency used for exchange purposes with the local
peoples m return for food The other two easterly routes were, it would
appear, frequently plagued by food shortage, especially alcmg those laps bet-
ween Kasama and Serenje in Northern Rhodesia and also between Kanyemba
and Smola on the SouthernRhodesian side. Such deficits were thus made up by
the provision of food depots at regular ten-mIle intervals, along these routes,
where grain stores and stock were kept by the Bureau. At the Wanlde com-
pound of the Bureau, for instance, cooldngutensUs were also provided to the
recruits as they waited to proceed to Bulawayo.
But a more significant improvem.ent, in the Bureau recruits' travel
arrangements, was noticeable in their mode of transport between Broken Hill,
Livingstone, Bulawayoand Salisbury. Under the new Bureau, the system of
crowding the recruits in insanitary cattle trucks, these labourers had often
experienced during the old dispension, was done awaywith. Instead, the new
Bureau had an increased number of trucks (18by 1912)provided by the rail-
ways and fitted with sanitary conveniences as well as water tanks. A Bureau
official, called the Travelling Inspector, usually supervised the entrainment of
the recruits in Northern Rhodesia andwas also required to check whether the
289C.O. 417/574: George W. Murray, Managing Director, RNLB, to Secret-
ary, Administrator's Dept., Salisbury: May29, 1913.
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railway trucks were disinfected or not. It was also this official's duty to
guard against overcrowding of recruits in these trucks, which were, for in-
stance, restricted to carry a maximum number of 45 recruits each. But
perhaps the sole and most notable shortcoming of the new Bureau's arrange-
ments on the transportation of recruits, after 1912, was the tendency to con-
vey these trans-Zambeslan recruits to and in Southem Rhodesia by goods
trains.290
The attempts mounted by the Bureau to reform the conditions, under
which trans-Zambesian recruits were raised and forwarded to the South,
alongside this labour organisation's efforts to intensify its activities to meet
the growing demands on the Southem Rhodesia labour market, must be viewed
here, necessarily, as self-conscious moves by a labour body under pressure
from a variety of current factors. Between 1911 and 1914, the Colonial Of-
fice, LondonWall and a number of BSACo. officials on the local scene in
South-Central Africa were becoming more concerned about the rising mort-
ality rate amongst trans-Zambesian labourers engaged on Southem Rhodesian
mines. Indeed, an embargo on labour supply was even placed on a number of
these mining properties by the Northern Rhodesian government, as a lever by
means of which the improvement of labour conditions on the properties in
291question could be effected.
Another influential factor operative, at this time, was the growing luke-
warm attitude; amongst BSACo. officials inNorthern Rhodesia as well as
within the Colao1a1Omce towards Katangan colonist employers, especially
Robert Williams and Company. This company had, as a matter of fact,
applied to the Northem Rhodesian authorities, in early 1913, to recruit
labour from the Mweru and Luapula districts and also the Luena division of
the Awemba district, In former North-Eastern Rhodesia, to the tune of
between 2,000, and 4, 000 recruits per annum. As matters turned out, the
reactions of the Administration of Northem Rhodesia were not as hostile as
of old, to such lminvited foreJgn interference in matters of economic impor-
tance like labour in the Companypossessions.
In fact, in the application of Robert Williams and Company for labour to
290C.O. 417/514: H.W. Kempster: to Secretary, Administrator's Dept. ;
August 14, 1912.
291Vide: Infra: pp.6n-4
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meet the requirements of their properties at The star of the Congo mine and
the LubulIlbashi Smelting plant, Northern Rhodesian officials foresaw a number
of advantages. For the coloo.ist farmers of Northern Rhodesia, the proposed
extension of the existing properties of Union Mlniere and the subsequent deve-
lopment whereby such mines as Kambove, Chitaru and a host of others would
be brought to a producing stage, could on1y mean a vast1y increased labour
force and, together with it, increased consumption of grain and meat. In
this way, the 10,0000 bags of grain and the 1,440 head of cattle the Northern
Rhodesian farmers sold annually to the Katanga by 1913 would naturally rise
in numbers.
The railways were equally expected to benefit by these increased mining
operations in the Katanga, bringing the amount of railage, via Beira, to an
estimated total of about 30, 000 tons of bar copper per annum, whilst the
rallway revenue derived, in the process, was expected to amount to about
£115,000 a year. Even the Wankie Colliery, too, was expected to benefit from
this arrangement whereby Northern Rhodesian labour, instead of Chinese
one, would be suppHed to the Katanga for increased mining operations. The
2,000 tons of coke., then being suppHed to Katanga monthly in 1913, were
expected to rise to about 10,000 once the expansion scheme, then proposed,was
292under way.
From an economic point of view, therefore, the advantages of allowing
Robert Williams and Company to recruit labour in Northern Rhodesia in 1913
were quite potent, if not obvious. The Magistrate of Ndola, John Moffat
Thomson, who was sent to examine the labour croditions at the Katanga mines,
on behalf of the Northern Rhodesia govemment, in JlUle 1913, was, for
293
example, totally in favour of labour recruitment for these mines. Mindful
of their special relationship with Southern Rhodesia over this issue of labour
supply, the Administration of this territory, which had, by July 1913, already
received a payment of £1,200 from Robert WllUams and Company to meet
medical and other recruitment expenses, justified their move to allow labour
292C. O. 417/535: F. V. Wortblnton, Acting Secretary, Administrator's
Office,. Livingstone, to BSACo. : June 14, 1913.
293Ibid: Report on Northem Rhodesian Natives at the Star of the COngOMine
and Lubumbashi Smelting Works by J. Moffat Thomson, Magistrate, Ndola:
JlUle 22, 1913.
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recruitment for the Katanga mines, in a number of ways.
Firstly, it was rationalized that such recruitment would not be harmful
to Southern Rhodesia's interests, since it would take place in those areas of
former North-Eastern Rhodesia where labour recruitment for Southern
Rhodesia had been prohibited since January of that year. The move had been
taken on account of the high mortality rate of Northern Rhodesian labourers
on the Southern Rhodesian mines. From the point of view of the African lab-
ourer, the new arrangements were justified in terms of the geographical
proximity of the districts in the Luapula Valley and on the Tanganyika plateau
to the Katanga as well as the cultural links of the migrant labourers of the
region to their kinsmen on the Belgian side of the border, which would, con-
sequently, ease characteristic linguistic problems for these labour mfgrantl.94
But perhaps the most interesting Une of argument, pursued by the
government of Northern Rhodesia to justify this apparent diversification of
its relations with its sister state, in the South, is the manner in whichWall-
ace, the Administrator, used the purported adverse sooio-economic effects
of labour migration to SouthernRhodesia as a cause for his government's
concern, especially with regard. to the long distances and terms of service
which labour migration to SouthernRhodesia involved This view had, in
fact, long been advocated by missionaries, traders and farmers of the trans-
Zambesian territories, in their bid to stop labour emigration to the South, but
295the various administrators had over and again summarily dismissed it. In
1913, however, the government of Northern Rhodesfa, in a fasclnatlng!2.!!!-
face, resorted to this age-old and threadbare conception of the inexorable con-
sequences, on the African societies, of labour migration to distant centres of
employment.
This quasi-moralistic conception on labour migration had, of course,
never been taken seriously by its various proponents, whowere, obviously,
more interested in attacking the trend of BSACo. economic policies and the
preservation of the lowwage tariffs in the trans-Zambesian territories than in
the African communities per se. In like manner, the government of Northern
Rhodesia adopted these theories, on the detrimental consequences of labour
29~id: Wallace, Livingstone, to BSACo.: August 16, 1913.
295Vide: C.O. 417/401: Sharpe to Codrington: June 7, 1904.
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migration to Southern Rhodesia, only for the sake of its alternative
arrange_nt to the Katanga. It was, therefore, in this respect, a defen-
sive mechanism, which was as devious as it was supercilious and yet one
which Wallace stuck to, when, in August 1913, he justified the grounds on
which he had allowed Robert Williams and Company to recruit labour in the
following ..a..r;
During my ~ourney through the Northern districts it has been
pointed out to me everywhere that the long absenqe in Southern
Rhodesia ot a large number of able-bodied men is having the
etrect of reducing considerably the amount of native cultivation,
and the scarcity ot tood last year in many places is to be
accounted for almost entirely by this fact. There was no
shortage of rain in North-Eastern Rhodesia but the price of
corn went up three-fold, and in some places was unprocurable •••
It has also been impressed upon me that, owing to the aboli-
tion ot reserved pay in Southern Rhodesia, natives come back
atter their long absence as poor as they went down, except
for an amount of shoddy European clothing, and that they are
no better able than before tQ pay their taxes •••• For this
Administration tNorthern Rhodesia~ therefore it would ••• be
better that natives living North of ~ge Railway should find
work nearer than Southern Rhodesia.2
The overall significance ot this shift in policy on trans-Zambesian
labour migration, which the government of Northern Rhodesia hurriedly
etfected without even prior approval from the Imperial authorities,297
was neither, necessarily, the beginning of divergent policies between the
two Company territories nor a result of Robert Williams' threat on dire
consequences to the Rhodesia railways in the event of labour recruitment
being denied his company. 296 It was the manner in which the BSA Co.
otticia1s in Northern Rhodesia punctured the monopoly of the RNLB over
labour recruitment in that territory, by allowing a rival group of colonist
employers to operate in the same region.
It cannot be denied, however, that Robert Williams and Company had
always proved a thorn in the flesh to the Bureau, as far as its activities
were concerned in Northern Rhodesia. But up to 1913, the activities of these
Katangan colonist employers were either clandestine or minimal, whereas, by
this date, these employers became a cognisable alternative labour agency,
in the eyes of'potential Af'rican labour migrants. For bOth 1he Bureau and the
296C•O• 417/535: Wallace to BSA Co.: August 16, 1913.
297Ibid: Minute by R. V. Vernon to Lambert: September 29, 1913.
29B1bid: R. Williams to Sir Edward Grey: October 24, 1913.
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African labourer, the official entry of Robert Williams and Company in the
labour recruiting field was destined to have a profound impact and adverse
results. To the Bureau, the granting of permission to Robert Williams and
Company to recruit labour in Northern Rhodesia by the authorities there
seriously undermined its confidence and may have, certainly, portended the
beginning of Its subsequent decline. The potential African labour migrants,
who were thus exposed to competitive recruitment, deeply feIt the pinches of
intensified activities, with the resuIt that recruiting agents and their touts
tended thereafter to overreach themselves.
In view of the preceding arguments, it could thus be said that
trans-Zambesian labour migration to Southern Rhodesia,prior to the advent of
World War I, was, therefore, marked by competitive and intensive strands,
which bore heavily on those African communities across the Zambesia
involved in these activities. One feature of these competitive and Intensive
activities was, of oourse, the manner in which the local porterage industry
was thwarted, in every way, by the more conducive employment conditions
proffered to prospective labour migrants by the recruiting organisations
operating in Northem Rhodesia. Between 1913 and 1914, administrative
officials had to resort to coercion to procure adequate numbers of carriers
to meet their demands. In the Kalomo division of the Batoka district, for
instance, a three-comered competition for labour supply had emerged, by
1913, in form of the Bureau; the local colonist farmers, whose numbers had
risen from only 11 in 1908 to 38 in 1913 due to the rate of economic develop-
ment induced by rallway construction; and the Administration, which required
carriers for public service, to make up for the deficiencies of the transporta-
tion sys tem,
Because of the relatively favourable conditions of employment In Southern
Rhodesia, in terms of wages, rations and accommodation, the Bureau, which
was actively involved in recruiting labour for the Southern Rhodesia labour
market in the Batoka district, was said to be collecting 'many hundreds of the
most physically fit natives of the District -{who)--{were)- sent away to work
-{onSouthem Rhodesian mines)- every year.' For the administrative officials
and their demand for carriers, without the labour conditions which could com-
p;re favourably with those promised by the Bureau, their task was, therefore,
a difficult one. R. I. Hughes, the Assistant :Magistrate of the Kalomo division
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of the Batoka district confessed in February, 1914:
Natives whohave been working in S. Rhodesia no doubt
object to what they consider the low rate of pay and in
consequence the natives who are available for this ldnd of
work -{as carrters)- ~V9generally middle aged men who
are past work. (sic.)
To rectify this state of affairs mentioned above and procure the
carriers required for both government and private interests, district officials,
unable to withstand Bureau competition, naturally, resorted to forced labour
to achieve their designs. Hughes once more confessed on the provenance of
forced labour in the Batoka district, by the time of Worthington's resignation
as Secretary for Native affairs, towards the end of 1913:
I venture to say that of all the many hundreds of carriers
collected each year in the Batoka district not one is a genuine
volunteer. To send out Messengers -(by)-themselves to
collect carriers as was doneby the late SNA-(Secretary for
Native Affairsr. •• , or to send them -(messengers)- as done
by me, with a message to an Induna or Headman to obtain them
-(carriers)- and whenbrought in :tSfall them volunteers, is
a mere travesty of the truth, •••
In the Kalomo division of the Batoka district, it might, therefore, be
said that the operations of the RNLB, by 1913/1914, were of such a nature
that they forced the administrative officials against the wall, with the result
that these ftmctionaries could only resort to administrative coercion, to
procure recruits for tga-teDga. which, it was freely admitted, had 'always
been hateful to the Batoka natives •••• ' In the other districts of Northern
Rhodesfa, the Bureau was not so successful and, therefore, resorted, in
turn, to those desperate measures, which its vanquished counterparts, the
district officials, had come to rely on to get carriers. The cases of Bureau
agents in the Kasempa and Bavolale districts in 1914 are here very good
illustrations on some of these desperate measures, deployed by this organi-
sation.
When, in November 1909, the rate of taxation was raised from 5/- to
10/- per head in the Kasempa district, in order to effect, by means of fiscal
pressure, the desired labour turn-out among the Kaondepeople of the region
and, in this way, meet the short-fall in labour recruitment sustained by the
299C•O. 417/539: R. I. Hughes, Assistant Magistrate, Kalomo, to Goode:
Livingstone: Confidential; February 14, 1914.
300Ibid_.
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Bureau due to the outbreak of sleeping sickness in other parts of the trans-
Zambesian territory, the move was welcomed with enthusiasm in official
circles. But these tax requirements appear to have failed to take into con-
sideratioo the ecooomic and geographical disadvantages of the Kaonde, living,
as they did, in an area about 200 miles west of the railway line, in what
Imperial omcials coocluded. was 'the remotest and most uncivilised district'
301in the territory. Indeed, when the Administration in Livingstone raised
tha tax for the Kasempa district it, in fact, grossly underplayed the draw-
backs of the area, arguing that the Kaonde were in a better position to pay
an increased tax than the Lozi; hence the permission granted to the Bureau to
302
commence recruiting activities there.
By 1911, when the Bureau agent,._ Mr. Ohlund of Swedish extraction,
was killed by the Kaonde in this district, these economic and geographical
factors of the district as well as the high-handed methods of this particular
agent were once more played down. Instead,the causes of the Kasempa up-
heavals were, at the time, attributed. by the BSACo. Administration of the
territory to vengeful designs, on the part of the Kaonde, for the deaths of their
relatives on the mines of Southem Rhodesia, whither they had been sent
through the agency of the Bureau. The similarity of the Kasempa district
proceedings in 1911 with those in the Mashukuhmbwe country in the Batoka
district in 1907, where the same causes were, initially, ascribed as res-
ponsible for the upheaval, till the actual state of affairs was revealed by an
303independent source, is here quite striking.
Yet the Administration of Northern Rhodesia itself could hardly accept
this analysis on these events in Kasemba district, even when the Imperial
authorities had ordered the suepenston of Bureau activities in the Kasempa
district, on the grounds that the cause of the Kaonde discontent with the meth-
ods of this body was that they were 'less ripe for exploitation by the Labour
304Bureau. ' Wallace could only agree to the suspension of labour recruiting
activities in this district because of the complications created by the fact
that the Kaonde and the Lunda were the only African national groups that were
301C. O. 417/500: Burns-Begg to Wallace: September 21, 1911.
302!2,!2: Wallace to Burns-Begg: November 25, 1911.
303Vide: SUpra:p.470
304-1.!!!i!: Burns-Begg to Wallace: September 21, 1911.
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still armed in South Central Africa. 305
Between 1913 and 1914, when recruiting activities in the Kasempa dist-
rict were still suspended and yet the Bureau and an assorted group of comp-
eting interests were coming under increasing pressure for more labour supply,
Labour Agents adopted a new set of techniques to recruit in this forbidden
region. One method, popularly employed by these agents, was that whereby
the agents themselves sent their African touts into the field for recruiting
purposes, whilst they, on their part, adopted an attitude of "'mastery inact-
ivity" at the villages.' Describing this method of employing capitaos for
recruiting purposes, which he regarded as a very dangerous one, W. Hazell,
the District Commissioner of Kasempa stated, in February 1914, that:
.•• these natives ",the capitaos)- generally wear hats and
European clothing, and are above the average in intelligent
rascality. Being vested with a little of the Whiteman's
authority, they recruit principally by means of fictitious
promises of high wages, threats etc, the most effective threat
being that non-compliance will meet with the displeasure of
the Government Authorities on the grounds that their master
-1bad)-paid £lHNsto the Government for the privilege of
rec ruiting: •.•
Other devices employed by these labour agents, who flouted the rest-
rictions in the Kasempa district and recruited labour without due authority,
included 'the practice of leaving a piece of calico at the hut of an absent
native', sending touts later for engaging the victims concerned. For those
recruits who appeared reluctant to engage for work, their names were taken
down by the agent threatening dire consequences in return, which apparently
effected the desired end. For all this, the Northem Rhodesian Administration,
however, blamed the 'low class Europeans ••• known as "Dagos'" and, at the
same time, confessed its Inability to deal with this seamy side of labour
recruitment, noticed in the Kasempa district in 1913 and 1914. Thus Hazell
admitted that in terms of labour recruitment, Northern Rhodesta had reached:
••• the stage which every youngnative country has to pass
through where there are mines and other forms of European
industry requiring labour and where the demand exceeds the
supply and where the low class whiteW is prepared to
exploit the native for all he is worth.
305C•O. 417/519: Wallace to Lord Gladstone: March 30, 1912.
30GC•O. 417/539: W. Hazell, D/C, Kasempa, to Secretary for Native Affairs:
Livingstone: February 23, 1914.
307Ibid.
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These devious tactics, employed by various labour agents to poach labour
supply from the restricted Kasempa district between 1915 and 1914, may be
excusable, because of the impecunious agents of small-scale mining proper-
ties like the Kansanshi Copper mine, in the neighbouring Kafue district. Yet
similar techniques were also adopted by Bureau agents In the Balovale dist-
rict to raise labour for Southern Rhodesia. Here an Interesting alliance
developed, for instance, between the Bureau officials and the Lozi aristocracy
over the exploitation of labour from the l1lvale: the Ltmda and other Mawiko
ethnic groups of the district. The Lozi aristocrats may have, in this instance,
seen their activities in promoting labour recruitment for the Southern Rhodesia
market, purely, in terms of a residual exercise of their age-old traditional
dominance over the :Mawikopeoples, whilst Bureau agents were only too glad
to make the most out of this alliance. In any case, the proceedings in the
Balovale district between 1912 and 1914 can best be regarded as indicative
of the effects of those pressures, for labour supply, the Bureau faced at the
time as well as the last flings of a doomed labour body.
In the events which took place in the Barotse district between 1912 and
1914, in connection with the labour recruiting activities of the Bureau, one
feature is evident. The Bureau, whose avowedfunction, in the first place, was
to squeeze out the unscrupulous labour agents, had apparently not succeeded
in attaining this objective. What it had actually donewas that it had itself in-
corporated some of these dubious characters, who then masquaraded as Bureau
agents and, under the umbrella of this body, perpetrated those aspects of
labour recruitment which onewould have expected to find in the pre-1903 era
of the private labour agent.
In the Balovale case, the Bureau agent, P. E. Webb, lmown as Mutenguna
by the African peoples amongst whomhe worked, revived a situation which
simulated, in every respect, those characteristics of labour recruitment
previously ascribed to the private labour agent. But forthis success in creat-
ing a veritably chaotic situation, two important pre--conditions were necessary
In the Balovale district; namely the attitude of the district offiCials and the co-
operation of the Lozi aristocracy, both ofwhichwere not by an means lacking.
D. E. C. Stirke, the Native Commissioner of the Balovale sub-district during
the period ofWebb's recruiting ventures, was quite forthright, in his views
on how to deal with the Lunda and Nkonyaethnic groups of the area, where such
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Bureau operations were carried out and whom Stirke regarded as, essentially,
'wild and nervous' and, therefore, meriting, in every way, 'harsh measures'
in dealing with them.308
Such views on the Lunda and Nkonya peoples, probably, may have been
shared by the Lozi aristocracy, as it was indicated that this country between
the Lukulu and Kabompo rivers, was the place 'where all malcontents -(in
Barotseland)- for years past -(had)- been placed by the Khotla -(Lewanika's
court)-' and that, when the Lozl ruler was intimated on the proceedings in the
area in 1912 and 1913, 'he only laughled and said he would quite believe it ••• ~Q9
Moreover, the actiCllS of Stirke, the adm1n1strative officer of the dist-
rict, in promoting the Bureau agent's recruiting efforts in the area were,
apparently, justified on the grounds of an ambiguous policy document, issued
in .May1912 by Worthington, the Secretary for Native Affairs, adjoining, as
it did, the district officers that 'all -(tax)- defaulters be permitted to pro-
ceed to S. Rhodesia (SiC)' and, also, that any taxes that were due 'may be
310
accepted on the return of the natives from S. Rhodesia (SiC). ' In short,
the Worthington circular was, virtually, a carte blanche authorisation, to the
district officials, for systematic regimentation of tax-paying males into the
ranks of Bureau recruits and, from this point of view, provided an ethical
justification to activities of individual officers like Storke, who backed the
Bureau's activities to the hilt.
Once the actual recruiting. for the Bureau was tmder way in the Lunda
and Nkonya area of the Balovale district, the methods employed by this
triumvirate of interests, involving as it did Bureau agents, adminlstrative
officials and Lozi traditional leadership, were, essentially, those which most
districts in the BSACo. territories feared; that is, the use of messengers,
police and Bureau touts, as couriers of recruits from the distant parts of the
Balovale sub-district. The activities of Webb's touts are well portrayed m the
evidence of their victims, given during the course of an official enquiry,
undertaken towards the end of 1913. One Ltmda headman, for instance, re-
called:
I remember last year -(1912)- the Bureau runners Siampoko,
Kakeke and Sepatela coming to my village. They sald -(to wifness)-
'Get up and go with us. If you forbid your young people to go Mut-
enguna (Mr Webb) w1ll put you in chains.' They bad already
308!!!.!S: D. E. C. Stirke, N/C, Nalolo sub-division, Barotse District, to Acting
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gathered the young men together when I arrived saying they
were going to take them. They said they were taking them
to the Sipalo -{Bureau,.. They told them they would be paid
very much money. They took three young men from my vil-
lage. They are still away -{In Southern Rhodestaj-, They did
not wish to go but went becall§f1the runners said I should be
put in gaol if they did not go.
The Lunda and Nkonyarecruits, whowere recruited in this manner for
Southern Rhodesia, were convinced that Webb, the Bureau agent, was, of
course, a member of their government. Because of the fear of these people,
regarding the dreadful power and arbitrary force which the BSACo. govern-
ment implied, these Nkonya and Lunda recruits from the Balovale district
concluded that they were in no position to question the authority of Webb and
his touts. Already these Bureau touts were provided with what the Bureau
312management itself called 'a semi-uniform' and were going about demand-
ing for treatment with deferenee.as they were '''Maswalala'' 1.e. Messengers
the same name by which we -(the Lunda,. know Governm.entMessengers and
Pollce. ,313 With this high regard and fear in their dealings with the Bureau
touts, the views of the Nkonyaand the Lunda are, therefore, quite understand-
able on why they treated the Bureau boss. himself in the Balovale district
with awe and respect. For these reasons, these people had concluded:
We thought he -{Siampoko, the chief of touts,. was a Government
native because he came from Mr Webb. We thought Mr Webb
was a Government official. He -{Slampoko,.did not say so but
we always understood so. We all thought he had been sent by the
Government to collect the people to take them to Bulawayo.
Siampoko told us we should get £1 a month for ploughing .,farIlla14
workj-, I had previously been to Bulawayo on my own account.
The extent to which these people in the Balovale district had resigned
themselves to the dicta of BSACo. officials, that Webb very evidently ex-
Resident Magistrate, Mongu: January 3, 1914.
3091bid:C. Mckinnon, Acting Administrator, Livingstone, to Lord Gladstone:
February 24, 1914.
3101bid: Circular to all Magistrates: Re: 'Defaulters': by F. V. Worthington,
-secretary for Native Affairs: May12, 1912.
311I!ll!!:Statement of Headman Kamb!ya, before R. H. Palmer. J. p., N/C
Ba Iovale District: November 11, 1913.
312C.O. 417/540: T. N. Micklem, RNLB Manager for N. Rhodesia to Mana-
ging Director, Bulawayo: July, 30, 1913.
313C• O. 417/539: Statement of Headman KaWag, before Palm.er, JP, N/C
BalovaIe DIstrict: November 8, 1913.
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ploited to his advantage, is also shownby the fact that even those migrant
labourers, who had gone independently to Southern Rhodesia before and had
no cause to go back through the Bureau, were here press-ganged into its
ranks because of fear, as one witness indicated:
When we came to Mr Webbwe did not tell him we did not wish
to go because we were afraid We had gone to work in Bula-
wayo other years of our accord We did not wish to go last
year -{l,912)-. WJyj_15 we went before we went alone and did not
go to the Bureau.
For these Lunda and Nkonyapeople, whohad been subject to Lozi
control and were, even under the BSACo. Administration, ruled through the
medium of a hierarchy of Lozi aristocrats, whose duty it was, as messengers
and Indunas, to facilitate the implementation of government edicts and
instructions, 316 the situation in their country was complicated by what they
regarded as a Lozi conspiracy in allowing the Bureau to exploit Lunda and
Nkonya labour, in the manner it did, in 1912and 1913. Of course, the Lozi
aristocracy was often consulted in matters of labour recruitment among the
Lozi, Mawikoand the allled and subject ethnic groups of Barotseland In the
Nalolo division of the Barotse district, for instance, the Bureau agent in the
area,:. J. Soane Cambell, was reported to be carrying out his recruiting
campaign, in mld-1913, with the blessings of Lewanika's Sister, Mokwae
317Nakatoka, the political supremo of the district. By virtue of its privi-
leged status, the Lozi aristocracy, therefore, developed vested interests in
labour recruitment for the labour markets in the South; a movement from
which this superordinate social stratum came to derive so much pecuniary
benefits that, even in more recent times, it resisted attempts to abolish the
318arrangement. Moreover, the very fact that labour recruitment for mine
and farmwork was, until quite lately, regarded as socially degrading to the
proper Lozi and was,therefore1a preserve of the non-Lozi populace of Barotse-
land, 319 may have encouraged this ruling class to adopt a nonchalant attitude
.j
31~id: Statement of Llala before Palmer, JP: November 18, 1913.- -
315Ibid: Statement of Sikelata before Palmer, JP: November 18, 1913.
316!!2!!!:Stirke, N/C Nalolo Sub-District, to Acting Resident Magistrate, Mongu:
317 January 3, 1914.
C. O. 417/540: Micklem, Libonda (Nalolo) to Murray: Byo: August 14, 1913.
3180n how the Lozi aristocracy conflicted with the new government of Zambia
over the abolition of labour migration to SouthAfrica between 1964 and
1966, Vide:Caplan: Opr cit. PP. 206-7, 214.
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towards the sufferings of the Nkanya and the Lunda under the Bureau and
BSACo. officials in the Balovale district between 1912 and 1914. This, at
least, was the point of view, from which some of the Bureau victims, in-
evitably, interpreted their plight.
Thus a Lozi government messenger, who had witnessed the harassment
of the Lunda residents in his home area of the Balovale district, paints the
following picture:
I was in the veldt another day and. •• was called from a distance
by two of Mr Webb's nmners.. • • They shouted 'Come here
you. Come here at once.' I went and asked what they meant
by callfng me thus. They said 'Don't you know we are police
come to take the people?' I replled 'Those you can take you
may take but don't try to take me. I mow you are no police. '
They replied 'You say thus because you are a Murose
-{Lozi)-. It is the M'alundawe -{the Bureau)- have been given
and if you had been Malunda we would have taktnyou'. Another
day many M'alunda including women ran to our -{Lozir village
for refuge saying they were being persecuted by Mr Webb's
runners. These people all belong to the Malunda chief Shima.
They said they -{would)- stay with us -{Lozir as the runners
left us alone. They said Lewanika -{hadr given -{them)- up to
be chased -{aboutr by these people -{Bureau runnersj-, We
-{Lozir replied: 'It is not Lewanika it is the white people'. I had
heard that Mr Webb's runners were catching the Malunda and
leaving all ~8ther tribes. • • • -{It)-was common talk in all
the villages.
For any Nkonya and LlDldarecruits, who may have doubted the complicity
of the Lozi ruling class in the unfortunate proceedfngs thus unleashed against
them. by the Bureau, the frequent assertions, by Webb's runners, that they had
the support of I..ewanika because 'Lewanika is a person of the Government •••
321
and we -{the Bureau)- are of the Government ••• too, ' may have cc:m.firmed
their worst fears. In addition, the Lunda and Nkonya people may also have
been evidently discouraged by what they may have rfghtly or WTonglydetected
as the indifference of the Lozi aristocracy to their pUght,in the sense that
when their chiefs and headmen reported the Bureau touts to Lewanika's Ngam-
bella (chief Oounctllor), they were emly told to 'better leave the matter alene
322
for the present. '
319Vide: Armor: 'Migrant Labour in the Kalabo District of Barotseland':loc. cit.
32°C. O. 417/539: Statement of MuhoDS2before Palmer, JP: November 11, 1913.321 ....
!2,!g: Statement of Headman KaWang.
322~: Statement of Indma Liatitima before H.G. WilUs, JP to Assistant
Resident Magistrate: Balovale District: November 28, 1913.
513
The culminating point in the Balovale district events of 1912-1914 was,
however, the manner inwhich the then Native Commissioner of this particular
division, where the Nkonyaand the Lunda lived, St1rke, placed his police and
messengers at the disposal ofWebband thus aided the latter's designs in
recruiting labour for Southern Rhodesia. The danger in utilising the African
police and messengers for labour recruitment lay, not so much in the in-
ordinate authority these functionaries wielded withln the African subject soc-
ieties, but in the fact that they were mostly alien in the region, consisting, as
they did, of Bemba, Angoniand Chlkun.darecruits from North-Eastern Rhod-
323esia. These aliens were brought into the police service in Barotseland,
primarily, because of the cardinal assumption, in colonial administrative
circles that,on account of the social and cultural distance between these
functionaries and local peoples, the degree of fraternization, across the
frontiers, would consequently be minimal and, therefore, the risk of the
African police force throwing its lot with these peoples, in the event of an up-
rising, was also expected to be less.
Of course, this policy of relying on functionaries from distant ethnic group-
ings, which the BSACo. officials had thus adopted in North-Western Rhodesia,
with regard to the security of both white colonists and officials, had also
been applied in SouthernRhodesia, when similar ethnic groups as well as
Zulus and Sothoswere sought for to serve in the police force and the Native
Department.324 In the Balovale district of Barotseland in 1912/13, it is
obvious that the Nkonyaand Lunda societies were falling victims to the general
defence strategy of the BSACo.)althoughno military conditions existed which
then warranted the implementation of the particular strategy. The situatioo
was merely onewhere labour mobilisation was the major concern amongst the
officials.
The involvement of the African police and messengers, on Stlrke's in-
structions, in the labour recruitment activities of the Bureau in theBalovale
district, must, of course, be seen in the Ugbt of the general proclivities of
these functionaries to overreach themselves in their dealings with the African
32:L"Report of the Administrator of North-Western Rhodesia (Corundm) for the
year ended December 1906: in BSACo. Director's Report and Accounts:
March 31st. 1907: P. 53.
324
Vide SUpra:PP.91- 6; 109.IS.
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societies. In other parts of the world like India, where minor functionaries,
like the Arkatta and the Kangani, were used m the field for the recruitment of
'coolie' labourers for exportation to the far away sugar plantations of the
West Indies, Natal, Mauritius and Fiji, both m the nmeteenth and early
twentieth century .', the tactics used by these functionaries were more subtle
and their objectives largely pecuniary. They applied deception, cajolery,
subtle forms of coercion, like money advances and psychological dominance
as well as diplomacy and a few ktdnappfngs, when other means failed. All
this was done by the Indian labour tout with the aim of either enhancing his
325economic gains or in a bid to seek promotion to the rank of a recruiter.
On the African scene, as depicted by the case of the Balovale district in
1912/13, the main preoccupations of the touts and the functionaries of the
Native Department, once set free to recruit In the field, as Native Commission-
er Stirke did here to help Webb, centred an sensual satisfaction. Thus whilst
326
these police, messengers and touts were often given food, meal and fowls,
327or even gifts of animal skins, by virtue of their positions as 'Government
people', they, however, did not forget to satisfy their sexual desires, byex-
propriating the wives of those able-bodied men whom they forcibly enlisted
either as carriers for their Native Commissioner or recruits for Webb's
Bureau requirements. A recruit, whose pregnant wife had fallen victim to
these functionaries' unsolicited amorous escapades, accordingly, informed
the enquiry In the Balovale district, InNovember 1913, that:
Last year when the Bureau people came, Mr Stirke -{the
Native Commissioner)- sent messengers and pollce to seize
people. They came to my village and wanted to arrest me.
I showed them my (fish) tax receipt (1911). There were
three messengers and four police. ••• I went with these ••• police
and. •• messengers ••• I left mywife In her hut. When I returned
my wife complafned that those policemen had come to her hut
and had had connection with her. • •• I did not think it was any
good to complain to Mr Stirke as we should not have lmown
the people -{concemed)- as it all happened at night. My wife
was with chUd -{pregnant)-when this happened and she was
illat the time. • • • Three days later I went to work for the
Bureau. I went to Livtngstone.... I was awaywhen my child
325326Tinker: op. cit. PP. 122-30, 133-4.
C.O. 417/539: Statements of Nyengungaand Kafoya (women)before Palmer,
327 JP: November 8, 1913.
I!;W!: Statement of Headman Mhimbt, The BSACo. used pictorial symbols for
tax receipts m Barotseland, namely 'a band' for 1910; 'fish' (1911)and 'a
bird' (1912): Vide: C.M. N. White: A PreUmmary Survey of Luvale Rural JioonOll:
Kanche.ter UDiveraity Press: Kanchester: 1959: p 5.
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was bom '1dying shortly an account of the mother's lllness}-.328
Other prominent malpractices committed by these messengers and touts,
among the Nkonya and the I..undaof the Balovale district, were, equally,
profound, in the light of their repercussions on the African societies concerned.
The standard practice of the messengers and touts attached to the Native Dep-
329artment everywhere, victimising those African peoples they dealt with,
was unleashed in the Balovale district, where women were not only captured
as hostages, but were also flogged for, allegedly, hiding away thedrhusbands
330and sons, whilst those able-bodied men who happened to be caught up in
these touts' drag-net were forwarded to the Native Commissioner's office, tied
up with ropes around their necks and subsequently chained for fear of their
331escaping.
Moreover, the myth that traditiooalleaders got a better deal, from these
labour mobilisatioo activities, by co-operating with the authorities for fringe
332
benefits, during the early period of colonial rule in South 'Central Africa,
does not look tenable in this particular case. Indeed, most of the chiefs and
headmen were not ooly chained or threatened with punitive measures of one
form or another, but those, who were considered capable of worldng, were
also forwarded to the Southem labour markets through the Bureau.333 No
regard of any kind was reserved even for those. who had met their tax obliga-
334
tions, as they too were sent down by the Bureau.
The global nature of Stirke and Webb's recruiting activities in the Balovale
district in 1912/13 had serious results. In the eyes of their superiors,
activities of this character. seriously harmed the preconditions of stable
administration and were, therefore, counter-productive in terms of the main-
tenance of order amongst the subject communities of a colonial setting. In-
deed, the hostility and suspicious attitude, wrought by the Bureau's labour rec-
ruiting activities amongst the local societies, were effectually demonstrated
in mid-1913, when Bureau officials, Micklem, the Manager for Northem
328C•O. 417/539: Statement of Kafulo before Willis, JP, Asst. Resident
329 Magistrate: Balovale District: November 30, 1913.
330Vide: Supra: Chapter "2
3 1Ibid: Statements of Nyangunga and Kafoya.
3:2IM!!: Statements of Chilango~lnd SeUwabefore Willis: November 29, 1913.
Vide: Van Onselen: 'The Role of Collaborators in the Rhodesian Mln1ng
333 Industry 1900-1935': Ioo, cit.
C. O. 417/539: Statements of Headman Kalenga and Headman Seliw! before
Wl1l1s: November 29, 1913.
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Rhodesia, and Bisset, the Inspector for Recruiting in Barotseland, called at
the Native Commissioner's camp in the Balovale district. The consequences of
this visit were quite striking as:
The MalWlda and Malovale near the camp without exception•••
ran away together with other ~ethnic groupsj- further north as
the nerNsreached them of the arrival of the Bureau represent-
ative.
The general unrest consequently instigated by the Bureau operations in the
Balovale district was of such dimensions that, by October 1915, the district
was closed to labour recruiting and the Bureau agent, . D. Salmon,
who had succeeded Webb, was thus forced to leave the area for Livingstone.SS6
Although the Bureau, in this case, attempted to clear the air by declaring
its innocence, in comection with the 1913unrest in the Balovale district,and,
at the same time too, tried to reorganise its machinery across the Zambesi,
particularly in BarotBeland, by bringing in fresh hands to take over from
Webb and Micklem~whohad left its service, and Bissett, the Inspector, who
S37was, conveniently, allowed to take some leave, the harm to the cause of
trans-Zambeslan labour mfgration had already been done. In fact, as the pre-
war phase of trans-Zambeslan labour migration into Southern Rhodesia came
to an end, most district omcials had become quite chary on the issue of
Bureau operations in their respective areas.
The proceedings in the Balovale district, between 1912 and 1914, in-
advertently affected the proverbial co-operation between the administrative
authorities and the Bureau omcials in the trans-Zambesian region over labour
matters. The adamant attitude andWlCtuous innocence of the Bureau officials,
with regard. to the unrest in the Balovale district towards the end of 1913, were
quite galling to the Northem Rhodesian Administration; more so that some of
the Bureau omcials, directly involved in the matter:. like Bissett, the inspect-
or of Recruiting for Barotseland, refused even to be present at the official
338enquiry on this body's proceedings, in this particular district. The rupture
~:~id: Statements of Headman Seliwaand Mwanuamo.
3 6!2!!!:Palmer, N/C Balovale to Resident MagIstrate, Mongu:January 3,1914.
3 C. O.417/540: Extract from Barotse Circle Report for October 1913by
Bissett, Recruiting Inspector, Barotseland.
337!e!2: Murray, Managing Director, RNLBBulawayoto Secretary for
Native Affairs: Livtngstone: April 22, 1914.
338C.O. 417/539: McKinnonto Burns-Beg, March 10, 1914.
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in the relationship between the Bureau and the Administration of Northern
Rhodesia occasioned by the Balovale district events was also in no way helped
by the attitude of the Imperial authorities, who decided to sit on the fence,
339whilst the two former al11esengaged in a mud-slinging exercise.
Under these circumstances, it could be said that, by the beginning of
1914, the fate of the Bureau, as the agency for trans-Zambesian labour recruit-
ment, was in the balance. A cleavage was becoming discernible within the
administrative circles of Northern Rhodesia, in relation to official attitudes
towards the Bureau and its activities. In the old territory of North-Western
Rhodesia, where most cases of labour abuse and other malpractices. by the
Bureau, had occurred. between 1907 and 1914, the district officials were
beginning to adopt a noticeably frigid attitude towards this body.
In the various divisions of the Batoka district, for instance, the officials
were no longer enthusiastic over the phenomenonof labour emigration to
Southern Rhodesia tmder the aegis of the Bureau, at the beginning of 1914, for
a variety of reasons. In the Magoyedivision, in particular, the cause for
concern and, therefore, one, which, incidentally, influenced some change in
official policy, was, mainly, the system of employing runners by the Bureau
to raise labour supply, whichwas here considered quite objectionable 'as
runners oo(cruld)-exceed their instructions and forcibly recruit labour since
their remuneration entirely oo(depended)-upon the results of their recruiting, ,
340so it was argued.
The authorities in the Gwembeand Kalomo sub-d1stricts were, (Jl the
other hand, not encouraged by what they viewed as the reckless disregard, by
the Bureau, of the welfare of the recruits, which made the task of tracing
deceased individuals on the Southern Rhodesian mines a dimcult one. 341 In the
Kalomo division, in particular, this problem was even further compl1cated by
the fact that the Toka recruits from that area were often classified by the
Bureau as Tonga; hence the confusion with residents of the M:agoyeand Gwembe
divisions.
..
"'
339Ib1d: Bums-Begg to Lord Gladstone: March 17, 1914.
340C•O. 417/558: Extract frolil the Annual Report for MagoyeSub-DIstrict of
Batoka Dlstrictfor the Year Ended March 31st, 1914 (by Mr M, Goslin.
Native Commissioner).
34~ld: Extracts from the Annual Report for the Kalomo Sub-DIstrict of
Batoka for the Year Ended March 31st, 1914 (byMr H.S. Thomlcroft,
Asst, Magistrate) and The Annual Report for the Guimbi Sub-DIstrict of
518
In the final analysis, the general consensus within the official circles, in
the Batoka district, was that greater emphasis should be placed on independent
labour migratioo rather than anything else. Whether this decision was more
influenced by the general malpractices of the Bureau in recruiting labour
throughout former North-Western Rhodesia than it was by the geographical
position and proximity of this particular dis.trict to the Southern Rhodesian
labour markets, is another story. All in all, such a decision greatly under-
mined the credibility of the Bureau, as a mediumfor trans-Zambesian labour
migration to Southern Rhodesia after 1914.
However, in the former territory of North-Eastern Rhodesia, not much
damage appears to have been further inflicted on trans-Zambesian labour
migration by early 1914, since the decision by the Administration to allow
recognised competition against the Bureau in the field of labour recruitment
the previous year. As a matter of fact, in areas like the East Luangwadist-
rict, where labour migration to Southern Rhodesia amongst the Angoni,
Chewa, Nsenga and allied ethnic groups had a long-standing tradition, the
movement was scarcely affected by the beginning of 1914 and the Bureau too
342held its sway.
In the northern portion of this province, the position of the Bureau was
not, at first, Significantly improved by the course of events in that region.
The rivalry of Robert Williams and Companyover labour supply was still
producing adverse consequences for the Bureau, notably in those districts
adjacent to the Congoborder. In the Luwingudivision of the Mweru district,
for instance, it was reported that:
The numbers -(of recrults)- engaged -(for the Lubumbashi
mfne)- show howpopular it has been ~slnce 1913)-. It has the
advantage over Southern Rhodesia of being nearer and the
shorter term (six months) and the deferred pay conditions are
appreciated by the Native. All repatriates §4Jfstioned report
well on the work, food, treatment and pay.
Yet in spite of what officials In the Bemba country, the Tanganyika
plateau and the Luapula Valley regarded as the :fncreas:ingly postttve Impres-
Batoka District for the Year Ended March 31st, 1914 (by Mr A.W. Griffin,
342 Native Commissioner).
Ibid: Extract from the AnnualReport for the Fort Jameson Sub-District of
the East LUaDgWaDistrict for the Year Ended March 31st, 1914 (by Mr
343 C. Marshall, Magistrate and D/C).
!2!!!: Extract from the AnnualReport for LuwinguSub-District of the Mweru
District for the Year Ended March 31st, 1914 (byMr E. B. Goodall: Nat-
ive Commissioner).
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sions and, therefore, the popularity, which the Katanga mines were gaining,
much to the disadvantage of their rivals in Southern Rhodesia, labour migra-
tion to the markets below the Zambesi was still very much in progress and
the Bureau had not yet become a spent-force by early 1914. Indeed, the via-
biUty of the Bureau ,as an active labour recruiting agency in this northern
portion of the former territory of Northern-Eastern Rhodesia, was, fortuna-
tely, revived by the trend of events in this part of Northern Rhodesia on the
eve of WorldWar I.
The increasing demand for carriers by the Anglo-Belgian Boundary
Commission, which had been operating since 1911 but had only reached the
Mweru and Tanganyika portions of the border in 1913, was evidently a
blessing in disguise to the Bureau and the labour migration movement to
Southern Rhodesia. The BSACo.officials of the area concerned, whowere
required to provide this Commission with carriers, could not help but observe
the unpopularity associated with working for this Commission, hence these
officials' difficulties in procuring the required numbers of carriers. In his
analysis of the causes of this unpopularity, E. B. Goodall, the Native Com-
missioner of the Luwingu division of the Mweru district, for example, com-
mented with melancholy:
••• it is much to be regretted that the contract with the men
sent ~to the Anglo-Belgian Commtsstonj- does not seem to
have been adhered to, nor were arrangements made for
supplying them with food on their journey home adequate.
This is the more unfortunate ~sincer it was represented to
the men that they were being engaged for A~strat1on
work, to work under GovernmentOfficials.
In the circumstances, the main beneficiaries here were not simply the
Katanga mines, for which labour migrants from these districts were beginning
to manifest overt preference, but the Bureau also reaped numerous advan-
tages for the cause of trans-Zambesian labour migration to Southern Rhodesia.
Because of the desire by the people of these districts, bordering on the Anglo-
Belgian boundary 'to escape the continual calls made on them locally', as it
were, labour recruitment by the Bureau for Southern Rhodesia by early 1914
was said to have increased by 'more than four times the number that went
South in ~ther previous year ~1913r', especially in the Mpikadivision of the
Awemba district. In fact, the Native Commissioner of this particular sub-
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district, ". G. stokes, was so alarmed by this exodus to Southern
Rhodesia, that he began to call for restrictive measures on the Bureau's
activities, indicating that:
••• the Bureau should be limited to recruit only a certain
percentage of able-bodied males, from anyone village, in
any me year. We have need for the men ourselves, and the
chiefs themselves grumble about it -{labour migration)-.
Apart fro~~e reasons it must affect the food supply and the
birth rate.
Stoke's call for restrictions on labour migration was understandable,
especially in that part of the country, where the system of agriculture,
chitememe. required the presence of able-bodied men, during the dry season,
to lop off branches of trees with axes for stacking and burning before the onset
346of the rainy season, Actually the Bemba traditional rulers were also
getting worried by this motmting rate of labour migration. For instance, one
Chief 'Ke.pa', whohad lost about 104 out of 354 of his men in the early months
of 1914, was especially concerned about this movement. Already the people of
this particular Bemba ruler were said to be showing a striking degree of in-
difference towards agriculture and food production in general, having,
allegedly, got into fa dan.'t care state awaiting the return of mine men with
money', as they did347
In summarizing the preceding events, covering the whole period between
1903 and 1914, it could confidently be said that the process of trans-Zambesian
labour mJgration was a success and the involvement of the successive versions
of the RNLB enabled the BSACo. officials, across the Zambesi to effectively
control and direct this movement to their own satisfaction as well as that of
the Bureau offtclals and the major colonist employers of labour in Southem
Rhodesia. The Bureau per se, symbolized, in many respects, the co-operation
between the political authorities and the private colonist employers, in the
territories concemed, to promote a movement cleverly designed to place
cheap labour at the disposal of capital where it required this commodity,
The growing tensions in the relationship between the BSACo, Admlnlstra-
tion and the Bureau officials in the trans-Zambeslan region, particularly in
345lE!!!: Extract from the AnnualReport for MpilmSub-District of the Awemba
District for the Year Ended March 31st. 1914: (by Mr. G, stokes: Native
346 CommiSSioner).
347Vide: Kaunda: Zambia Shall be Free: p. 8.
lE!!!: Extract from the AnnualReport of the Mpika Sub-District ••••
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the closing stages of this phase, were mere pin-pricks brought into play by
the errors of judgement on the part of individual Bureau officials, on one hand,
as well as by the Northern Rhodesian government's desire to diversify its
economic priorities, in order to make the most out of the regional economic
system in which it operated, on the other. In the event, both these pin-pricks
and the tentative efforts at economic diverSification, in this case in order to
meet the demands of the Katangan labour market, had minimal effects on the
process of trans-Zambesian labour migration to Southern Rhodesia, by the
beginnJng of 1914. Instead, it took events of more fundamental character and
international magnitude, like the World War I, to drastically affect the future
of the Bureau, whose role in trans-Zambesian labour migration to Southern
Rhodesia. had hitherto been taken for granted since 1903. The nature of those
changes wrought by the World War I factor and the manner in which these
affected trans-Zambesian labour migration to the South, constitute a very sig-
nificant aspect of the history of African immigration into Southern Rhodesia
between 1914 and 1923.
11: Trans-Zambesian labour immigration during the World War I and after,
1914-1923: The peak and subsequent decline of a phenomenon,
The outbreak of the World War I introduced new elements in the history of
African labour in the trans-Zambesian territories. The sudden demand for
African manpower to reinforce British war effort against the Germans in
Tanganyika could hardly by-pass Northern Rhodesia, located, as it was, on the
borders of this German territory. The cumulative effects of these new require-
ments inexorably affected the course of labour migration, either independent-
ly or through the Bureau,to Southern Rhodesia. Of course, right from the
outbreak of this war in mid-1914. to the end of 1915, the recruiting activities
of the Bureau were, by no means, adversely affected by events beyond the
Zambesi. If anything, the problem of this bodywas, more or less, one of a
glut of trans-Zambesian labour supply rather than that of ~Jn fact, the
incidence of surplus labour was so sertous that the Bureau management in
Southern Rhodesia. was worried by the developments. George Upton, the new
Managing Director of this labour organisation who had succeeded his former
superior, George Wolfe Murray, then called abroad for military service, viewed
this situation, by June 1915, as one likely to ruin the Bureau. With about 600
recruits in its Bulawayo compound, whom no colonist employer needed, the
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the Bureau was faced with a new problem of maintaining these men at a great
348expense.
As if these difficulties were not by themselves enough, the Bureaumana-
gement found itself also compelled to plead, often.unsuccessfully, with col-
onist employers of labour In Southern Rhodesia, whowere taking advantage of
this labour surplus to either ill-treat Bureau labourers or systematically
reduce their wages and, by these actions, consequently prejudicing the position
of this body, in the eyes of trans-Zambesian labour migrants. These coloo.lst
employers 00. their part, faced with this unprecedented turn of events, reacted
in various ways. Some of those, whowere accused of brutalizing these appa-
rently 'unwanted' labourers, argued, with evident Indifference, as C. 'S.
Marks of the Hartley district did, that the assaults on the labourers In question
were only minimal and that the <Dlyoffensive instruments used by his capltaos
were. merely "'sjamboks' of an extraordinarily useful ldnd', which these
capitaos 'certainly applied. •• to the legs of certain natives to clear the road
349
••• ' but without any malevolent desJgns. Those colonist employers, who
had been prevailed upon, against their intentions, to absorb some of this excess
labour, like the managem.entof the Falcon mine in the Chillmanzi district,
actually later reneged, alleging that these new additions to their labour force
were likely to raise the mortality rate on their property, with the result that
'our -{Falcm Mine)- death rate -(wouldbe)- criticized adversely, with the pos-
sibility of -(our)- being deprived of a large number of our working boys at short
ti ,350no ce, •••
The excessive influx of trans-Zambesian labour tnto Southern Rhodesia,
during the first two years after the outbreak of World War I, may not have
been unconnected with the general African reactions to proceedings on the
borders of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In Nyasaland, for instance,
the level of awareness amongst the African peoples was certainly high enough
to enable them to move abreast with the trend of events, either inside their own
348A 3/18/30/30: G. Upton, Managing Director, RNLB, to Secretary,
Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, Bulawayo: June 14, 1915.
349 / /~: C. S. :Marks, Hartley, to Taylor, C N C, Sallsbury, December 23,1915.
350Ib1d: J.G. McDonal, ManagingDirector, The Gold Fields Rhodesian Deve-
lopment Co. Ud., Bulawayo, to Uptcm:Salisbury, January 26, 1916.
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territory or across the frontier in Tanganyika. Indeed, when, in September
1914, the govemment of that territory initiated a plan to recruit African
askaris, John Chllembwe and other members of the contemporary African
sub-elite had simultaneously launched a surreptitious movement to resist
what they regarded as an unwarranted attempt to involve Africans in a purely
351'white men/s war'; hence the rising of 1915. Moreover, even the NyasaIand
labour recruits in the Bureau depot at Letombo, near Salisbury, were report-
ed, in August 1916, to be followingclosely the movement of General Jan
352Smuts' army in the campaign.
With this degree of awareness, itmight be posstble, therefore, that the
reasons given by the Bureau management, for the abnormal influx of Nyasa-
land labour during the years 1914 and 1915, that these people were nmning
away from their countries with the purpose of 'evading their obligations to
353their own Government during the war', may well have been based on
correct assum.ptions. In any case, the govemment of Nyasaland was, suf-
ficiently persuaded by the force of the Bureau management's conclusims and,
accordingly, acted to arrest the situation. In the opfnJ.onof Sir George Smith,
the governor of Nyasaland, this massive labour emigration to Southern
Rhodesia had to be stoppe~because:
••• it ~as)- very essential for the successful prosecUlion of
the campaign ~agaJnst German East Africa)- that the requisite
labour should be forthcoming and that every endeavour be made
to rectify an~~1sconceptions which may have arisen in the
native mind.
The anxieties. manifested by the government of Nyasaland over labour
emigration as hindering official attempts to recruit manpower to meet various
military requirements were also shared by authorities in Livingstone. Here,
as early as February 1916, it was becoming apparent to the officials, that
extensive mobilisation of African labour was necessary to meet the demands,
prompted by the war situation on the Tanganyika/Northern Rhodesia frontier.
According to the estimates of the territory's Secretary for Native Affairs,
351Vide: Shepperson and Price: Independent African:. .:
~ ,'" .. Chapters V & VI.
352
A 3/18/30/30: Uptonto Secretary, Dept. of Administrator, Salisbury:
353 August 4, 1916•
.!2!!!:Report of the Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the RNLB,
35LSalisbury, Extract fromRhodesia Herald : April 28, 1916.
1!!!!!: Sir George Smith, Governor, Zomba, Sir Drummond Chaplin: Salis-
bury: JlD1e7, 1916.
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about 'one thousand labourers' were, for Instance, wanted for the construction
of the Broken.Hill-Abercom road, to facilitate communication with the war
front, whilst, at the same tim.e:
Manythousands of natives -(were)- required to carry supplies
to the Forces operating on the Northern Border. As many
natives. -(were)- necessary to transport food for the
carriers.
To effect all these needs, it was becoming, Increasingly necessary for
the government of Northern Rhodesia, therefore, to restrain the activities of
the Bureau, which had hitherto managed to maintain the tempo of its >'labour
recruiting activities, by the beginning of 1916. The clash of interests between
this labour organisation and the government of Northern Rhodesia was be-
coming quite obvious. In the Barotse district, for Instance, by January and
February 1916, the Acting Resident :Magistrate at Mongu, whohad received
instructions to supply from his area 'between 1500 and 2000 carriers immedi-
ately', was at pains to avoid direct competition with the Bureau agent of the
district over this issue. At Fort Jameson too, where severalloads were
said to be arriving in large numbers. through the Feira and Tete overland
routes. for urgent transportation to Kasama, the Magistrate there was
equally anxious over the outcome of Bureau labour recruiting operations on
the prospects of raising the required quota of carriers for the purpose. In a
nutshell, a situation had arisen in Northern Rhodesia, by the beginning of 1916,
whose ccnsequences were best described by the Managing Director of the
Bureau, in the following language:
It seems to be feared that the pressure nowbeing brought to
bear by the Government -(ofNorthern Rhodesia)- may cause
natives to enUst at Bureau agencies In order to escape unpopular
employment as carriers, and thereby rendering doubly difftcult
the very important work of transporting supplies to the Northern
Border. If this apprehension proves correct there is likelihood
of the Bureau being asked to suspend r~t1ng operations until
Government requirements are satisfied.
The fears of the Bureau management over the course of trans-Zambesian
labour recruitment for Southern RhodeSia, by 1916, were vindicated sooner or
later. The colossal demand for manpower for services of one kind or another
on the war front, between Apr1l1916 and March 1917, was begfnnlng to bear
355
N 3/22/11/1: Confidential Circular to Members of the Board of RNLB
Management by Upton: Salisbury: February 11, 1916.
356Ibld.-
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fruits. During this short period, for instance, about 162,982 men were
engaged from all over Northern Rhodesia for services on the war front.357
The military offensive by the German general, Von Lettow Vorbeck, against
the northern portion of Northern Rhodesia in 1916 was the primary cause of
these vigorous activities on the part of the officials of that territory.
In those districts closer to the war zone, like the Abercorn division of
the Tanganyika district where the officials were more desperate over the
labour question, over 7, 000 women were also mobilised for services in
casual transport and for grinding grain to feed the askaris. and the carriers. 358
Under these circumstances, labour migration to Southern Rhodesia was, of
course, severely curtalled. Once priority was established over labour supply
in Northern Rhodesia for General Edward Northey's East Africa campaign
359in March and April 1916. the subsequent embargo on labour recruitment
for Southern Rhodesia was inevitable.
For the Bureau, the most painful aspects of these new developments were
the uncertainty and expense which they involved Already by February 1917,
this body had been called upon to make various readjustments in its infra-
structure, notably in Barotseland, where the changed situation necesettated
the removal of Bureau heacquarters fromSenanga to Mongu and the effecting
of related modiflcations in the food and depot routes at a cost of between £400
and £500. Moreover, the prohibition on labour recruitment by the Bureau
in the East Uumgwa district, the traditional backbone of trans-Zambesian
labour supply to Southem Rhodesia, which, together with independent migrant
labour from Nyasaland, contributed to 'between 60% and 80%' of Bureau
recruits for mine and farm work, patently crippled the cause of trans-Zambes-
ian labour migration to the South, particularly so because the authorities of
Northern Rhodesia did not then know for how long the embargo would last, not
to mention also the obvious fact that 'the East IAlangwa District and the Nyasa
Border produced our ~the Bureau's)- cheapest and best recruits', as compared
360
to more costly labour material from Barotseland Certainly, the prospects
357Cross: The Watch Tower Movement in South Central Africa: pp. 192-3:
(Vide: Plate .m: 'The Carriers or "Tenga-Tenga" Boys With their Loads
358 (1914)').
359Mee.elo: Reaction to Colonialism: pp. 135-6.
C. O. 417/586: H. J. Stanley, Res/Com., Salisbury to Wallace, Uv1ngstone
360 March 3, 1917.
A 3/18/30/31: Managing Director's -{RNLB)- Weekly Report No. 127 for
Period Ending: February 24, 1917.
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for sound labour recruitment, as of old, did not seem encouraging, at all, to
the Bureau at this juncture. Given, in this case too, the Nyasaland author-
ities' avowed intention to 'pollce their border to prevent natives crossing to
361Northern Rhodesia, , consequent to the Chllembwe .. ising and the pressure
imposed agafnst the African communities there to procure carriers, the
situation was, from the Bureau's point of view, qultebleak.
From all appearances, the sltuatiOll created by the embargo on labour
recruitment for Southem Rhodesia was not changfng for the better at all, by
the end of 1917. Although mlnlmal concesslOllB were granted to the Bureau
for labour recruitment, by November of that year, In the Batoka district and
the Petauke division of the East Luangwa district, these were too meagre to
raise the optimism of this labour boc:\Y. Bureau offtclals were not contended,
In the least, with the areas of recruitment so allowed: the Batoka distr1ct, for
instance, having been, so it was alleged, totally stripped of Ita able-bodied
men, since 'very large numbers of war carriers' had been drawn from this
region between 1916 and 1917. In the East Luangwa district, the Petauke
division was, by no meana, the favourite bOlUldof the Bureau agenta preferring,
as they did, the Fort Jameson and Lundazl divlalolUJ, then popularly known as
the Bureau's 'most prolific sources of -(labour)- supply and from whence the
362
best and cheapest labourers -(were)- usually drawn'.
Because of these defects, Indicated above, in those particular areas
where the authorities of Northern Rhodesia had agreed to lift the embargo
against the Bureau, It would appear that the advantagea proffered by this
official measure were somehow oancelled by the drawbacks Involved. As the
Bureau management also lamented, the fact that permJsslon to recruit labour
had been granted In September 1917, towards the beginning of the ram season.
could only mean that no recrultiJW activities oould be undertaken till February
of the following year, when this wet season drew to an end and the rivers sub-
sided.
But perhaps the prospecta for the Bureau, In resuming Ita operatlona In
Northern Rhodelia, might not have looked so gloomy, had thls body and the
361N 3/22/11/1: ConfideDtlal Circular to Members of the Board of Mancement
by Upton: February 11, 1916.
362A 3/18/30/31: Managing Director's -(RNLB)- Weekly Report No. 180 for
the period Ending November 10, 1917.
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colonist employers of labour in Southem Rhodesla bad. at their dl.po8n.l,
alternative means of supply to make up for the loaa whloh the embargo across
the Zambesi thus entailed. These alternative schemes were, In tho least.
encouraging at thls particular time, when they were 80 badly needed for
reHef purposes. Independent trana-Zambealan labour Immigration fnOO
Southern Rhodesia, between 1914 and 1916, wo., 0. we have seen, at ita peak.
but colonist employers of labour squandered their chanoes by exploiting the
situation to lower the wages of their employees and. by 80 do... allowed
both labour relatlOl18 and cOllcUtf0D8to dee_erate on the u8umptton thAt thi8
labour was easier to replace at any time. By 1916, the situation bad, however,
materia.1Jy ohanged and no voluntary labour wo. fortbcomlnlln such lal"le
numbers, as It had delle before.
In fact, by the end of 1916, voluntary labour mJcn,tton from Darotaeland
was reported to have been quite effectively offset, by rumours on an alleged
war, In progress, amangst the white oolon.. ta ID IJvtncstone and Dulawayo or
that Africans in these urban OeDtrM 'were beiDI "PI'M.ed" for war s.rvtoe'
and, consequently, 'sent to act u a "shield" for the whiteman' at the war
front.363 Of course, with the recruitment or an Afrtcan Coottna .. t In ada-
wayo in February 1916. OOll8 .. ttng of 600 Ndebel. volunteers, followed by
that of a Bemba foroe averaging between 200 aDd 300 m.. , m_t of wbom were
enUsted Into the seoOlld battalion of the Klng'. Afrloan nines fn JUne of th.
same year, 364 th_e Afrloan potential labour ml(rnnbl to the South, who wort'!
aware of these dlatorted rumour., were, obviously, forced to think twice be-
fore they undertook the Journey. The c:lamaclDleft'ecbl, tb ... c1evelopm«tt
had on lndependent labour mliratton to Southern RbodIIata. are .vldet In the
fact that, henoeforth, trana-Zambealan labour mtcratton, even from Darotae-
land, to Katanga helm to exceed the oorrMpoDdI.ac ~I. to the Southern
labour marketl·
Other altematlve external .ou.ro .. or labour npply, Cbe Du.reau auempted
to rely on after 1916, ID order to keep the oolaD1lt .mployers of labour ID
Southam Rhodelia weU auppHed with tbU oommodlty ad tbua thwart the em-
363C•O. 417/674: Extract from tbe N/C'. Report, Makoaya 8ub-Dlatrtct 01
Barotae Dlatrlct, (A.Q, Helm) for 1814-1816: §9019led Ip Lord DgtQ!!
to A. Bonar kw: Marcb 4, 1816.
364C. O. 417/676: Lord BuxtaIl to BoDar Law: JUDe20. 1818.
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bargo of the trans-Zambesian governments, were the Bechuanaland Protect-
orate and the Portuguese territory of Mozambique. But even these two alter-
natives were not as promising as the Bureau had expected, during the World
War I. As far as the Bechuanaland Protectorate was concerned, for instance,
colonist employers of labour in SouthernRhodesia had never seriously re-
garded it as a credible source of labour though spasmodic, but very little
supply had frequently entered the country, independently, from the Bokalaka
I
districts of the Protectorate, adjacent to the borders of Southern Rhodesia.365
By 1917, however, arrangements were made by the Bureau with the
Protectorate's Resident Commissioner, Major Pansera.In Mafekingand the
Tati Companyto procure labour from the Tat! concession area; a bid which
could not yield any fruitful results at an. All that the Bureau managed to
366secure from this source was, apparently, only a total of 143 recruits, since
most of the able-bodied men of the Bokalaka area were reported to be abiding
their time and 'hanging out with the hope of being accepted for the Transvaal',
367
where better opportunities obtained. With regard- to the rest of the Pro-
tectorate and its potential as a source of labour supply to Southern Rhodesia,
the prospects were even bleaker due to the omnipresence of WNLA In the
territory and, hence, the pervasion of the Rand influence in that country. In
short, Uptoncorrectly summed up the situation, in quite a gloomy tone,
stating that:
••• it wouldbe a waste of time and mmey to attempt to recruit
~abour)- outside of the Tati Concession. The Protectorate
-(BechuanaIand)-swarms with Witwatersrand recruiting agents,
who, in view of the labour shortage on the Rand mines, receive
large capitation fees, and are able to offer natives far superio~68
pay and conditions, to those obtainable in -(Southern)-Rhodesia.
With regard to the Mozambiquealtemative, it was not so much the
competition of WNLA as the troublous conditions then existing in that terri-
tory. which completely frustrated Bureau efforts to procure labour. from this
source for Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, when the Bureau was, initially,
allowed to recruit labour from the Tete district of Mozambique in 1913, under
365Schapera: ope cit. p, 47.
366C•O. 417/601: RNLBReport for June 26, 1918: Enclosed in Douilas-JCIles
to lDrd Buxtcm: December 16, 1918.
367A 3/18/30/31: Managing Director's -(RNLB)-WeeklyReport No. 172 for the
Period Endtng February 23, 1918.
36~1t!: :M:anaging Director's WeeklyReport No. 139 for the period Ending June
9, 1917.
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369what came to be popularly mown as the Tete Agreement, the Randlords
and the SouthAfrican authorities in general, had raised no objections to
the arrangements, which apparently did not seem to interfere with South
African interests on labour matters in anyway, especially that the Tet e
district was situated north of latitude 22 degrees South, beyondwhich labour
, 370recruitment for the Rand had been prohibited
Whilst the Tete agreement had functioned quite smoothly for the first
four years of its existence, by 1917, the Makomberising in the Portuguese
territory Significantly, affected the ebb and flowof labour between Porgu-
guese Zambesla and SouthernRhodesia. The Bureau management clearly
aclmowledgedthe obstructive effects this conflict had produced on both the
recruitment of labour from the Tete district in particular and on trans-
Zambesian labour migration to SouthernRhodesia. Ingeneral. In June 1917,
for instance, three gangs of Bureau recruits despatched from Tete to Mount
Darwin in Southem Rhodesia were never heard of again; having either been
dispersed or captured by the insurgents in the Portuguese territory, then in
full conrrol of the area through which the labour route from Fort Jameson via
Tete and MountDarwin to Sallsbury passed. Indeed, the frequency of these
interruptions on labour mfgrati<mto SouthernRhodesia was such that it
compelled the Bureau to transfer most of its recruits, on this route, at Tete
to the new road, coonectfng Feira and Salisbury via SipoUlo.371
Even more ominous for the Bureau, on this issue of labour recruitment
from the Tete district, was the manner inwhich the Por tuguese authorities
prosecuted their campaign against the Insurgents, which, literally, reduced
the whole of Portuguese Zambesia to chaos. Everyone in the area seemed to
be at odds with everybody. The relations between the prazo holders, the so-
called muzungos, and the Portuguese officials could hardly be said to have been
amicable, especially as the latter felt that it was, particularly, the hIgh-
handed methods of these landowners in dealing with their African tenant
communities, which had contributed to the rising.
369For the Tete Agreement, Vide: C.O. 417/530: Crewe at F. O. to C.O. :
January 28, 1913; Sir Arthur Harding, LIsbon, to Sir Edward Grey at
F. 0.; January 21, 1913:' and also: P.R. Warhurst: 'The Tete Agreement':
370 Rhodesian History: VoL I: 1970: pp. 31-41.
C.O. 417/525: General Louis Botha, Prime Minister, Pretoria, to Lord
371 GladstcDe:August 14, 1913.
A 3/18/30/31: Managing Director's ~NLB}- WeeklyReport No. 139 for
Period Ending June 9, 1917.
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Indeed, as early as 1913, V.F. Crouch, the Acting Native Commissioner
of the Mou.ntDarwin district of Southern Rhodesia, had pleaded with his
superiors in Salisbury, with a view of settling some of the refugee families
from the neighbouring Portuguese territory in the area between the Mamvura-
donha mountains and the Mukumburariver of his district. Apparently, these
African commtmities could no longer return to their homelands in the Portu-
guese territory, where they were generally being ill-treated by the prazo
holders, whilst the wives, in particular, were also compelled to work as
372carriers alongside their menfolk.
But it was, especially, with regard to the manner in which these Portu-
guese authorities raised African auxiliaries and the veritable techniques of
divide and rule1whichthey pursued, that created such a completely chaotic
situation that the Bureau managem.entfelt convinced that their labour organi-
sation's infrastructure, through the territory, was being threatened. Upton
aptly described the situation in the Tete district, in November 1917:
The condition of affairs here -(Tete district)- can only be
described as chaotic. The Portuguese system of settling native
disturbances by setting one tribe against another, whilst per-
haps possessing the merit of cheapness, cannot but Indefinitely
delay the proper restoration of order. Everything is dis-
organised; families and tribes are scattered over the country;
and in some instances having ceased to rebel against Portu-
guese~, the natives have launched out Into internecine
strife.
Perhaps Bureau losses in the Tete district may have been well compen-
sated had the African refugees from the Portuguese territory, in both Northern
and SouthernRhodesia, offered themselves for employment in Southern
Rhodesia through this labour organisation. On the contrary, this was just not
the case. In SouthernRhodesia, where the Barwe followers of Chief Makosi
Makombehad been settled in the Mtokoand Inyanga districts after initiating
negotiations for asylum with the BSACo. officials through their leading Shona
kinsmen, like Chiefs Tangwenaand Chioko, on the Rhodesian side of the bor-
der, 374 it was hoped that these 4,000 refugees would provide useful material
372C.O. 417/526: V.F. Crouch, Acting N/C Mt. Darwin to C/N/C Salisbury:
373 May9, 1913.
A 3/18/30/31: ManagingDirector's (RNLB)WeeklyReport No. 160 for the
period Ending November 10, 1917.
374C.O. 417/590: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator:
August 6, 1917.
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375for labour purposes in that country. This, of course, was not the case
and the whole issue was, as a matter of fact, clouded by diplomatic wrangles
connected with the efficacy of the Tete agreement on this score.376
As regards those refugees, who settled along the banks of the Zambesi
and the Luangwarivers in Northern Rhodesia, their attitude could not be said
to have been, at all, encouraging. Uptononce more reported on the Bureau's
futile attempts to recruit labour from these people, towards the end of 1917,
in the followingmanner:
••• despite persuasion they -(refugees)- are disinclined to
proceed to work, firstly because they wish to remain with
their famiUes to watch events on the spot; and secondly,
they have just passed through a very trying and disturbing
time and are thoroughly unsettled. Every legitimate in-
nuence has been brought to bear on the men by both Govern-
ment and Bureau officials including an offer to supply food
regularly to their dependents during their -(men's)- absence
in Southern Rhodesia but for the reasons given they pr~
to remain near their old homes awaiting eventualities.
Thus up to 1918, the Tete district, as an alternative source of labour to the
traditional trans-Zambesian supply to which the Southern Rhodesian labour
market had become so accustomed, could not be counted upon.
The embargo imposed by the northern governments on labour recruit-
ment during the course of the war; the inabll1ty of Southern Rhodesian colo-
nist employers to offer comparable labour terms and conditions, in order to
compete on the same plane with the Rand over labour from. the Bechuanaland
Protectorate and the chaotic situation in the Tete district, ensuing from the
Makombe rising, were, altogether, factors beyond the control of the Bureau
as a labour organisation, primarily, to serve the interests of the colonist
employers in Southern Rhodesia. The Bureau management had no levers with
which to influence the designs and other various factors, which characterized
the origins and courses of those particular proceedings, which so abnoxiously
affected the process of external labour ImmJgration into the country, during
this period. For this reason, the Bureau and its customers could not be held
responsible for the evil days which befell the movement of foreign labour Into
3751bid:Chaplin to Stanley: Secret: August 28, 1917.
376!E!!!:Lord Buxton to Stanley: Secret: September 16, 1917: Vide also:
Warhurst: 'The Tete Agreement': pp. 39-41.
377A 3/18/30/31: Managing Director's (RNLB)WeeklyReport No. 172 for per-
iod Ending February 23, 1918.
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the country, especially from those domains across the Zambesi.
Yet the same pretexts, given above, could not be resorted to, in order to
explain the manner inwhich some sections of the colonist employers in
Southern Rhodesia contributed, either directly or indirectly, to the decline of
the Bureau, by withdrawing their support from this body and, in this way,
unwittingly, biting the hand, which had, hitherto, fed them. The colonist
farmers of Southern Rhodesia represented that section of employers, which,
in one way or another, played an important role in mapping out the gradual
demise of the Bureau especially noticeable in the post-war period.
Between 1916 and 1917, when all the above-mentioned drawbacks had so
seriously undermined the very existence of the Bure~Jthat the number of its
annual labour recruits fell drastically from 11,316 in 1915 to only 6,693 in
3781916, the lowest figure since the Bureau was reconstituted in 1906, the
farmers had begun, once more, to question the credibllity of the Bureau as
a channel for labour supply to the colonist employers in Southern Rhodesia as
a body. Of course, it may be pointed out here that these colonist farmers
had been. influenced by the glut of labour supply on the Southern Rhodesia
labour market, precipitated by the massive influx of trans-Zambesians at the
vital stage of the war years. Their feelings, Uke those of other colonist
employers in Southern Rhodesia during that time, may have approximated the
attitude of the Falcon Mine management, who had become, more or less, con-
vinced that the Bureau was losing its importance as a purveyor of labour and
should, therefore, apply its energies to selective processes of labour recruit-
ing, in the trans-Zambesia territories, in order to lessen the mortality rates
on Southern Rhodesian mJnes which had caused so much furore in Imperial
official Circles, prior to the outbreak of World War I. In this particular case,
itwas recommended, in January 1916, that the Bureau should see to it that
'boys should only be recruited for Southern Rhodesia from the higher altitudes
of Northern Rhodesia ~and)- Central Africa ~yasaland)-, , whilst medical
examination of the recruits 'should be stri cter ~so)- that any boys showing
379
signs of weak lungs should be promptly rejected. '
However, the farmers' attitudes, in 1916/1917, appear to have gone fur-
ther in demonstrating these colonist employers' waning support for the
378C. O. 417/589: Stanley to Lord Buxton: July 19, 1917.
379
A 3/18/30/31: :McDonaldto Upton: January 26, 1916.
533
Bureau's activities in labour recruitment than mere peripheral criticisms
on the physical condition of recruits, this body brought forward from across
the Zambesi and elsewhere. Relying on their inordinate proportion on the
Bureau membership lists (1,082 farmers and 264 mineowners out of a total
membership of 1, 346 subscribers in 1916), the farming community launched.
a vicious attack on the bona fides of this body to cater for the interests of all
employers, when the farmJDgcommunity was, actually, under-represented on
the management level within the Bureau administrative machinery. The
system whereby, according to Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau Ordinance No.
8 of 1911, the Bureau's seven-member Board of Management had only ane man
standing for the interests of the farmers, whilst the rest represented the
BSACo. and other mining consortia, could no longer satisfy these colonist
farmers.
Led by Gilchrist of the Hartley district and Dunlopof the Mazoe area, in
June 1917, the colonist farmers of Southern Bhodesta, as members of the
Bureau, would not be persuaded to accept that the financial problems of this
labour organlsatim were a logical sequel to the suspensions and embargoes
imposed by the northern governments, thus reducing the Bureau's where-
withal for revenue and income. Neither would this class of colonist employers
accept the argument on the adverse effects of the reduction of the £3, 000
annual subsidy to the Bureau from the Railways to £1,400, which obviously
knocked some holes Into the Bureau's purse, consequently, affecting its effi-
ciency in the field of labour recruitment.
To these colonist farmers, whowere mostly subscribers to R. A.
Fletcher's proto-populist anti-Charter movement, the main causes of the
Bureau's financial problems were, Simply, the dominance of the mining indus-
try and the Bureau's dependence on the BSACo., an the grounds of the £20,000
debt this labour body owed the Company. Thus to avoid the risk of ta:xat1an
being imposed on the rank and file colonists, in order to raise adequate funds
to maintain a one-sided labour organisation, the farmers, by mid-1917.began
to call for the abolition of the Bureau and the restoration of forced labour,
through recognised government channels, as the only solution to equitable
labour supply and distribution. 380
380C. O. 417/589: Stanley to Lord Buxtm: July 19, 1917.
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The attack by the farming community against the Bureau, of which most
of them were members, may have been, primarily, directed against the
BSACo. by a group of colonists who, as we have said, were becoming increa-
singly disenchanted by Company rule. The Bureau, therefore, may have
become a mere Cinderella, caught up in the melee of the beginnings of a long
struggle between two hostile sides. But, nonetheless, the damage, this
labour organisation sustained from these accidental blows, was no less sig-
nificant, especially at a time, when all its members should have rallied be-
hind it. Farmers everywhere in the BSACo. territories, of course, had
developed a particular passion. for attacldng the Bureau; those of Northern
Rhodesia being no exceptions.
In former North-Western Rhodesia, the farm.ers, ironically led by Biss-
ett, a former Bureau official, felt that they were not getting the suitable
labourers they required from the Bureau, in spite of the 30/- capitation fees
381they paid, whilst their counterparts in former North-Eastern Rhodesia
called, as usual, for the total exclusion of this labour organisation from their
382territory, where It was alleged to be depleting labour supply. Yet during
the war years, the flings, by these farmers, at the Bureau, could only cause
long-term injuries rather than gashing wounds. There were other factors,
however, which proved more effective in. Immediately crippling the Bureau
and, along with it, the phenomenon of trans-Zambesian labour migration to
Southern Rhodesia. The Spanish Influenza epidemic at the close of 1918was,
for example, one such enemy, which both the Bureau and trans-Zambesian
labour migration foundmore formidable than the periodic flings from the Irate
colonist farmers.
Spanish Influenza was an importation into the African sub-continent from
Europe, where it had broken out in June 1918, managing to reach SouthAfrica
in September and then spreading along the railway line, in the African sub-
continent, till it reached Bulawayo, by the beginning of October 1918, and,
subsequently, enguIff.ng most of the major urban settlements and mining cen-
381Ib1d:Extract from the Liytngstone Mall. September 8, 1916: Enclosed in
Stanley to IDrd Buxton: July 10, 1917.
382C.O. 417/617: MInutes of the DepUtationof the North-Eastern Rhodesia
Farmers and Commercial Association with His Honour the AdmJnistrator
Wallace) at Fort Jameson: On August 4, 1917.
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383tres in SouthernRhodesia by the close of 1918. The most interesting
features of this epidemic, with regard- to the deployment of African labour,
in general, and the immigration of external supply into SouthernRhodesia, in
particular, were, not merely its specular impudence in kUlingoff the top-
level officials of the Bureau, like Upton, the Managing Director himself, 384
but also its pervasiveness and rather indiscriminate character, once it
reached South··CentralAfrica. The heavy toll of deaths this epidemic Imposed
on towns, mine centres or mining districts in a wider sense, like the Gwelo,
Salisbury, Umtali, Bulawayo, Hartley and Victoria districts, was quite
staggering. In statistical terms, as Table V, below, indicates, these mining
districts sustained the followingcasualties, in descending order, amongst
their African labourers: 385
Table V: Statistical Returns on Spanish Influenza Victims 1918:
~in& District No. of Deaths % DeathRate
Gwelo 896 15.2
Victoria 126 11.4
Bulawayo 999 10.6
Salisbury 389 7.9
Harley 349 7.1
Umtali 92 6.5
In the rural areas adjoining these mining districts in SouthernRhodesta,
the effects of what the Africans called in Shonay!!! or ingubane in Ndebele,
were just as devastating as they were in the urban and mining centres. In
Mashooaland, for instance, the massive exodus of African mine and urban
labourers from places like Gatooma, Hartley and other areas of peri-urban
settlement, greatly helped to spread the epidemic to the Ganga, Mhondoroand
386GGbazareserves of the Hartley district with serious consequences. The
same applied to the Madangombearea of the Chibi district, virtually, en-
387closed in a triangle formed by the Mashaba, Shahaniand Selukwemines as
well as the Umtal1district, where a large African labour force was engaged
on the Penhalonga andRezende mines and on railway and bridge construction
388across the Odzi river. In all these cases, the desertion of African labour-
383C.O. 417/619: Report on the Outbreak of the Epidemic Influenza in Southern
384 Rhodesia in 1918by Dr A,M, Fleming, Medical Director: May1st, 1919.
385C,O. 417/601: Douglas-Jones to Lord Buxton:December 16, 1918.
C.O. 417/619: Report on the Outbreak of the Epidemic Infiuenza••• by Flem-
386 ing: May1st, 1919.
C.O. 417/617: Extract from the Report of the Hartley District for the
MonthEndedNovember 30, 1918, (By L.C. Meredith, N/C): Enclosed in
536
ers, whether local or allen, from their centres of employment and their flight
into the adjoining African reserves were the cause of the undoing of those
African areas in question.
In Matabeleland too, where intensive mining activities were going on, the
local African communities of particular districts, where African labourers
were amassed, were, inexorably, affected by the presence of deserters from
389the nearby centres of employment. In the Bulawayodistrict and the neigh-
390bouring Bubi area, for instance, where the Spanish Influenza had made its
earliest appearance in the country, the congestion of people in the urban and
mining centres was, obviously, complicated by the lack of preparedness amongst
the offiCials, whowere caught on one foot by this epidemic; whilst in the
Gwanda district, another heavy mining area, some of the mineowners and
absentee landlords were not as co-operative as the Native Department would
have liked, with regard to the welfare of those African charges on their
391properties.
The net results of the Spanish Influenza epidemic were its wide-ranging
repercussions on SouthernRhodesia'S position, both in terms of its local
labour turn-out and its role as a destination area for foreign immigrant lab-
our. With regard to immigrant labour, either on voluntary basis or through the
Bureau, it was not only the high morbidity rate occasioned by this epidemic,
as demonstrated in Table VIbelow:392
Table VI: statistical Returns on the Mortality of African Immigrants:
Spanish Influenza, 1918:
Southern Rhodesia -(labourers)-
Portuguese East Africa -do-
Northern Rhodesia "
Nyasaland "
Other Sources "
802 -(deaths)-
408
671
917
53
which frightened away potential labour immigrants. Official attempts to contain
387 Do'!Slas-Jones to Lord Buxton:March 10, 1919.
!2!!!: Extract from the Report of the Chibi District for the MonthEndedNov-
388 ember 30, 1918 (ByW.A. Loades, Acting N/C.)
!!ili!: Extract from the Report of the Umtali District for the MonthEnded
389 November 30, 1918 (ByT. B. Hulley, S/O/N.)
.!2!!!: Extract from the Report of the BulawayoDistrict for the MonthEnded
390 November 30, 1918 (By H.M. Jackson, S/O/N.)
!2!!!: Extract from the Report of the Bubi District for the MonthEnded
391 November 30, 1918 (ByD.W. Green, N/C.)
!2!!!: Extract from the Report of the GwandaDistrict for the month Ended
November 30, 1918 (by H.A. Hemans, N/C.)
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the disease, by encouraging the African population to live in the open, as much
as possible, were, of course, a sequel to the heavy mortality rates so notice-
able in the urban and mining centres. But these measures very frequently had
their drawbacks too.
The closure of schools, churches and pass offices in the Mrewa dist-
393rict, for example, as well as the prohibition of any form of interaction
394between local communities and strangers in the Lomagundi district,
obviously, exposed the gravity of the epidemic incidence in Southem Rhod-
esia, to the incoming foreign labourers, at the close of 1918. In frontier
districts, like the Mrewa and Lomagundiin Mashonaland, for instance, the
result was that these measures also acted as a deterrent to prospective
labour immigrants. At the Mrewa and Mtokodepots of the Bureau, where
aliens were often received, large numbers of migrant labourers were detain-
395ed on account of the closure of the pass offices, whilst it was also observed
that a large proportion of these immigrants, apparently due to shortage of food
396
on their arrival, easily succumbed to Influenza at these depots.
For tile rank and file labour immigrants, who did not use the Mlsale-
Mtoko route which entalled this detention, the consequences of the epidemic
were just as discouraging to the Bureau. The Bureau recruits from Barotse-
land proper and the Batoka and KaNe districts, who had hitherto plied the
Livingstone and Lomagundi routes to Matabeleland and Mashonaland respecti-
vely' were said to have panicked and stampeded to their homes, mce reports
reached them that Influenza had appeared in Livingstone, in November
1918. In fact, as the news of this disease spread throughout Barotseland, the
Administration of Northem Rhodesia had once more to prohibit labour rec-
ruitment for Southem Rhodesia.
As for North-Eastem Rhodesian and Nyasaland immigrant labourers, who
392C.O. 417/618: Fleming, Medical Director, to Secretary, Department of
Administrator: March 11, 1919.
393C•O. 417/617: Extract from the Report for the Mrewa District for the Mooth
Ended November 30, 1918 (by W. Edwards).
39~id: Extract from the Report for the Lomagundi District for the Month
Ended November 30, 1918 (By H.S. Ketgwin, N/C.)
395N3/22/1/2: Taylor C/N/C to Secretary, Dept of Administrators: November
396 8, 1918.
N 3/22/11/2: D. Hawksley, SaUsbury District '1RNLB)-to C/N/C Salisbury:
November 19, 1918.
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used the Feira-Sipoillo route to Salisbury, the situation looked better for the
Bureau in the sense that, with the exception of reported cases of bubonic
plague in the Lundazi division of the East Luangwadistrict, the Influenza
epidemic had not yet appeared in former North-Eastern Rhodesia by
November 1918. But these bright prospects were, however, cancelled out
by the fact that once recruits were CIl the road, between Feira on the Northern
bank of the Zambesi _and Sipoillo in Southern Rhodesia, they speedily turned
back to Feira, as they heard of the epidemic below the Zambesi. The Portu-
guese authorities, whohad recently allowed the Bureau to resume recruitment
since the Makomberising fn 1917, once more reimposed their ban, as a
397response to Spanish Influenza. In all respects, the prospects for the
Bureau over trans-Zambesian labour recruitment, by December 1918, were
quite dim, as more and more recruits turned back to their homes, fn their
thousands and in panic, before they reached the centres of employment in
398
Southern Rhodesia, thus Involvingthis labour body in great expenses.
The gloomy prospects of the Bureaulensuing from the Spanish Influenza
crisis in South Central Africa, were well reflected in the serious constraints
imposed on the labour market in Southern Rhodesia, at the end of 1918 and the
beginning of 1919. On one hand, trans-Zambesian labourers were no longer
coming downIn great numbers, either on account of their own fear of the
epidemic or because those whohad been recently in the employ of the mili-
tary authorities as carriers had 'their pockets full of money' and were, there-
fore, more concerned with their gardens, which had 'suffered from their
absence' at the war !Tontthan in looldng for work fn Southern RhodeSia. 399
The local African labour supply fn Southern Rhodesia itself was, in tum, just
as equally discouraging.
The suspicions and hostility raised by the Influenza crisis, within the
African communities, were not conducive to either positive labour response or
sound race relations. In spite of the attempts of some mining companies to
undertake the task of collecting all the labourers, who had fled from the min-
397A 3/18/30/32: Managing Director's (RNLB)WeeklyReport No. 203 for the
period Ending November 23, 1918.
398C. O. 417/601: Douglas-Jones to Lord Buxton: December 16, 1918.
399 !!ili!-
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ing and urban centres, and gathering them at specified depots to explain the
400state of affairs before re-engaging them, the suspicions of the African
population as to the malevolent intentions of the white colonists, whom they
charged with the introduction of the killer disease, could not be easily dis-
pelled Accordingly, Taylor, the Chief Native Commissioner, warned the
colonist employers of Southem Rhodesia on this score:
The natives have an idea that the Europeans are responsible
for the introduction of the disease ~nuenza)-, and any ref-
erence to labour matters at the present time might have the
effect ofMeatfDg our present object, which is to calm the
natives.
SUch suspicions, on the part of the African populati<n, were, certainly, abetted
by what officials regarded as 'wild rumours', circulating within the African
areas, particularly in the Umtali district, that 'a plague of the liver -{would)-
follow the influenza epidemic, which -{would)- be more deadly than the
latter'; an obvious allusion to the pneumonia, which followed the recovery of
402
the influenza victims once they resumed hard work prematurely,
Of course, African reactions to the Influenza epidemic and assooiated
rumours in Southern Rhodesia were manifested in various ways, In the
Belingwe district, br-example, where suspicious Shona communities of Reserve
No, 2 rejected the medicament issued by the white officials,in December 1918,
in their preference for African herbal remedies, the Rev. Skold of the Church
of Sweden, based in that district, concluded in characteristic colonist atti-
tude towards the Shona peoples:
After the experiences I got from my journey, I have formed
the opinion that it is of very little use to distribute quinine or
similar medicine amongst the so called low class natives, as
they seem not to appreciate it, but believe that medicines
supplied by Europeans do more harm than good As far as I
can see, there is no POS~Uty to prevent the influenza among
this nation -{the Shona)-.
This uncompromising attitude of the Shona communities of Belingwe, which,
400N 3/22/1/2: McDonal to Montagu, Salisbury: Telegram: November 4, 1918.
401Ibid: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator: November 5,
1918.
402!2!!!: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator: November 8,
1918.
403 1918:
C. O. 417/606: Notes on the Influenza Epidemic: December 1-10;py C/N/C
Taylor: Enclosed in Chaplin to Douglas-Jones: December 12, 1918.
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in this r-espect.chtmed in with that of their kinsmen in the Gutu district,404
was, of course, based on the tangible fact; that African herbal treatment was
then commonly lmown to have occasionally effected the Intended desire. In the
Chibi district, for example, the nhokwe grass and pumpkin seeds were widely
used as preventatives, 405 whilst in the Bulawayo district of Matabeleland.tbe
infusion of the bark of the megulu or mbanazankezo tree was said to have
produced results 'at least as good as -{were)- obtained from the use of Euro-
406pean drugs. ' Backed by such psychologically potent factors as the neo-
self-sufficiency of African medicament, it is no wonder, therefore, that local
Africans in Southern Rhodesia could hardly be persuaded to accept overtures
from what they regarded as the enemy camp, the white colonists, during the
Spanish Influenza crisis.
But it was, essentially, the local Africans' reactions in 1918, In relation
to the dwindling labour supply, that their attitude produced the most telling
results. Employers of labour in Southern Rhodesia had, of course, never for-
given the African labourers for their global desertion from the centres of em-
ployment, even during the Spanish Influenza epidemic, when official opinion
was prepared to overlook this development. MJneowners and mfning compan-
ies' in particular, demanded that steps should be taken to bring back their
former labourers, even if this meant resorting to coercive measures. The
mining interests in those districts which constituted the Salisbury Circle of
northern and central Mashonaland were quite voluble on this matter,407whilst
the Globe and Phoenix mine and other properties of the Que Que mining dist-
rict, actually, despatched special messengers Into the neighbouring districts
for both rounding up and reassuring their former African labourers that the
epidemic had been checked. 408 Yet no African labour was forthcoming, In the
post-epidemic phase.
The situation here was further complicated by an outburst of traditional
religiOUS fervour, within the local African circles, as people became Involved
404C•O. 417/617: Extract from the Report of the Gutu District for the Month
405 Ended November 30, 1918 (by E. T. Kenny, N/C).
40aIbid: Extract from, the Report of the Chlbi District.
.!,2!g: Extract from. the Report of the Bulawayo District.
407C. O. 417/606: Notes on the Influenza Epidemic by C/N/C Taylor: Novem-
408 ber 11-20: 1918: Enclosed in Chaplln to Douglas-Jones: November 27,1918,
N 3/22/1/2: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator: Novem-
ber 8, 1918.
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In widespread thanksgiving festivities, once the deadly disease had passed.
The fact that the outbreak of the disease, at the close of 1918, had coincided
with the shortage of rain and, therefore, famine.naturallY,added a cosmic
dimension to the whole crisis. For this reason, in Southem Mashonaland, it
was reported, during the middle of the epidemic, that people were '1dlling
409black goats to propitiate the "Mwari" •••• ' Indeed, when the Felixhurg
Farmers' Association, near Fort Victoria, demanded for assistance from the
authorities by resorting to forced labour to solve their problems in this field
In November 1919, the Native Department replied:
Enquiries have recently shctted the fact the excessive drinking
of beer is the cause of many natives staying in their kraals
Instead of going to work.
This excessive drinking is the result, in the first place, of a
successful harvest and in the second, ~of)- the belief that it
is the wish of the Mlimo that the people should show their
gratitude for their delivery from the Influenza scourge by410
indulging inwild orgies of beer-bibbhlg and thanksgiving.
It was particularly this ldnd of reaction from the local African societies
coupled with the noticeable decline in trans-Zambesian labour immigration,
which singled out the Spanish Influenza episode as one of the mos t decisive
factors in the history of the Bureau and its involvement in the processes of
labour mobllisatioo. The drastic effects of thls factor both during and immedi-
atelyafter the epidemic were, to say the least, particularly telling on the
Southem Rhodesia labour market. In those mining districts like Selukwe,
where, in spite of official waming to the Africans of the area 'to leave their
huts and reside in the bush r, no dispersal was undertaken, the death toll from
the epidemic was quite heavy, amounting to a tota1loss of about '2} to 3%
amongst the kraal natives and from 12% and 15% amongst the Mine natives.111
The overall result for the Selukwe mining district was, therefore, that there
was complete cessation of production as all the mines closed down, tempor-
arily, by November 1918. Throughout the country, only those mines, which
409C. O. 417/617: Extract from the Report of the Chibi District,
410N 3/22/1/2: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Department of Administrator:
Salisbury: December 10, 1919,
411C. O. 417/617: Extract from the Report for the Selukwe DIstrict for the
Month Ended November 30. 1918 (by E, G. Howman, N/C).
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successfully introduced quarantine measures or were located in sparsely
populated districts, like the Wankie Colliery, were saved from the excessive
412loss of their employees. In short, the impact of the Influenza epidemic on
the mining industry, in terms of severe ffnanciallosses, estimated at about
£400,000, and disruption of African labour supply, both allen and local, was
profound. Besides, the ill-effects of the crisis were still felt long after
1918. 413
In assessing the effects of the World War I, the Spanish Influenza and
related events, covering the period 1914-1918, and their bearing on the
Bureau and its role in the process of trans-Zambesian labour immigration into
Southern Rhodesia, numerous factors emerge, which by themselves too, help
us to understand the subsequent 1919-1923 period better. As has already been
observed, the primary objectives in founding the Bureau in the pre-war era
were, in the first instance, manifold and quite sound, from the point of view
of the colonist employers of labour especlally in Southern Rhodesia. Itwas
the hope of the BSACo. officials and colonist employers in the pre-war period
that the Bureau, in all its various forms since 1903, would try to meet the
labour supply requirements, especlally those of the expanding mining industry
of Southern Rhodesia, whilst, at the same, cushloning the employers against
the adverse effects of a general reduction in the African labourers' wages
without which this industry would not have been suffiCiently viable and attra-
ctive to capital.
With the parallel growth of capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesta,
particularly after 1907, the role of the Bure8.\J"inprovlding maximum labour
supply at minimum wage overhead expenses, was quite necessary. It was
also felt that the Bureau was essential as a means of enabling the colonist
employers of Southern Rhodesia to secure an equitable share of African lab-
our, given the relentless competition of rival interests, like the Rand and the
Katanga mining industries, also operating within the same regional economic
system of South Central Africa. Finally, and by no means least Significant,
this semi-official labour organisation was regarded as a paramount factor in
412N 3/22/1/2: Taylor, C/N/C to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator: Salis-
bury: November 8, 1918.
413I. R. Phimister: 'The "Spanish" Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and its Impact
on the Southern RhodeSian Mining Industry': The Central African Journal
of Medicine: No.7: Vol. 19: July 1973: p, 148.
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cana11z1ngAfrican labour to those colonist employers in Southern Rhodesia,
especially, who, by virtue of their unpopularity, would not have procured
414adequate supply on the open market.
Whilst the Bureau had,of course,tried to meet these objectives in the pre-
1914period, m the post-war era, however, it ran the risk of becoming
irrelevant and moribund, due to the changed labour market conditions. The
rise in prices and the general cost of Uvlng, which characterized the post-war
years had severe effects on the African peoples of the sub-continent, more so
that, as m the case of SouthernRhodesia, the rise in African wages in the
mining industry, for instance, was merely nominal, whilst the colonist
farmers, actually, reduced the real cash wages of their employees to below
415the pre-war level, in most cases. In SouthAfrica, for example, the
African workmen responded to these post-war economic problems by organi-
sing themselves fnto trade unions, hence the birth of the Industrial and
416Commercial Workers' Unionof Africa m the Cape, in January 1919. In
Southern Rhodesia where this post-war economic crisis was, equally, biting
and, actu.al1y, drove a number of white workers, Uke the miners and railway-
417men, to stage strikes, the Africans whowere inexorably caught in the
vortex of this crisis chose several ways of resisting this new onslaught, where
they managed to do so. The colmist employers of labour and, indirectly, the
Bureau.were the victims in the process.
As Sir Herbert Taylor, the Chief Native COmmissioner of Southern
Rhodesia, observed m 1919, in spite of the tremendous rise in prices, esti-
mated at about 50 per cent, since the armistice in 1918, and about 300per
cent, since the beginn.f.ngof the war in 1914 andwhich, in consequence, seve-
rely undermined African purchasing power, the local African labourers had
become quite selective in their response to employment opportunities. Rather
414Aninteresting discussion of these objectives, functions and methods of
the Bureau before and after W. W. I is foundin: van Onselen: Chibaro:
415 PP. 103-14.
C.O. 417/638: RNLBChairman's -{Hawksley's)-Address to Annual Gen-
eral Meeting: in Extract from the Rhodesia Herald: May18, 1920.
416Vide: C. Kadalie: MyLife AndThe I.C.U. : The AutobiographYof a Black
Trade Unlm1st in SouthAfrica: Frank Cass & Co. Ud,: London:1970:
pp. 40-3.
417BSACo. Director's Report and Accounts: March 31st, 1920: p. 27.
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than work on the farms and on the railways for wages ranging from 15/- to
18/- per month, they preferred minework to anything else. 419Alternatively,
the sale of stock and agricultural produce was also resorted to, In order to
thwart these post-war economic pressures. Thus In 1920, it was Indicated
that African peasant farmers had accounted for a total of 198,000bags of
gram, bought by European traders at an average price of 10/- per bag. In
fact, In areas Uke the Charter district of Mashonaland, for Instance, African
agricultural prociucticmhad reached such a high level tmt the Native Commis-
sioner of the district concluded that some of these African agriculturalists:
••• may be styled successful farmers ••• and as long as there
is a demand for their products they will not work for Euro-
peans, wdYfelcmghours, lowwages and routine work
prevail
Moreover, In those lean years of low agricultural output and a general
slump In cattle prices on the local stock market, local Africans proceeded to
the Rand and, in this way.exacerbated the labour problem on the local scene.
This was even more so In 1921, when a general reduction In wages and the
size of the labour force was effected In the Southem Rhodesian mining indus-
try, due to the closure of some mining properties in the Belingwe and Gwanda
districts and also the restrictions on the production of base metals. like
asbestos from the Shahan! and Mashaba mines as well as chrome mined at
Selukwe.421 These moves, said to have been necessitated by the fall In the
gold premium and the excess supply of base metals on the Londonmarket.
422between 1921 and 1922, served to dem.onstrate In Southern Rhodesia the
loathing, which the local African harboured for lowly paid railway and farm-
work.
The post-war economic ills, symbolized by the spiralling prices, low
wages and labour shortage were, to say the least, strange antonyms. Both
Bureau and administrative officials In SouthernRhodesia were aroused from
their slumber by the hue and cry of the farming community, In particular,
over the shortage of labour. But, at the same time, these officials were also
C9 ~JReport of the Chief Native Commissioner -(hereafter C C. i for the
Year 1919: PP. 9, 14.
42~eport of the CJNtc.'i for the Year 1920: PP. 2-3.
42~eport of the C/N/C for the Year 1921: pp. 5-6.
422BSACo. Directors' Reports and Accounts for the Years EndedMarch 31st.
!!!!!: p, 11.
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aware of a number of contingent factors, which, adversely, influenced the
volume of labour supply in these immediate years after the war. The recur-
rence of the Influenza epidemic in the Inyanga district of Mashonaland, in
August 1919, apparently belching from the Portuguese territory of Mozam-
bique to which this area adjoined, may have exercised a negative effect on the
Issue of labour supply. Indeed,in Northern Rhodesia, where the Bureau was
attempting to pick up the bits and pieces of its recruiting infrastructure at
this period, all its efforts, to resume labour recruiting, were seriOUSly ham-
pered by some of the epidemic restrictions governing the movement of people,
423
which had not yet been rescinded.
But even when the Influenza epidemic had receded, other factors were
still at play and their influence was not necessarily an advantage to the
colonist farmers of Southern Rhodesia. These factors were, of course, linked
with the low wages paid by the farmers, the Ill-treatment of Bureau recruits
and the eclectic attitudes of some of these farmer-employers who preferred
particular ethnic groups in their employ. Mashonaland colonist farmers, in
particular, manifested all these traits, which, consequently, complicated
the) . labour situation. In the Hartley district of that province, for example,
the Native Department observed, between 1919 and 1920, conditions which were
considered to be only capable of repelling rather than attracting labour to the
farms. In one section of the Hartley district, south of the Umfuli river bor-
dering on the Mhondoro reserve and occupied mostly by 'Dutch farmers', for
instance, Ill-treatment of Bureau-supplied labourers was regarded as:
•.• the cause of Dutch farmers getting a bad namt2? employers,
hence the natives would not offer their services.
In other parts of the Hartley district, low wages were the farmer's
biggest enemy on this question of labour supply. After observing, In October
1919, that most labourers, who 'were still being paid on the pre-war stand-
ards -(of wages)-' in the district, were becoming increasingly reluctant to
purchase anything from the nearby stores at Makwiro, preferring, as they did,
'to travel to a store some thirty or forty miles distant, to procure their wants,
rather than pay a little more at the stores nearby ••• ', H. M. Meade, the
42:L-Report of the c/N/C for the Year 1919: p. 3.
424N 3/33/12: Report of L.C. Meredith, N/C Hartley: Quoted in Taylor C(N/C
to Ma.naginK Director; RNLB: Salisbury; December 28, 1920.
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Acting Assistant Native Commissioner of this district, was quite conclusive
on the importance, for the colonist farmers, to raise the wages of the employ-
ees, in order to rectify the situation. For this reason, Meade stated:
If -iit is)- the very widespread belief among the farmers
that thousands of young, able-bodied male Natives are
spending their Uves in complete and wasteful leisure at
their kraals, the reluctance of the Natives to be exploited
can hardly be severely condemned in the circumstances.
They are doubtless developing an increasing appreciation
that they now receive only about half the pre-war value in
retum for their service espec1ally as they have had by this
date ample time to real1se that the farmer-employer
receives a considerably .ced price for his produce -
the fruits of their labour.
These actions of the colonist farmers in Mashonalandwere, certainly,
not, by any means, out of tune with the attitudes of the rank and file white
colonists in connection with both their preconceptions on the functions of a
composite colonial society and their economic survival as a class, especially
given in this case, the farmers' inability to compete with more viable economic
interests in the country, like the mining industry. For the other colonist
employers of labour, the primary objectives of the Bureau, in the whole
process of labour mobilisation in Southern Rhodesia, may have petered out
with the outbreak ofWorld War I. But to the colonist farmers, the case was
different. Like those unpopular mines and properties frequently avoided by
independent African labourers, the farmers still regarded the Bureau as a
major factor in labour supply even after the war, since itwas the sole body
capable of channelling labour to them on long-term basis and, in this manner,
guaranteed the viability of commercial agriculture in the country.
Thus by February 1921, when the minlDgindustry, then enjoying the
advantage of surplus labour supply through independent trans-Zambesian immi-
gration, suggested that 'the -(prevailing)- cost of labour imported by the
Bureau was unfairly distributed' and that 'the time had arrived when an attempt
should be made to distribute this cost more eqUitably', the farmers, who had
sensed and heeded the call for the abolition of the Bureau as an organisation
whose services were no longer necessary, readily agreed to pay 'a Capitation
Fee 10/- in excess of that paid by the miners.' On this score, the farmers
were supported by the Railway employers, who also agreed to pay to the
425Ibid: H.M. Meade, Acting Asst. N/C., Hartley to Meredith, N/C Hartley"
October 16, 1919.
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Bureau the usual charge, but at a rate '15/- higher' than the mines, in place
426of their fixed £1,400 subsidy.
In view of the farmers' historic opposition to increased financial backing
of the Bureau by the employers, which had led to the 1911 revolt and was
further asserted in 1917when the farming community refused to aclmowledge
427the Bureau's £20,000 debt to the BSACo., the change of heart by this
section of colonist employers, by 1921, can only be described as remarkable.
Yet from all appearances, the farmers were not fools, The labour problem
for the farming and the railway industries, which could not pay the same,
comparatively, high rate of wages as the m.iningindustry in the post-war years,
was quite acute, as we have already observed. Indeed, in the farming indus-
try, the problem had actually reached a crisis situation by 1920 and, for this
reason, the Native Commissioner of the Hartley district commented, in
December of the same year, thlt:
The dearth of native labour in this area -{occupiedby Dutch
farmers)- is deplorable, some Wflers have to have their
cattle herded by their children.
Yet notwithstanding this dire situation, Southern Rhodesia's colonist
farming community still hoped that the Bureau would somehow meet its labour
requirements, especially by providing adequate trans-Zambesian farm labour
to meet these needs. Perhaps in keeping with this optimism on the part of
the farmers, in their anticipation over trans-Zambesian labour supply, was the
manner in which they came to regard local labour. In the Hartley district
once more, where the colonist farmers were so pressed for this commodity,
their attitudes towards the surrounding Shonacommunities were both bitter
and scathing. Meade again observed, in this connection, that:
The attitude of some of the farmers towards the indigenous
natives renders the problem -{oflabour shortage)- more
difficult, for some of the~eeclare they will not have 'Swina'
-(Shona)-m their farms.
426C.O. 417/659: Extract from the Rhodesia Herald February 25, 1921:
Enclosed in Douglas-Janes to Prince Arthur of Coonaught:Apri114. 1921.
427C.O. 417/589: Stanley to Lord Buxtm: July 19, 1917.
428N 3/33/12: Report of N/C Hartley: Quoted in Taylor to Hawksley: Decem-
ber 28, 1920.
429!2!!!: Meade, Asst, N/C to Meredith, N/C Hartley: October 16, 1919.
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The reasons for this reluctance amongst the colonist farmers of the
Hartley district to utilise Shona labour, if they could get any, were many. It
was alleged, for Instance, that because of 'the incorrigible indolence of the
Swina', their 'natural thieving proclivities', 'general unreliability' and 'the
brief periods' they usually remained in employment, the local Shona labour-
ers were unwelcome. As had become customary within the Southern Rhod-
esian colonist circles, this tendency to reject any possible offers of African
labour from local sources was very often accompanied by calls for Immigrant
labour as a substitute. In this particular case, Mashonaland colonist farmers
required the Bureau to provide them with recruits from Barotseland, since
they considered the 'Barotse boy••• a good milker', whowas, therefore, quite
unllke those recruits raised by the Bureau outside Barotseland, in former
North-Westem Rhodesia, whom they equally despised because they were 'not
430milkers, and. •• -(dtd)-not mow anything about cattle. '
This overt preference for labour, from particular African ethnic groups,
was not a new phenomenon in the colonial history of Southem Rhodesia. In a
number of Instances, such eclectic tactics were resorted to by colonist em-
ployers either as a way of expressing their frustrations with the objective
situations created by and associated with the pecuUarities of racially com-
posite colon1al societies or purely as a means of getting access to foreign
labour, more vulnerable to control as well as to ecooomic and social exploi-
tatioo. 431 In the post-war era in Southern Rhodesia, it was certainly not only
the colooist farmers of Mashonaland who fell victims to these socio-economic
dynamics of a racially hierarchical colonial society, characterized by both
overt and subtle conflict between various colonial groups, a number of other
colonist employers, too, were equally motivated by these pressures, with the
result that they had all come to the conclusion that alien labour, rather than
realistic reforms in the employment conditions throughout the country, was
the panacea to their Ills,
In the case of the colonist farmers of Mashonaland, their predilection for
Lozi labour may have been perhaps superficial, having been cultivated rather
430C•O. 417/638: The RNLB Chairman's Address to the Annual General
Meeting: May 17, 1920: in Extract from the Rhodesia Herald: May 18,
1920.
431Vide: Supra: PP.39~
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too late for that matter. Indeed, the Bureau management, on being confron-
ted by this demand in 1919 and 1920, was quick to point out its unrealistic
aspects. After all, Lozi labour had only been made available to Mashonaland
farmers during the war, because, the Bureau argued, it was the only farm
labour supply available and had, therefore, to be distributed to all the farmers
throughout the COlUltry, including those of Mashonaland, who had hitherto
relied on Angoni and related labour recruits from the East Luangwa district,
where the heavy demand for carriers on the war front had put a total stoppage
on labour migration to Southern Rhodesia. Once the war conditions had dis-
sipated, labour from Barotseland was, naturally, available only for :Matabele-
land, its usual hound, where the recruiting and transportation expenses
between Livingstone and Bulawayo amounted to only £3 per head, as compared
432to £6 for the distribution of the same labourers in Salisbury.
A similar request by the Wankle Colliery in April 1918 had produced no
results. The Colliery management, unlike the Mashonaland farmers, were
altogether averse to the engagement of Lozilabour 'as they 'iLozi)- seldom
agree'id)- to underground labour.' Instead, what these coal miners required,
as labourers amongst the trans-Zambesian ethnic groups, were 'mainly
Angoni and Mashukulumbwe natives, with natives of the Zambesi Valley a good
secoad, ,433 But like other colonist employers throughout Southern RhodeSia,
the Wankle Colliery management shared a common dislike and distrust of
labourers recruited from the country's local sources and, In this particular
case, those raised from Kimberley and Bechuanaland as well, where this par-
ticular mining concern had previously tried to recruit labour, without any
noticeable success at all. With these views In mind, A.R. Thomson, the
General Manager of the Wankle Colliery, had accordingly dismissed labour
supply from Southern Rhodesia and the South as follows:
The natives recruited from these sources are usually more
susceptible to sickness than Northern natives and as they do
not takfJ~dly to the place 'iWankle)- they are often trouble-
some.
In fact what Thomson failed to aclmowledge here was the unfavourable
geographicallocatlon of the Wankle Colliery, with regard to both the climatic
432~: The RNLB Chairman's Address ••• May 17, 1920.
433A 3/18/30/20: A.R. Thomson, General Manager, Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd.
to Chaplin: AprU 22, 1918.
43~id.
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zones of SouthernRhodesia and the regional economic system of Southern
Africa as a whole. Situated in the midst of the extremely hot Zambesi
Valley and associated with lowwages and a poor health record, the Wanlde
Colliery had acquired a peculiarly bad reputation in the eyes of the C01Ultry's
435African population. The repercussions arising from these factors were
thus quite apparent, even In the eyes of the BSACo.Administration In Southern
Rhodesia. Thus the Native Department in Salisbury commented in 1918, In
relation to Thomson's complaints over his difficulties with local African
labour supply, that the local Africans OIl 'falling to obtain work in the Distri-
cts south of Wanlde prefer to seek work further south rather than go north.4,36
This assertion was particularly true at this time, when, in spite of the mass-
ive redundancies Inducedby the closure of some mining concerns in the Gwanda
and Belingwe districts of Matabeleland, no local labour offered at Wanlde
where itwas so badly needed. For the various reasons indicated above, the
Wankie Colliery came to inevitably rely, to a greater degree than most
mining properties in Southern Rhodesi~on trans-Zambesian labour supply.
The labour returns of this particular mine, since it started full-scale
operations in 1904 up to about 1920, for instance, demonstrate, beyond doubt,
the dominance of the trans-Zambesian labourers, especially those from Nor-
thern Rhodesia next to which it was so strategically placed, who consistently
formed over three-quarters of the Colliery's labour force as Table VIIbelow
indicates:
Table VII:
437WanldeAfrican Labour Returns: A Territorial Analysis: 1904 and 1920:
Year '1'otallabour From S.
force Rhodesia
From N.
Rhodesia
From PEA From Nyas- From
aland other
sources
1904 243
1920 2,9.11
44
451
195
2,146
26
73 73
23
53
Notwithstanding their different emphasis and specifications, the demands
435Van Onselen: 'The 1912 Wankie Colliery Strike' p. 276.
436A 3/18/30/20: Taylor C/N/C to Administrator's Private Secretary: Salis-
437 bury: May 8, 1918.
These statistics have been culled from files C. O. 417/399: Labour Returns:
Wanlde District by Andrew Dale, Asst. N/C, March 7, 1904; and C.O.
417/640: Mortality Returns for the Quarter Ended March 31, 1920, by
Fleming, Medical Director: Enclosed in Fleming to Chaplin: June 17,1920.
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of the colonist farmers of Mashonaland and the Wankie Colliery once more
spurred the Bureau into its old saddle, as the purveyor of trans-Zambesian
labour for the benefit of Southem Rhodesian colonist employers. In the
period stretching between mid-1919 to the end of 1920, the recruiting
activities of this labour organisation, together with a spontaneous stream of
independent labour mJgratioo from the trans-Zambesian territories to Sou-
them Rhodesia, reached such a high peak that the authorities and colonist
employers in Northern Rhodesia were, evidently, becoming worried by the
economic, social and political implications of these developments. In fact,
the dimen.sioos and extent of this post-war trans-Zambesian labour immigra-
tion into Southern Rhodesia and their effects on the labour market there were
very well demonstrated by the hostile reactioos of the colonist farmers in
Southern Rhodesia to the congratulatory attitude of one of the former BSACo.
officials, Sir F. J. Newton, with regar<k to the permission granted by the
Colonial Office to colonists In Kenya to utilise forced labour in March 1920:38
Although Sir Newton, who was, by 1920, farming in the :Ma.zoe district,
had merely sought to justify his personal role in also sanctioning forced labour
in 1911 and although his proposal was sympathetically viewed in some circles
of the Colonial Office where Henry Lambert, for Instance, asserted:
I have no particular sympath13B'Ith the view that the native has
an inherent right to be lazy.
the farming community in Southem RhodeSia, backed by the misSionaries,
though for different motives, of course, would not approve of compulsory
labour, at this particular stage. Instead) they seized the chance to attack the
BSACo., with which Sir Newton was associated, for what they regarded as the
bankruptcy of its labour policies and its proclivity to rob the Bureau, 'with
Shylock-avidity', through instalments from 'an already over-burdened
~minfng)- industry that ~could)- ill-afford such a drain m its resources. ,440
Itwould, obviously, appear that the colonist farmers in Southern Rhodesia
were, in 19201more concerned with their anti -Charter campaign than with the
labour supply problem, which, only a year before, had been a cause of so much
438C. o. 417/636: Letter to the Edltor of the Rhodesia Herald by Sir F. J.
Newton: March 11, 1920.
439ibid: MInute by Lambert to Sir G. V. Fiddes: April22, 1920.
440!2!!!: Letter by 'J. M.B. ' of Gatooma to the Editor of the Rhodesia Herald:
March 16, 1920.
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concern within the farming community.
Itwas, however, in Northern Rhodesia that evidence on the global
character of labour migration to the Southwas more apparent by 1920. In the
former North-Western Rhodesia portion of this territory, Barotseland and the
Kafue districts were quite drastically affected by this massive labour migra-
tion to Southern Rhodesia, with the result that even the Lozi aristocracy
itself, in the Barotse districts, was becoming increasingly disconcerted. Thus
in March 1920, the Lozi ruler, !.etia, who had assumed the title Yeta m
since the death of his father Lewanika in 1916, and his brother, Chief Imwtko,
the induna of Sesheka, were said to be discontented by the growing number of
their able-bodied men Ieaving the country 'in the first instance to seek work
and finding the surroundings ~in the destination areas)- more congenial ••
~ad)- remained away••• " thus joining the class of the so-called machona
441(the lost ones).
In the Lealui division of the Barotse district, for example, where over
1,200 young men had left during the period between 1908 and 1915 never ret-
urning to Barotseland, the situation was said to be worsening as a result of
the current renewed recruiting activities of the Bureau for farm work in
Southern Rhodesia. In 1919 and 1920, the Bureau was, actually, said to have
collected about 2,139 recruits for this type of work in the South. The same
situation was also observed in the Mumbwadivision of the Kafue district,
where a greater proportion of young men from the Lumbu, Ila ~Mashukulum-
bwe)- and allied ethnic groups were taking to labour migration to Southern
Rhodesia in 1920, on an unprecedented scale. In this area, the authorities
blamed the war experiences, whereby these people had been extensively rec-
ruited as war carriers, with the result that this precedence 'opened up new fields
of labour for the local natives which their pre-war choice of confinement to a
self-prescribed area ~d)- denied to them, and ~therefore were now}-be-
442coming less dependent on local employment. '
In the former North-Eastern Rhodesian terrltory, a similar pattern of
441C.O. 417/658: Extracts from Annual Report of the Barotse District for the
Year Ended March 31, 1920by Mr. G. p. Lyons, Resident Magistrate.
442!2!!!:Extracts from Annual Report of the MumbwaSub-District of the Kafue
District for the Year Ended March 31, 1920 by Mr. L.A. Russell, N/C.
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developments was taking place with regard to labour migration to Southern
Rhodesia between 1919 and 1920, whether under the aegis of the Bureau or
independently. But, unlike those conditions obtaining in former North-
Western Rhodesia, the consequences of this phenomenon in North-Eastern
Rhodesia, particularly in the three divisions of the East Luangwadistrict, the
most favourable source of labour supply to Southern Rhodesia, were more
fundamental in their social, economic and political implications. In the Fort
Jameson division of this East IAlangwadistrict, the Native Commissioner,
H. F. C; Robinson, was evidently worried by the social implications of this
increased volume of labour migration to Southern Rhodesia amongst his Ngoni
wards, whether the migrants so involved returned with money or not. Thus
he stated:
There is no guarantee that these natives once they leave the
Territory ~orthern Rhodesiar will receive food or be looked
after adequately. They lose touchwith their relatives. Fre-
quently they are weaklings, whose only medical examination has
been for sleeping siclmess. So many relatives are outside the
district that immorality and domestic disputes willinevitablY443
increase unless their wives lmowwhen to expect them home.
In the Petauke division of the same East Luangwadistrict, where the
Nsenga and other ethnic groups of the area had been so hard hit by the post-
war rise in prices that they had abjurred not 'to buy clothes or calico until
the prices -{hadr come down' once more and, instead, had resorted to 'the
old bark cloth and skin clothing' as an alternative, the Assistant Magistrate,
E. Sharpe, whilst expressing concern at the increased volume of emigration
to SouthernRhodesia was, however, not too displeased by the corresponding
increase in cash revenue accruing from the process. For this reason, Sharpe
was quick to point out that the African migrant labourers, working on the
mines of Southern Rhodesia, had contributed about £S64:17s:0d in revenue for
the financial year 1920/1921in comparison to £74:Ss0d for 1919/1920, when
444labour recruiting was slightly restricted. But it was in the third and last
section of the East Luangwadistrict, the Lundazi division, where labour
emigration to Southern Rhodesia had the most severe impact on the soclo-
443C.O. 417/676: Extracts from the Annual Report of the Fort Jameson Sub-
DIstrict. East Luangwa, for the Year Ended March Sl. 1921by H.F. C.
Robinson, N.C.
44~id: Extracts from theAmual Report of the Petauka Sub-District, East
t-uangwa, for the Year Ended March Sl, 1921by E. Sharpe, Asst.
Magistrate.
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political structures of the Senga, Chewa, Tumbuka and other ethnic groups of
this region by 1920.
Of course, a number of reasons may have accounted for the intensity of
labour recruitment by the Bureau and the extensive nature of independent
migration in this area by 1920. The Lundazi and the Fort Jameson divisions
of the East Utangwa districts had been closed to recruitment during the war,
whereas the Petauke division was not totally sealed off. Moreover, in the
Lundazi division in particular, a new rate of taxation had been imposed in 1920.
raising this impost from 5/- per head in 1919 to 10/- in 1920. For these
reasons, Bureau recruiting agents and other purveyors of labour supply to the
Southern labour markets may have seized the opportunity to make up for their
lost chances, but, of course, with adverse consequences for the local socio-
political infrastructure. The extent of labour emigration to Southern Rhodesia,
from the African societies of the Lundazi division, reached such a scale in
1920 that even administrative officials were alarmed by the increasing tendency
amongst the traditional rulers and messengers of the Native Department to
join the bandwagon, thus forsaldng their positions and responsibilities on the
local scene. Evincing this streak of official concern, T. S. Sandford, the
Native Commissioner of the Lundazi division, accordingly,state in March 1921:
So far this -{tendencyto emigrater has not spread beyond village
headmen thoughone unofficial chief m.essenger has this year
thrown up his post to proceed to Southern Rhodesia. In this
cmnection it has to be noted that chiefs in this district -{Lundazir
do not awn livestock and their conditions are not to be compared
with the wages of most houseboys and yet their work is of great
importance to the govemment. Threats of punishment for non-
feassance may produce some result but not the best and merely
lead to dissatlsfaction. Their position can be siWfDedup as
many penalties, little pay -{andr no privileges.
In this respect, the Administration of Northern Rhodesia was certainly being
hoist with its own petard
From me point of view, it might be argued that the success of the Bureau,
in its involvement with trans -Zambesian labour migration to Southern Rhod-
esia between 1919 and 1920, was too good to be true. Indeed, in this success
lay the seeds of the beginning of this labour organisation's demise. Panic-
striken administrative officials and colonist employers in Northern Rhodesia
445Ibid: Extracts from the Annual Report for the Lundazi Division, East
LuangwaDistrict, for the Year Ended March 31, 1921by T. S. Sandford,
N/C.
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were, actually, becoming worried by what they viewed as the progressive
denudation of their sources of labour supply and the consequent economic
retardation which this movement of labour to the South implied. In Southern
Rhodesia too, the increased rate of trans-Zambesian labour immigration, both
under the aegis of the Bureau and independently, and the increasing pace of
the process of local African integration Into the colonist economic system,
since the end of the war, as symbolized by the growing size of local African
446
female labour forthcoming onto the labour market, naturally led to the
conclusion, especially after 1920, that the Bureau had become irrelevant and
redundant as an Instrument for mobilising African labour supply.
In Northem Rhodesia, the officials had already observed that the growing
volume of labour migration to SouthernRhodesia was, In one way or another,
linked with the deepening labour shortage problem amongst the colonist farmers
of the territory. Accordingly, it was,therefore,temptlng, for both administ-
rative officials and colonist farmers there, to attribute the labour crisis in
Northern Rhodesia to either the labour recruiting activities of the Bureau or
independent labour emigration to SouthernRhodesia. Thus G.G. P, Lyons,
the Resident Magistrate for the Barotse district, pursuing this cause-and-
effect line of argument on labour emigration from Barotseland and its con-
sequences on the local labour market, stated,in March 1920, that:
An attempt was made to induce recruits offering for farm work in
Southem Rhodesia to sign on. Instead for farm work in Northern
Rhodesia towards the end of 1919when labour was wanted so
badly in Northem Rhodesia, but very few responded. The natives
plead lower pay, worse treatment and perhaps a desire to go fur-
ther afield, if they are going out for work at all, may have some-
thing to do with their disinclination to go to this class of work
-(1°callYh I think lack of familiarity with -(the conditions of)-
work and of the employers may have something to dowith it
also. If the pay was made the same as --tthat)-for Southern
Rhodesia and the same rations and good treatm.ent assured I see
no reason why Northern -{Rhodesian)-farms sl.ft'9d not become
popular as a working field for the Barotse ••••
The colonist farmers of Northern Rhodesia too had themselves started to
agitate against labour emigration to Southern Rhodesfa, on the grounds that
446For the growing number of African women offering for domestic service in
post-war Southern Rhodesia for Instance, Vide: RePOrt of the C/N/C for
the Year 1919: PP. 10-2.
447C.O. 417/658: Extracts from the Annual Report of the Barotse District. _...
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this contributed, both directly and indirectly, to their economic ruination.
In former North-Western Rhodesia, we have already seen how the farmers of
that province voiced their discontent, towards the end of 1916, over the
question of Bureau operations and what they considered the inequitable dis-
tribution of farm labour by this labour organisation, of which they were
448members. With the post-war shortage in 1919 and 1920, this discontent
even took a more tangible form. Those farmers in former North-Eastern
Rhodesia, whohad never sought membership to the Bureau ardhad their own
association and separate Identity well represented by the North-Eastern
Rhodesia Agricultural and Commercial Association, based in Fort Jameson but
with strong sentimental attachment to Zomba, were clearly more articulate
in their opposition to both Bureau labour recruiting activities and independent
labour emigration to Southern Rhodesia.
In the pre-war years, the colonist farmers of former North-Eastern
Rhodesia had tended to emphasise the risks of migrant labourers spreading
the dreaded sleeping sickness and the concomitant rise in wages which the
process of emigration entailed. But in the post-war period this tune changed
as these farmers faced a more serious labour crisis. Whilst in the pre-war
period these farmers had unsuccessfully tried to grow cotton as a commer-
cial crop for North-Eastern Rhodesia, in the post-war era they changed to
the production of Virginia tobacco for the purpose of which they had persuaded
a Cape Townflrm~ the United Tobacco Company (South)Limited,to establish
a tobacco factory for purchasing and processing the leaf. For the success of
this new cash crop, for which it was alleged that there was 'a very great
demand in England and SouthAfrica. •• and -{that)-there -{was)-practically no
limit to the amount that can be produced provided we -{thefarmers)- have the
sympathetic assistance of the Administration. •• -{over labour and transport)-
449
difficulties ••• " abundant labour supply at very cheap rates was required.
Under these circumstances, permission for the Bureau to resume re-
cruiting activities in Northern Rhodesia after the war must have been wrung
from the authorities of that territory with utmost difficulty. Perhaps the only
448Vide:Supra: p.535
449C.O. 417/617: G.R. Christie, Secretary, The North-Eastern Rhodesia
Agricultural and Commercial ASSOCiation,Fort Jameson to the Resident
Commissioner, Salisbury: November 29, 1918.
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justification these authorities may have given for such a paradoxical decision
may have been similar to the one previously given to the same colonist
farmers' association, in August 1917, that Southern Rhodesia was in greater
need for labour, because 'the mines ,were)- mostly working for the Imperial
450Government ,and that their)- output -(was)- an Imperial necessity. ' But,
to some extent, the Administration of Northern Rhodesia had also tried to
meet the post-war demands of these colonist farmers, especially those of
former North-Eastern Rhodesia where there was a more genuine case of
shortage, by instituting clandestine measures to procure African labour, in
that part of the country, by force.
Thus in May1919, one colonist farmer, W.A. Sayer, who had foundcause
to quarrel with the local administration in the Fort Jameson division of the
East Luangwadistrict, informed the Antl-Slavery Society in London, on con-
ditions then imposed on the African communities of that area 'which, if not
actual and complete slavery, ,were)- not distantly removed from such. '
Sayer went on to reveal how the BSACo. local officials used African police and
messengers to supply him and other farmers of the area with labourers:
Districts were raided by native police and uniformed emissaries
styled messengers.... Wholesale arrests of natives of all ages
were effected. These were herded together and, under the
eompulston of in some instances armed police, and in others the
uniformed power of the 'messengers', conveyed to the Administ-
ration offices in Fort Jameson.... At the Administration offices
the natives were divided into gangs and, - - . sent off under escort
to labour for a period of six months on tobacco producing estates.
A gang numbering seventeen of these unwilling and coerced
natives, in varying degrees of malnutrition, was brought to me by
two police ,men)- in October -(1918)-. They were youths, their
ages ranging from twelve years to sixteen years or so•••• Other
planters were Similarly issued with gangs, and numbers of these
forced labourers had just returned to their homes for a rest from
more or less arduous spells elsewhere, when they were arrested
by force and despatched to various places for a further term of
naturally undesJstble work. It is slavery and will bear no other
interpretation.
Once such a process of systematic coercion, to procure labour to meet
450C.O. 417/620: W.A. Sawyer, Fort Jameson to Sir T.Fowell Buxton,
President, APS: May24, 1919.
451Ibid: Minutes of Deputation of the North-Eastern Rhodesian Farmers and
Commercial Association with His Honour the Administrator iWalla.ce)=
at Fort Jameson on August 4, 1917.
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the pressing needs of the colonist farmers in one particular region of Nor-
thern Rhodesia, was revealed, it naturally became untenable for administra-
tive officials either to pursue it further or apply it to the other regions of the
territory. Obviously, these coercive designs may have been deployed in an
attempt to avoid any form of restrictive measures on labour recruitment and
emigration in general, which might have embarrassed the Bureau and those
colonist employers it served south of the Zambesi. But as the war years
receded into memory and the so-called 'Imperial necessity' behind mineral
production in SouthernRhodesia became less significant, even the more en-
thusiastic supporters of the Bureau within the Northern Rhodesian official
circles could no longer supportits role in the process of trans-Zambesian
labour migration to SouthernRhodesia. By the end of 1920, the Administra-
tion of Northern Rhodesia had apparently reached the end of its tethers and,
consequently, the axe fell onto the Bureau's labour recruiting activities in
that territory.
Thus itwas essentially these changed circumstances of the early 1920's,
which, certainly, contributed, in various ways, to the progressive decline of
the Bureau and its role in trans-Zambesian labour migration. By the second
half of 1920, for instance, wide-ranging restrictions were imposed on labour
recruitment by the Bureau for SouthernRhodesia, in order to avoid crippling
any prospects the colonist farmers of the railway belt of Northern Rhodesia
might have had on their local labour supply. These measures were, appa-
rently, a culmination of a prolonged wrangle and a number of broken promises
between the Bureau and the government of Northern Rhodesia, on howbest to
deal with the labour problems of the farming community of former North-
western Rhodesia. For its part, the Bureau had undertaken to re-direct the
efforts of its two labour agents in Barotseland, Wheatcroft and Cam,bell, on
this matter, whilst two more hands, Morrell and Eyre, were also sent up to
Barotseland in September 1919, ostensibly to assist and 'to make special
efforts to obtain recruits necessary to satisfy the requirements of your
-{NorthernRbodestan)- farmers', in order to minimize any possible conflict
between thisgroup of colonist employers and the Bureau.452
452A 3/18/30/20: Hawksley, Managing Director, RNLB, Salisbury to Sec-
retary for Native Affairs, Livingstone: September 23, 1919.
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Yet at the same time, this labour agencywas quite aware of the problems
involved in meeting those labour requirements of the Northern Rhodesian
colonist farmers, especially given,in this case, the comparatively unfavour-
able working conditions then obtaining on the farms in former North-Western
Rhodesia; conditions which had consequently led to a situation whereby the
colonist farmers in question were faced with the paradox of labour shortage,
whilst, at the same time, they 'lived in the midst of a very considerable
native population', from which the SouthernRhodesian and the Katangan labour
markets were systematically makingheavy and successful withdrawals. For
this reason, the Bureau management in Salisbury and Bulawayocould only
give its ple~e to bail the colonist farmers of Northern Rhodesia's railway
belt out of their labour shortage crisis in 1919, either under duress or along
with heavily circumscribed conditions. Thus Douglas Hawksley, the Bureau's
ManagingDirector, informed the Secretary for Native Affairs in Livingstone,
in September 1919, that:
Our agents can only use persuasion and influence they have in
order to get recruits to undertake any particular form of work,
and if these fail, I know of no way of doing it. We cannot direc~53
or force recruits to undertake work they decline to engage for.
Because of what the Bureau regarded as its genuine but unsuccessful
attempts to meet the needs of the Northern Rhodesian colonist farmers, which
seemed to be then largely undermined by numerous market factors the
Northern Rhodesian colonist employers themselves were better placed to
deal with, the management of this labour body eventually concluded that the
Northern Rhodesian government was, somehow, asking their agency to redeem
a situation over which they had no means of control to influence the outcome
of events. Accordingly, the Bureau managementwere thus prepared to accept
the worst of any ensuing consequences, in case prohibition on labour recruit-
ment were re-imposed. Hawksley, undoubtedly, demonstrated this attitude,
whenhe further stated:
Iwould respectfully submit that itwouldbe a very great hard-
ship, both on the natives of Barotseland and on ourselves -(the
Bureaur, if you -(Northern Rhodesia govemment)- were to stop
our operations until the labour requirements of the Northern
-(Rhodesian)-farmers are satisfied.
We have done and are stUI doing our best to supply this labour
~to Northern Rhodesian farmers)-.
453Ibid,
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In the final analysis, it was on the basis of comparable working conditions
on the farms of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia, as opposed to the
labour recruit's right to choose his employer within the constraints of a con-
gruent pattern of overall political control by the BSACo., that the future of
the Bureau's labour recruiting activities and,indeed,trans-Zambesian labour
migration to SouthernRhodesia, in general, had to be decided. By October
1919, when J.C.C. Coxhead, the Secretary for Native Affairs himself, had
apparently gone into the Bureau compoundat Livingstone and tried to persuade
the recruits boundfor SouthernRhodesia and 'managed to induce ~only)- 39
natives to go to Northern Rhodesia farmers' and of whom 'the majority of them
454were however unwilling to do so', it became evident that the movement to
SouthernRhodesia, which various BSACo.officials across the Zambesi had
hitherto encouraged, was far more complicated than it appeared to the eye.
A temporary ban an labour recruiting for SouthernRhodesia in Barotseland,
455initially for two months, was imposed consequently. During the course
of the ban, Bureau agents were to recruit farm labour for Northern Rhodesia
till a specified quota had been reached, On. its part, the govemment of
Northern Rhodesia undertook 'to explain to the Natives in Barotseland that no
more recruits wouldbe enlisted for SouthernRhodesia until a sufficient
number had enlisted for work on Northern ~odesian)- farms'. At the same
time, the labour shortage was also to be 'explained to the chiefs ~of Barotse-
land)-with a view to their using their influence to induce people to engaged for
this class of work. ,456
But even these,obviously.drastic measures failed to meet the expectations
of the colonist farmers of Northern Rhodesia and the prohibition was once
more introduced, towards the end of 1920, with more serious intent than be-
fore. This new round of restrictions on labour recruitment for Southern
Rhodesia was, evidently, precipitated by the failure of the railway belt farmers
of Northern Rhodesia to procure some 600 labourers, whom they required
since March 1920. As a matter of fact, the two actual issues of controversy,
454ybid:J. C.C. Coxhead, Secretary for Native Affairs, Livingstone/to
Managing Director, RNLB, Salisbury: October 6, 1919.
455coxhead to Hawksley:October 9, 1919.
456J2!!!: Hawksleyto Coxhead:October 21, 1919.
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for both the Bureau and the Administration of Northern Rhodesia, were,
firstly, the need to divert labour recruits from the Luapula and Awemba
districts as well as other parts of former North-Eastern Rhodesia, where such
labour was still proceeding to Southern Rhodesia in large numbers, to Northern
Rhodesia's railway belt farmers. Secondly, there was the low wage tariff on
the Northern Rhodesian farms which the Bureau wanted reformed, thus ul-
timately enabling these colonist employers to attract sufficient labour.
In view of the contentioos pointed out above, T.V. Bird, the Acting Mana-
ging Director of the Bureau, accordfngly.conveyed the considerations of his
agency to the Administration of Northern Rhodesia in Livingstone, in Sept-
ember 1920, stating that:
The question of whether natives will engage. for employment in
the North or in the South is decided entirely by themselves but
I think that there is little doubt that the other conditions being
equal, the determining factor is the higher wage offered in the
South to adult labourers which is 18/- per month as against 15/-
in the North. I would therefore strongly urge that Northern 457
employers -(shouldr increase the wage offered to adults to 18/-.
Bfrd's proposal was inacceptable to the authorities of Northern Rhodesia who
were, at this juncture, more inclined to deploy political rather than economic
remedies to solve the labour problem of : 0' °th~ 0 o· "'0" • farmers. Thus
E. N. Carlton, who had succeeded Coxhead as the Secretary for Native Affairs,
indic ated in his reply to the Bureau:
It would appear unreasonable to expect Northern Rhodesian
farmers to pay Southern Rhodesian wages to natives working in
their own country and woul'\R~t -(in any casej- have any great
effect on the labour supply.
Perhaps things would have looked different for the Bureau if, as in the
first decade of the twentieth century when it was founded, it had had all
spheres of colcntst public opinion in Southern Rhodesia behind it. But by
1920, the unstinted support, which this labour agency had hitherto enjoyed
from the colonist public in Southern Rhodesia, was visibly dwindling. With
the exception of the colonist farmers, then lately converted to the cause of
the Bureau, most colonist employers and officials in Southern Rhodesia, by
457Ibid: T. V. Bird, Managing Director, RNLB, Salisbury to Secretary for
Native Affairs: Livingstone: September 10, 1920.
458!2!2: E. N. Carlton, Secretary for Native Affairs, Livingstone to Bird:
Salisbury: September 22, 1920.
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the early 1920's, were becoming increasingly convinced that this labour organ-
isation was losing its significance in the face of massive independent trans-
Zambesian labour immigration into the country and the gradual integration of
the local Africans Into the white colonist, economy.
Indeed, at a meeting of Superintendents of Natives and Native Commiss-
ioners held in Salisbury in October 1920,
# , _. whilst
these officials of Southern Rhodesia's Native Department had praised the
Bureau for its great job in '-(paving)- the way for the introduction of labour
from the North', they also concluded, however, that the value of this labour
agency had been greatly 'diminished ~as)- in order to recruit labour the
Bureau ~ad)- to go further afield which -{added)- to the expense of recruit-
ing•••• ,459 This development was conceded as much by the Bureau itself,
when Hawksley informed the body's Annual General Meeting, in June 1921,
that amongst the organisation's current difficulties was the fact that it was
'only able to recruit natives in numbers from those parts of Northern Rhod-
esia which ~entai1ed)- a long and expensive journey to and from Southern
Rhodesia', like the Laapula, Awemba and North Luangwa districts, where the
recruits had to be brought by train either from Broken Hill or Ndola, dis-
tances of about 368 and 489 miles respectively from Livingstone and at
460great expense In feeding and transport costs.
However, by the end of 1920, changes were taking place which even
officials themselves could not afford to ignore. In relation to trnns-Zambesian
labour migration, the Native Department officials, at their Salisbury conference,
observed:
These Northern natives ~now)- make their own arrangements as
to places of rest and food on their journey, and some of them are
two months on the road.... -{They)- arrive in good physical con-
dition and many of them work their way down by carrying out
agricultural work for a few days at a time at the different kraals
they stop at, for which they receive food. When they arrive here
-(in Southern Rhodes~ they choose their own masters and are
entirely free agents.
459C. O. 417/655: E. W. S. Montague,Acttng Administrator to Secretary,
BSACo. : October 29, 1920.
460
C. O. 417/676: Report of the Annual Meeting of the RNLB for June, 1921:
Quote in Rhodesia Herald JUne 8, 1921.
461
C. O. 417/655: Montague to BSACo. : October 29, 1920.
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In the circumstances, the problem for the officials in Southern Rhodesta,
with regard to trans-Zambesian labour by 1920, was not so much its shortage
as compared to the question of the proper care of these immigrants, once
they arrived in the country.
A proposal was, therefore Iput forward at this period, albeit unsuccess-
fully, by the Native Department, to abolish the Bureau altogether and sub-
stitute it with a government department, charged with the task of looking after
foreign African labourers entering the country, especially from the
trans-Zambesian region, in large numbers. Although this suggestion had to
wait for 1941, when this branch of African administration, termed the Depart-
ment of Native Immigration, was established, with A. L. Holland as its first
462supervisor, it is quite clear that the days of the Bureau, by the early
1920's, were already numbered. This view was strongly endorsed by the
Native Labour Committee of Enquiry. appointed in April 1921 to look into
the state of labour supply and consisting of four members, namely, E. W. S.
Montague, the Secretary for Mines and Works in Southern Rhodesia; George
Mitchell and Theodore Haddon, representfng the Southern Rhodesian mining
industry, and finally, Hugh C. Marshall, the Magistrate of Fort Jameson in
463Northern Rhodesia. The conclusion of this Committee of Enquiry that the
Bureau had outlived its functions and was. therefore ,redundant, though strongly
attacked by the colonist farmers, represented, in this respect, by the Umvukwe
464Ranchers and Farmers' Association of the Lomagundi district, was, from
the Bureau's point of view, one of the final straws, which ultimately broke
the camel's back.
Of course, the end may not have been as abrupt for the Bureau as the cut
and dried decision of the Native Labour Committee of Enquiry pre-supposes.
But all the indications, between 1920 and 1922, did not, certainly augur well
for this labour organisation's future in the process of trans-Zambesian labour
migration to Southern Bhodesta, As the Bureau management themselves con-
ceded, in the end, trans-Zambesians were no longer interested in either
462Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs (the C/N/C) for the Year 1942:
463 p.10.
C. O. 417/659: Douglas-Jones to Prince Arthur of Connaught: Apri114, 1921.
464A 3/18/30/33: S. P. LIght, Han. Secretary, Umvukwe Ranchers and
Farmers' Association to Secretary, Dept. of Administrator: July 28, 1921.
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coming down through the medium of this agency or in utilising its facilities
for the purpose. The 'twelve-months' contract, hitherto prescribed by the
Bureau and very much adored by colonist employers like the farmers, as well
as the arbitrary allocation of recruits to 'strange employers', which the
system of assisted labour migration implied, had become quite unpopular
amongst potential trans-Zambesian labour migrants, who preferred to pro-
465
ceed to the labour markets of the South on their own.
In one sense, this dwindling importance of the role of the Bureau as a
medium of foreign labour supply was starkly revealed by the fact that out of
the 43,205 African labourers who entered Southern Rhodesia in 1924, only
about 4, 589 were supplied by this Bureau. Besides, all the amount of labour.
which this agency could supply to the mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia
merely constituted abOut 10. 45 per cent of the total labour force engaged In
466that particular iBdustry. This state of affairs was, perhaps, a logical
development from the conditions, envisaged with regret. by the Bureau Itself
at the beginning of 1922, when a surplus of over 800 labour recruits led to
Instructions being sent to the body's recruiting agents 'to suspend operations
and only forward such natives as -(werer already definitely engaged' and to
anticipate 'any considerable betterment In the outlook of the farming industry
or any other Increase In mining activities ~which mightr at once alter the
467
position and create a large demand for native labour. '
In essence, this diminishing role of the Bureau in foreJgn and trans-
Zambesian labour immigration Into Southern Rhodesia did not only imply the
end of active official co-operation In the process of labour migration as of
old, but it also spelt the end of Bureau monopoly over trans-Zambestan labour
supply and the Withdrawal of offiCial financial backing which this labour agency
had enjoyed since 1903. Thus the move in February 1922 by the Administra-
tion In Salisbury, to accept the claims by the mining Industry for a refund
from the Bureau. for the support rendered to this body by the miners since
1911, under the Labour Tax Ordinance, and the subsequent reduction of the
465C• O. 417/676: Report of the Annual Meeting of the RNLB for June, 1921.
466L. Burrell: The Native Problem inAfrica: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.: London:
(Second Edition): 1965: PP. 226-7.
467A 3/18/30/33: Managing Director's (RNLB) Weekly Report No. 369 for the
period Ending: January 28, 1922.
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government subsidy to this body from £12,000 to £2,000 in 1926, with also a
warning on possible withdrawal of the subsidy altogether by 1927,468obviously
inflicted a severe blow on the Bureau's financial base.
Moreover, the end of BSACo. rule, In both Northern and Southern
Rhodesia, in 1923 appears to have removed that most effective monolithic
factor, which had, by both direct and indirect means, influenced a discernible
linear pattern of political and ecmomic development to which the two Company
territories were inextricably committed. The Intensive development of the
469copper mining industry in Northern Rhodesia after 1924, was also a sig-
nificant Indication that this territory was no longer to remain attached to the
coat-tails of its sister state in the South. Its role as a labour reserve for
development capital In the Southhenceforth ceased, as the local copper min-
ing industry began to consume more and more of its labour supply locally. In-
deed, with the formation of the Native Labour Association in 1929 in Northern
Rhodesia to mobilise labour supply to the best advantage of that country's
470copper mining industry, the rupture between Northern and Southern
Rhodesia, in terms of labour supply, had become _ . . irreversible.
The end of company rule on both sides of the Zambesi, may have put an
end to effective official co-operation on trans-Zambesian labour migration,
but did not, however, terminate the phenomenonaltogether. Independent
labour migration from across the Zambesi remained as strong as ever. In
fact, though colonist employers of labour may have either abandoned or mini-
mised the frequency with which they had hitherto resorted to the Bureau for
adequate labour supply, the ethical justification for the perststence of foreign
labour immigration, nonetheless, remained strongly entrenched in the minds
of the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia, in their bid to utilise the
cheapest form of labrur they could lay hands on. After all, in 1921 the Admin-
istration of Southern Rhodesia had rejected the recommendations of two Inter-
national labour Conferences held inWashingtonand Genoa, including even
such aspects as the limitation of the labourers' working hours 'to eight in the
day and forty-eight in the week', as Inapplicable to the territory 'either in
468Burrell: The Native Problem in Africa: Ioc, cit.
469E. L. Berger: Labour, Race and ColonialRule: The Copperbelt from 1924
to Independence: Oxford University Press: London: 1974: pp. 10-1.
470· .Heisler: OPe cit. pp. 42-3.
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their ••• form or with such modifications as might be suggested by local con-
ditions. ,471 Cheap labour was the paramount factor not only in Southern
Rhodesia, but m the African sub-continent, as a whole, and the best way to
achieve it was through foreign African labour immigration. With this view in
mind, Dr. C.T. Loram of the Native Affairs Commission, based in Cape
Town, had thus cmtacted his counterpart, the Chief Native Commissioner in
Salisbury, in June 1922, Indicating, in a tone of despair, that:
The indenture of cheap native labour is a thorn In our side here
-{in SouthMrica)-. We get boys from -{SouthernRhodesia)-. You
get them from Nyasaland and so on and all to keep down the
price of labour. How long can this go on? Already our natives are
asking for representations on the Council of the League49~
-{Nations)-as far as labour movements are concerned.
Thus for the sake of sustaining the faith of the colonist employers of
Southern Rhodesia on the importance of foreign African labour as an essen-
tial ingredient in the utilisation of cheap labour, the functions of the Bureau after
1923, when trans-Zambesians were increasingly coming into the country with-
out this body's assistance, dealt, in the main, with the maintenance of ferries
on such points as the Zambesi, Luangwa and Hunyani rivers to facilitate the
crossing of the trans-Zambesian migrants, especially during the ram season;
and provision of free food and permanent water supplies, particularly, along
those labour routes passing through and near the Portuguese borders,where
. . 473 .
complaints oh shortages had been frequently '.. r-a.1 sed. Itwas essen-
tially in this capacity, as a means of facilitating the mobility of Independent
labour migrants, that the Bureau, therefore, managed to survive in the period
after 1923. Although the demand for cheap labour was as prominent as ever,
with the result that the colonist farmers in Southern Rhodesia were in 1927
474even resorting to local female and child labour for tobacco and cotton picking,
the Bureau had become outrightly irrelevant to the colonist employers'
general scheme on labour supply and utilisation. For this reason, when the
economic depression of the early 1930's set in, this body, which had faithfully
served the colonist employers of Southern Rhodesia for three full decades, had
471472C.O. 417/668: Chaplin to Prince Arthur of Connaught: October 15, 1921.
N 3/33/12: C. T. Loram, Cape Town to C/N/C Taylor, SaUsbury: June 6,
1922.
473n•O. 63/1: Sir John Chancellor, Governor to LCMSAmery, MP, Sec-
ret: January 6, 1926
474n.O. 63/3: Chancellor to Amery: Secret: July 7, 1927.
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to be abolished in 1933, ironically, as an unnecessary luxury, incapable of
playing any further useful part in African labour matters, either in terms of
local African labour supply or with regard- to trans-Zambesian labour mfg-
475
rants. Moreover, in relation to one form of trans-Zambesian labour
supply, that is, Nyasaland labour migration to the South, the role of the
Bureau was, from the start, simply peripheral and hence its influence
proportionately minimal, as the next chapter will demonstrate.
475van Onselen: Chibaro: pp. n8-9.
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